Stephonn T. Sutton v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                         FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                   May 10 2019, 10:04 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                              Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                        and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Peter D. Todd                                           Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Elkhart, Indiana                                        Attorney General
    Henry A. Flores, Jr.
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Stephonn T. Sutton,                                     May 10, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-CR-2430
    v.                                              Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Kristine A.
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                      Osterday, Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    20D01-1710-F6-1508
    Crone, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2430 | May 10, 2019                      Page 1 of 3
    [1]   Stephonn T. Sutton appeals his conviction for level 6 felony failure to return to
    lawful detention. Sutton failed to appear at his jury trial and was tried in
    absentia.1 He concedes that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to
    counsel and had elected to represent himself at his jury trial. He now asserts
    that the trial court violated his right to counsel in failing to order standby
    counsel to represent him and try his case in his absence. Sutton has failed to
    satisfy Indiana Appellate Rule 46’s requirement of providing a cogent argument
    supported by citation to authority. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a)
    (providing that each contention made in argument section of appellant’s brief
    “must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented,
    supported by cogent reasoning” and “citations to the authorities … relied on.”).
    Accordingly, he has waived appellate review of this issue. See Foutch v. State, 
    53 N.E.3d 577
    , 581 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (waiving issue for lack of cogent
    argument).
    [2]   Waiver notwithstanding, Sutton’s claim is without merit. Despite the knowing
    and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel, Sutton appears to suggest that the
    trial court abused its discretion in failing to reassert his right to counsel for him
    and to direct standby counsel to take over when he failed to appear. We
    1
    Although criminal defendants have the constitutional right to be present at all stages of their trial, a
    defendant may be tried in absentia if the trial court determines that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily
    waived the right to be present. Jackson v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 494
    , 498 (Ind. 2007). Sutton does not assert that
    his constitutional right to be present was violated or that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive that
    right. Indeed, it is undisputed that he knew of the scheduled trial date but failed to appear. See Brown v. State,
    
    839 N.E.2d 225
    , 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (trial court may presume defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and
    intelligently waived right to be present upon showing defendant knew scheduled trial date but failed to
    appear), trans denied (2006).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2430 | May 10, 2019                          Page 2 of 3
    initially note that the appointment of standby counsel for a pro se defendant is
    discretionary, as is the trial court’s decision to direct standby counsel to take
    over at any point during the proceedings. Sherwood v. State, 
    717 N.E.2d 131
    ,
    135 n.2 (Ind. 1999). Moreover, it is within the trial court’s discretion to
    determine whether a defendant may abandon his pro se defense after the trial
    has begun and reassert his right to counsel. Koehler v. State, 
    499 N.E.2d 196
    ,
    198-99 (Ind. 1986). We do not equate Sutton’s voluntary failure to appear as a
    reassertion of the right to counsel, and the trial court was under absolutely no
    obligation to direct standby counsel to take over the proceeding in Sutton’s
    absence. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the conviction.
    [3]   Affirmed.
    Bradford, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2430 | May 10, 2019   Page 3 of 3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18A-CR-2430

Filed Date: 5/10/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/10/2019