Aaron Isby a/k/a Aaron Israel v. Richard Brown in his capacity as Warden of Wabash Valley Correctional Facility (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
Sep 07 2016, 5:52 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Aaron E. Isby Gregory F. Zoeller
Carlisle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Kyle Hunter
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Aaron Isby a/k/a Aaron Israel, September 7, 2016
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
77A05-1601-MI-233
v. Appeal from the Sullivan Circuit
Court
Richard Brown in his capacity as The Honorable Lakshmi Reddy,
Warden of Wabash Valley Special Judge
Correctional Facility, Trial Court Cause No.
Appellee-Respondent. 77C01-1411-MI-673
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
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[1] In 1988, Appellant-Petitioner Aaron Isby began serving a thirty-year sentence
for robbery. In 1992, Isby was sentenced to forty years imprisonment for an
attempted murder committed while he was incarcerated. The sentencing court
ordered Isby to serve the attempted murder sentence consecutive to his prior
sentence for robbery. In 2008, Isby completed his thirty-year robbery sentence.
In 2010, Isby filed a complaint against the commissioner of the Indiana
Department of Correction (“DOC”) which was treated as a petition for writ of
habeas corpus. Isby’s petition was denied by the trial court and that decision
was affirmed by this court on appeal. In 2014, Isby filed a second habeas
petition which the trial court denied. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Isby’s
petition.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On September 27, 2010, Isby filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus which
was ultimately denied by this court on appeal. Isby v. Lemmon, No. 77A01-
1504-PL-132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). As we outlined in Lemmon, Isby’s
underlying convictions can be summarized as follows:
Isby’s record of convictions, sentences, and pro se petitions
makes outlining his status something of a challenge, but rather
than elaborate on his seven convictions and a contempt sentence,
we think the crucial timelines are these: (1) a thirty-year sentence
for class A robbery, imposed in 1988, from which he was
released in 2008; (2) a ninety-day sentence for contempt of court,
which he began serving after finishing his sentence for robbery;
and (3) a forty-year sentence for an attempted murder he
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committed while in prison[1], a sentence that began to run in 2009
after he finished his sentence for contempt.
In 2010, Isby filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive
relief, contending that he was entitled to immediate release. The
case was transferred to Sullivan County, where Isby is presently
confined. After an appeal which produced a change of judge,
Special Judge Christopher Newton granted the State’s motion for
summary judgment.
Id. at slip op. 1.
[3] In Lemmon, Isby argued that the was entitled to immediate release because a
2008 letter from the parole board indicated that he should be released to parole
in 2009 after serving his sentence for robbery. In other words, Isby would have
been paroled on his original robbery sentence in 2009 if not for his forty-year
sentence for attempted murder. This court addressed Isby’s argument as
follows:
The Parole Board’s letter to Isby was correct, as far as it went. In
early 2009, Isby completed the executed portion of his robbery
sentence and the ninety days he owed on the contempt. The
Board’s letter made no mention of the fact that Isby was to begin
serving his sentence for attempting to murder a prison guard after
these two obligations ran their course. It may be that Isby’s letter
to the Board did not mention his sentence for attempted murder,
just as he has argued here that it was improper for Judge Newton
to take cognizance of that conviction in deciding that Isby was
not entitled to an order releasing him from prison. Or, it may be
that the Board responded to Aaron Isby thinking that he and
1
In October of 1990, while incarcerated, Isby stabbed a correctional officer in the neck with a knife.
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Aaron Israel were two different people, as appellant has used
both names.
In any event, the forty-year conviction and sentence for
attempted murder appear not actually to be under attack. There
are no disputes of material fact, and the trial court properly
granted judgment to the State.
Id. at slip op. 2.
[4] The instant appeal concerns a second habeas petition filed by Isby on
November 25, 2014. In this petition, Isby again argued that the parole board
letter entitled him to release in 2009. Isby also argues that his sentence for
attempted murder should have run concurrent to his sentence for robbery. On
January 5, 2016, the trial court denied Isby’s petition finding that his claims
were barred by the doctrine of res judicata and that his sentences were properly
run consecutively.
Discussion and Decision
[5] On appeal, Isby reiterates his argument that the parole board letter entitles him
to release and argues that his sentence for attempted murder should have run
concurrent to his sentence for robbery.
I. Whether Isby’s Claim is Barred by the Doctrine of Res
Judicata
[6] “The doctrine of res judicata bars litigating a claim after a final judgment has
been rendered in a prior action involving the same claim between the same
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parties or their privies. The principle behind the doctrine is the prevention of
repetitive litigation of the same dispute.” Love v. State, 22 N.E.3d 663, 664 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2014) (quotations omitted), trans. denied. Isby argues that the doctrine
of res judicata should not apply here for two reasons: (1) the doctrine cannot be
applied to habeas corpus cases, and (2) the respondent in this case is different
than in his previous habeas petition.
[7] As for his first argument, Isby is incorrect in his belief that the doctrine of res
judicata cannot be applied to habeas cases. The Indiana Supreme Court has
held as follows on this issue:
The general common-law rule as to the rule of res judicata in
proceedings for writ of habeas corpus is that a decision under one
writ of habeas corpus, refusing to discharge a prisoner, is not a
bar to the issuance of another writ. This was the early common-
law rule and the federal courts, as well as many state courts, have
generally accepted or given effect to this rule where not changed
by statutory enactment. However, it has been repeatedly held
that where a second or subsequent application is based on the
same, or not materially different, facts, a prior refusal to
discharge may constitute authority for refusal on subsequent
applications.
***
It is obvious that no useful purpose would be served by trying
over and over again in habeas corpus proceedings the same
questions which were fully considered and determined in the
original proceedings.
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Shoemaker v. Dowd, 232 Ind. 602, 606-607, 115 N.E.2d 443, 446 (1953); see also
Adams v. Eads, 255 Ind. 690, 692, 266 N.E.2d 610, 611 (1971); Love, 22 N.E.3d
at 664.
[8] With regards to his second argument, Isby claims that the named parties are
different in his two habeas petitions. In Lemmon, Isby named the
Commissioner of the DOC as a defendant, whereas here he brought his claim
against the Superintendent of the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. Both of
these individuals were sued in there capacity as State actors whose function it is
to maintain Isby’s incarceration. Therefore, there is no meaningful difference
between these two parties for the purposes of Isby’s habeas petitions and,
likewise, the application of the doctrine of res judicata. Accordingly, we decline
to address any of Isby’s contentions which were raised in his previous petition
for habeas corpus including his claim regarding the parole board’s letter.
II. Whether the Sentencing Court Erred in Running
Isby’s Sentence for Attempted Murder Consecutive to his
Prior Sentences
[9] Isby claims that his sentence for attempted murder should have begun running
as soon as it was imposed. For its part, the State claims that the sentence
properly began running as soon as Isby finished serving his prior sentence for
robbery. Initially, we note that by challenging the imposition of consecutive
sentences, Isby is essentially attempting to convert his habeas petition into a
petition for post-conviction relief, which he is not permitted to do. See Sumbry
v. Misc. Docket Sheet for Year 2003, 811 N.E.2d 457, 460 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“a
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person may not petition a court for writ of habeas corpus to attack his
conviction or sentence.”). Nevertheless, we will address why there was no error
in running Isby’s sentences consecutively.
[10] Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(e) provides that “If, after being arrested for one
(1) crime, a person commits another crime [] before the date the person is
discharged from probation, parole, or a term of imprisonment imposed for the
first crime…the terms of imprisonment for the crimes shall be served
consecutively.” Pursuant to this statute, Isby was properly ordered to serve his
attempted murder sentence consecutive to his prior sentences. As such, Isby
did not begin serving his forty-year attempted murder sentence until 2009. The
trial court did not err in denying Isby’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.
[11] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Pyle, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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