Linda Wells v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Aug 09 2016, 9:18 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ellen M. O’Connor Gregory F. Zoeller
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Eric P. Babbs
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Linda Wells, August 9, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1601-CR-51
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable William Nelson,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G18-1408-F6-41544
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Linda Wells was convicted of Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief for
setting a scooter on fire. She now appeals, arguing that the evidence is
insufficient to show that she is the one who set the scooter on fire. Finding that
a reasonable inference from the evidence is that Wells started the fire, we
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The facts most favorable to the judgment show that in August 2014, Wells
asked Dana Jones, an acquaintance, to fix her scooter. Jones agreed, so Wells
brought her scooter over to his house. Jones locked Wells’s scooter next to his
scooter in front of the house.
[3] Before Jones could start to work on Wells’s scooter, it was stolen from Jones’s
house. Jones’s scooter was not stolen because, according to Jones, he had an
alarm and a special cable lock. Jones called Wells and told her that her scooter
had been stolen and to call the police to make a report. Wells later called Jones
and told him that he had to pay for her scooter.
[4] Wells went to Yolanda Cox’s house on August 6. Cox was friends with both
Jones and Wells. Wells was upset about her scooter being stolen from Jones’s
house. During the early-morning hours of August 7, Wells and Cox walked to
Jones’s house to talk to him about it. Jones was awakened by pounding on his
front door. Jones looked out his front door and saw Cox standing there. Jones
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saw movement behind Cox. Wells was standing by Jones’s scooter. “[A]ll of a
sudden” Wells kicked over Jones’s scooter and poured gasoline from a gas can
onto it. Tr. p. 26. When Jones opened the front door, he heard a “whoosh”
and saw his scooter go up in flames. Id. Cox was still standing at Jones’s front
door when the scooter went up in flames. Id. at 28. According to Jones, he and
Cox were blown back by the force of the fire. By the time Jones got outside,
Wells was gone. Jones’s scooter was “totaled.” Id. at 29.
[5] The Indianapolis Fire Department was on another run a couple houses down
when they heard a “whoof” and then saw the scooter on fire. Id. at 5. They put
out the fire and called the police. When the police arrived, they spoke to Cox,
who was still on the scene, and Jones. An investigator with the fire department
determined that the fire was caused by flammable liquid and that there were
two ignition points. Id. at 53-57. An arson detective later interviewed Wells.
Although Wells admitted kicking over Jones’s scooter while Cox was still
standing on Jones’s porch and then pouring gasoline on it, she denied setting it
on fire. Ex. 9. In other words, Wells admitted that she “did everything besides
strike a match.” Id. Wells told the arson detective that Cox started the fire and
that Cox should go to jail. Id.
[6] The State charged Wells with Level 6 felony arson and Class A misdemeanor
criminal mischief. At the bench trial, the State presented evidence that Jones
paid $981.11 for his scooter about six months before this incident. See Ex. 7 &
7a. At the close of the State’s case in chief, the trial court granted Wells’s
motion to dismiss the arson charge because the charging information for arson
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listed the wrong date. Tr. p. 70. The trial court ultimately found Wells guilty
of Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief.
[7] Wells now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Wells contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for
Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief. In reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we consider only the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences supporting the judgment. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144,
146 (Ind. 2007); see also McElfresh v. State, 51 N.E.3d 103, 111 (Ind. 2016)
(“[T]he rule is well settled that in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain a conviction, this court will consider only that evidence which is most
favorable to the state.” (quotation omitted)). It is the fact-finder’s role, not that
of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to
determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. Drane, 867 N.E.2d at
146. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder
could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
146-47. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence; rather, the evidence is sufficient if an
inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the judgment. Id. at 147.
In addition, a conviction may be based purely on circumstantial evidence if that
evidence supports a reasonable inference of guilt. Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d
1065, 1067 (Ind. 2015); Maul v. State, 731 N.E.2d 438, 439 (Ind. 2000).
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Presence at the crime scene when combined with other facts and
circumstances—such as the defendant’s course of conduct before, during, and
after the offense—may raise a reasonable inference of guilt. Maul, 731 N.E.2d
at 439.
[9] In order to convict Wells of Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief as charged
here, the State had to prove that Wells recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
damaged or defaced Jones’s scooter without his consent, resulting in a
pecuniary loss of at least $750 but less than $50,000. Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2(a);
Appellant’s App. p. 19. Wells argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove
that she is the one who set Jones’s scooter on fire.
[10] The evidence shows that Wells was upset when her scooter was stolen from
Jones’s house. Wells called Jones and told him that he had to pay for it. Wells
and Cox also walked to Jones’s house to talk to him about Wells’s scooter being
stolen. While there, Wells kicked over Jones’s scooter and poured gasoline on
it. Although no one testified at trial that they saw Wells set Jones’s scooter on
fire, Cox was still standing at Jones’s front door when the scooter went up in
flames, causing both Jones and Cox to be blown back. Tr. p. 28. Wells then
quickly left the scene while Cox stayed and spoke with firefighters and police.
A reasonable inference from this evidence is that Wells set Jones’s scooter on
fire, which caused at least $750 in pecuniary loss. Wells’s arguments, such as
that Cox had a lighter on her, are merely requests for us to reweigh the
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evidence. We therefore affirm Wells’s conviction for Class A misdemeanor
criminal mischief.1
[11] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.
1
In light of our conclusion that the evidence is sufficient to show that Wells set Jones’s scooter on fire, we do
not address Wells’s alternate argument that in the event we find that the evidence is only sufficient to show
that Wells kicked over and poured gasoline on Jones’s scooter (but did not set it on fire), the evidence does
not support her conviction as a Class A misdemeanor (which requires at least $750 in pecuniary loss) because
it was the fire—and not the toppling of the scooter or pouring gasoline on it—that caused that much damage.
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