Kevin E. Groover v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
Sep 06 2016, 7:46 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
precedent or cited before any court except for the Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Alan L. Whitted Gregory F. Zoeller
Alex R. Whitted Attorney General of Indiana
Whitted Law, LLC
Ellen H. Meilaender
Columbus, Indiana
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kevin E. Groover, September 6, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
03A01-1603-CR-706
v. Appeal from the Bartholomew
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Hon. Kathleen T. Coriden,
Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Trial Court Cause No. 03D02-1503-
F6-1512
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] In March of 2015, Appellant-Defendant Kevin Groover attempted to steal
several items from a Columbus Walmart but was observed by an employee.
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When confronted in the parking lot, Groover drove off with his young son in
the car but was soon stopped by police. When deputies attempted to detain
Groover, he forcibly resisted and threatened one of them. Groover ultimately
pled guilty to Level 6 felonies resisting law enforcement, theft, and intimidation
and Class A misdemeanors resisting law enforcement and criminal trespass.
The trial court sentenced Groover to an aggregate three-and-one-half-year
sentence. Groover contends that the trial court’s sentencing statements were
insufficiently detailed. Because we disagree, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On October 5, 2014, Groover was “trespassed”1 from all Walmart stores for a
period of one year, a fact of which he was aware. Tr. p. 53. On March 6, 2015,
Groover entered a Walmart store in Columbus without having a contractual
interest in the property. Groover, who brought his young son, was observed by
Walmart asset protection officer Mason Cochran opening an electronics box,
removing an adapter, and concealing it on his person. Groover then selected
some merchandise from the toy department, a pair of shoes, and bottle of Jack
Daniels, all of which he put in a plastic Walmart bag he removed from his
pocket. Groover then left the Walmart without paying for the merchandise.
1
This apparently means that Groover was informed that he was not welcome on Walmart property and
would be subject to prosecution for criminal trespass if found there.
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[3] Cochran confronted Groover in the parking lot, but Groover refused to return
to the store. Groover put his child into his car and then “recklessly pulled out,
… almost hit[ting] two vehicles in the parking lot as he sped off.” Tr. p. 62. By
this point, Cochran was on the telephone with police, to whom he related
Groover’s direction of travel. Bartholomew County Sheriff’s Deputy Leah
Burton was nearby and responded almost immediately. Groover led Deputy
Burton on a brief chase before stopping in a driveway and slinging open the
driver’s side door.
[4] Groover approached Deputy Burton saying that he had not done anything, and
she ordered him to return to his car. Groover, very upset and shaking, returned
to his car, followed by Deputy Burton. When Groover announced that he was
going to light a cigarette, Deputy Burton told him that he could not and that he
could wait until they were done. Groover began reaching for items in the car,
and then reached behind his back.
[5] Deputy Burton grabbed Groover’s left arm and told him to put his arms behind
his back. Groover began yelling and “pushing and pulling” against Deputy
Cochran. Tr. p. 70. After Deputy Teancum Clark arrived as backup, the
deputies were able to handcuff Groover, who continued to fight with the
deputies. Groover communicated a threat to Deputy Clark in retaliation for a
prior lawful act within the scope of his law-enforcement duties.
[6] On March 24, 2015, Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana charged Groover
with Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement and Class A misdemeanors
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resisting law enforcement and criminal conversion. On November 4, 2015, the
State amended the criminal conversion charge to Level 6 felony theft and added
charges for Level 6 felonies neglect of a dependent, intimidation, and resisting
law enforcement and Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass. On February 19,
2016, Groover pled guilty to Level 6 felonies resisting law enforcement, theft,
and intimidation and Class A misdemeanors resisting law enforcement and
criminal trespass.
[7] On March 18, 2016, the trial court sentenced Groover to two years of
incarceration for Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, a concurrent one
and one-half years for theft, a consecutive one and one-half years for
intimidation, and a concurrent one year for criminal trespass, for an aggregate
sentence of three and one-half years. In sentencing Groover, the trial court
stated:
And Mr. Groover you’ve heard both the State’s recitation of
what they believe the aggravators are and I am in agreement with
the prosecutor as to those aggravators. The fact that you are
employed at this point is a mitigator but it’s not enough to take
you away from the DOC. Your actions sir were reckless,
exceptionally dangerous. Both the prosecutor and [defense
counsel] have pointed out the obvious in that your record is
substantial and many of the crimes that you have been charged
with and or convicted of are crimes of dishonesty. I don’t find
your pleading the day of the trial as a mitigator. We had the
entire jury here, ready to go to trial so the fact that you pled that
morning is not a mitigator in my mind.
Tr. p. 91.
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[8] The trial court also issued a written sentencing order which included the
following:
Aggravators: lengthy criminal history, crimes of dishonesty,
violated while on probation in the past, child with Defendant
while committed crimes for which he entered guilty plea, used
the child as a reason to sidestep the consequences of his action
and then acted recklessly with the child in his automobile.
Mitigators: The court finds his guilty plea to be of no
consequence as the jury was in the courtroom ready to hear the
case. The Court does not find the state’s exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in filing additional charges against Mr. Groover as a
mitigating factor (nor does the court find [defense counsel’s]
handling of the case was in any way inappropriate) although the
court does not disagree that the state’s characterization that it’s
position could be considered heavy-handed.
Appellant’s App. p. 10.
Discussion and Decision
[9] Groover contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to enter a
sufficiently detailed sentencing statement. Under our current sentencing
scheme, “the trial court must enter a statement including reasonably detailed
reasons or circumstances for imposing a particular sentence.” Anglemyer v.
State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), modified on other grounds on reh’g, 875
N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2008). We review the sentence for an abuse of discretion. Id.
An abuse of discretion occurs if “the decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id.
[10] A trial court abuses its discretion if it (1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at
all[,]” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a
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sentence–including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any–but
the record does not support the reasons,” (3) enters a sentencing statement that
“omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for
consideration,” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”
Id. at 490-91. There is no requirement that a trial court generate a list of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, only that it state reasonably detailed
reasons. Id. at 490. If the trial court has abused its discretion, we will remand
for resentencing “if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would
have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy
support in the record.” Id. at 491. However, the relative weight or value
assignable to reasons properly found, or to those which should have been
found, is not subject to review for abuse of discretion. Id.
[11] We conclude that the trial court’s sentencing statements, both oral and written,
are sufficient. In its oral statement, the trial court accepted the State’s proposed
aggravating circumstances, which it then detailed in its written order:
Groover’s criminal history, his commission of crimes of dishonesty, his child
was with him when he committed his crimes, he used his child to try to avoid
the consequences of his actions, and he acted recklessly with his child in his car.
Of these, Groover seems to challenge only the lack of detail in the trial court’s
statement regarding his criminal history. Because at least some of the
particulars of Groover’s criminal record appear elsewhere in the record,
however, we will not require the trial court to recite them again in detail. The
State provided details of Groover’s criminal history in its sentencing
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memorandum, none of which Groover disputed. According to that
memorandum, Groover has prior convictions, dating back to 1997, for false
informing, three counts of conversion, check deception, battery, and
interference with the reporting of a crime and had a pending charge of theft
when sentenced in this case. It is sufficient that the trial court cited Groover’s
“lengthy criminal history” as an aggravating circumstance.
[12] Groover also argues that the trial court did not adequately explain why it
rejected his guilty plea as a mitigating circumstance. In both statements, the
trial court clearly explained that it was not giving Groover’s guilty plea any
mitigating weight because he waited until the jury was selected on the morning
of trial to do so. See, e.g., Gray v. State, 790 N.E.2d 174, 178 (Ind. Ct. App.
2003) (concluding that guilty plea on day of trial was not entitled to significant
mitigating weight). Groover points to his previous attempt to plead guilty in
October of 2015, approximately four months prior to his trial date. The record
indicates that Groover’s attempted plea in October was a pragmatic decision,
however, made in the hopes of pleading guilty in exchange for the State not
filing additional charges. Groover notes that the trial court would not permit
him to plead guilty in October of 2015 because Groover was taking pain
medication that might diminish his capacity to understand the proceeding.
There is no dispute, however, that Groover was capable of pleading guilty in
February of 2016 and no evidence that he was incapacitated the entire interim.
Yet, Groover made no further attempt to plead guilty until the morning of trial.
Given this record, the trial court’s statement regarding Groover’s guilty plea
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and its rejection of it as a proffered mitigating circumstance was adequate. The
trial court’s sentencing statements were adequate.
[13] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Pyle, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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