Bryce A. Burton v. Martin Benner and Indiana State Police , 127 N.E.3d 1198 ( 2019 )

FILED
Jun 13 2019, 8:39 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Karl L. Mulvaney Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Margaret M. Christensen Attorney General of Indiana
Nana Quay-Smith Monika Prekopa Talbot
Bingham Greenbaum Doll LLP Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
R.T. Green
Kellie C. Clark
Collin W. Green
Blackburn & Green
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Bryce A. Burton, June 13, 2019
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CT-135
v. Appeal from the Benton Circuit
Court
Martin Benner and The Honorable Hunter J. Reece,
Indiana State Police, Special Judge
Appellees-Respondents Trial Court Cause No.
04C01-1612-CT-176
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-135 | June 13, 2019 Page 1 of 5
[1] Bryce Burton appeals the trial court’s order granting partial summary judgment
in favor of Martin Benner, arguing that the trial court erred by finding as a
matter of law that Benner was acting within the scope of his employment at the
time of a vehicle accident. We agree. Therefore, we reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
Facts
[2] On June 4, 2015, Burton was operating a motorcycle traveling northbound on
Meridian Road in Benton County. Benner, who is a trooper with the Indiana
State Police, was traveling southbound on Meridian Road when he decided to
pass the vehicle traveling in front of him. Benner moved into the northbound
lane and observed Burton on the motorcycle traveling toward him. When the
distance closed between Benner’s vehicle and Burton’s motorcycle, Benner
abandoned his attempt to pass the vehicle in front of him and moved back into
the southbound lane. In the meantime, however, Burton took evasive measures
to avoid a head-on collision, resulting in the locking up of the motorcycle’s
brakes. Burton lost control and left the roadway, sustaining injuries as a result.
[3] Benner was off-duty at the time of the accident. He was driving an unmarked
Dodge Charger owned by the Indiana State Police on the way to his son’s
baseball game. The Indiana State Police authorizes its troopers to engage in de
minimis use of police vehicles for personal matters but requires that they
maintain radio contact to respond to emergency situations. Benner had worked
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-135 | June 13, 2019 Page 2 of 5
earlier in the day, but when his shift was over he had gone home, taken a
shower, changed into street clothes, and left home to go to the baseball game.
[4] On December 12, 2016, Burton filed a complaint against Benner, seeking
damages for the injuries he sustained as a result of the accident. In Benner’s
answer, he responded, among other things, that he was immune from liability
because he had been operating the vehicle within the scope of his employment.
On April 9, 2018, Benner filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing in
relevant part that as a matter of law, he was operating the vehicle within the
scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Following briefing, on
October 22, 2018, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor on
Benner on this issue.1 Burton now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Our standard of review on summary judgment is well established:
We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard as the trial court: “Drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of . . . the non-moving parties, summary judgment is
appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Williams v.
Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009) (quoting T.R. 56(C)). “A
fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the
1
On October 30, 2018, Burton filed a motion to amend his complaint, stating that because summary
judgment was granted in Benner’s favor on the issue of his employment, Burton intended to substitute the
Indiana State Police as the defendant. The trial court ultimately granted the motion, with the result that both
Benner and the Indiana State Police are named as defendants.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-135 | June 13, 2019 Page 3 of 5
case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to
resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the
undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable
inferences.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014).
[6] If it is found that Benner was working within the scope of his employment with
the Indiana State Police, he is immune from personal liability for the accident.
Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(b)-(c). As a general matter, usually discussed in the
context of the respondeat superior doctrine, “‘it is well established that whether
an employee’s actions were within the scope of employment is a question of
fact to be determined by the factfinder.’” Knighten v. E. Chi. Hous. Auth., 45
N.E.3d 788, 794 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Walgreen Co. v. Hinchy, 21 N.E.3d 99, 107
(Ind. Ct. App. 2014)).
[7] In this case, the salient facts are undisputed. Benner is employed by the Indiana
State Police. At the time of the accident, he was driving a police vehicle, but
the vehicle was unmarked. Benner was wearing street clothes, was not on duty,
and was traveling from home to his son’s baseball game when the accident
occurred. He was authorized to use his police vehicle for personal purposes but
was required to (and did) maintain radio contact in case of emergency
situations. After Burton’s accident, Benner stopped to provide assistance
although he, himself, had not been affected by the accident.
[8] While the facts are without dispute, the inferences that can be made from and
conclusions that can be based on those facts are anything but. One reasonable
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-135 | June 13, 2019 Page 4 of 5
factfinder could look at these facts and easily conclude that Benner was not
acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Another
reasonable factfinder could reach precisely the opposite conclusion. Given our
standard of review on summary judgment and our Supreme Court’s caution
that summary judgment should not be used to “short-circuit[] the trial process”
where even a “minimal[]” amount of evidence raises a factual issue to be
resolved at trial, Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1004-05, we can only find that the trial
court erred by entering summary judgment in favor of Benner on this issue.
[9] The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
Najam, J., and Robb, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CT-135 | June 13, 2019 Page 5 of 5