In re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of Bai.M. (Minor Children) and A.M. (Mother) and S.M. (Father) A.M. and S.M. v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 08 2019, 8:53 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT A.M. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Cara Schaefer Wieneke Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General
Brooklyn, Indiana
Robert J. Henke
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT S.M. David E. Corey
Deputy Attorneys General
Amy Karozos
Indianapolis, Indiana
Greenwood, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In re the Termination of the May 8, 2019
Parent-Child Relationship of Court of Appeals Case No.
Bai.M., Brax.M., and Bran.M. 18A-JT-2089
(Minor Children) and A.M. Appeal from the
(Mother) and S.M. (Father) Adams Circuit Court
A.M. (Mother) and The Honorable
S.M. (Father), Chad E. Kukelhan, Judge
Appellants-Respondents, Trial Court Cause Nos.
01C01-1801-JT-09
v. 01C01-1801-JT-14
01C01-1801-JT-15
Indiana Department of Child
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner
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Vaidik, Chief Judge.
Case Summary
[1] S.M. (“Father”) and A.M. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the
termination of their parental rights to their three children. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Father and Mother are the parents of Bran.M., born in 2008; Bai.M., born in
2011; and Brax.M., born in 2013 (collectively, “Children”). The facts that
follow are taken primarily from the trial court’s findings of fact, none of which
Parents challenge on appeal.1
[3] Parents first became involved with the Department of Child Services (DCS) in
2012. DCS substantiated allegations of neglect due to the condition of Parents’
house and for lack of supervision of Bran.M. and Bai.M. (Brax.M. was not born
yet). DCS entered into an informal adjustment with Parents and provided
services to help them improve the condition of their house. Bran.M. and
Bai.M. remained in Parents’ care. Then in 2013, while the informal adjustment
was ongoing, DCS substantiated another allegation of neglect for Parents’ lack
of supervision of Bran.M. and Bai.M. Parents continued receiving services, and
at some point DCS closed the case.
1
Because Parents do not challenge the trial court’s findings of fact, we accept them as true. See Maldem v.
Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992).
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[4] Two years later, in June 2015, DCS received a report alleging that Children
were victims of neglect. The report alleged that the family was living in the
basement of Father’s dad’s house and the conditions of the house were
“horrid.” Tr. Vol. I p. 10. On June 16, Family Case Manager (FCM) Laurie
Hoffacker visited the house to investigate. Mother allowed FCM Hoffacker to
enter the house but cautioned that the house “was kind of messy.” Id. at 12.
When FCM Hoffacker entered the first floor of the house, she saw that there
were flies and other insects swarming around the ceiling and that the carpet was
covered in dirt. FCM Hoffacker went into the kitchen and saw that the sink
was full of dirty dishes and that there was old food in the microwave. As FCM
Hoffacker approached the stairway to the basement, where the family was
living, she noticed that the “flying insects and flies were thicker and there was a
definite odor of unclean and dog feces.” Id. When FCM Hoffacker walked
down the stairs into the basement, she saw the basement floor was covered in
“a pile of clothing, trash, that was as high as the bottom step” that continued
“throughout the rest of the basement.” Id. FCM Hoffacker also saw “dog
feces,” “eggs shells,” and “food” spread all over the basement floor. Id. When
FCM Hoffacker looked up, she saw that some of the ceiling tiles were missing
and that some “dropped down to where they appeared to be in danger of
falling.” Id. FCM Hoffacker saw that one of the ceiling tiles looked like it was
going to fall directly onto one of the children’s beds. FCM Hoffacker also
checked on Children, who were two, three, and seven years old at the time, and
observed that the “bottoms of their feet were black.” Id. at 15. At that point,
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FCM Hoffacker decided to remove Children and requested assistance from the
Decatur Police Department.
[5] Officer Kevin Gerber arrived to assist FCM Hoffacker. Officer Gerber went
inside the house and saw that the basement was “covered in clothing, toys, or
trash.” Id. at 14; see also Ex. 3. Officer Gerber noticed “[f]eces on the floor in
multiple locations” and “[s]uch a high quantity of flies flying around the
basement” that he would later report, “I felt like I was breathing them in.” Ex.
3. After seeing the house, Officer Gerber contacted the Adams County Health
Department. Joe Spaulding from the health department arrived and, after
seeing the condition of the house, told Officer Gerber that the house would be
condemned. Officer Gerber spoke with Parents and explained that the house
was going to be condemned. After conferring with DCS case managers, Officer
Gerber arrested Parents for Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent. Children
were removed from Parents’ care and placed in foster care in the home of P.G.
DCS then filed petitions alleging that Children were in Need of Services
(CHINS).
[6] In July, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the CHINS petitions, and
Parents admitted that the Children were CHINS. After the hearing, the trial
continued Children’s foster-case placement and ordered that Parents participate
in numerous services, “maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing with
adequate bedding, functional utilities, adequate supplies of food and food
preparation facilities,” and “keep the family residence in a manner that is
structurally sound, sanitary, clean, free from clutter and safe for [Children].”
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Ex. 28. Later, Parents pled guilty to Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent and
were sentenced to 545 days of probation.
[7] After the house was condemned, Parents briefly stayed with a friend, then at
the Matador Inn for a month-and-a-half, and then with Mother’s relatives until
they secured their own apartment in June 2016. During that time, DCS
provided Parents with numerous services, including case-management services,
supervised visitation, psychological assessments, individual therapy, and
homemaker services to help Parents with budgeting. Through the rest of 2016
and into the beginning of 2017, the trial court held periodic review hearings and
continued to find that while Parents were “cooperating with DCS,” they had
“not enhanced [their] ability[ies] to fulfill [their] parental obligations.” Ex. 44;
see also Exs. 45-49. In September 2016, DCS began providing Parents with
Family Centered Treatment (FCT), the most intensive program available
through DCS, and, after six months of FCT, Children were returned to Parents’
care for a trial home visit in March 2017. In May, Parents’ FCT provider
reported that she believed that Parents could maintain a clean house on their
own so she discharged Parents from FCT. However, by the end of July,
Children were once again removed from Parents’ care due to unsanitary home
conditions. On July 20, Parents’ new FCM, Christina Gaspar, made an
unannounced visit to Parents’ house and found that there were items “wall to
wall on the floor,” “food on the floor where ants had gathered,” and
“cockroaches on the cabinet doors, counter, stove, floor, and inside the
refrigerator.” Ex. 55. Parents were given twenty-four hours to clean their
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house, but by the next day, although some progress was made, there were still
cockroaches throughout the kitchen. DCS made several more visits to Parents’
house but no more improvements were made. Thereafter, DCS filed a motion
for a more restrictive placement for Children. On July 31, the trial court held a
hearing on DCS’s motion and found that Parents “failed to maintain their
house in a clean and sanitary condition.” Id. After the hearing, the trial court
ordered that the trial home visit end and that Children be placed back in foster
care.
[8] After Children were removed for the second time from Parents’ house, the trial
court held periodic review hearings through the remainder of 2017 and into the
beginning of 2018. Throughout these review hearings, the trial court found that
Parents “participate and complete services, but don’t benefit completely from
said services” and “have not enhanced their ability to fulfill their parental
obligations.” Ex. 59. Additionally, the trial court found that visitations were
not going well because Mother “makes comments in front of [Children]
regarding the foster parents and has cursed in front of [Children] during visits.”
Id. Likewise, the trial court found that Father must be redirected during visits
“due to comments he has made to the children.” Id. Finally, the trial court
concluded that Parents were not cooperating with DCS and that Parents “do
not follow through and maintain stability for their family.” Id.
[9] In January 2018, DCS filed petitions to terminate Parents’ parental rights to
Children. In June, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the termination
petitions. FCM Hoffacker testified that when she was working with the family,
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DCS decided to put FCT in place “because it’s the most intensive home based
program that we have available to us and it was . . . kind of a last ditch effort to
work towards reunification.” Tr. Vol. I p. 20. FCM Hoffacker said that after
FCT discharged Parents, no other services were recommended because Parents
had to “show that they could parent on their own.” Id. at 56. FCM Gaspar
testified that DCS referred Parents to case-management services and referred
Mother to Park Center for medication management. Regarding Parents’ house
condition, FCM Gaspar said that DCS worked with Parents in “pretty much
any way we could without going in there and basically cleaning the apartment
ourselves.” Id. at 74. As for Parents’ progress, Gaspar said that toward the end
of her time as their FCM, Parents startied “missing visits” and “cancelling case
management appointments.” Id. at 78. Parents’ current FCM, Jeff Boolman,
testified and explained that DCS made the decision to remove services, such as
case management, in February 2018 because Parents “had just about every
service [DCS] can provide and we decided that we’ve reached a point if
[Parents] were going to try to have [Children] in their home, [Parents] would
have to prove that they could maintain a home that’s safe for [Children]
without services being in place.” Id. at 171. FCM Boolman also said that
termination of Parents’ parental rights is in Children’s best interests because
Parents “are not able to be motivated to be parents to [Children] without having
a service provider in their home twenty-four hours a day telling them what to
do.” Id. at 195. Misty Thornburgh, Parents’ homemaking service provider,
testified that she would give Parents a budget worksheet to bring back to her but
that she “never got one turned back in.” Id. at 150. After working with Parents
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for about a year, Thornburgh said that Parents had made no progress “[a]s far
as the[ir] budgeting.” Id. at 154.
[10] Children’s foster parent, P.G., testified that when Children were removed from
Parents’ care, Brax.M. was “almost blind in one eye. [Doctors] said he should
have had glasses a long time before we got him and . . . he ended up having
surgery on his one eye.” Id. at 112. P.G. also testified that neither Bai.M. or
Brax.M. were potty trained but that in the two years they stayed with his
family, they were both potty trained. However, after the trial home visit ended,
P.G. said that four-year-old Brax.M. came back in diapers. See id. at 122.
Bran.M.’s therapist, Riley Powell, testified that Bran.M. has a “diagnosis of
autism and oppositional defiant disorder” and that for him, structure and
consistency is very important. Id. at 96. Children’s Guardian ad litem (GAL),
Beth Webber, a licensed attorney, testified that she was concerned about
Parents missing Childrens’ medical appointments and about the cleanliness of
Parents’ house. GAL Webber also stated that she believes it is in Children’s
best interests if Parents’ parental rights are terminated. FCM Boolman and
GAL Webber testified that the plan is for Children to be adopted. See id. at 194,
219.
[11] In July, the trial court issued its order, concluding: that Children had been
removed from Parents for at least six months under a dispositional decree; that
Children had been removed from Parents under the supervision of DCS for at
least fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months; that there was a reasonable
probability the conditions resulting in removal of Children from the home of
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Parents or the reasons for placement of Children outside the home of Parents
would not be remedied; that continuation of the parent-child relationships
posed a threat to the well-being of Children; that there was a satisfactory plan
for the care and treatment of Children—adoption; and that termination was in
Children’s best interests. The trial court terminated Parents’ parental rights.
[12] Father and Mother separately appeal.
Discussion and Decision
[13] Parents’ briefs touch on several different topics, and we consolidate their
arguments and address them as one where possible.
I. Parents’ Due Process
[14] First, Parents argue that DCS failed to provide services or failed to provide the
right services and that this violated their due-process rights. Specifically,
Mother alleges that “the recommended services were not the right services
needed to reunify this family,” Mother’s Reply Br. p. 8, whereas Father
contends that “he [was not] aware [of] what needed to be addressed and [was
not] provided services,” Father’s Br. p. 17. It is true that when the State seeks
to terminate the parent-child relationship, it must do so in a manner that meets
the requirements of due process. Hite v. Vanderburg Cty. Office of Family &
Children, 845 N.E.2d 175, 181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). However, DCS points out
that Parents did not raise their due-process claims before the trial court and
asserts that Parents’ arguments are therefore waived. Because Parents do not
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deny that they failed to make their due-process claims in the trial court, we
agree with DCS that they are waived. See id. at 180 (“It is well established that
we may consider a party’s constitutional claim waived when it is raised for the
first time on appeal.”).
[15] Waiver notwithstanding, Parents have not convinced us that they were
deprived of due process. Determining what process is due involves the
balancing of three factors: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding;
(2) the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and (3) the
countervailing government interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.
Id. In addition, procedural irregularities in a CHINS proceeding may be of
such import that they deprive a parent of procedural due process with respect to
the termination of his or her parental rights. In re C.M.S.T., 111 N.E.3d 207,
212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). However, the “failure to provide services does not
serve as a basis on which to directly attack a termination order as contrary to
law.” In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 148 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); see also In re
E.E., 736 N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he provision of family
services is not a requisite element of our parental rights termination statute, and
thus, even a complete failure to provide services would not serve to negate a
necessary element of the termination statute and require reversal.”).
Furthermore, parents may not sit idly by without asserting a need or desire for
services and then successfully argue that they were denied services to assist
them with their parenting. In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000).
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[16] Here, Parents were offered a vast array of services, including: psychological
assessments, parenting assessments, case-management services, individual
counseling, homemaker services, supervised visitation, and family-centered
treatment, the most intensive program available to DCS. Nonetheless, multiple
service providers and FCMs testified that Parents were unable to benefit from
any of the services provided by DCS. In fact, when Children were returned to
Parents’ care for a trial home visit, the condition of Parents’ house began to
deteriorate just as it had done twice before. Finally, regarding Mother’s
arguments as to what DCS “could have” done, see Mother’s Br. pp. 32-33, we
have previously held that if a parent feels the services are inadequate to
facilitate the changes required for reunification, it is the parent’s responsibility
to request additional services or assistance from the court or DCS, see Prince v.
Dep’t of Child Servs., 861 N.E.2d 1223, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). In this case,
Parents did not do so.
[17] In support of her due-process argument, Mother cites several passages from a
report issued by the Child Welfare Policy and Practice Group (CWG). In
January 2018, Indiana Governor Eric Holcomb asked CWG to assess the
Indiana Department of Child Services. In June 2018, CWG issued a report
making numerous findings regarding DCS. Mother acknowledges that she did
not present this information to the trial court but asks us to take judicial notice
of it on appeal pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 201(d). Indiana Evidence
Rule 201(d) provides that judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
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proceeding, which includes appeals. Banks v. Banks, 980 N.E.2d 423, 426 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
[18] Some of the findings she cites could be considered “facts” and therefore are
capable of being judicially noticed. For example, she states that CWG found
that “while neighboring states experienced significant reductions in children
being placed outside the home, during that same time period Indiana
experienced an enormous increase in DCS placements of children outside the
home.” Mother’s Br. p. 23 (citing The Child Welfare Policy and Practice
Group, Evaluation of the Indiana Department of Child Services, June 18, 2018, found
at http://www.in.gov/dcs/files/IndianaEvaluationReportCWGFinal.pdf (last
visited Apr. 23, 2019)). Mother also asks us to take judicial notice of various
provisions from DCS’s Child Welfare Policy Manual. For instance, she quotes
a variety of statements from the “Values and Principles” section of DCS’s Child
Welfare Policy Manual:
• If a child is determined to be unsafe, DCS and the family
will develop a timely plan to keep the child safe, with all
efforts toward services to protect the child in his or her
own home.
• Families will receive ongoing supports that will enable
families to safely sustain their children in their homes.
• Vigorous early intervention services should be offered to
at-risk families to enable a child to remain safely in his or
her own home.
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• Reunification and permanency is accelerated when
visitation between parents and children is frequent and in
the most normalized environment possible.
Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. Child Welfare Pol’y Manual, Ch. 1, Sec. 0,
www.in.gov/dcs/files/1.00%20Introduction.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2019)
(quoted in Mother’s Br. pp. 31-32).
[19] The problem with Mother’s argument is that, even if we were to take judicial
notice of the statements she cites, see, e.g., In re D.H., Case No. 18A-JT-1861
(Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2019) (Petition to Transfer due May 10, 2019), Mother
does not tell us how these “facts” show a due-process violation in this case.
That is, she does not connect these “facts” to this case. As these “facts” are
meaningless in a vacuum, we see no need to take judicial notice. See Banks, 980
N.E.2d at 426 (this Court need not take judicial notice when its review of the
record “actually presented to the trial court leaves us with sufficient information
to affirm its decision”).
II. Children’s Constitutional Rights
[20] Next, Mother contends that the trial court should have appointed Children their
own legal counsel (“expressed-interest advocacy” Mother’s Br. p. 34) for
purposes of the termination proceedings. Specifically, she argues that not
appointing Children their own legal counsel violates the due-process and equal-
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution as well as Article 1, Sections 12 (due course of law) and 23
(privileges and immunities) of the Indiana Constitution. She acknowledges that
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she did not make this argument to the trial court but asserts that “[i]t was
fundamental error for the juvenile court to not appoint counsel to represent
[Children].” Mother’s Br. p. 34. The fundamental-error doctrine applies to
egregious trial errors. In re E.E., 853 N.E.2d 1037, 1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006),
trans. denied. In order for this Court to reverse based on fundamental error, the
error must have been a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary
principles, and the harm or potential for harm therefrom must be substantial
and appear clearly and prospectively. Id.[21] At the outset, Mother recognizes that providing children “expressed-interest
advocacy” in termination proceedings “is an issue of first impression in
Indiana” Id. at 34. Indeed, there is no authority in Indiana requiring that
children be appointed their own legal counsel in termination proceedings.
Indiana Code section 31-35-2-7(a) states that if a parent objects to the
termination of the parent-child relationship, the court shall appoint a guardian
ad litem, a court-appointed special advocate, or both for the child. Here, the
trial court did exactly that and appointed GAL Webber, a licensed attorney, to
represent and protect the best interests of Children. See Ind. Code § 31-32-3-6.
Next, even if we were to hold that appointment of counsel is required, Mother
has not directed us to any evidence suggesting that the lack of counsel for
Children in this case created an unfair proceeding. Due process has never been
defined, but the phrase embodies a requirement of “fundamental fairness.” In
re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011). Here, GAL Webber was appointed to
represent Children’s best interests, and P.G. (Children’s foster parent) and Riley
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Powell (Bran.M.’s therapist) both testified about Children’s need for structure
and consistency. As such, we do not see any error, let alone fundamental error,
in the trial court not appointing Children their own legal counsel.
III. Sufficiency
[22] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the
evidence or judge witness credibility. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind.
2013). Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that
are most favorable to the judgment of the trial court. Id. When a trial court has
entered findings of fact and conclusions, we will not set aside the trial court’s
findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. To determine whether a
judgment terminating parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review whether
the evidence supports the trial court’s findings and whether the findings support
the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016).
[23] A petition to terminate parental rights must allege, among other things:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.
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(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by
clear and convincing evidence. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. If the court
finds that the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the
parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).
[24] First, Parents argue that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
conclusion that the conditions resulting in Children’s removal will not be
remedied. In determining whether the conditions that resulted in a child’s
removal will not be remedied, the trial court engages in a two-step analysis.
First, the trial court must ascertain what conditions led to their placement and
retention in foster care. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. Second, the trial
court determines whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions
will not be remedied. Id. “The trial court must consider a parent’s habitual
pattern of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of
future neglect or deprivation.” Id.
[25] Here, Parents failed to demonstrate that they were any closer to providing
Children a safe, clean home than they were at the beginning of the CHINS
case. The evidence shows that Parents were unable to benefit from services,
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some of which were very intensive, to reunite with Children and that as soon as
Children returned to Parents’ care for a trial home visit, the home’s conditions
went back to the way they were when Children were removed the first time. As
such, the trial court did not err when it concluded that there is a reasonable
probability that the conditions resulting in Children’s removal and continued
placement outside the home will not be remedied.2
[26] Next, Parents argue that the trial court erred in concluding that termination is
in Children’s best interests. To determine what is in the children’s best
interests, the trial court must look to the totality of the evidence. In re A.D.S.,
987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. In doing so, the trial
court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children. Id.The trial court need not wait until the children are irreversibly harmed before
terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. We have previously held that the
recommendation by both the DCS case manager and child advocate to
terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in
removal will not be remedied, is clear and convincing evidence that termination
is in the best interests of the children. Id. at 1158-59.
2
Because we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in Children’s removal will not be remedied, we do not address its alternate conclusion that there is a
reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationships pose a threat to the well-being of
Children. See In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 478 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is
written in the disjunctive and requires the trial court to find only one of the two requirements of subsection
(b) has been established by clear and convincing evidence), trans. denied.
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[27] Here, in addition to Parents’ inability to maintain a clean house and safe
environment for Children that necessitated DCS involvement and their lack of
progress since then, FCM Boolman and GAL Webber testified that terminating
Parents’ parental rights would serve the best interests of Children. See Tr. pp.
195, 245. Furthermore, the trial court found that Children have been removed
from Parents’ care for nearly three years and that “they need permanency.”
Mother’s App. Vol. II p. 73. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it
determined that termination is in Children’s best interests. See also In re K.T.K.,
989 N.E.2d at 1230 (finding that “children have an interest in terminating
parental rights that prevent adoption and inhibit establishing secure, stable,
long-term, continuous relationships”).
[28] Finally, Father challenges the trial court’s conclusion that there is a satisfactory
plan for Children’s care and treatment. In order for the trial court to terminate
a parent-child relationship, it must find that there is a satisfactory plan for the
care and treatment of the child. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(D). That plan need
not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction the child will
go after the parent-child relationship is terminated. Lang v. Starke Cty. Office of
Family & Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.
Adoption is generally a satisfactory plan, even when a potential adoptive family
has not been identified. See id. at 375. Part of the reason for this is that it is
within the authority of the adoption court, not the termination court, to decide
whether an adoptive placement is appropriate. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007
(Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.
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[29] Here, DCS’s plan is adoption. FCM Boolman and GAL Webber agreed with
this plan. Father contends that because the “foster parents had not decided
whether they wanted to adopt [Children]” and “there is no guarantee that
[Children] will remain together,” adoption is not a satisfactory plan. Father’s
Br. pp. 20-21. However, adoption is not an unsatisfactory plan even if DCS has
not identified a specific family to adopt Children and even if the plan were for
Children to have separate adoptive homes. See In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d at 1007.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that adoption is a
satisfactory plan for Children.
[30] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Crone, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-2089 | May 8, 2019 Page 19 of 19