Kayniece B. Davis v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Aug 30 2016, 8:32 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Steven Knecht Gregory F. Zoeller
Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana
Lafayette, Indiana
Katherine Modesitt Cooper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kayniece B. Davis, August 30, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
79A02-1511-CR-1911
v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Laura Zeman,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
79D04-1306-CM-398
May, Judge.
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[1] Kayniece B. Davis challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting her
conviction of Class B Misdemeanor public intoxication. 1 We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On May 1, 2013, Davis called the police to report an intruder was attempting to
enter her home. Lafayette Police Department Officers Jacob Daubenmier and
William Meluch responded. When the officers arrived, Davis became “irate,”
(Tr. at 20), and began “yelling that she didn’t need [the officers’] help, she’ll
take care of it herself[.]” (Id. at 5.) “Yelling and cursing,” (id. at 5), she left her
home and started walking down the street, saying, “[S]he’ll take care of it; she’ll
go get him[.]” (Id. at 6.) Officer Daubenmier was concerned at this point
because he had arrested her previously for stabbing another person.
[3] Officer Daubenmier noted an “odor of alcoholic beverage on her exhaled
breath.” (Id.) He also noticed Davis “had watery, bloodshot eyes; her balance
was really poor.” (Id.) Officer Meluch could hear Davis yelling at Officer
Daubenmier from “half a block if not further away[.]” (Id. at 16.) Officer
Meluch also noted Davis’ “eyes were watery and bloodshot[.]” (Id. at 17.) He
“noted the odor of an alcoholic beverage and . . . that she was unsteady on her
feet.” (Id.)
1
Ind. Code § 7.1-5-1-3 (2012).
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[4] Davis’ friend arrived on the scene to help calm her down, but he was
unsuccessful, telling the officers: “he didn’t think he could get her under
control.” (Id. at 7.) The officers arrested Davis and she fought their attempt to
place her in handcuffs. The State charged her with public intoxication for being
intoxicated in a public place and “breach[ing] the peace or [being] in imminent
danger of doing so [or] harass[ing], annoy[ing] or alarm[ing] another person.”
(App. at 9.)
[5] At trial, Davis argued she had only consumed one alcoholic beverage, was
upset because of the intruder, and was “irate, because as soon as [the officer]
pulled up he was you know, referring back to that – we - - (inaudible) - - our
last, our last, our last – the last time I seen him basically which was when he
was arrested [sic] me for the stabbing[.]” (Tr. at 20.) The trial court found her
guilty and stated: “Her intoxication caused her actions; her anger caused her
actions but anger does not cause you to be unsteady on your feet[.]” (Id. at 30.)
Discussion and Decision
[6] The State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Davis’ conviction. When
reviewing sufficiency of the evidence in support of a conviction, we will
consider only probative evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
judgment. Binkley v. State, 654 N.E.2d 736, 737 (Ind. 2007), reh’g denied. The
decision comes before us with a presumption of legitimacy, and we will not
substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Id. We do not assess the
credibility of the witnesses or reweigh the evidence in determining whether the
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evidence is sufficient. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). Reversal
is appropriate only when no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of
the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Thus, the evidence is not
required to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence and is sufficient
if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict. Id. at
147.
[7] The public intoxication statute provides four conditions by which a person may
be convicted of the crime. Davis was charged with only two of these: “breaches
the peace” or “harasses, annoys, or alarms another person.” Ind. Code § 7.1-5-
1-3(a)(3&4). She asserts the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove
she committed the sections of the statute with which she was charged. 2 To
convict Davis of public intoxication as charged, the State had to prove she was
intoxicated in a public place and “breach[ed] the peace or [was] in imminent
danger of breaching the peace; or harasse[d], annoy[ed], or alarm[ed] another
person.” Ind. Code § 7.1-5-1-3(a)(3&4). 3 To prove Davis breached the peace,
the State had to prove she violated “public peace, order or decorum.” State v.
Hart, 669 N.E.2d 762, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). “It is a violation or
disturbance of the public tranquility or order and includes breaking or
2
A person may also be convicted of public intoxication if, while intoxicated in a public place, she endangers
a person’s life. Davis asserts the State proved only endangerment, with which she was not charged. As the
evidence was sufficient to convict her of the offense as charged, we need not address endangerment.
3
On appeal, Davis does not claim she was not intoxicated in a public place.
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disturbing the public peace by any riotous, forceful, or unlawful proceedings.”
Id.
[8] Davis was yelling in the middle of the night as she walked down the middle of
the street. She was stating she would “go get him[.]” (Tr. at 6.) The officers
believed her statement evidenced an intent to find the alleged intruder and
commit violence against him. When approached by her friend, she still would
not calm down. Davis admitted she was “irate” with one of the officers
because “he immediately started speaking on my past which is the stabbing I
did – I had no respect for him after that because he had none for me.” (Id. at
20.)
[9] Screaming in the street in the middle of the night and threatening violence can
be a breach of the peace. See Williams v. State, 989 N.E.2d 366, 371 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013) (defendant’s state of intoxication together with his belligerence
towards police officers was sufficient for the trial court to find he had breached
the peace). Davis’ arguments in her Reply Brief that her statements did not
indicate violence toward anyone or that the violence was not imminent are
invitations to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Drane, 867
N.E.2d at 146 (appellate court will not reweigh evidence on appeal.) Nor was
the State required, as Davis suggests, to prove she had in fact disturbed any
specific neighbor’s peace. See Whited v. State, 256 Ind. 386, 389, 269 N.E.2d
149, 151 (1971) (proof of a crowd gathering is not requisite to a conviction for
breach of peace), opinion clarified on other grounds, 256 Ind. 618, 271 N.E.2d 513
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(1971). For all these reasons, we affirm Davis’ conviction of public
intoxication.
Conclusion
[10] As the State presented sufficient evidence to support the conviction as charged,
we affirm.
[11] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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