J.R. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                        FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                               Jun 12 2019, 6:11 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                      CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                             and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Michelle Laux                                             Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    St. Joseph County Public Defender’s                       Attorney General of Indiana
    Office
    Tiffany A. McCoy
    South Bend, Indiana                                       Angela Sanchez
    Deputy Attorneys General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    J.R.,                                                     June 12, 2019
    Appellant-Respondent,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-JV-2206
    v.                                                Appeal from the
    St. Joseph Probate Court
    State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable
    Appellee-Petitioner.                                      James N. Fox, Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    71J01-1607-JD-210
    Kirsch, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2206 | June 12, 2019                    Page 1 of 14
    [1]   Following his admission to sexual battery,1 which would be a Level 6 felony if
    committed by an adult, J.R. appeals his placement with the Indiana
    Department of Correction (“the DOC”) and raises the following issue for our
    review: whether the juvenile court abused its discretion when it ordered his
    placement in the DOC. He asserts that the placement was not close to his
    family and home, was punitive instead of rehabilitative, and was not the least
    restrictive placement or most appropriate setting for him.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   On July 7, 2016, J.R., who was fifteen years old at the time, entered the home
    of his adult neighbor, C.P., unannounced and uninvited. Appellant’s App. Vol. II
    at 103. At that time, C.P.’s two young children were playing outside, and she
    was on the computer in her bedroom. 
    Id. J.R. entered
    C.P.’s bedroom with his
    erect penis sticking out of his pants. 
    Id. J.R. approached
    C.P. and placed his
    bare penis on her arm and rubbed her arm. 
    Id. at 114.
    C.P. immediately told
    J.R. to leave and that his behavior was very inappropriate. 
    Id. at 103.
    J.R.
    ignored C.P.’s command, grabbed her by both upper arms and attempted to
    force her down on the bed. 
    Id. C.P. pushed
    back and was able to keep herself
    on her feet, but J.R. continued to hold her shoulders. 
    Id. C.P. repeatedly
    yelled
    for J.R. to leave, but instead, he ran his hands down C.P.’s sides to her buttocks
    1
    See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-8(a)(1)(A).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2206 | June 12, 2019   Page 2 of 14
    and squeezed with both hands. 
    Id. While still
    holding onto C.P.’s arms, J.R.
    also attempted to kiss her on the neck several times. 
    Id. Despite C.P.
    continuously telling J.R. to get out of her bedroom and house, J.R. continued to
    restrain C.P., grope her, and attempt to kiss her. 
    Id. Before releasing
    C.P. and
    leaving the house, J.R. told C.P., “I’m going to eat your pussy tomorrow.” 
    Id. J.R. then
    let C.P. go, said “I’m sorry,” and walked out the front door. 
    Id. C.P. told
    her live-in boyfriend what had happened, and he called the police. 
    Id. at 106.
    C.P. told the responding officer that she knew J.R., that he lived three or
    four doors north, and that he had played with her children before. 
    Id. [4] J.R.
    was arrested the same day. A detention hearing was held on July 11, 2016,
    and J.R. was detained at the St. Joseph County Juvenile Justice Center. 
    Id. at 16.
    On July 18, 2016, the State filed a delinquency petition against J.R.,
    charging him with criminal confinement and sexual battery, both of which
    would have been a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult. 
    Id. at 21.
    On July
    29, 2016, the State filed an admission agreement that offered to dismiss the
    criminal confinement charge if J.R. admitted to the sexual battery charge. 
    Id. at 23.
    At the initial hearing, held that same day, J.R. admitted to sexual battery
    pursuant to the admission agreement. 
    Id. at 48-52.
    [5]   At the dispositional hearing, held on October 14, 2016, the State expressed
    concern about the seriousness of J.R.’s offense and recommended placement
    with more supervision. 
    Id. at 56-57.
    The juvenile court reasoned that it was in
    J.R.’s best interest to be in the community and engage in intensive out-patient
    counseling and placed J.R. on strict and indefinite probation. 
    Id. at 29,
    61. The
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2206 | June 12, 2019   Page 3 of 14
    juvenile court also gave J.R. multiple court ordered requirements, including
    writing an apology letter to the victim, attending school regularly without any
    unexcused absences, tardies, or suspensions, participating in a prosocial
    activity, and obtaining a part-time job or completing twenty hours of
    community service. 
    Id. at 30.
    [6]   On March 1, 2017, almost five months after the dispositional hearing, a petition
    for modification was filed, and a modification hearing was held April 7, 2017.
    
    Id. at 9,
    32-34. At that time, J.R. had not written his apology letter to the
    victim, completed any community service, or found a part-time job; he also had
    multiple issues in school resulting in three out-of-school suspensions and his
    expulsion from school. 
    Id. at 64,
    134. Specifically, J.R. received a two-day
    suspension for his involvement in a fight concerning a stolen cell phone on
    February 2, 2017. 
    Id. at 134.
    J.R. was filming the altercation and could be
    heard provoking the students to fight. 
    Id. Three days
    after J.R. returned to
    school from that suspension, he received another three-day suspension on
    February 21, 2017, for threatening to shoot a student. 
    Id. When J.R.
    returned
    to school on February 27, 2017, he was suspended for five days with expulsion
    requested because he had twice engaged in sexual activity with a female student
    on school property in the choir dressing room. 
    Id. [7] The
    probation department was concerned that J.R. continued to place himself
    in high risk situations and was being uncooperative and violating his probation.
    
    Id. at 144.
    The juvenile court determined that J.R. was in need of supervision,
    care, treatment, and services that were not available in the community and that
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2206 | June 12, 2019   Page 4 of 14
    it was in his best interest to remove him from the home. 
    Id. at 32-33.
    The
    court ordered J.R. to be placed in Oaklawn, a residential program, to complete
    sex offense programming. 
    Id. at 33.
    [8]   Because the probation department was concerned with J.R.’s impulsivity and
    risky decision making, an examination of J.R.’s sexual history was conducted
    through a polygraph test. 
    Id. at 146-51.
    During this examination, J.R.
    admitted that he became sexually active at the age of fourteen, and that, over
    the next two years, he had a sexual relationship with at least twenty different
    teen-aged females, with many instances occurring on school grounds. 
    Id. at 147-48.
    J.R. also admitted that when he was thirteen, he had his four-year-old
    cousin touch his penis and, when he was fourteen, he and his sister engaged in
    mutual fondling. 
    Id. at 150.
    [9]   In his first month at Oaklawn, J.R. struggled with his behavior and attitude,
    but, in his second month, he became more engaged in treatment. 
    Id. at 74.
    After completing Oaklawn’s program, in April 2018, he was placed back into
    the care of his mother and was ordered to continue probation and participate
    with aftercare services through Lincoln Therapeutic Partnership (“LTP”). 
    Id. at 79,
    163-64. After he was placed back in his mother’s care, probation stated J.R.
    became “arrogant” and did not “take his probation seriously.” 
    Id. at 172.
    He
    missed several appointments, and the probation department learned that when
    he was released from Oaklawn, J.R. almost immediately began violating his
    safety plan. 
    Id. Specifically, another
    juvenile on probation who was only
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2206 | June 12, 2019   Page 5 of 14
    thirteen at the time indicated that, beginning in April 2018, she and J.R.
    engaged in a sexual relationship. 
    Id. [10] J.R.
    took another polygraph examination on July 26, 2018, and after receiving
    his results, LTP discharged him from therapy because he violated treatment
    guidelines. 
    Id. at 84.
    J.R. admitted to regular pornography use, sexual activity
    with five to six teen-aged females, going to parties, sending and receiving nude
    images, videoing girls during sexual acts, using marijuana, and using social
    media. 
    Id. at 84,
    173-74. On August 14, 2018, J.R. was detained because he
    was not in compliance with probation. 
    Id. at 41.
    On August 21, 2018, a
    modification hearing was held, and the probation department recommended
    that J.R. be placed in the DOC because, although J.R. had completed a year of
    residential placement and had been ordered to participate in aftercare services,
    he was uncooperative, violated his safety plan multiple times, and had an
    overall assessment score that placed him in the high-risk category to reoffend.
    
    Id. at 177-78.
    [11]   The juvenile court determined that J.R.’s continued placement at home would
    not provide the level of structure and supervision necessary and that it was in
    J.R.’s best interest to be removed from the home. 
    Id. at 42–43,
    178. The
    juvenile court ordered J.R. to the DOC, which would be suspended if LTP was
    willing to accept J.R. back into its treatment program. 
    Id. at 43.
    LTP was
    unwilling to do so because J.R. consistently violated his treatment plan. 
    Id. at 180.
    The probation department recommended placement in the DOC because
    LTP was the sole provider of sex offender specific treatment in St. Joseph
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2206 | June 12, 2019   Page 6 of 14
    County, and no other community program was offered that would meet J.R.’s
    treatment needs. 
    Id. The juvenile
    court ordered J.R. to be placed in the DOC.
    
    Id. at 44-46.
    When committing J.R. to the DOC, the juvenile court found that
    “reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal”
    and that the modification was the least restrictive alternative to insure the
    child’s welfare and rehabilitation and the safety and welfare of the community.”
    
    Id. at 44-45.
    J.R. now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    [12]   J.R. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it ordered him to
    be placed in the DOC because such a placement was punitive instead of
    rehabilitative, especially because J.R. had no prior encounters with the juvenile
    justice system. J.R. contends that his placement in the DOC was also not the
    least restrictive and most family-like setting available and was contrary to
    Indiana Code section 31-37-18-6. He maintains that, after he completed his
    initial treatment at LTP, he should have been released from probation, but
    because he was not, he was punished for participating in consensual sex with
    other teenagers, which was not criminal behavior.
    [13]   “A juvenile court is accorded ‘wide latitude’ and ‘great flexibility’ in its dealings
    with juveniles.” J.T. v. State, 
    111 N.E.3d 1019
    , 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)
    (citing J.S. v. State, 
    881 N.E.2d 26
    , 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)), trans. denied. The
    choice of a specific disposition of a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent child is a
    matter within the sound discretion of the juvenile court and will only be
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2206 | June 12, 2019   Page 7 of 14
    reversed if there has been an abuse of that discretion. 
    Id. “The juvenile
    court’s
    discretion in determining a disposition is subject to the statutory considerations
    of the welfare of the child, the safety of the community, and the policy of
    favoring the least-harsh disposition.” 
    Id. An abuse
    of discretion occurs when
    the juvenile court’s action is clearly erroneous and against the logic and effect of
    the facts and circumstances before it. 
    Id. [14] The
    goal of the juvenile process is rehabilitation, not punishment. 
    Id. “‘Accordingly, juvenile
    courts have a variety of placement choices for juveniles
    who have delinquency problems, none of which are considered sentences.’” 
    Id. (quoting R.H.
    v. State, 
    937 N.E.2d 386
    , 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). Indiana
    Code section 31-37-18-6 provides that:
    If consistent with the safety of the community and the best
    interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional
    decree that:
    (1) is:
    (A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate
    setting available; and
    (B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest
    and special needs of the child;
    (2) least interferes with family autonomy;
    (3) is least disruptive of family life;
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2206 | June 12, 2019   Page 8 of 14
    (4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the
    child’s parent, guardian, or custodian;
    (5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the
    child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.
    Ind. Code § 31-37-18-6. “[T]he statute recognizes that in certain situations the
    best interest of the child is better served by a more restrictive placement.” 
    J.S., 881 N.E.2d at 29
    (citing K.A. v. State, 
    775 N.E.2d 382
    , 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002),
    trans. denied). The law requires only that the disposition selected be the least
    restrictive disposition that is “consistent with the safety of the community and
    the best interest of the child.” 
    J.T., 111 N.E.3d at 1026
    (citing D.S. v. State, 
    829 N.E.2d 1081
    , 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).
    [15]   At the time of the disposition, J.R. was seventeen years old, and his case had
    been ongoing since he was fifteen years old. Although he did not have any
    prior juvenile adjudications, this case involved a sexual battery, where he
    entered his neighbor’s house unannounced, exposed his penis, and forcibly
    restrained the neighbor while squeezing her buttocks and attempting to kiss her.
    The State recommended placement with more supervision because of the
    severity of the offense, but the juvenile court, reasoning that it was in J.R.’s best
    interest to be in the community and to engage in intensive out-patient
    counseling, placed J.R. on strict and indefinite probation. Appellant’s App. Vol.
    II at 29, 56-57, 61. The juvenile court also ordered J.R. to write the victim an
    apology letter, attend school regularly without any unexcused absences, tardies,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2206 | June 12, 2019   Page 9 of 14
    or suspensions, participate in a prosocial activity, and obtain a part-time job or
    complete twenty hours of community service. 
    Id. at 30.
    [16]   Nine months later, J.R. had violated multiple terms of his probation. He failed
    to write the apology letter, to complete community service, and to find a part-
    time job. He had multiple issues in school resulting in three out-of-school
    suspensions and a request for expulsion. 
    Id. at 64,
    134. He had been suspended
    for provoking students to fight, threatening to shoot another student, and
    engaging in sexual activity while on school property. 
    Id. at 64,
    134. At that
    time, the juvenile court ordered J.R. to Oaklawn for a residential treatment
    program, finding that it was in his best interest to be removed from the home
    because “[c]ontinued placement at home would not provide the level of
    structure and supervision necessary to prevent future delinquent behaviors
    which are harmful to [J.R.] and others.” 
    Id. at 35.
    [17]   After some initial struggle with his behavior, J.R. was able to complete the
    program at Oaklawn and was released back to his mother’s care and ordered to
    continue on probation. 
    Id. at 79-80.
    J.R. asserts that, at that time, he should
    have been released from probation because the case had been ongoing for
    almost two years. However, the juvenile court determined that it was in his
    best interest to monitor him after he finished the treatment program at Oaklawn
    to determine if J.R. could apply the progress he made while in treatment to his
    life at home. The juvenile court stated, “you’re going to have a lot more
    freedom…with that freedom comes responsibility… if you comply with all the
    terms we have, they’re talking about closing the case, but that’s going to require
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2206 | June 12, 2019   Page 10 of 14
    you to make good decisions.” 
    Id. at 79-80.
    This was a reasonable course of
    action by the juvenile court and clearly aimed at ensuring that the goal of
    rehabilitation had been reached.
    [18]   Instead of applying what he had learned at Oaklawn, J.R. violated probation
    and his safety plan multiple times and was ultimately discharged from LTP for
    violating treatment guidelines. 
    Id. at 84.
    Within about three months from his
    release from Oaklawn, J.R. admitted to using social media, going to parties,
    using marijuana, regular pornography use, sexual activity with five to six same-
    aged females, sending and receiving nude images, and videotaping females
    during sexual acts, all of which violated probation and his safety plan. 
    Id. at 84,
    173-74. Additionally, another juvenile on probation indicated that she and J.R.
    were in a sexual relationship that had begun in April 2018. 
    Id. at 172.
    This
    indicated that upon release from Oaklawn J.R. immediately began violating his
    safety plan, and that despite his treatment focusing on the age of consent, he
    was sexually involved with a thirteen-year-old female when he was seventeen
    years old. 
    Id. at 172.
    When committing J.R. to the DOC, the juvenile court
    found that “reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for
    removal” and that the modification was the least restrictive alternative to insure
    the child’s welfare and rehabilitation and the safety and welfare of the
    community.” 
    Id. at 44-45.
    [19]   J.R. maintains that the juvenile court’s determination that he be placed in the
    DOC was punitive rather than rehabilitative, citing to E.H. v. State, 
    764 N.E.2d 681
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. In that case, E.H. was adjudicated a
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2206 | June 12, 2019   Page 11 of 14
    delinquent for the theft of a necklace, and this court vacated the juvenile court’s
    dispositional order placing E.H. in the DOC because “the one-year
    commitment imposed by the juvenile court conflicts with rehabilitative goals of
    the juvenile justice system.” 
    Id. at 685-86.
    This court noted that E.H. had
    recently been placed in a stable foster home where he was making significant
    improvement with his adjustment issues and was enrolled in home-based
    counseling and in a program assisting with reunification with his family and
    was making significant progress in both programs. 
    Id. at 686.
    This court also
    stated that there was “no evidence . . . that E.H. is a threat to the community.”
    
    Id. This court
    concluded that in light of E.H.’s recent progress and given the
    nature of his offense, a less restrictive placement would be more appropriate for
    E.H. 
    Id. [20] J.R.
    contends that, like in E.H., his placement in the DOC should be found to
    conflict with the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile system, especially in light of
    the fact that J.R. has no prior encounters with the juvenile justice system.
    However, E.H. is distinguishable from this case. First, J.R.’s offense, the sexual
    battery of a neighbor, was far more serious than E.H.’s offense, which was the
    theft of a necklace. Second, and more significant, unlike E.H., who was
    showing signs of improvement and was not deemed to be a threat to the
    community, here, J.R. had not shown improvement and was deemed to be a
    threat to the community and himself because of his lack of improvement and
    behavior.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2206 | June 12, 2019   Page 12 of 14
    [21]   J.R. asserts that the juvenile court failed to consider an alternative placement
    when it placed him in the DOC. Just because a less restrictive alternative
    exists, however, does not mean that the juvenile court must follow it. D.C. v.
    State, 
    935 N.E.2d 290
    , 292 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]he availability of a less
    restrictive alternative does not mean the juvenile court was required to order
    that placement.”), aff’d on trans., 
    958 N.E.2d 757
    (Ind. 2011). Indiana Code
    section 31-37-18-6 provides that the trial court is only required to consider the
    least restrictive placement if that placement comports with the safety needs of
    the community and the child’s best interests. See J.B. v. State, 
    849 N.E.2d 714
    ,
    717-18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion when it committed the juvenile to the DOC because the less-
    restrictive placement suggested by him would have fallen short of meeting the
    community’s safety needs), trans. denied.
    [22]   In mentioning the seriousness of J.R.’s underlying offense, his continuous risky
    behavior, uncooperativeness with probation, and violation of his safety plan,
    the juvenile court considered his danger to the safety of the community. We
    have previously found that the seriousness of an offense and the likelihood of
    re-offense allow for commitment to the DOC. See, e.g., 
    D.C., 935 N.E.2d at 293
    (“Given the serious nature of D.C.’s offense and the likelihood that he will
    reoffend, this is clearly a situation in which commitment to a less restrictive
    environment than DOC is not in the best interest of D.C. or of the
    community.”). Additionally, the juvenile court’s finding that J.R. had
    completed a year of residential treatment, which had failed to curb his risky
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2206 | June 12, 2019   Page 13 of 14
    behavior, showed that such services were no longer in J.R.’s best interest.
    Although J.R. asserts that he did nothing criminal and was being punished for
    typical teenager behavior, the evidence showed that, while on probation, J.R.
    did commit potentially illegal acts, and the juvenile court properly considered
    these acts when determining the best placement.
    [23]   We conclude that it was reasonable for the juvenile court to find that the
    services and opportunities offered to J.R. had not been successful and that he
    posed a danger to both himself and to the community. Because of the serious
    nature of J.R.’s underlying offense, his failure to engage in and benefit from
    past services offered, and the likelihood that he will reoffend, we find that the
    juvenile court was within its discretion to conclude that commitment to a less
    restrictive environment than the DOC was not in the best interest of J.R. or
    consistent with the safety of the community. The juvenile court did not abuse
    its discretion when it ordered J.R.’s placement in the DOC.
    [24]   Affirmed.
    Vaidik, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-2206 | June 12, 2019   Page 14 of 14