Dorothy Williams v. State of Indiana ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    Aug 26 2016, 8:21 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Jennifer L. Koethe                                        Gregory F. Zoeller
    LaPorte, Indiana                                          Attorney General of Indiana
    Angela N. Sanchez
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Dorothy Williams,                                         August 26, 2016
    Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
    46A03-1511-CR-1913
    v.                                                Appeal from the LaPorte Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Michael S.
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       Bergerson, Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    46D01-1411-F5-433
    Najam, Judge.
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Dorothy Williams appeals from her conviction for disorderly conduct, as a
    Class B misdemeanor, following a jury trial. She asserts on appeal that there is
    insufficient evidence to support her conviction because her conviction was
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 46A03-1511-CR-1913 | August 26, 2016                  Page 1 of 14
    based on political speech, which Williams raised as an affirmative defense
    under article 1, section 9 of the Indiana Constitution. Where, as here, the
    defendant is not the original subject of a police investigation, 1 the defendant
    demonstrates that her expression was unambiguous political speech when she
    shows that the focus of her speech exclusively concerned government action.
    Such speech must both be directed at state actors and refer to state actors or
    their conduct. Speech directed toward a private party or that refers to a private
    party, or the conduct of a private party, is politically ambiguous for purposes of
    an affirmative defense under art. 1, sec. 9. And when the focus of speech is
    politically ambiguous, a reasonable fact-finder may reject the asserted
    affirmative defense.
    [2]   If the defendant does not meet her burden of showing that her speech was
    unambiguously political, the State’s impairment of her speech—e.g., the
    defendant’s arrest for disorderly conduct—is constitutional so long as the State
    acted rationally in impairing the speech. However, if the defendant meets her
    burden of showing unambiguous political speech, the burden shifts to the State
    to demonstrate that the defendant’s exercise of her speech was an abuse of her
    right to that expression. While the words used by the defendant do not matter
    to this analysis, the State can meet this heightened burden in either of the
    1
    Our supreme court has held that a person of interest to an investigation who refuses to cooperate with an
    investigating officer is not protected by the political-speech defense under art. 1, sec. 9. Barnes v. State, 
    946 N.E.2d 572
    , 578 (Ind.), aff’d on reh’g, 
    953 N.E.2d 473
     (2011), superseded by statute on other grounds, see Cupello v.
    State, 
    27 N.E.3d 1122
    , 1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 46A03-1511-CR-1913 | August 26, 2016                              Page 2 of 14
    following circumstances: (1) the defendant’s volume had more than a fleeting
    interference with a private interest,2 or (2) the defendant interfered with an
    ongoing police investigation.3
    [3]   Here, during her encounter with police at her home, Williams directed some of
    her speech toward her neighbors, and she repeatedly referred to herself and her
    own conduct during the encounter. Accordingly, the focus of her speech was
    politically ambiguous for purposes of the art. 1, sec. 9 affirmative defense, and
    the fact-finder was free to reject Williams’ affirmative defense. As her speech
    was politically ambiguous, the State’s impairment of her speech was
    constitutional so long as it was rational. And it was here: the State presented
    evidence that some of her neighbors, while in their homes, were actually alerted
    to Williams’ encounter with police by the volume of her speech, and the State
    further showed that numerous officers diverted their attention away from the
    task at hand because of Williams’ speech. Accordingly, we affirm Williams’
    conviction for disorderly conduct, as a Class B misdemeanor.
    2
    E.g., Madden v. State, 
    786 N.E.2d 1152
    , 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the defendant’s political
    speech was an abuse of the right to speak when her speech was “loud enough to draw a crowd” that
    disrupted traffic), trans. denied.
    3
    E.g., Dallaly v. State, 
    916 N.E.2d 945
    , 953-54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the defendant’s political
    speech was an abuse of the right to speak when it interfered with an officer’s ability to function as a law
    enforcement officer, which, in turn, created a traffic hazard).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 46A03-1511-CR-1913 | August 26, 2016                          Page 3 of 14
    Facts and Procedural History
    [4]   Around 6:00 a.m. on November 21, 2014, six to ten officers of the Michigan
    City Police Department went to Williams’ residence on Highland Avenue to
    serve an arrest warrant on Robert Sanders, Jr. Sanders is Williams’ brother,
    and, according to his driver’s license records, Sanders lived at Williams’
    residence. Williams’ minor niece, V.G., also lived at that residence, as did
    Williams’ elderly and disabled mother, Rady Sanders. Rady is paralyzed from
    the waist down, and Williams is responsible for Rady’s care.
    [5]   Detective William Henderson knocked on Williams’ front door, and Williams
    answered. Detective Henderson asked Williams if Sanders was at the residence
    and informed Williams that he had an arrest warrant for Sanders. Williams
    “started yelling” and said that Sanders was not there. Tr. at 59. Williams
    appeared “verbally and completely irate that [the officers] were there” and
    repeatedly told the officers that Sanders “didn’t live there.” Id. at 60. When
    Detective Henderson asked for permission to enter the residence to ensure that
    Sanders was not present, Williams “slammed the door in [his] face.” Id.
    [6]   Detective Henderson “continued to try and [make] verbal contact” with
    Williams over the next ten to fifteen minutes. Williams “continued yelling” at
    him in response. Id. at 61. Detective Henderson then contacted a prosecutor
    and requested a search warrant.
    [7]   Pursuant to protocol, while they awaited the search warrant Detective
    Henderson instructed the other officers at the scene “to make sure that [they]
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 46A03-1511-CR-1913 | August 26, 2016   Page 4 of 14
    maintained a solid perimeter and nobody came in or out” of the residence. Id.
    at 62. Detective Henderson requested the presence of additional officers to
    assist with maintaining that perimeter. Shortly thereafter, fifteen to twenty
    officers total were maintaining a perimeter around Williams’ residence. The
    officers used unmarked vehicles and did not activate any vehicular emergency
    lights or sirens.
    [8]   At approximately 7:00 a.m., Williams and V.G. exited the front door of the
    residence. Williams walked V.G. through the police perimeter to a nearby car,
    which took V.G. to her school. When Williams walked back towards her
    residence, Detective Henderson stopped her at the police perimeter and
    informed her that he could not let her reenter the residence “for safety reasons”
    because, first, once a person exits a surrounded residence, “it’s one less person
    [the officers] have to worry [about] that has access to any firearms[] or anything
    that could harm [others],” and, second, if the subject of the search warrant is
    inside the residence, the person who has come outside can “see where [the
    officers] are tactically around [the residence], so if [the subject] were to try to
    plan any assault . . . [the officers will have] given up [their] positions . . . .” Id.
    at 140-41.
    [9]   “After informing her of that,” Williams grew “irate” and began “yelling,
    screaming, [and] cussing” at the officers. Id. at 65. Detective Henderson asked
    her to “please be quiet” “several times,” to no avail. Id. at 140. Officers
    informed Williams that she was not under arrest, and Williams loudly asked,
    “You mean to tell me you are not going to let me enter my motherf***ing
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 46A03-1511-CR-1913 | August 26, 2016    Page 5 of 14
    house?” Id. at 66. Williams then loudly declared, “I’m going back in my
    house,” and that she was “going back in here to see about my mother, you
    know my mother’s in here and she’s sick, I’m going back in here to see her.”
    Id. at 297-98. When informed that she would be arrested for disorderly conduct
    if she continued her loud outburst, Williams loudly informed the officers that
    she “doesn’t care about going to jail.” Id. at 66.
    [10]   In response to Williams’ outburst, her neighbors came out of their nearby
    residences to see what was going on “like there was a show.” Id. at 68, 155.
    When officers continued to deny Williams reentry into her residence, Williams
    loudly asked the officers how they could “deny my right to go back in my own
    home” when she had not committed any crime and was not under arrest. Id. at
    275. Williams then proceeded to “tell my neighbors to look and see how the
    Michigan City police department [is] treating me . . . and an elderly woman[.]”
    Id. at 276.
    [11]   Williams’ outburst required Detective Henderson to turn his “back to the
    residence[] and . . . fully engage[] . . . with Ms. Williams rather than keep[ his]
    post around the house,” which “could’ve been a big danger” to Detective
    Henderson and other officers. Id. at 176. Williams’ outburst also “divert[ed]
    some of [the] . . . officers” who were responsible for “dealing with the tactical
    surrounding [of] that residence” from that responsibility “[to] being concerned
    with [Williams’] demeanor and how she was going to react with the other
    officers [who] were dealing directly with her.” Id. at 102. Williams’ outburst
    lasted approximately two to four minutes before officers arrested her for
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 46A03-1511-CR-1913 | August 26, 2016   Page 6 of 14
    disorderly conduct. Upon obtaining a search warrant and searching Williams’
    residence, the officers found Sanders hiding in the attic.
    [12]   The State charged Williams with assisting a criminal, as a Level 5 felony, and
    disorderly conduct, as a Class B misdemeanor. A jury acquitted Williams of
    assisting a criminal, but it found her guilty of disorderly conduct. The trial
    court entered judgment and sentence accordingly. This appeal ensued.
    Discussion and Decision
    Overview
    [13]   Williams contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support her
    conviction. In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we do not reweigh
    the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Sharp v. State, 
    42 N.E.3d 512
    , 516 (Ind. 2015). Rather, we look to the evidence and reasonable
    inferences drawn therefrom that support the verdict, and we will affirm the
    conviction if there is probative evidence from which a reasonable jury could
    have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Id.
    [14]   To prove disorderly conduct, as a Class B misdemeanor, the State had to show
    that Williams recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally made unreasonable noise
    and continued to do so after being asked to stop. 
    Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3
    (a)(2)
    (2014). On appeal, Williams does not suggest that the State failed to present
    sufficient evidence to demonstrate that she committed disorderly conduct.
    Rather, she maintains that the evidence underlying her conviction shows that
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 46A03-1511-CR-1913 | August 26, 2016   Page 7 of 14
    her speech was political speech, an affirmative defense under article 1, section 9
    of the Indiana Constitution.
    [15]   Article 1, section 9 states: “No law shall be passed, restraining the free
    interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or
    print, freely, on any subject whatever: but for the abuse of that right, every
    person shall be responsible.” As our supreme court has explained:
    Because one’s conduct or expression may be free speech
    protected under the Indiana Constitution, an application of the
    disorderly conduct statute must pass constitutional scrutiny. We
    employ a two-step inquiry in reviewing the constitutionality of an
    application of the disorderly conduct statute: we (1) “determine
    whether state action has restricted a claimant’s expressive
    activity” and (2) “decide whether the restricted activity
    constituted an ‘abuse’ of the right to speak.” Whittington v. State,
    
    669 N.E.2d 1363
    , 1367 (Ind. 1996). The first prong may be
    satisfied based solely on the police restricting a claimant’s loud
    speaking during a police investigation.[4] Id. at 1370. The second
    prong hinges on whether the restricted expression constituted
    political speech. Id. at 1369-70. If the claimant demonstrates
    under an objective standard that the impaired expression was
    political speech, the impairment is unconstitutional unless the
    State demonstrates that the “magnitude of the impairment” is
    slight or that the speech amounted to a public nuisance such that
    it “inflict[ed] ‘particularized harm’ analogous to tortious injury
    on readily identifiable private interests.” Id. (quoting Price v.
    State, 
    622 N.E.2d 954
    , 964 (Ind. 1993)). If the expression,
    viewed in context, is ambiguous, it is not political speech, and we
    4
    The State does not suggest that Williams failed to satisfy this requirement.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 46A03-1511-CR-1913 | August 26, 2016         Page 8 of 14
    evaluate the constitutionality of the impairment under standard
    rationality review. Id. at 1370.
    Barnes v. State, 
    946 N.E.2d 572
    , 577 (Ind.), aff’d on reh’g, 
    953 N.E.2d 473
     (2011),
    superseded by statute on other grounds, see Cupello v. State, 
    27 N.E.3d 1122
    , 1124
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
    [16]   Here, we first consider whether Williams’ speech was unambiguous political
    speech under art. 1, sec. 9. We then “evaluate the constitutionality” of the
    State’s “impairment” of Williams’ speech. See 
    id.
    Political Speech
    [17]   We first consider whether Williams’ speech was political speech for purposes of
    the art. 1, sec. 9 affirmative defense. We review the defendant’s speech under
    an objective standard. 
    Id.
     However, Williams carried the burden of proof to
    demonstrate to the fact-finder that her expression was unambiguously political.
    Whittington, 669 N.E.2d at 1370. As the fact-finder rejected her asserted
    defense, Williams now appeals from a negative judgment. In such appeals, “we
    will reverse only if the evidence is without conflict and leads inescapably to the
    conclusion that the [appellant] is entitled” to her requested relief. Barnett v.
    State, 
    867 N.E.2d 184
    , 186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.
    [18]   As our supreme court has explained:
    Expressive activity is political, for the purposes of [art. 1, sec. 9],
    if its point is to comment on government action, whether
    applauding an old policy or proposing a new one, or opposing a
    candidate for office or criticizing the conduct of an official acting
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 46A03-1511-CR-1913 | August 26, 2016    Page 9 of 14
    under color of law. The judicial quest is for some express or
    clearly implied reference to governmental action.
    Whittington, 669 N.E.2d at 1370 (footnote omitted). Thus, “political expression
    focuses on the conduct of government officials and agents.” Id. at 1370 n.11.
    “In contrast, where an individual’s expression focuses on the conduct of a
    private party—including the speaker himself or herself—it is not political.” Id.
    at 1370. And, as our case law has applied art. 1, sec. 9, expression that is
    directed toward a private party or refers to the conduct of a private party, even
    if in part, does not demonstrate protected political expression.
    [19]   For example, in Price, the defendant responded to an officer who had
    threatened to arrest her by saying, “F--- you. I haven’t done anything.” 622
    N.E.2d at 957. Although the parties before the court in Price did not challenge
    whether that assertion was political, in Whittington the court revisited that
    language and concluded that it was “not political” because it was “a defense of
    [the defendant’s] own conduct.” Whittington, 669 N.E.2d at 1370 (discussing
    Price, 622 N.E.2d at 957). Likewise, on the facts before it in Whittington our
    supreme court concluded that the defendant’s statements that he “had not done
    anything and that the other witnesses were lying” were not political statements
    because they did not refer to the conduct of state actors. Id. at 1366, 1370-71.
    The court in Whittington further held that other statements made by the
    defendant were not political because they “were not directed toward” state
    actors but, rather, were “directed . . . toward his sister’s boyfriend, who may
    have been the one who summoned the police.” Id. at 1370-71.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 46A03-1511-CR-1913 | August 26, 2016   Page 10 of 14
    [20]   This court has likewise concluded that speech in which the speaker refers to
    him- or herself, even when prompted by a police officer’s conduct or
    statements, and even when coupled with political statements, permits a
    reasonable fact-finder to conclude that the focus of the entirety of the speech is
    ambiguous and, therefore, not political. For example, in Anderson v. State, 
    881 N.E.2d 86
    , 90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), we held that the defendant “asserting a
    right to be where he was, which is a comment on his own behavior,” rendered
    his speech not political. In Blackman v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 579
    , 586 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2007), trans. denied, we held that the defendant’s comment that she had
    “every right to be there, that she did not have to leave the scene” focused on her
    own conduct, and, therefore, it was not political, even though it was in direct
    response to officer conduct that the defendant had asserted to be
    unconstitutional. In Wells v. State, 
    848 N.E.2d 1133
    , 1150 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006),
    we held that a politician’s statement upon arrest that he had been set up by his
    political adversaries was not political because it “reasonably [could] be viewed
    simply as an attempt . . . to ‘talk his way out’ of . . . further investigation . . . .”
    And in Johnson v. State, 
    719 N.E.2d 445
    , 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), we held that
    the defendant’s assertion to an officer that the defendant was not going to
    attend classes required for his probation was not political because it could have
    been interpreted as focusing on the defendant’s own conduct rather than state
    action.
    [21]   However, where the defendant’s speech was directed exclusively at state actors
    and focused exclusively on the actions or conduct of state actors, we have
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 46A03-1511-CR-1913 | August 26, 2016    Page 11 of 14
    repeatedly concluded that the speech is political.5 E.g., Dallaly v. State, 
    916 N.E.2d 945
    , 952-53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); U.M. v. State, 
    827 N.E.2d 1190
    , 1193
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Madden v. State, 
    786 N.E.2d 1152
    , 1156-57 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2003), trans. denied; Johnson v. State, 
    747 N.E.2d 623
    , 630-31 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2001); Shoultz v. State, 
    735 N.E.2d 818
    , 826-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans.
    denied.
    [22]   Applying that law here, we hold that a reasonable fact-finder could have
    concluded that the focus of the entirety of Williams’ speech was ambiguous
    and, therefore, not political. During her encounter with the officers outside of
    her house, Williams said the following: “I don’t care if I go to jail”; “I’m going
    back in my house”; “my mother’s in here and she’s sick, [so] I’m going back in
    here to see her.” Tr. at 66, 297-98. Williams also directed part of her speech
    toward her neighbors, stating: “look and see how the Michigan City police
    department [is] treating me . . . and an elderly woman[.]” Id. at 276. Williams’
    statements refer to herself or her mother; they refer to her own conduct; and
    they were directed at least in part toward private parties. As our case law
    applies art. 1, sec. 9, those statements are plainly not political. Thus, a
    reasonable fact-finder could have concluded that the focus of the entirety of her
    speech was ambiguous and, therefore, that Williams’ did not meet her burden
    5
    In one recent case, a panel of this court held that the defendant’s assertion that she “did not need to go”
    was political in light of the overall context of her speech, which was a criticism of officers for, in the
    defendant’s view, unjustly stopping African-Americans. Jordan v. State, 
    37 N.E.3d 525
    , 532-33 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2015). Williams does not argue that her facts are analogous to those in Jordan. See Ind. Appellate Rule
    46(A)(8)(a).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 46A03-1511-CR-1913 | August 26, 2016                     Page 12 of 14
    to establish her affirmative defense. Thus, we reject Williams’ argument to the
    contrary on appeal.
    State’s Impairment of Williams’ Expression
    [23]   Having concluded that Williams’ speech was not political, we next “evaluate
    the constitutionality of the [State’s] impairment [of her expression] under
    standard rationality review.” Barnes, 946 N.E.2d at 577. In that review, we
    determine whether the State rationally could have concluded that Williams’
    expressive activity, because of its volume, was an “abuse” of the right to speak.
    Whittington, 669 N.E.2d at 1371. In other words, we consider whether
    Williams’ speech was “a threat to peace, safety, and well-being.” Id.
    [24]   Applying that standard in Whittington, our supreme court held:
    We easily conclude that Whittington has not negated “every
    conceivable basis” for the state action in his case.
    In Price we abstractly observed that “abating excessive noise is an
    objective our legislature may legitimately pursue.” On the facts
    of this case, it is reasonably conceivable that the loud outbursts in
    the concrete circumstances of this case could have agitated other
    persons in the apartment, sparked additional disruptions of
    [Officer] Finnell’s investigation, or interfered with his ability to
    manage the medical crew and the alleged crime scene. The noisy
    tirade could have threatened the safety of Whittington’s sister by
    aggravating her trauma or by distracting the medical personnel
    tending her injury. Finally, the volume of the speech
    undoubtedly made it highly annoying to all present. The state
    could therefore have believed Whittington’s outbursts constituted
    an “abuse” of the right to speak and, as such, fell within the
    purview of the police power.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 46A03-1511-CR-1913 | August 26, 2016   Page 13 of 14
    Id. (citations omitted; emphases added).
    [25]   The facts presented by the State here are far more concrete than the
    hypothetical harms held to be sufficient in Whittington. Here, the State
    presented evidence that, as a result of the volume of Williams’ speech, her
    neighbors came out of their homes to see what was going on. The State also
    presented evidence that numerous officers were distracted from the task at
    hand—securing a perimeter around the residence—by Williams’ outburst. As
    such, a reasonable fact-finder could have easily concluded that Williams’
    outburst was an abuse of her right to speak. Accordingly, the State’s arrest of
    Williams was rational and, therefore, constitutional. See Barnes, 946 N.E.2d at
    577. We affirm Williams’ conviction.
    Conclusion
    [26]   In sum, we hold that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the focus of
    Williams’ speech was politically ambiguous and, therefore, that she did not
    meet her burden under art. 1, sec. 9. We further hold that the State acted
    rationally in impairing Williams’ speech. Thus, we affirm her conviction.
    [27]   Affirmed.
    Vaidik, C.J., and Baker, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 46A03-1511-CR-1913 | August 26, 2016   Page 14 of 14