Reta M. Hollowell v. Donald Hollowell (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  •       MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                  FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                          Feb 28 2017, 6:29 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                           CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                            Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                       and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
    Norman L. Reed                                           Maria Matters
    The Law Office of Norman Reed                            Maria Matters Attorney at Law
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                    LLC
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Reta M. Hollowell,                                       February 28, 2017
    Appellant-Petitioner,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    49A02-1605-DR-985
    v.                                               Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    Donald Hollowell,                                        The Honorable Christopher Haile,
    Appellee-Respondent.                                     Magistrate
    Trial Court Cause No.
    49D11-1504-DR-12821
    Pyle, Judge.
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Reta Hollowell (“Wife”) appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to correct
    error filed with respect to a dissolution decree that ordered Donald Hollowell
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-DR-985 | February 28, 2017    Page 1 of 10
    (“Husband”) to pay her $500.00 per month in incapacity maintenance and
    equally divided the parties’ property. Concluding that the trial court did not
    abuse its discretion in determining the amount of incapacity maintenance or in
    dividing the parties’ marital property, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Issues
    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining
    the amount of incapacity maintenance it ordered Husband to
    pay Wife; and
    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in equally
    dividing the parties’ property.
    Facts
    [3]   Husband and Wife were married in June 1973. They are the parents of two
    adult children. Wife became disabled in 1979 as the result of a back injury and
    began receiving Social Security disability benefits. Husband is a financial
    analyst for Defense Financing and Accounting Service.
    [4]   Wife filed a petition for dissolution in April 2015. Testimony at the November
    2015 dissolution hearing revealed that sixty-three-year-old Wife received $8,684
    per year in Social Security disability benefits, and sixty-four-year-old Husband
    earned $82,524 per year. The parties owned a house, and each party owned a
    car. They agreed on the items to be included in the marital pot.
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    [5]   During the hearing, Wife asked the trial court to award her the marital
    residence, her car, and the parties’ three dogs. She never argued that she should
    receive more than the fifty percent of the marital pot. Instead, she asked the
    trial court to “divide the [home] equity equally.” (Tr. 9). Wife also asked the
    trial court to order Husband to pay her $500.00 per week in spousal
    maintenance.
    [6]   Husband testified that Wife was not capable of maintaining the house and the
    large lot. He also explained that the house was currently financed through a
    Veteran’s Administration loan that was in his name. He did not believe that
    Wife would be able to secure a new loan on the house. Husband further
    testified that the two youngest dogs belonged to him and that all three dogs
    were too much for Wife to currently handle. He asked the trial court to award
    him the house, the two youngest dogs, and his vehicle. Husband also offered to
    pay Wife $500.00 per month in spousal maintenance.
    [7]   At the end of the hearing, Husband asked the trial court if it wanted the parties
    to submit proposed orders. The trial court responded that it did not. In
    January 2016, the trial court issued an order, finding that Wife was disabled
    and ordering Husband to pay her $500.00 per month in spousal maintenance.
    The trial court also concluded that the statutory presumption of an equal
    division of property had not been rebutted, and it awarded each party an equal
    division of the joint property. Husband was awarded the house and the two
    youngest dogs, and the trial court equalized the property division by awarding
    Wife a $34,628.00 distribution from Husband’s deferred compensation account.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-DR-985 | February 28, 2017   Page 3 of 10
    [8]   Wife filed a Motion to Correct Error wherein she accused Husband and the trial
    court of a possible ex parte communication and violation of the Indiana Rules
    of Professional Conduct. Specifically, Wife alleged that Husband’s counsel had
    tendered a proposed order to the trial court and had not provided her with a
    copy of this order. Wife further alleged that the trial court had ultimately
    approved Husband’s tendered order without any revisions. Wife alleged that
    the trial court “simply trusted opposing counsel to divide the assets properly,
    and rubber stamped [Husband’s] proposed decree unintentionally.” (App. 19).
    Wife further argued that the trial court should have ordered Husband to pay her
    $500.00 per week, rather than $500.00 per month, in spousal maintenance and
    awarded her more than fifty percent of the marital estate.
    [9]   In a motion in opposition to Wife’s motion, Husband’s counsel stated she had
    not submitted a proposed order to the trial court and argued that Wife’s
    “reckless disregard for the truth in pleadings [was] subject to Rule 11 sanctions .
    . . .” (App. 14). At the March 2016 hearing on her motion, Wife apologized
    for her allegations of misconduct. She explained that “[i]t just appeared as
    though . . . virtually everything [H]usband [had] asked for he [had] received. . .
    . The Court gave . . . the dogs to husband. . . . [Wife] asked for $500.00 a
    week [in maintenance]. He asked for $500.00 a month. The Court gave
    $500.00 a month. . . .” (Tr. 56-57). In response, the trial court explained as
    follows regarding its decision to award Wife $500.00 per month in spousal
    maintenance and to equally divide the parties’ property:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-DR-985 | February 28, 2017   Page 4 of 10
    I looked at the entire record, okay? I listened to the hearing. I
    went back and listened to the hearing. I looked at my notes. I
    looked at everything in the record in this Court in making this
    decision. I get that [Wife] isn’t happy with the decision, but, you
    know, I’m looking for you to point me to an error that the Court
    made in making some valuation or some decision other than the
    fact that you don’t like the way things were divided or you don’t
    like the amount of maintenance.
    (Tr. 61). Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order accepting Wife’s
    apology, declining to order sanctions against Wife’s counsel that would have
    been warranted under Rule 11 of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, and
    denying Wife’s motion to correct error. Wife now appeals.
    Decision
    [10]   Wife appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to correct error. Our
    standard of review in such cases is well-established. We review a trial court’s
    ruling on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion. Old Utica School
    Preservation, Inc. v. Utica Tp., 
    7 N.E.3d 327
    , 330 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans.
    denied.
    1. Incapacity Maintenance
    [11]   Wife first argues that the trial court erred in awarding her $500.00 per month in
    spousal maintenance. She specifically contends that the “amount of spousal
    maintenance is excessively low and constitutes an abuse of discretion.”
    (Appellant’s Br. 13).
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    [12]   The trial court has broad discretion to make an award of spousal maintenance,
    and we will reverse only upon an abuse of that discretion. Bizik v. Bizik, 
    753 N.E.2d 762
    , 768-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Discretion is a privilege
    afforded a trial court to act in accord with what is fair and equitable under the
    facts of each case. Pala v. Loubser, 
    943 N.E.2d 400
    , 405 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011),
    trans. denied. We will find an abuse of discretion only where the trial court’s
    decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
    before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn
    therefrom. 
    Id. In determining
    whether a trial court abused its discretion in a
    spousal maintenance determination, this Court will presume that the trial court
    properly followed the applicable statutory factors in reaching its decision. 
    Bizik, 753 N.E.2d at 769
    . The presumption that the trial court correctly applied the law
    in making an award of spousal maintenance is one of the strongest presumptions
    applicable to the consideration of a case on appeal. 
    Id. [13] A
    court may order spousal maintenance under INDIANA CODE § 31-15-7-2 in
    three circumstances:          (1) incapacity maintenance for a spouse who cannot
    support himself or herself; (2) rehabilitative maintenance for a spouse who needs
    additional education or training before seeking a job; and (3) caregiver
    maintenance for a spouse who must care for an incapacitated child. Balicki v.
    Balicki, 
    837 N.E.2d 532
    , 542 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. At issue in this
    appeal is incapacity maintenance.
    [14]   INDIANA CODE § 31-15-7-2(1) governs incapacity maintenance and provides that
    “[i]f the court finds a spouse to be physically or mentally incapacitated to the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-DR-985 | February 28, 2017   Page 6 of 10
    extent that the ability of the incapacitated spouse to support himself or herself is
    materially affected, the court may find that maintenance for the spouse is
    necessary during the period of incapacity, subject to further order of the court.” 1
    However, even if a trial court finds that a spouse’s incapacity materially affects
    her self-supportive ability, a maintenance award is not mandatory. 
    Bizik, 753 N.E.2d at 769
    .
    [15]   Here, after viewing the parties’ courtroom demeanor and hearing their
    testimony, the trial court determined that Wife was disabled. Although this
    determination did not require the court to award Wife spousal maintenance, see
    
    Bizik, 753 N.E.2d at 769
    , the court nevertheless ordered Husband to pay Wife
    $500.00 per month. Wife challenges the amount of maintenance awarded but
    fails to show how it constituted an abuse of discretion. Our review of the facts
    in this case reveal that the trial court’s decision is not clearly against the logic
    and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or the reasonable, probable,
    and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. The trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in awarding Wife $500.00 per month in spousal maintenance.2
    1
    Wife mistakenly directs us to INDIANA CODE. § 31-15-7-2(3), which governs rehabilitative maintenance
    rather than incapacity maintenance. Specifically, the statute provides that a “court may find that
    rehabilitative maintenance . . . is necessary in an amount and for a period of time that the court considers
    appropriate, but not to exceed three (3) years from the date of the final decree.”
    2
    Despite Wife’s claim to the contrary, Pham v. Pham, 
    650 N.E.2d 1212
    (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), simply does not
    state that there is a presumption that spousal maintenance should be 35% of the payor’s weekly adjusted
    gross income. Rather, Pham holds only that “an award of spousal maintenance requiring Husband to pay
    Wife virtually all of his earnings [is] unreasonable.” 
    Pham, 650 N.E.2d at 1214
    .
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    2. Property Division
    [16]   Wife also argues that the trial court erred in equally dividing the parties’
    property. We note, however, that Wife did not ask the trial court to deviate
    from the statutory presumption and award her more than 50% of the marital
    property at the dissolution hearing. Rather, she did not raise this issue until she
    filed her motion to correct error. A party cannot raise a previously available
    issue for the first time in a motion to correct error. Yater v. Hancock Cty. Bd. of
    Health, 
    677 N.E.2d 526
    , 530 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Failure to raise errors that
    existed at trial may not be remedied in a post-trial motion to correct error or on
    appeal. 
    Id. The issue
    is therefore waived. See 
    id. [17] Waiver
    notwithstanding, we find no error. The division of marital assets is a
    matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Harris v. Harris, 
    42 N.E.3d 1010
    , 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). By statute, the trial court must divide the
    property of the parties in a just and reasonable manner, and that includes
    property owned by either spouse prior to the marriage, acquired by either
    spouse after the marriage and prior to the final separation of the parties, or
    acquired by their joint efforts. 
    Id. (citing IND.
    CODE § 31-15-7-4(A)). There is a
    statutory presumption that an equal division of property between the parties is
    just and reasonable. 
    Id. (citing I.C.
    § 31-15-7-5). Specifically, INDIANA CODE §
    31-15-7-5 provides:
    The court shall presume that an equal division of the marital
    property between the parties is just and reasonable. However,
    this presumption may be rebutted by a party who presents
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-DR-985 | February 28, 2017   Page 8 of 10
    relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the following
    factors, that an equal division would not be just and reasonable:
    (1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the
    property, regardless of whether the contribution was income
    producing.
    (2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each
    spouse:
    (A) before the marriage; or
    (B) through inheritance or gift.
    (3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the
    disposition of the property is to become effective, including the
    desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell
    in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just
    to the spouse having custody of any children.
    (4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to
    the disposition or dissipation of their property.
    (5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:
    (A) a final division of property; and
    (B) a final determination of the property rights of the
    parties.
    [18]   A party seeking to rebut the presumption of an equal division of marital
    property bears the burden in so doing. 
    Harris, 42 N.E.3d at 1017
    . The party
    challenging a trial court’s division of marital property must overcome a strong
    presumption that the court considered and complied with the applicable statute.
    
    Id. This presumption
    is one of the strongest presumptions applicable to our
    consideration on appeal. 
    Id. Although the
    facts and reasonable inferences
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1605-DR-985 | February 28, 2017   Page 9 of 10
    might allow for a different conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for
    that of the trial court. 
    Id. [19] Here,
    our review of the evidence reveals that the only mention of property
    division at the dissolution hearing was when Wife asked the trial court to
    “divide the [home] equity equally.” (Tr. 9). Based her lack of evidence and
    arguments at the dissolution hearing, Wife has failed to overcome the strong
    presumption that the trial court properly divided the marital estate.
    Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in equally dividing the
    parties’ property, and we find no error.
    [20]   Affirmed.
    Baker, J., and Mathias, J. concur.
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