Michael Ray Gross v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 25 2019, 6:43 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Darren Bedwell Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Chandra K. Hein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michael Ray Gross, April 25, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-2303
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable James Snyder,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Master Commissioner
Trial Court Cause No.
49G20-1709-F4-33595
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issue
[1] Following a traffic stop, Michael Gross was arrested after officers searched the
stolen vehicle he was driving and observed a firearm, methamphetamine, and
drug paraphernalia. Gross was ultimately convicted of unlawful possession of a
firearm by a serious violent felon, possession of methamphetamine, and
possession of paraphernalia. Gross presents one issue for our review, namely
whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction of unlawful
possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. Concluding the State
presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The facts most favorable to the verdict are as follows. On August 28, 2017,
Elizabeth Calkins reported that her truck had been stolen from the parking lot
of her apartment complex. Calkins informed friends and relatives through
Facebook that her truck had been stolen and asked to be notified if anyone saw
it. On September 5, 2017, Zachary Sponsel, the nephew of Calkins’ co-worker,
recognized the truck. He began following the truck and, he contacted the
police. Officers Douglas Lepsky and Matthew Coffing of the Indianapolis
Metropolitan Police Department responded to the call and located the vehicle
near the 1600 N. block of Ritter Avenue in Indianapolis. The officers ran the
truck’s vehicle identification number and confirmed the truck was stolen.
Officer Lepsky activated his lights and sirens. After sixty seconds, the driver of
the truck, later identified as Gross, pulled over. Officer Lepsky approached the
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truck, escorted Gross out of the vehicle, explained to Gross why he was
stopped, and read Gross his Miranda rights.
[3] Gross agreed to talk with the officers. When asked where he got the truck,
Gross replied that “some girl sold it to [him] on [O]ffer [U]p.” Appellant’s
Appendix, Volume II at 17; see also Transcript, Volume 2 at 14. According to
Gross, he entered into an agreement with S.K. to exchange his motorcycle for
her truck. Gross first told Officer Lepsky he purchased the truck about five
days prior, then said he purchased it about three days ago. See id. Officer
Lepsky ran Gross’ information and was informed there was an open warrant
for Gross’ arrest. Unable to locate the owner of the truck, the officers began an
inventory search of the vehicle before impounding it. Officer Lepsky went to
the passenger side while Officer Coffing went to the driver’s side. During the
search, officers observed a firearm in the center console, an open pack of
cigarettes with suspected methamphetamine on the passenger seat, and two
glass pipes next to the cigarettes. Testing later revealed 7.63 grams of
methamphetamine. See Exhibits at 14; Tr., Vol. 2 at 39.
[4] Officer Lepsky arrested Gross. The officers were ultimately able to contact
Calkins, and she arrived on scene. After officers confirmed that none of the
items in the truck belonged to Calkins, they released the truck to her. See Tr.,
Vol. 2 at 32. On September 18, 2017, the State charged Gross with the
following: Count I, unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon,
a Level 4 felony; Count II, possession of methamphetamine, a Level 4 felony;
Count III, auto theft, a Level 6 felony; and Count IV, possession of
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paraphernalia, a Class C misdemeanor. Gross waived his right to a jury trial,
and a bench trial was held on August 14, 2018. See Appellant’s App., Vol. II at
50. Gross was convicted of Counts I, II, and IV.1 With respect to Counts I and
II, Gross was sentenced to eight years, with four years executed in the Indiana
Department of Correction, one year in a Marion County Community
Corrections program, and three years suspended with two years suspended to
probation. The trial court sentenced Gross to sixty days executed in the
Department of Correction for Count IV. See Tr., Vol. 2 at 118-19; Appealed
Order at 1-2. All sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. Gross now
appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
A. Standard of Review
[5] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we do
not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. McHenry v.
State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). We consider only the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867
N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). When confronted with conflicting evidence, we
must consider it “most favorably to the trial court’s ruling” and the evidence
1
Count III, auto theft, was involuntarily dismissed pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 41(B) during the bench
trial. See Tr., Vol. II at 69-70.
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need not “overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Id. “We will
affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value such that a reasonable
trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009).
B. Unlawful Possession of Firearm
[6] Gross only challenges his conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm by a
serious violent felon. Specifically, he argues there is insufficient evidence that
he constructively possessed the firearm.
[7] In order to convict Gross, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Gross was a serious violent felon who knowingly or intentionally possessed
a firearm. Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c).2 A conviction for possession of a firearm
may rest upon proof of either actual or constructive possession. Smith v. State,
113 N.E.3d 1266, 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. A person who has
direct and physical control over a firearm has actual possession, whereas a
person who has the intent and capability to maintain control over a firearm has
constructive possession. Tate v. State, 835 N.E.2d 499, 511 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005), trans. denied. Here, there is no evidence that either officer observed the
2
Gross’ prior conviction of dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 5 felony, renders him a “serious violent
felon.” See Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(b)(25); see also Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 21, 23. He does not challenge
his status as a serious violent felon.
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firearm in Gross’ physical possession. Therefore, the State must establish
constructive possession.
[8] “A person constructively possesses contraband when the person has (1) the
capability to maintain dominion and control over the item; and (2) the intent to
maintain dominion and control over it.” Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174
(Ind. 2011). To prove capability, the State must show the defendant is able to
reduce the contraband to his or her personal possession. Smith, 113 N.E.3d at
1270. A trier of fact may infer that a defendant had the capability to maintain
dominion and control over contraband from the simple fact that the defendant
had a possessory interest in the premises on which an officer found the item.
Gray, 957 N.E.2d at 174. “In essence the law infers that the party in possession
of the premises is capable of exercising dominion and control over all items on
the premises. . . . And this is so whether possession of the premises is exclusive
or not.” Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 340-41 (Ind. 2004). Because Gross was
the sole occupant of the truck in which the firearm was found and stated that he
had purchased the truck days before, the trier of fact could reasonably infer
Gross had the capability to maintain dominion and control over the firearm.
See Whitney v. State, 726 N.E.2d 823, 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that
defendant’s sole possession of the car in which contraband was found was
sufficient to show his ability to control the contraband).
[9] To prove intent, the State must demonstrate that the defendant had knowledge
of the presence of the contraband. Id. at 826. This knowledge may be inferred
from either the exclusive dominion and control over the premises that contain
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the contraband or, if control is non-exclusive, evidence of additional
circumstances that point to the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of the
contraband. K.F. v. State, 961 N.E.2d 501, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans.
denied. These include: (1) incriminating statements made by the defendant; (2)
attempted flight or furtive gestures; (3) proximity of contraband to the
defendant; (4) location of the contraband within the defendant’s plain view; or
(5) mingling of the contraband with other items owned by the defendant.
Bradshaw v. State, 818 N.E.2d 59, 63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). In addition, this
court recognizes that the nature of the place in which the contraband is found
can be an additional circumstance demonstrating a defendant’s knowledge of
the contraband. Johnson v. State, 59 N.E.3d 1071, 1073 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
These circumstances are nonexhaustive and ultimately, our question is whether
a reasonable fact-finder could conclude from the evidence that the defendant
knew of the nature and presence of the contraband. Id. at 1074.
[10] In this case, the State argues that Gross had exclusive possession of the truck
when he was pulled over because he was the sole occupant, but Gross contends
“[t]here is not undisputed evidence here that [he] had ‘exclusive dominion’ over
the truck for more than the hour to which he testified.” 3 Brief of Appellant at
11. However, the evidence presented at trial established that after officers
activated their lights and sirens, sixty seconds passed before Gross stopped the
3
At trial, Gross disputed this. He testified that he told Officer Lepsky that he “made the deal three days ago”
not that he had been in possession of the truck for three days. Tr., Vol. 2 at 77 (emphasis added). Gross
testified he only had the truck for about an hour.
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truck; Gross was the sole occupant of the truck at the time of the arrest; he told
officers he had purchased the truck three or five days prior from a woman on
“Offer Up,” Tr., Vol. 2 at 14; he stated that he did not know if anyone else had
been in the vehicle since he had purchased it; the handgun was located in the
center console in close proximity to where Gross sat as he was driving the
truck; and the officers testified at trial that photographs entered into evidence
that showed the handgun in plain view, in the center console, with the console
open reflected how the handgun looked at the time it was located.4
4
Although the parties dispute whether the compartment where the firearm was discovered was open or
closed, we are obligated to view the facts most favorably to the verdict and cannot reweigh the evidence. See
Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146. Exhibit 3, a photo depicting the truck’s center console with the firearm, was
admitted at trial and reveals that the center console was open and the firearm was in plain view. Officer
Lepsky, who began searching the passenger side of the truck, testified that evidence remained in place until
the evidence tech arrived and was able to take photos. He testified that procedure was consistent with the
entire search. Officer Coffing also testified that Exhibit 3 accurately illustrated “how the firearm looked
when it was located[.]” Tr., Vol. 2 at 47. Below is Exhibit 3:
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[11] Therefore, there is sufficient evidence from which the fact-finder could infer
Gross had exclusive possession of the truck in which the firearm was found. See
Goliday v. State, 708 N.E.2d 4, 6 (Ind. 1999) (holding that a defendant had
exclusive possession of the vehicle when the defendant was the only person in
the car at the time he was stopped); cf. Holmes v. State, 785 N.E.2d 658, 661
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding a defendant did not have exclusive control over a
vehicle when he was merely a passenger).
Conclusion
[12] Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude the trial court, as trier of fact,
could reasonably infer that Gross had the capability and intent to maintain
dominion and control over the firearm and that he constructively possessed the
firearm. Sufficient evidence was presented to support Gross’ conviction for
unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. Accordingly, we
affirm.
[13] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.
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