Joshua T. Prince v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
Jul 27 2016, 6:56 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), CLERK
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
regarded as precedent or cited before any and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
John T. Wilson Gregory F. Zoeller
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Richard C. Webster
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Joshua T. Prince, July 27, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
33A01-1512-CR-2236
v. Appeal from the Henry Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Mary G. Willis,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
33C01-1506-F6-145
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] Joshua T. Prince was convicted of dealing in a schedule IV controlled
substance, a Level 6 felony. Prince appeals, expressly presenting sentence
inappropriateness as the sole issue. Within his argument, however, he also
contends that the trial court abused its discretion in the consideration of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] On July 24, 2014, Prince sold ten tablets of Diazepam—a schedule IV
controlled substance—to a confidential informant working with the Henry
County Drug Task Force. The confidential informant was given an
audio/video recording device and was able to capture video evidence of the
transaction. On June 12, 2015, the State charged Prince with one count of
Level 6 felony dealing in a schedule IV controlled substance. Prince entered
into a plea agreement with the State on September 17, 2015, wherein he agreed
to plead guilty as charged with sentencing left to the trial court’s discretion.
[4] At Prince’s sentencing hearing on November 12, 2015, the trial court accepted
the plea agreement and sentenced Prince to two years executed in the
Department of Correction (DOC). The trial court identified three significant
aggravating circumstances: (1) violation of conditions of probation, parole or
pardon; (2) history of criminal or delinquent activity; and (3) high risk to
reoffend. The trial court found Prince’s acceptance of responsibility for his
crime to be a significant mitigating circumstance, but tempered by a video
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recording of the controlled drug transaction between Prince and the confidential
informant. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion & Decision
[5] Prince has presented the sole argument of sentence inappropriateness. Within
this argument, Prince also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
its consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. We have
repeatedly stated that these are two separate arguments and should be
addressed and analyzed separately. See King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2008). We will therefore address each issue separately.
I. Abuse of Discretion
[6] Sentencing decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial court and are
reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d
482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of
discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the
facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual
deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. A trial court abuses its discretion by
(1) failing to enter a sentencing statement, (2) entering a
sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing the
sentence but the record does not support the reasons, (3) the
sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by
the record and advanced for consideration, or (4) the reasons
given in the sentencing statement are improper as a matter of
law.
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Kimbrough v. State, 979 N.E.2d 625, 628 (Ind. 2012).
[7] The trial court may impose any sentence within the statutory range, regardless
of the presence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Anglemyer, 868
N.E.2d at 490-91. Moreover, if the trial court finds aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, the court is “no longer obligated to weigh the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances against each other” when imposing a sentence. See
Richardson v. State, 906 N.E.2d 241, 243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Anglemyer,
868 N.E.2d at 490-91). Therefore, “a trial court can not now be said to have
abused its discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ such factors.” Anglemeyer,
868 N.E.2d at 491.
[8] Prince’s sole argument with respect to the aggravating circumstances is that the
trial court abused its discretion when it considered the Indiana Risk Assessment
System (IRAS) score. 1 In Malenchick v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 575 (Ind. 2010),
our Supreme Court held that evidence-based offender assessment instruments
should not serve as aggravating or mitigating circumstances, but nevertheless
encouraged trial courts to use these instruments in “crafting a penal program
tailored to each individual defendant.” Id.
1
The Indiana Risk Assessment System Community Supervision Tool assesses an offender’s level of “risk and
needs.” Appendix at 57. The resulting score takes into consideration “criminal history; education,
employment and finances; family and social support; neighborhood problems; substance use; peer
associations; and criminal attitudes and behaviors.” Id.
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[9] In this case, we observe that the trial court’s sentencing decision was clearly
based on circumstances apart from Prince’s IRAS score. The trial court
specifically found as aggravating circumstances that Prince had violated
probation, had a history of criminal or delinquent activity, and had a high risk
to reoffend. The trial court briefly mentioned Prince’s IRAS score, but did not
rely upon it as an independent aggravating circumstance. 2 Accordingly we find
no error. Id. at 568.
[10] With regard to the mitigating circumstances, Prince argues that the trial court
did not give significant weight to his guilty plea. As noted above, however, the
weight accorded to a specific mitigating circumstance is not subject to review
for abuse of discretion. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. “Further, the court is
neither obligated to accept the defendant’s arguments as to what constitutes a
mitigating [circumstance] nor required to give the same weight to a proffered
mitigating [circumstance] as does the defendant.” Sandleben v. State, 29 N.E.3d
126, 135-6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Prince’s argument is, therefore, improper.
[11] Additionally, Prince argues that the trial court failed to recognize his fourteen
years of law-abiding behavior as a mitigating circumstance. An allegation that
the trial court failed to identify a mitigating factor requires the defendant to
2
Prince also asserts that the aggravating circumstance of his high risk to reoffend was in the written
sentencing order but not in the oral sentencing statement. We have examined the oral statement alongside
the written sentencing order and determine that the trial court clearly considered Prince’s high risk to
reoffend as an aggravating circumstance. See Berry v. State, 23 N.E.3d 854, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“Rather
than presuming the superior accuracy of the oral statement, we examine it alongside the written sentencing
statement to assess the conclusions of the trial court”).
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establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported
by the record. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. In September of 2001, Prince was
convicted and sentenced to two years suspended to formal probation for
possession of marijuana and operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Between
September 2001 and June 2015, Prince had no subsequent convictions.
However, during those fourteen years, Prince violated his probation and was
ordered to serve his previously suspended sentence. Furthermore, he was
arrested twice for drug-related activity similar to his current crime. See Pickens v.
State, 767 N.E.2d 530, 534 (Ind. 2002) (holding that a record of arrests
“reveal[s] to the court that subsequent antisocial behavior on the part of the
defendant has not been deterred even after having been subject to the police
authority of the State”). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
this proffered mitigating circumstance.
[12] Prince also argues that the trial court failed to recognize the lack of serious
harm caused to persons or property during the commission of the crime. As we
have before held, a “conviction of a crime that does not contain violence as an
element is not a circumstance requiring mitigating weight.” Sandleben, 29
N.E.3d at 136.
[13] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when determining aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and the decision was clearly in line with the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances presented.
II. Inappropriate Sentence
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[14] Prince contends that his two-year executed sentence at the DOC is
inappropriate. Specifically, he claims he should have been allowed to serve his
sentence on probation. Although the trial court imposed a sentence that is
authorized by statute, we may revise Prince’s sentence if “after due
consideration of the trial court’s decision, we determine that the sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender.” Sandleben, 29 N.E.3d at 136. Prince has the burden of persuading
our court that the sentence is inappropriate. See Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864,
876 (Ind. 2012).
[15] The statutory sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is six months to two and
one-half years, with the advisory sentence being one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-
7(b). Where a sentence should be served is an “appropriate focus for
application of our review and revise authority.” King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265,
267 (Ind. Ct. App. 208). However, as a practical matter, we recognize that trial
courts “know the feasibility of alternative placements in particular counties or
communities.” Id. at 268.
[16] With respect to the nature of the offense, Prince sold ten Diazepam tablets to a
confidential informant. This was a standard drug transaction; the offense is
unremarkable. In reference to Prince’s character, a relevant consideration is
Prince’s criminal history. The record reflects that Prince had a juvenile history,
including an adjudication for theft that would have been a Class D felony if
committed by an adult. Prince’s adult history includes an arrest for possession
for marijuana in 1999 and a conviction for possession for marijuana and driving
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while intoxicated in 2001. Prince’s sentence for his 2001 conviction was
suspended to probation, but in 2003—during the fourteen years he allegedly led
a law-abiding life—he violated his probation and was ordered to serve his
sentence. Prince was subsequently arrested twice for drug-related offenses
similar to the current crime. Prince’s criminal history reflects poorly on his
character.
[17] Prince’s two-year executed sentence for dealing in a schedule IV controlled
substance was well within the statutory range. Though the nature of the offense
was unremarkable, Prince’s history of criminal activity, prior probation
violation, and continuous involvement with drugs does not reflect positively on
his character. Understanding that the trial court has a better understanding of
feasibility, Prince failed to persuade us that his placement in the DOC is
inappropriate. See generally King, 894 N.E.2d at 268. Having reviewed the
record, Prince’s two-year executed sentence is not inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and Prince’s character.
[18] Judgment affirmed.
[19] Bailey, J. and Bradford, J., concur.
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