Lisa Crawford v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing Feb 28 2017, 6:48 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. Burns Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Michael Gene Worden
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Lisa Crawford, February 28, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1608-CR-1786
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Amy M. Jones,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G08-1511-CM-41824
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Lisa Crawford (“Crawford”) was convicted in Marion Superior Court of Class
A misdemeanor driving while suspended, Class A misdemeanor leaving the
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scene of an accident causing bodily injury, and Class B misdemeanor false
informing. On appeal, Crawford claims that the State presented insufficient
evidence to support her convictions for leaving the scene of an accident and
false informing.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On November 23, 2015, Roi Dawes (“Dawes”) was driving a truck for his
employer, Trucker’s 24 Hour Road Service. Dawes left the company’s location
on Holt Road in Indianapolis to pick up parts. Shortly after he left, his truck
was hit in the rear by another vehicle, a Chevrolet S-10 pickup truck. This truck
did not stop at the scene of the accident; instead, the driver of the truck backed
up, drove around Dawes’s truck, and drove away down Farnsworth Street.
[4] Dawes decided to pursue the S-10 and followed the truck for ten to fifteen
blocks. At this point, the driver of the S-10 made a left turn, quickly stopped,
jumped out of the truck, and ran away. The driver of the S-10 ran down an
nearby alley. Dawes briefly gave chase and saw the driver’s face for a few
seconds when she turned to look behind her, but he quickly decided the better
option was to call the police. Dawes described the driver of the S-10 as a “late
twenties, early thirty year old white female, [with] red hair.” Tr. p. 7.
[5] Indianapolis Police Department (“IMPD”) Officer David Janicijevic (“Officer
Janicijevic”) responded to Dawes’s call and interviewed Dawes at the scene
where the driver of the S-10 had abandoned her truck. Dawes informed him of
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the accident and gave him a description of the driver. Officer Janicijevic ran a
license plate check on the abandoned truck, which revealed that the truck was
registered to Crawford and that Crawford’s license was suspended.
[6] In the meantime, IMPD received a call from Crawford, who claimed that her
Chevrolet S-10 pickup truck had been stolen from a local restaurant. However,
the officers who responded to Crawford’s call could not find anyone who could
corroborate Crawford’s claim that her truck had been stolen from the
restaurant. The police told Crawford to go to the scene where her truck had
been found abandoned. When she arrived, Dawes identified her as the woman
he had seen fleeing from the vehicle. The police then arrested Crawford.
[7] The following day, the State charged Crawford with Class A misdemeanor
driving while suspended, Class A misdemeanor fleeing the scene of an accident
causing bodily injury, and Class B misdemeanor false informing. A bench trial
was held on July 12, 2016. At the trial, Dawes again identified Crawford as the
woman who had been driving the truck that hit his vehicle. Officer Janicijevic
testified that Dawes identified Crawford at the scene. The State also presented
Crawford’s driving record, which confirmed that her driver’s license was
suspended on the date of the accident. Crawford testified on her own behalf and
repeated her claim that her truck had been stolen and that she reported this to
the police even though she knew that her license was suspended.
[8] The trial court determined that Crawford’s testimony was not credible and
found her guilty as charged. The court sentenced Crawford to 363 days on the
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conviction for driving while suspended, with all 363 days suspended to
probation; a concurrent 363-day sentence on the conviction for leaving the
scene of an accident, again with all 363 days suspended to probation; and a
consecutive 180-day sentence on the conviction for false informing, with all 180
days suspended and ninety days on probation. Crawford now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[9] On appeal, Crawford presents one issue for our review, namely whether the
State presented evidence sufficient to establish that she was the person driving
her pickup truck at the time it hit Dawes’s truck and then fled the scene.1 Our
standard of review on claims of insufficient evidence is well settled but bears
repeating:
When reviewing a claim that the evidence is insufficient to
support a conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge
the credibility of the witnesses; instead, we respect the exclusive
province of the trier of fact to weigh any conflicting evidence. We
consider only the probative evidence supporting the [judgment]
and any reasonable inferences which may be drawn from this
evidence. We will affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a
reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
1
Crawford admits that the evidence was sufficient to convict her of driving while suspended. Appellant’s Br.
p. 10.
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Harrison v. State, 32 N.E.3d 240, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied (citing
McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005)).
[10] Crawford claims that Dawes’s testimony identifying her as the driver of the S-
10 pickup truck should not be credited because Dawes saw the driver for only a
short time and saw her face for only a few seconds. She also argues that
Dawes’s identification was flawed because it was based on an improperly
suggestive showup instead of a more controlled photographic lineup. However,
Crawford does not challenge the admissibility of Dawes’s identification; she
claims only that the identification evidence was insufficient to prove that she
was the one who was driving the S-10 at the time of the accident.
[11] It has long been held that the uncorroborated testimony of one witness may be
sufficient by itself to sustain a conviction on appeal. Scott v. State, 871 N.E.2d
341, 343-44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). If the identification evidence of the witness is
unequivocal, the identification does not need to be supported by other
circumstantial evidence. Id. at 344. However, if the identification is equivocal,
then the identification must be supported by circumstantial evidence. Id.
[12] Here, Dawes’s identification of Crawford was unequivocal. He clearly testified
that the person he saw run from the truck was Crawford “or her twin.” Tr. p. 8.
At no time did he back away from his testimony that Crawford was the
individual he saw. Even if Dawes’s identification testimony were equivocal, his
identification was further supported by the fact that the S-10 was registered to
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Crawford, who, at the time of the offense, was a twenty-eight-year-old white
female with red hair,2 matching the description of the person Dawes saw.3
[13] The trial court was well within its role as the trier of fact to credit the eyewitness
testimony of Dawes and to reject Crawford’s self-serving testimony. Thus, the
evidence favorable to the trial court’s judgement, and the reasonable inferences
that can be drawn from this evidence, were sufficient to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that Crawford was driving her truck at the time she rear-ended
the truck driven by Dawes. See Gorman v. State, 968 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2012) (holding that testimony of single eyewitness was sufficient to
support defendant’s conviction for robbery where witness stated that she was
“one hundred percent certain” that defendant was the one who robbed her and
her friend).
[14] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
2
We recognize that Crawford’s driving record indicates that her hair is brown. Ex. Vol., State’s Ex. 1, p. 1.
However, the evidence at trial indicates that her hair was red. Immediately after describing Crawford as
having red hair, Dawes identified her in court as the same red-haired individual he saw fleeing the truck. Tr.
pp. 7-8. Officer Janicijevic also testified that Crawford had red hair. Tr. p. 28.
3
Crawford claims that her testimony that her truck was stolen should be credited because her report to the
police of her stolen truck would expose her to a charge of driving while suspended. However, while reporting
her truck stolen might have exposed her to a charge of driving while suspended, it also provided her with a
defense to the charge of fleeing the scene of an accident. The trial court was not required to credit her
testimony.
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