Jesse N. Cole v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                     FILED
    MEMORANDUM DECISION                                            Jun 21 2016, 5:51 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                             Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Bryan L. Cook                                            Gregory F. Zoeller
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                    Attorney General of Indiana
    Monika Prekopa Talbot
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Jesse N. Cole,                                           June 21, 2016
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    32A04-1512-CR-2045
    v.                                               Appeal from the Hendricks
    Superior Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Stephenie Lemay-
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Luken, Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    32D05-1412-CM-1311
    Pyle, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1512-CR-2045 | June 21, 2016    Page 1 of 6
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Jesse Cole (“Cole”) appeals his conviction by jury of operating a vehicle while
    intoxicated (“OVWI”) as a Class A misdemeanor.1 He challenges the
    sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Concluding that the
    evidence is sufficient to support this conviction, we affirm.
    [2]   Affirmed.
    Issue
    Whether there is sufficient evidence to support Cole’s conviction
    of OVWI.
    Facts
    [3]   At approximately 1:30 a.m. on August 10, 2014, Plainfield Police Department
    Lieutenant Joseph Smock (“Lieutenant Smock”) was dispatched to a
    motorcycle accident on an Interstate 70 West off-ramp. When Lieutenant
    Smock arrived at the scene, he discovered Cole lying in a ravine 100 feet from
    the roadway. Lieutenant Smock also saw a motorcycle with its lights on lying
    on its side. It was located 50 to 100 feet from Cole. Cole had severe facial
    injuries and one of his eyes was swollen shut. Lieutenant Smock smelled a
    “very strong odor of alcohol or intoxicating beverage coming from [Cole]” and
    1
    IND. CODE § 9-30-5-2.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1512-CR-2045 | June 21, 2016   Page 2 of 6
    noticed that his open eye was bloodshot and glossy. (Tr. 74). Cole was
    transported to IU Methodist Hospital.
    [4]   Shortly thereafter, Lieutenant Smock went to the hospital with a search warrant
    for a sample of Cole’s blood. A forensic nurse took a blood sample, and, at
    approximately 3:30 a.m., Cole registered .24 gram of alcohol per one hundred
    milliliters of his blood. On December 19, 2014, the State charged Cole with
    OVWI as a Class A misdemeanor and operating a motor vehicle with an
    alcohol concentration equivalent to at least 0.15 gram of alcohol per 210 liters
    of the person’s breath or 100 milliliters of the person’s blood (“Operating Per Se
    (.15)”) as a Class A misdemeanor. Thereafter, Cole filed a motion to suppress
    the blood test results, which the trial court denied.
    [5]   At the November 2015 trial, Cole’s theory of defense appeared to be that
    someone else was driving the motorcycle. Steve Carroll an investigator at the
    Hendricks County Prosecutor’s Office testified that he had “charted the whole
    path of the motorcycle” after the accident and had discovered that it had been
    sold “out of country.” (Tr. 287). According to Carroll, the motorcycle was a
    “crotch-rocket or sport bike,” which had passenger foot-pegs closer to the seat
    than most motorcycles. (Tr. 296). Carroll explained that “for a tall person to
    get on this motorcycle [as a passenger] would kind of be like a jockey riding a
    race horse.” (Tr. 297).
    [6]   A jury convicted Cole of both charges. The trial court entered judgment of
    conviction for OVWI as a Class A misdemeanor and sentenced Cole to 365
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1512-CR-2045 | June 21, 2016   Page 3 of 6
    days in the Hendricks County Jail with 363 days suspended and credit of one
    day for one day served.2 (App. 25). Cole appeals.
    Decision
    [7]   Cole argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his OVWI conviction.
    Specifically, he contends that there is insufficient evidence that he was
    intoxicated. Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is
    well settled. We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable
    inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 
    867 N.E.2d 144
    , 146 (Ind.
    2007). We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. 
    Id. We will
    affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact finder could find the
    elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Id. The evidence
    is
    sufficient if an inference may be reasonably drawn from it to support the
    verdict. 
    Id. at 147.
    [8]   To convict Cole of Class A misdemeanor OVWI, the State was required to
    prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Cole operated a vehicle while intoxicated
    in a manner that endangered a person. See I.C. § 9-30-5-2(b). “Intoxicated”
    2
    Both the CCS and the trial court’s completed Judgment of Conviction, Sentencing Order, and Order of
    Commitment reveal that the trial court entered judgment of conviction and a sentence only on the OVWI
    conviction. The record of the proceedings does not include a transcript from the sentencing hearing because
    Cole did not request it in his Notice of Appeal. Although not so stated, it appears that the trial court merged
    the Operating Per Se (.15) conviction with the OVWI conviction. See Green v. State, 
    856 N.E.2d 703
    , 704
    (Ind. 2006) (explaining that a merged offense for which a defendant is found guilty but on which there is
    neither a judgment or sentence is unproblematic as far as double jeopardy is concerned)..
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1512-CR-2045 | June 21, 2016                Page 4 of 6
    means “being under the influence of . . . alcohol . . . so that there is an impaired
    condition of thought and action and the loss of normal control of a person’s
    faculties. I.C. § 9-13-2-86(1). Impairment can be established by evidence of:
    (1) the consumption of a significant amount of alcohol; (2) impaired attention
    and reflexes; (3) watery or bloodshot eyes; (4) the odor of alcohol on the breath;
    (5) unsteady balance; (6) failure of field sobriety tests; and (7) slurred speech.
    Matlock v. State, 
    944 N.E.2d 936
    , 941 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Proof of a person’s
    blood alcohol content is not required to establish intoxication. 
    Id. In addition,
    OVWI convictions may be supported by circumstantial evidence. 
    Kremer, 643 N.E.2d at 360
    .
    [9]    Here, our review of the evidence reveals that Lieutenant Smock noticed a
    strong odor of alcohol emanating from Cole and that Cole had a watery and
    bloodshot eye. In addition, Cole was found 100 feet from the roadway in a
    ravine and 50 to 100 feet from the overturned motorcycle. From this evidence a
    jury could reasonably infer that Cole had consumed alcohol and was impaired.
    Accordingly, this evidence supports the jury’s finding that Cole was intoxicated
    as well as Coles’ OVWI conviction.
    [10]   We further note that Cole’s argument that there is insufficient evidence that he
    operated the motorcycle is nothing more than an invitation for us to reweigh
    the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See
    
    Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146
    . First, the evidence reveals that Cole was the only
    person found at the scene of the accident and that the motorcycle was a “crotch-
    rocket,” making it difficult for passengers to ride. Further, none of the cases
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1512-CR-2045 | June 21, 2016   Page 5 of 6
    cited by Cole support his argument because they all concern a defendant who
    left the scene of the accident. See Robinson v. State, 
    835 N.E.2d 518
    (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2005) (Robinson was found 2-4 miles from the accident scene after it
    occurred); Flanagan v. State, 
    832 N.E.2d 1139
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (Flanagan
    was found walking toward a local convenience store after the accident); Floyd v.
    State, 
    399 N.E.2d 449
    (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (Floyd was found six blocks from
    the scene of the accident after it occurred). There is sufficient evidence to
    support Cole’s OVWI conviction.3
    [11]   Affirmed.
    [12]   Kirsch, J., and Riley, J., concur.
    [1]    3
    Cole also makes multiple challenges to the admission of the blood test evidence. Specifically,
    he contends that the trial court erred in admitting this evidence because (1) the search warrant
    for Cole’s blood was not supported by probable cause, (2) the police made material
    misrepresentations in order to obtain the warrant; and (3) the State failed to establish a
    foundation that the blood draw protocol was prepared by a physician. However, we need not
    decide this issue because any error in the admission of the blood test evidence was harmless.
    Error is harmless if it does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant. Littler v. State, 
    871 N.E.2d 276
    , 278 (Ind. 2007). Harmlessness is ultimately a question of the likely impact of the
    evidence on the jury. 
    Id. Blood alcohol
    tests are not necessary to support a conviction for
    operating a vehicle while intoxicated pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 9-30-5-2. Pickens v. State,
    
    751 N.E.2d 331
    , 335 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Where there is no statutory requirement of proof
    of a particular blood-alcohol content above which a person is intoxicated, the State may prove
    intoxication by a showing of impairment. 
    Id. Here, the
    State met that burden with evidence
    that amply supported the jury’s finding that Cole operated his vehicle while intoxicated. The
    test results likely had no impact on the jury’s verdict, and under these circumstances, any error
    in their admission was harmless. See Combs v. State, 
    895 N.E.2d 1252
    , 1259 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2016) (explaining that erroneous admission of Combs’ blood test results was harmless because
    the evidence otherwise amply supported the jury’s finding that Combs operated his vehicle
    while intoxicated and that test results likely had no impact on the jury’s verdict), trans. denied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 32A04-1512-CR-2045 | June 21, 2016       Page 6 of 6