In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of M.S. and K.S. (Children) and D.S. (Mother) D.S. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION                                                       FILED
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                               Aug 05 2016, 8:01 am
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                     CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Craig W. Graham                                          Gregory F. Zoeller
    Jeffersonville, Indiana                                  Attorney General of Indiana
    Robert J. Henke
    Abigail R. Recker
    Deputy Attorneys General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of the Termination                         August 5, 2016
    of the Parent-Child Relationship                         Court of Appeals Case No.
    of M.S. and K.S. (Children) and                          10A01-1512-JT-2376
    D.S. (Mother);                                           Appeal from the Clark Circuit
    Court
    D.S. (Mother),                                           The Honorable Daniel Donahue,
    Appellant-Respondent,                                    Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    v.                                               10C04-1501-JT-1
    10C04-1501-JT-2
    The Indiana Department of
    Child Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1512-JT-2376 | August 5, 2016         Page 1 of 7
    May, Judge.
    [1]   D.S. (Mother) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to
    M.S. and K.S. (collectively, Children). We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   M.S. and K.S. were born to Mother 1 on April 4, 2006, and March 13, 2007,
    respectively. On August 6, 2012, the Department of Child Services (DCS) filed
    a petition alleging Children were Children in Need of Services (CHINS) based
    on Mother’s substance abuse issues, including her intravenous use of heroin in
    the presence of Children. The trial court held an initial hearing on the matter
    on the same day and authorized the emergency removal of Children from
    Mother’s home. On August 21, on Mother’s admission, the trial court
    adjudicated Children as CHINS. On September 27, the trial court held a
    dispositional hearing and on October 3 it issued dispositional orders requiring
    Mother to, among other things, complete substance abuse assessment and
    training as well as complete random drug screens.
    [3]   On December 20, 2012, the trial court held a periodic case review and approved
    Mother’s trial home visit. Children were placed back in Mother’s care at that
    time. On March 21, 2013, Children were again removed from Mother’s home
    1
    The fathers do not participate in this appeal. K.S.’s father, A.W., signed a consent to adoption. The record
    is unclear regarding the status of M.S.’s father, A.B., as Mother did not include the Termination Order
    regarding M.S. in the record filed on appeal.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1512-JT-2376 | August 5, 2016              Page 2 of 7
    because of Mother’s non-compliance with Children’s case plan. On October
    17, 2013, and January 16, 2014, the trial court held periodic case review
    hearings. During both, the court noted Mother’s non-compliance with the case
    plan and dispositional order, as Mother regularly tested positive for illegal
    substances and missed therapy sessions.
    [4]   On March 20, 2014, the trial court held a permanency hearing and changed the
    permanency plan for Children from reunification to adoption. On November
    20, 2014, the trial court held a periodic case review hearing and noted Mother’s
    continued non-compliance with Children’s case plan. By this time, Mother had
    tested positive for illegal substances twenty-eight times. On January 5, 2015,
    DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights.
    [5]   The trial court held evidentiary hearings regarding the termination of Mother’s
    parental rights to Children on March 19, April 15, and May 21, 2015. Mother
    did not attend any of the evidentiary hearings. On December 3, 2015, the trial
    court terminated Mother’s parental rights to Children.
    Discussion and Decision
    [6]   We review termination of parental rights with great deference. In re K.S., 
    750 N.E.2d 832
    , 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). We will not reweigh evidence or judge
    the credibility of witnesses. In re D.D., 
    804 N.E.2d 258
    , 265 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable
    inferences most favorable to the judgment. 
    Id.
     In deference to the trial court’s
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1512-JT-2376 | August 5, 2016   Page 3 of 7
    unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating
    a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S., 
    717 N.E.2d 204
    , 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied, cert. denied 
    534 U.S. 1161
     (2002).
    [7]   “The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is
    protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In
    re M.B., 
    666 N.E.2d 73
    , 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. A juvenile court
    must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child, however,
    when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. In re K.S., 
    750 N.E.2d at 837
    . The right to raise one’s own child should not be terminated
    solely because there is a better home available for the child, 
    id.,
     but parental
    rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or
    her parental responsibilities. 
    Id. at 836
    .
    [8]   To terminate a parent-child relationship in Indiana, the State must allege and
    prove:
    (A)     that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i)     The child has been removed from the parent for at
    least six (6) months under a dispositional decree.
    (ii)    A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6
    that reasonable efforts for family preservation or
    reunification are not required, including a description of
    the court’s finding, the date of the finding, and the manner
    in which the finding was made.
    (iii) The child has been removed from the parent and
    has been under the supervision of a county office of family
    and children or probation department for at least fifteen
    (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months,
    beginning with the date the child is removed from the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1512-JT-2376 | August 5, 2016   Page 4 of 7
    home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in
    need of services or a delinquent child;
    (B)      that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i)    There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
    that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
    placement outside the home of the parents will not be
    remedied.
    (ii)   There is a reasonable probability that the
    continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat
    to the well-being of the child.
    (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
    adjudicated a child in need of services;
    (C)      that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
    (D)      that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment
    of the child.
    
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4
    (b)(2). The State must provide clear and convincing proof
    of these allegations. In re G.Y., 
    904 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1260-61 (Ind. 2009), reh’g
    denied. If the court finds the allegations in the petition are true, it must
    terminate the parent-child relationship. 
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8
    .
    [9]   Mother does not challenge any of the trial court’s findings or conclusions.
    Mother contends “D.C.S. failed to meet the burden of I.C. 31-35-2-4(2)(b). 2”
    (Br. of Mother at 2) (footnote added). However, she does not indicate which
    part of the statute was not met, nor does she make an argument that could be
    understood to challenge a portion of the statute. As such, her argument is
    waived. See Pasha v. State, 
    524 N.E.2d 310
    , 314 (Ind. 1988) (“Bald assertions of
    2
    We presume this is a typographical error. The relevant statute is 
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4
    (b)(2).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1512-JT-2376 | August 5, 2016                Page 5 of 7
    error unsupported by either cogent argument or citation to authority result in
    waiver of any error on review.”).
    [10]   Waiver notwithstanding, the trial court found Mother did not comply with
    numerous requirements of the dispositional orders, noting her continued issues
    with substance abuse and her inability to complete treatment. There existed a
    satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Children following termination.
    Finally, Children had been removed from Mother for fifteen of the last twenty
    two months at the time Mother’s rights were terminated. There is ample
    evidence in the record to support those findings, which support the court’s
    decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights. See In re C.A., L.A., and M.A., 
    15 N.E.3d 85
    , 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (termination of parental rights affirmed
    based on totality of evidence, findings supported by that evidence, and
    conclusions pursuant to statute).
    [11]   Mother also argues “she could have benefitted from more drug treatment. With
    further treatment she could have complied with the Dispositional Order.” (Br.
    of Mother at 2.) A “failure to provide services does not serve as a basis on
    which to directly attack a termination order as contrary to law.” In re J.W., Jr.,
    
    27 N.E.3d 1185
    , 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. We therefore cannot
    find error on that ground.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1512-JT-2376 | August 5, 2016   Page 6 of 7
    Conclusion
    [12]   DCS presented sufficient evidence to support the termination of Mother’s
    parental rights to Children, and Mother’s argument regarding services cannot
    be raised as part of an appeal of the termination of her parental rights.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    [13]   Affirmed.
    Kirsch, J., and Crone, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1512-JT-2376 | August 5, 2016   Page 7 of 7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10A01-1512-JT-2376

Filed Date: 8/5/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/5/2016