Chanse T. Starr v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
Aug 25 2016, 7:42 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
regarded as precedent or cited before any Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT, PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Chanse T. Starr Gregory F. Zoeller
Bunker Hill, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Larry D. Allen
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Chanse T. Starr, August 25, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
90A02-1501-CR-62
v. Appeal from the Wells Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Kenton Kiracofe,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
90C01-1204-FC-12
May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A02-1501-CR-62 | August 25, 2016 Page 1 of 4
[1] Chanse T. Starr appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for additional
credit time. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Following a guilty plea, the trial court sentenced Starr to eight years for Class C
felony burglary. Starr appealed his sentence and we affirmed. Starr v. State, No.
90A02-1306-CR-499 (Ind. Ct. App. August 11, 2014), trans. denied. On
December 15, 2014, Starr, pro se, filed a motion for additional credit time in
Wells County Circuit Court. Starr provided evidence he completed a substance
abuse program while incarcerated. On December 22, the trial court denied
Starr’s motion.
Discussion and Decision
[3] We first note Starr proceeds in his appeal pro se. A litigant who proceeds pro se
is held to the same established rules of procedure that trained counsel is bound
to follow. Smith v. Donahue, 907 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans.
denied, cert. dismissed. One risk a litigant takes when proceeding pro se is that he
will not know how to accomplish all the things an attorney would know how to
accomplish. Id. When a party elects to represent himself, there is no reason for
us to indulge in any benevolent presumption on his behalf or to waive any rule
for the orderly and proper conduct of his appeal. Foley v. Mannor, 844 N.E.2d
494, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A02-1501-CR-62 | August 25, 2016 Page 2 of 4
[4] Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.3(b)(2014) 1 provides the requirements for an offender to
earn educational credit time and states in relevant part:
(b) . . . [A] person may earn educational credit if, while confined
by the department of correction, the person:
(1) is in credit Class I, Class A, or Class B;
(2) has demonstrated a pattern consistent with
rehabilitation; and
(3) successfully completes requirements to obtain at least
one (1) of the following:
*****
(B) A certificate of completion of a substance abuse
program approved by the department of correction.
The Department of Correction (DOC) has original jurisdiction over the
decision to grant additional credit time to an offender who completes an
educational program pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.3. Sander v. State, 816
N.E.2d 75, 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). The DOC’s decision is subject to review by
the trial court. McGee v. State, 790 N.E.2d 1067, 1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003),
trans. denied. A petitioner seeking credit time “must show in the first place what
1
Starr filed his petition for additional credit time in December 2014, and thus we refer to the statute in effect
at that time.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A02-1501-CR-62 | August 25, 2016 Page 3 of 4
the relevant DOC administrative grievance procedures are, and then that he has
exhausted them at all levels.” Young v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (Ind.
2008).
[5] Starr did not show what the relevant DOC administrative grievance procedures
are, did not provide evidence he exhausted them, and argued he was not subject
to that requirement. As he did not make that showing, we cannot say the court
abused its discretion by denying his motion for additional credit time. See, e.g.,
Sander, 816 N.E.2d at 78 (affirming denial of credit time because petitioner did
not prove he exhausted administrative remedies).
Conclusion
[6] Starr did not indicate what the DOC administrative grievance processes are, nor
did he demonstrate he had exhausted them. Accordingly, we affirm the denial
of his petition.
[7] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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