Jackie Butler v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION                                                 FILED
    Aug 31 2016, 10:06 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as                        CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    precedent or cited before any court except for the                   and Tax Court
    purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Gary A. Cook                                             Gregory F. Zoeller
    Peru, Indiana                                            Attorney General of Indiana
    Ian McLean
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Jackie Butler,                                           August 31, 2016
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Cause No.
    34A04-1512-CR-2238
    v.                                               Appeal from the Howard Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable George A. Hopkins,
    Judge
    Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Cause No. 34D04-1506-F5-65
    Riley, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion 34A04-1512-CR-2238 | August 31, 2016   Page 1 of 15
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    [1]   Appellant-Defendant, Jackie Butler (Bulter), appeals his conviction and
    sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level
    4 felony.
    [2]   We affirm and remand with instructions.
    ISSUES
    [3]   Butler raises three issues on appeal, which we restate as the following:
    (1) Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the portion of Butler’s
    conviction for possession of a firearm;
    (2) Whether Butler’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
    offense and his character; and
    (3) Whether the trial court committed a sentencing error on the habitual
    offender enhancement.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    [4]   From October 2014, Butler was Jill Wilson’s (Wilson) live-in boyfriend. Also
    living at Wilson’s apartment in Kokomo, Indiana, was her adult son, Dominic
    Wilson (Dominic) and her fifteen-year-old daughter. On June 15, 2015, at
    approximately 3:45 p.m., Dominic came home from work and he violently
    banged on the door. Butler let Dominic in and remarked on Dominic’s errant
    conduct. Wilson, who was at home, heard Butler call Dominic “a punk ass
    bitch,” and Dominic called Butler “a bitch.” (Transcript p. 131). A scuffle
    ensued. Wilson pleaded with Dominic not to fight Butler since he had a
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion 34A04-1512-CR-2238 | August 31, 2016   Page 2 of 15
    pacemaker. When the two stopped fighting, Dominic went upstairs to another
    apartment to help a friend move out, and Butler went to a neighbor’s house
    down the street. During the fight, Dominic’s wallet had fallen on the floor.
    Dominic had just been paid, and when Wilson peeked through his wallet, she
    saw that it was empty. After a short while, Dominic returned to Wilson’s
    apartment to retrieve his wallet, but Wilson informed Dominic that the wallet
    was empty. Dominic then stated, “that bitch ass nigga took my money,” and
    he ran down the street to the neighbor’s house to confront Butler. (Tr. p. 131).
    [5]   When Dominic confronted Butler, Butler denied the allegations. Infuriated by
    his denials, Dominic returned to his mother’s apartment and threw Butler’s
    clothes out of the apartment. Shortly thereafter, Butler returned to Wilson’s
    apartment, and Wilson yelled at him for taking Dominic’s money. Annoyed by
    Wilson’s allegations, Butler forced Wilson into the bedroom and threw her on
    the bed. Butler proceeded to choke Wilson. Because he had a pacemaker,
    Wilson did not want to kick Butler, and instead wiggled herself out of Butler’s
    hold and slid off the bed. Butler followed Wilson and tried to smother her with
    a pillow. To free herself, Wilson kicked Butler and escaped from the room.
    Dominic, who was upstairs in another apartment, heard screams and
    commotion originating from his apartment. Accompanied by his friend,
    Dominic opened Wilson’s apartment door and realized that Butler had
    assaulted Wilson. A fight ensued. During the fight, Wilson exited her
    apartment.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion 34A04-1512-CR-2238 | August 31, 2016   Page 3 of 15
    [6]   Once outside her apartment, Wilson encountered Sarah Tomlinson
    (Tomlinson), Dominic’s acquaintance. Wilson was coughing, and Tomlinson
    directed Wilson to get away from her apartment and seek safety in hers. At that
    moment, Tomlinson and Wilson heard two gunshots, and they both ran to
    Tomlinson’s apartment for safety. As they neared Tomlinson’s apartment, they
    saw Butler running toward them, and according to Tomlinson, Butler was
    holding a “very small gun.” (Tr. p. 168). Tomlinson and Wilson entered
    Tomlinson’s apartment, and thereafter Tomlinson called the police.
    [7]   Numerous Kokomo Police Department and Howard County Sheriff’s
    Department officers responded to a dispatch of an active shooter at Wilson’s
    apartment complex. The officers knocked on Wilson’s apartment door, and a
    short while later, Butler emerged and was arrested. Afterward, the officers
    entered Wilson’s apartment and conducted a protective sweep and then left. A
    search warrant to search Wilson’s apartment was subsequently obtained, and
    during the search, the officers found a semiautomatic pistol with a loaded
    magazine hidden underneath a mattress in the southeast bedroom. They also
    found an ammunition box with about forty-five bullets. In addition, there was
    a bullet hole in the door, but the officers were unable to find a fired bullet or
    casing.
    [8]   On June 11, 2015, the State filed an Information, charging Butler with Count I,
    criminal recklessness, a Level 5 felony; Count II, strangulation, a Level 6
    felony; and Count III, domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor. On July 9,
    2015, the State added Count IV, unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion 34A04-1512-CR-2238 | August 31, 2016   Page 4 of 15
    violent felon, a Level 4 felony, and at the same time, the State filed a habitual
    offender enhancement.
    [9]    On October 20 through October 21, 2015, the trial court conducted Butler’s jury
    trial. The trial was split into three phases. The first phase of trial involved all
    charges except the serious violent felon (SVF) portion of Count IV. At the close
    of the evidence, the jury acquitted Butler of the criminal recklessness charge and
    returned guilty verdicts for strangulation, domestic battery, and possession of a
    firearm. In the second phase, the jury found Butler guilty of unlawful
    possession of a firearm by a SVF. Finally, in the third phase of Butler’s trial,
    the jury adjudicated Butler as an habitual offender.
    [10]   On November 20, 2015, the trial court conducted Butler’s sentencing hearing,
    and at the close of the evidence, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of
    one and one-half years for strangulation, one year for domestic battery, and ten
    years for unlawful possession of a firearm by a SVF. Due to his habitual
    offender adjudication, Butler’s sentence was enhanced by ten years, to be served
    consecutively to his other ten-year sentence. As such, Butler’s aggregate
    executed term was twenty years. In addition, the trial court ordered Butler’s
    instant sentences to run consecutively with his other sentence in Cause Number
    34D04-1507-F4-00080—unlawful possession of a firearm by SVF and resisting
    law enforcement, where the trial court imposed a five-year sentence.
    [11]   Butler now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion 34A04-1512-CR-2238 | August 31, 2016   Page 5 of 15
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    [12]   Butler asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support actual possession
    of the firearm in question. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
    evidence, we do not reweigh evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses.
    Duncan v. State, 
    23 N.E.3d 805
    , 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Instead,
    we consider only the evidence and the reasonable inferences supporting the
    verdict. 
    Id.
     If there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a
    reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the crime
    charged beyond a reasonable doubt, then the judgment will not be disturbed.
    
    Id.
     Further, a conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, and it is not
    necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of
    innocence. Boggs v. State, 
    928 N.E.2d 855
    , 864 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans.
    denied.
    [13]   The State presented evidence that Butler possessed a firearm. At trial,
    Tomlinson stated that she and Dominic were friends but no longer talked since
    Dominic was serving time in prison. Tomlinson testified that on the day in
    question, she and other residents from her apartment complex were drawn to
    Wilson’s apartment due to an altercation. Tomlinson testified that when she
    arrived at Wilson’s apartment, the back door was wide open and she observed
    Butler smothering Wilson. When Wilson exited her apartment, Tomlinson
    directed Wilson to her apartment for safety. Tomlinson further stated that as
    they were walking to her apartment, they heard gunshots originating from
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion 34A04-1512-CR-2238 | August 31, 2016   Page 6 of 15
    Wilson’s apartment. Both ran to Tomlinson’s apartment for safety. However,
    before going inside, Tomlinson stated that they were met by Butler and he was
    holding a small gun. Tomlinson indicated that Wilson was not paying
    attention to Butler, and once inside her apartment, she informed Wilson that
    Butler was holding a gun. Throughout Butler’s jury trial, Tomlinson
    unequivocally testified that she saw Butler holding a gun and he was about
    fifteen feet from her. In addition, Tomlinson identified the gun found in
    Wilson’s apartment as the same gun she saw Butler holding.
    [14]   Butler’s contention is that, Tomlinson, the State’s only eyewitness, was
    incredibly dubious in her testimony because (1) Tomlinson was the only person
    who stated that she saw him with a gun; (2) Tomlinson was in a romantic
    relationship with Dominic, thus making her testimony biased; and (3) Wilson,
    who was beside Tomlinson, did not observe him holding a gun.
    [15]   Under the narrow limits of the incredible dubiosity rule, a court may impinge
    upon a jury’s function to judge the credibility of a witness. Gray v. State, 
    871 N.E.2d 408
    , 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. For testimony to be
    disregarded based on a finding of incredible dubiosity, it must be inherently
    contradictory, wholly equivocal, or the result of coercion. 
    Id.
     Moreover, there
    must also be a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s guilt.
    
    Id. at 417
    . The rule is rarely applicable. 
    Id.
    [16]   The incredible dubiosity rule applies only if a witness, within her own
    testimony, contradicts herself. Butler’s arguments misapply the incredible
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    dubiosity rule by speculating about Tomlinson’s motive or bias, and the fact
    that Tomlinson’s testimony was contradicted by Wilson, who testified that she
    did not see Butler with a gun. Notwithstanding his claims, we find that the
    evidence supporting Butler’s possession of a firearm is sufficient to support
    Butler’s guilt.
    [17]   Possession of a handgun may be established through either actual or
    constructive possession. Wallace v. State, 
    722 N.E.2d 910
    , 913 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2000). Actual possession occurs when a person has direct physical control over
    an item. 
    Id.
     Constructive possession occurs when a person has both the intent
    and the capability to maintain dominion and control over the item. 
    Id.
    [18]   Here, the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to
    establish constructive possession. Constructive possession can be established if
    the defendant has both the intent and the capability to maintain dominion and
    control over the item. Gee v. State, 
    810 N.E.2d 338
    , 340 (Ind. 2004). The proof
    of a possessory interest in the premises on which the item is found is adequate
    to show the capability to maintain dominion and control over the item in
    question. 
    Id.
     In essence, the law infers that the party in possession of the
    premises is capable of exercising dominion and control over all items on the
    premises. Id. at 340-41. And this is so whether possession of the premises is
    exclusive or not. Id. Here, we find that, even though Butler shared an
    apartment with Wilson and her two children, Butler had a possessory interest in
    the house because he lived there. Butler was capable of maintaining dominion
    and control over the gun because the gun was recovered from the bedroom he
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion 34A04-1512-CR-2238 | August 31, 2016   Page 8 of 15
    shared with Wilson. As such, the State established the capability prong of
    constructive possession.
    [19]   However, when a defendant’s possession of the premises where the item is
    found is not exclusive, then the inference of intent to maintain dominion and
    control over the item must be supported by additional circumstances pointing to
    the defendant’s knowledge of the nature of the item and its presence. Id. The
    “additional circumstances” can be shown by various means: (1) incriminating
    statements made by the defendant, (2) attempted flight or furtive gestures, (3)
    location of substances like drugs in settings that suggest manufacturing, (4)
    proximity of the item to the defendant, (5) location of the item within the
    defendant’s plain view, and (6) the mingling of the item with other items owned
    by the defendant. Id.
    [20]   At Butler’s jury trial, the State introduced a picture of Wilson’s bedroom as
    Exhibit 2. Wilson testified, “[T]hat’s my bedroom, that’s my bed and that’s the
    gun that they found.” (Tr. p. 161). In addition, Wilson testified that the last
    time she saw Butler, he was in her bedroom. Also, the jury heard evidence that
    the gunshots originated from Wilson’s apartment, and that Dominic informed
    Wilson that it was Butler who fired the shots. In light of the evidence that
    Butler was last seen in Wilson’s bedroom, the gunshots originated from
    Wilson’s apartment, and the fact that the gun was found under his bedroom
    mattress, Butler’s living quarters, we conclude that Butler was capable of
    maintaining dominion and control over the gun.
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    [21]   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State proved specific facts that
    provided a solid basis to support a reasonable inference that Butler possessed
    the gun, and we therefore reject Butler’s claim that there was insufficient
    evidence.
    II. Inappropriate Sentence 1
    [22]   Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B) empowers us to independently review and revise
    sentences authorized by statute if, after due consideration, we find the trial
    court's decision inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
    character of the offender. Reid v. State, 
    876 N.E.2d 1114
    , 1116 (Ind. 2007). The
    “nature of offense” compares the defendant’s actions with the required showing
    to sustain a conviction under the charged offense, Cardwell v. State, 
    895 N.E.2d 1219
    , 1224 (Ind. 2008), while the “character of the offender” permits a broader
    consideration of the defendant's character. Douglas v. State, 
    878 N.E.2d 873
    ,
    881 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). An appellant bears the burden of showing both
    prongs of the inquiry favor revision of his sentence. Childress v. State, 848
    1
    Pursuant to Indiana Administrative Rule 9(G)(2)(b) and Indiana Code section 35-38-1-13, the presentence
    investigation (PSI) report must be excluded from public access. However, in this case, the information
    contained in the PSI report “is essential to the resolution” of Butler’s claim on appeal. Ind. Admin. Rule
    9(G)(7)(a)(ii)(c). Accordingly, we have included confidential information in this decision only to the extent
    necessary to resolve the appeal
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion 34A04-1512-CR-2238 | August 31, 2016            Page 10 of 
    15 N.E.2d 1073
    , 1080 (Ind. 2006). Whether we regard a sentence as appropriate at
    the end of the day turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the
    severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other
    considerations that come to light in a given case. Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224.
    [23]   The advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an
    appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Abbott v. State, 
    961 N.E.2d 1016
    ,
    1019 (Ind. 2012). The sentencing range for a Level 4 felony is two to twelve
    years, with an advisory sentence of six years. 
    Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5
    .5. In the
    instant case, the trial court sentenced Butler to ten years for unlawful possession
    of a firearm by an SVF, a Level 4 felony.
    [24]   Butler’s appellate brief does not make a proper argument challenging his
    sentencing based on his character and nature of the offense. Accordingly, he
    has waived this argument on appeal. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Waiver
    notwithstanding, Butler’s claims fail.
    [25]   With respect to the nature of the offense, after Wilson confronted Butler about
    taking Dominic’s money, Butler beat and choked Wilson. Butler again choked
    Wilson with a pillow when she tried to escape. Finally, when Wilson fled from
    her house and was walking to Tomlinson’s house for safety, Butler met them
    and he was holding a gun. Butler’s armed pursuit of Wilson does not render his
    sentence inappropriate.
    [26]   With respect to his character, Butler’s entire adult life has been spent
    committing crimes. Butler’s criminal history began in 1995 when he was
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    charged with operating a motor vehicle without receiving a license. In the same
    year, he was charged with resisting law enforcement, but that charge was later
    dismissed. In the following year, 1996, Butler was charged with theft. Two
    other outstanding charges for disorderly conduct against Butler were later
    dismissed pursuant to his guilty plea to theft. The PSI shows that Butler’s theft
    probation was revoked twice. In December of 1997, Butler was convicted of
    false informing and he was placed on probation for one year. In 1998, Butler
    pleaded guilty to possessing marijuana and he received another year of
    probation. In the same month, Butler was charged with dealing in a narcotic
    drug and he was sentenced to ten years, with six years executed and the
    remainder suspended to probation. In 2001, Butler was charged with operating
    a vehicle without having a license and was placed on one year of unsupervised
    probation. In March of 2002, Butler was again convicted of operating a motor
    vehicle without having been licensed and was sentenced to ten days in jail. In
    June of 2002, Butler was charged with resisting law enforcement and was
    sentenced to six months of unsupervised probation. In September of 2002,
    Butler was charged with domestic battery and false informing, but those charges
    were dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement in another cause. In October of
    2002, Butler was convicted of possessing cocaine and was sentenced to three
    years in the DOC. Two years of Butler’s previously-suspended drug dealing
    sentence were revoked based on Butler’s cocaine-possession conviction.
    Between 2004 and 2005, Butler was charged with resisting law enforcement,
    domestic battery, and false informing. In June 2005, Butler was charged with
    possessing marijuana and was sentenced to two years in the DOC with one year
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion 34A04-1512-CR-2238 | August 31, 2016   Page 12 of 15
    suspended to probation. In July of 2006, a petition to revoke Butler’s
    marijuana-possession sentence was filed. Later that month, Butler was charged
    with domestic battery. In May of 2007, Butler was again charged with
    domestic battery. In November of 2007, Butler was charged and convicted of
    three Counts of dealing in cocaine, and was sentenced to twelve years in the
    DOC. In 2013, Butler was charged with driving with a suspended license. That
    same month, Butler was charged with criminal trespass and was sentenced to
    one year. Shortly before Butler committed the instant crimes, he was charged
    with unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF and resisting law enforcement.
    [27]   At Butler’s sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that it could not ignore
    Butler’s extensive criminal history. Despite the fact that Butler has received
    lenient sentences in the past, including suspended sentences, fines, and
    probation, none of these measures were sufficient to deter him from committing
    the present offense. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our authority under
    Appellate Rule 7(B) to revise Butler’s ten-year sentence in relation to unlawful
    possession of a firearm by an SVF.
    III. Habitual Offender Enhancement
    [28]   Lastly, Butler argues, and the State agrees, that the trial court, treated the
    habitual offender enhancement as a separate sentence to be served
    consecutively to his other ten-year sentence.
    [29]   We note that habitual offender is a status that results in an enhanced sentence.
    I.C. § 35-50-2-8(j). A habitual offender finding does not constitute a separate
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion 34A04-1512-CR-2238 | August 31, 2016   Page 13 of 15
    crime nor does it result in a separate sentence. Davis v. State, 
    935 N.E.2d 1215
    ,
    1218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. When imposing a habitual offender
    enhancement, the trial court is required to “‘attach the habitual offender
    enhancement to the felony conviction with the highest sentence imposed and
    specify which felony count is being enhanced.’” State v. Arnold, 
    27 N.E.3d 315
    ,
    321 (Ind. Ct. App .2015) (quoting I.C. § 35-50-2-8(j)), trans. denied.
    [30]   The abstract of judgment lists a separate sentence for the habitual offender
    count and does not attach the habitual offender enhancement to Butler’s
    sentences of strangulation, domestic battery or unlawful possession of a firearm
    by an SVF. Because the trial court did not specify which of Butler’s convictions
    was enhanced by his habitual offender adjudication, we remand and instruct the
    trial court to revise the sentencing statement to reflect which conviction is
    enhanced.
    CONCLUSION
    [31]   In light of the foregoing, we conclude that (1) there was sufficient evidence to
    support Butler’s possession of a firearm; (2) Butler’s sentence for unlawful
    possession of a firearm by an SVF is not inappropriate in light of the nature of
    the offense and his character; and (3) we remand and instruct the trial court to
    revise the sentencing order to indicate which conviction is enhanced by Butler’s
    habitual offender adjudication.
    [32]   Affirmed and remanded with instructions.
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    [33]   Bailey, J. and Barnes, J. concur
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