Ronald A. Williamson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
Aug 11 2016, 5:31 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
regarded as precedent or cited before any Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Samuel J. Beasley Gregory F. Zoeller
Muncie, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Richard C. Webster
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Ronald A. Williamson, August 11, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A02-1509-CR-1588
v. Appeal from the Delaware Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Linda Ralu Wolf,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
18C03-1205-FA-10
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issues
[1] Pursuant to a written agreement, Ronald Williamson entered a plea of guilty to
child molesting as a Class A felony and sexual misconduct with a minor as a
Class B felony, and five additional charges were dismissed. The sentence was
left to the trial court’s discretion with the provision that the total sentence
imposed would not exceed fifty years. The trial court sentenced Williamson to
fifty years for child molesting and twenty years for sexual misconduct, with the
sentences to be served concurrently. Williamson now appeals his sentence,
raising two issues for our review: 1) whether the trial court abused its discretion
in the weight it assigned to the mitigating circumstances, and 2) whether his
sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character.
Concluding the trial court’s weighing of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances is not reviewable on appeal and the sentence is not inappropriate,
we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Williamson is C.L.’s step-father. Beginning in approximately 2002, when C.L.
was four years old, until 2012, Williamson molested C.L. multiple times per
week.1 The State charged Williamson with three counts of child molesting for
events occurring between January 1, 2002, and January 11, 2012; three counts
1
The record does not include the transcript of the guilty plea hearing, so the facts related herein are taken
from the probable cause affidavit and the pre-sentence investigation report.
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of sexual misconduct with a minor for events occurring between January 12,
2012, and May 14, 2012; and one count of possession of child pornography.
On July 20, 2015, one week prior to his scheduled jury trial, Williamson moved
to withdraw his previous plea of not guilty and to enter a plea of guilty to one
count of child molesting and one count of sexual misconduct with a minor. A
factual basis was established and the trial court took the change of plea under
advisement. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court
accepted Williamson’s guilty plea, granted the State’s motion to dismiss the
remaining counts, and sentenced Williamson to an aggregate sentence of fifty
years:
First, I turn to mitigating circumstances. [Williamson] is thirty-
six (36) years old and this case is his first felony conviction.
However, the Court attributes minimal weight to this factor since
he repeatedly molested C.L. over a span of approximately ten
(10) years. Number 2, [Williamson] has some family backing
and support which should aid in his rehabilitation. Number 3,
through the years, [Williamson] has attempted to meet his
financial obligations by maintaining some gainful employment
. . . prior to him . . . becoming eligible and receiving disability.
Number 4, [Williamson] has plead guilty in this cause of action
. . . however, the Court grants attributes minimal weight to it
because . . . I noticed in the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report
. . . [Williamson] tended to blame C.L. for the situation . . . .
Number 5, the Court considers the detrimental effect long term
incarceration may have upon him due to his mental, emotional
and physical health. So, the Court, does note for the record that
he has been examined and diagnosed with certain mental
conditions but also with some medical physical medical issues, as
well. . . .
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So now I turn to aggravating circumstances. Number 1,
[Williamson] took a substantial degree of care and planning
when he committed these offenses. . . . Number 2, [Williamson]
is in need of correctional or rehabilitative treatment that can best
be provided by removing him from society and placing him in a
penal facility offering the sex offender management monitoring
program . . . . Number 3, as I have already noted in the first
aggravating circumstance, the facts and circumstances of his
actual crimes are heinous and disturbing. I mean, it was
repeated. It was every week, twice a week, three (3) times a
week, for over ten (10) years. . . . Number 4, [Williamson] was
in a position of trust with C.L. He is C.L.’s step-father. . . .
Number 5, [Williamson’s] crimes are particularly devastating to
C.L., who is his step-daughter. . . . Not only did this effect C.L.
but [Williamson’s] crimes effected [sic] his own children, her
brothers. . . . [H]is crimes are devastating to the mother of C.L.,
his wife. . . . Another aggravating circumstance, these offenses
are not impulse crimes or one (1) time acts. . . .
So in imposing sentence the Court does consider these facts and
circumstances the most serious and heinous nature of his crimes
and the character of the Defendant. The Court finds that the
aggravating circumstances overwhelmingly outweigh the
mitigating circumstances. Therefore, the Court sentences
[Williamson] on Count 1, child molesting, a Class A felony, to
the Indiana Department of Correction for fifty (50) years. As for
Count 4, sexual misconduct with a minor, a Class B felony, the
Court sentences [Williamson] to the Indiana Department of
Correction for twenty (20) years to be served concurrently to the
sentence I imposed in Count 1 of this cause of action.
Transcript 18-22. Williamson now appeals his sentence.
Discussion and Decision
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I. Abuse of Sentencing Discretion
[3] Sentencing decisions are in the sound discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer v.
State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218; see also
Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(d) (“A court may impose any sentence that is: (1)
authorized by statute; and (2) permissible under the Constitution of the State of
Indiana; regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances or
mitigating circumstances.”). However, if, in sentencing a person for a felony,
the trial court finds aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the trial court must
make a statement of its reasons for selecting the particular sentence. Ind. Code
§ 35-38-1-3; see also Ind. Code § 35-38-1-1.3 (“After a court has pronounced a
sentence for a felony conviction, the court shall issue a statement of the court’s
reasons for selecting the sentence that it imposes unless the court imposes the
advisory sentence for the felony.”). Thus, a court may be found to have abused
its sentencing discretion by: failing to enter a sentencing statement at all;
entering a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence
that are unsupported by the record; entering a sentencing statement that omits
reasons clearly supported by the record and advanced for the court’s
consideration; or entering a sentencing statement giving reasons which are
improper as a matter of law. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-91. The reasons or
omission of reasons given for choosing a sentence are reviewable on appeal for
an abuse of discretion. Id. at 491. The weight given to particular aggravating or
mitigating circumstances is not subject to appellate review, however, and a trial
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court cannot be said to have abused its discretion in failing to properly weigh
those circumstances. Id.
[4] Williamson contends the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him by
“not affording sufficient weight to certain mitigating factors.” Brief of
Defendant-Appellant at 6. Specifically, Williamson takes issue with the trial
court’s assignment of minimal weight to the fact that this was Williamson’s first
felony conviction and the fact that he pleaded guilty, arguing they are both
circumstances worthy of “great or substantial weight.” Id. at 8. However, a
trial court is not obligated to give the same weight to mitigating circumstances
that a defendant would, Healey v. State, 969 N.E.2d 607, 616 (Ind. Ct. App.
2012), trans. denied, and the relative weight assigned by the trial court to
mitigating circumstances is not subject to our review, Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at
491. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Williamson.
II. Inappropriate Sentence
[5] Williamson also asks that we exercise our authority under Rule 7(B) to revise
his sentence, arguing that the nature of his offense and his character renders a
maximum sentence, which should be reserved for the “worst of the worst,”
inappropriate. Br. of Defendant-Appellant at 10. Even when a trial court has
not abused its sentencing discretion, we may independently review a sentence
under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides, “The Court may revise a
sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s
decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature
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of the offense and the character of the offender.” When examining the nature
of the offense and the character of the offender, we may look to any factors
appearing in the record. Spitler v. State, 908 N.E.2d 694, 696 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009), trans. denied. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on
our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the
damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given
case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). Finally, we note
the principal role of appellate review is to “leaven the outliers,” not achieve the
perceived “correct” result in each case. Id. at 1225. We therefore “focus on the
forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or
concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual
count.” Id. The defendant bears the burden of persuading this court that his or
her sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind.
2006).
[6] The advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an
appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Id. at 1081. Williamson pleaded
guilty to child molesting, a Class A felony, and sexual misconduct with a
minor, a Class B felony. A person who commits a Class A felony faces a
sentence of twenty to fifty years, with the advisory sentence being thirty years.
Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(a). A Class B felony carries a possible sentence of six to
twenty years, with an advisory sentence of ten years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(a).
The trial court ordered Williamson to serve fifty years for the Class A felony
conviction and twenty years for the Class B felony conviction. He therefore
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received the maximum sentence allowed by statute for each of his convictions.
He was also ordered to serve the sentences concurrently, and no time was
suspended.
[7] As to the nature of the offense, Williamson molested his step-daughter multiple
times per week from the time she was four until she was fourteen. He touched
and fondled her and made her do the same to him, engaged in sexual
intercourse with her, and committed acts of deviate sexual conduct. He
threatened her to keep her from telling anyone of his misdeeds. As a result of
these repeated violations, C.L. began to self-harm, and she suffers from anxiety
and depression. C.L., her mother, and her two half-brothers all participate in
counseling due to these events. As the trial court noted, the nature of this crime
is “most serious” and “very disturbing.” Tr. at 21-22.
[8] As to Williamson’s character, these are his first convictions (as well as his first
charges), and he was gainfully employed until he became disabled. He suffers
from various physical ailments. However, despite his limited criminal history,
these convictions arise out of crimes which occurred repeatedly and
continuously for ten years. Williamson has therefore not been living a law-
abiding life for a substantial period of time. See Edrington v. State, 909 N.E.2d
1093, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that despite a minimal criminal history,
defendant’s admission to using marijuana for a long period of time indicated he
was not living a law-abiding life), trans. denied. Williamson was also acting in a
parental role with respect to his victim and abused that position of trust and his
proximity to engage in a long-term pattern of abuse. See McCoy v. State, 856
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N.E.2d 1259, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that as the victim’s step-father,
defendant was “in one of the highest positions of trust” and his enhanced
sentence for a single act of molestation was not inappropriate).
[9] After due consideration of the sentence imposed by the trial court, the nature of
Williamson’s offenses, and Williamson’s character, we cannot say
Williamson’s fifty-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate.
Conclusion
[10] By arguing the trial court failed to give proper weight to certain mitigating
circumstances, Williamson has failed to raise a claim we can review on appeal.
Further, he has failed to persuade us his sentence is inappropriate. We
therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.
[11] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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