Devon R. Rush v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                             FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    Mar 09 2017, 7:07 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                           CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Derick W. Steele                                        Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Deputy Public Defender                                  Attorney General of Indiana
    Kokomo, Indiana
    Jesse R. Drum
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Devon R. Rush,                                          March 9, 2017
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    34A05-1607-CR-1590
    v.                                              Appeal from the
    Howard Superior Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                     William C. Menges, Jr., Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    34D01-1505-F2-485
    Kirsch, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A05-1607-CR-1590 |March 9, 2017   Page 1 of 7
    [1]   Devon R. Rush (“Rush”) pleaded guilty to dealing in a narcotic drug 1 as a Level
    2 felony, dealing in cocaine2 as a Level 2 felony, and unlawful possession of a
    firearm by a serious violent felon (“SVF”),3 a Level 4 felony, and was sentenced
    to a thirty-year aggregate sentence. He appeals, raising the following restated
    issue: whether his thirty-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of
    the offense and the character of the offender.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   On May 20, 2015, the police found Rush in the backseat of a car, sitting next to
    a child in a car seat, and in close proximity to a loaded .380 handgun, 22.4
    grams of heroin, 48.7 grams of cocaine, and $3,871 in cash. Rush initially lied
    to the police and said the gun and drugs were not his, and another passenger
    lied and said the gun and drugs were hers. On May 22, 2015, the State charged
    Rush with Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug, Level 2 felony dealing in
    cocaine, Level 3 felony possession of a narcotic drug, Level 3 felony possession
    of cocaine, and Level 4 felony possession of a firearm by a SVF.
    [4]   The parties entered into a plea agreement in which Rush agreed to plead guilty
    to Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug, Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine,
    1
    See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(2), (e)(1).
    2
    See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(2), (e)(1).
    3
    See Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A05-1607-CR-1590 |March 9, 2017   Page 2 of 7
    and Level 4 felony possession of a firearm by a SVF in exchange for the State’s
    dismissal of the remaining counts. The parties agreed that sentencing would be
    left to the discretion of the trial court, but that the sentences would run
    concurrently.
    [5]   The trial court found Rush’s prior criminal history, the fact that he was on
    probation when he committed the present offenses, and his decision to deal
    drugs even though he had two young children to take care of as aggravating
    factors. Tr. at 30-31. The trial court gave Rush’s guilty plea mitigating weight
    since he pleaded guilty “in the midst of trial.” 
    Id. at 31.
    After finding that the
    aggravating and mitigating factors justified an enhanced sentence, the trial court
    imposed thirty years for Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug, thirty years
    for Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine, and twelve years for Level 4 felony
    possession of a firearm by a SVF and ordered the sentences to run concurrently
    for an aggregate sentence of thirty years. Rush now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    [6]   Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), “we may revise any sentence authorized by
    statute if we deem it to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and
    the character of the offender.” Corbally v. State, 
    5 N.E.3d 463
    , 471 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2014). The question under Appellate Rule 7(B) is not whether another
    sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence
    imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 
    894 N.E.2d 265
    , 268 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2008). It is the defendant’s burden on appeal to persuade the reviewing court
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A05-1607-CR-1590 |March 9, 2017   Page 3 of 7
    that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Chappell v. State,
    
    966 N.E.2d 124
    , 133 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
    [7]   Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate
    sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should
    receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 
    895 N.E.2d 1219
    , 1222 (Ind.
    2008). The principal role of appellate review is to attempt to “leaven the
    outliers.” 
    Id. at 1225.
    Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the
    end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the
    severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that
    come to light in a given case.” 
    Id. at 1224.
    [8]   Rush argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him and that his thirty-year
    sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character
    of the offender. He specifically asserts that the nature of his offense was not the
    worst offense and that, although he had a significant criminal history, his
    character does not make him the worst offender. To bolster his character, Rush
    contends that he was only engaged in dealing drugs to help a family member
    bond out of jail and not for selfish personal gain and that his children would be
    impacted by his incarceration.
    [9]   When considering the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting
    point to determine the appropriateness of a sentence. Johnson v. State, 
    986 N.E.2d 852
    , 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Anglemyer v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 482
    ,
    494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 
    875 N.E.2d 218
    (2007)). Here, Rush pleaded
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A05-1607-CR-1590 |March 9, 2017   Page 4 of 7
    guilty to one count of Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug, one count of
    Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine, and one count of Level 4 felony possession of
    a firearm by a SVF. A person who commits a Level 2 felony shall be
    imprisoned for a fixed term of between ten and thirty years, with the advisory
    sentence being seventeen and one-half years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. A
    person who commits a Level 4 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of
    between two and twelve years, with the advisory sentence being six years. Ind.
    Code § 35-50-2-5.5. Here, the trial court sentenced Rush to thirty years for each
    of his Level 2 felony convictions and twelve years for his Level 4 felony
    conviction and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently for a total
    sentence of thirty years.
    [10]   As to the nature of the offense, police discovered Rush in a car, sitting next to a
    baby, and in possession of a loaded handgun, 22.4 grams of heroin, 48.7 grams
    of cocaine, and $3,871 in cash. At the time he was found to be possession of
    this contraband, he was on probation for dealing drugs. When confronted with
    the contraband by the police, Rush lied about possessing the drugs, handgun,
    and cash and, instead, allowed the other passengers in the car to take the blame
    for the items.
    [11]   As to Rush’s character, he had a significant criminal history, beginning when he
    was a juvenile. He began dealing drugs at the age of sixteen years old, and he
    was twenty-eight at the time of sentencing. His criminal history consisted of a
    juvenile adjudication for possession of marijuana, a felony conviction for
    possession of cocaine or narcotic drug, three misdemeanor convictions for
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A05-1607-CR-1590 |March 9, 2017   Page 5 of 7
    operating a vehicle without ever receiving a license, and two Class B felony
    convictions for dealing in cocaine. Rush was released from the Community
    Transition Program on April 13, 2015 and started dealing drugs again about a
    week later. He also began to use cocaine, marijuana, and Lortab since leaving
    incarceration. Rush was also still on probation when he committed the instant
    offenses on May 20, 2015.
    [12]   Further, although Rush asserts that he was only dealing drugs to earn money to
    help bond his family member out of jail, he does concede that that was not an
    excuse for committing a crime. Additionally, Rush’s criminal history
    demonstrates that his present offenses were not out of line with his criminal
    history. Further, even though Rush had two young children, he chose to
    commit crimes instead of reuniting with them after being recently released from
    incarceration. Lastly, while Rush claims his sentence is inappropriate because
    he should have received leniency due to his guilty plea, the traditional reasons
    for granting lenience were not present here because Rush did not plead guilty
    until the third day of his jury trial after the trial court and the State had
    expended time and resources in trying him. See Pagdett v. State, 
    875 N.E.2d 310
    ,
    317 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“[T]he significance of a guilty plea is lessened if it is
    made on the eve of trial after the State has expended resources in preparing its
    case.”), trans. denied. We conclude that, in light of the nature of the offense and
    the character of the offender, Rush’s sentence is not inappropriate.
    [13]   Affirmed.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A05-1607-CR-1590 |March 9, 2017   Page 6 of 7
    Robb, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 34A05-1607-CR-1590 |March 9, 2017   Page 7 of 7