G.S. v. T.K. (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Sep 14 2016, 9:07 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Matthew J. Elkin Craig A. Dechert
Deputy Public Defender Kokomo, Indiana
Kokomo, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
G.S., September 14, 2016
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
34A04-1601-AD-140
v. Appeal from the Howard Circuit
Court
T.K., The Honorable Lynn Murray,
Appellee-Petitioner. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
34C01-1501-AD-3
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] G.S. appeals the trial court’s grant of T.K.’s petition to adopt G.S.’s son. We
reject all of G.S.’s arguments except one: the trial court erred by accepting a
limited criminal-history check for T.K. rather than ordering the complete
criminal-history report required by Indiana Code section 31-19-8-5(d). We
vacate and remand to the trial court for reconsideration in light of a complete
background check.
Facts and Procedural Summary
[2] C.K. (Mother) and G.S. were married and have one son, T.S. (Child), born
December 22, 2008. The couple divorced in 2011, and Mother was awarded
custody of Child. G.S. was granted supervised parenting time and ordered to
pay child support.
[3] G.S. initially maintained his parenting time with Child every other weekend,
but he did not pay the ordered child support.1 In November 2012, Mother
married T.K. T.K became the sole financial support for Mother and Child and
a primary caregiver for Child. Around the same time, the visits between G.S.
and Child stopped. There was only one visit after November 2012—G.S. went
to Child’s t-ball game in spring 2013 and spoke with Child at the game. In
March 2014, G.S. was incarcerated, serving sentences for, among other crimes,
1
G.S. did pay some child support in the summer of 2015, six months after the adoption petition was filed.
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possession of methamphetamine and auto theft. His only communication with
Child during his incarceration was “five or six” cards or letters he sent for
Child’s birthday, Christmas (which is three days after Child’s birthday), and “a
few in between.” Tr. p. 24.
[4] On January 22, 2015, T.K. filed a petition to adopt Child. The petition
included the following statement:
That [G.S.] is the natural father of [Child] and his consent should
not be necessary due to him having no contact with the child
since April of 2013 and providing no support for the minor child
for the past year.
Appellant’s App. p. 32. A summons and a copy of the petition were sent to
G.S. However, T.K. did not tender the Notice to Named Father form to the
trial court until three weeks later, and the notice T.K. tendered for service on
G.S. did not comply with the section of the Indiana Code to be used for
adoption petitions where it is being argued that consent is not required.
Nevertheless, on February 12, 2015, G.S. requested a continuance until he
completed his incarceration in Hendricks and Marion Counties, and on March
16, G.S. filed a motion to contest the adoption. The trial court appointed
counsel for G.S. in April and held a hearing on the adoption petition on
November 24, 2015.
[5] At the hearing, G.S.’s counsel argued that the petition should be dismissed
because, in addition to the issue with the Notice to Named Father, the petition
itself did not contain Child’s gender or race; the trial court failed to return the
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petition to T.K. within five days to add the omitted gender and race; T.K. failed
to submit proof with the adoption petition that certain fees due to the State were
paid; the required medical-history report was filed five months after the
statutory deadline and was incomplete; and the criminal-history report T.K.
offered into evidence at trial was prepared by the Howard County Sheriff and
did not contain the state or national components of the criminal history report
required for adoption. The trial court reserved ruling on G.S.’s requests to
dismiss the petition. After the hearing, T.K. submitted a Limited Criminal
History prepared by the Indiana State Police declaring that a search of Indiana
records indicated T.K. had no criminal history. The trial court ultimately found
all of these defects harmless.
[6] The trial court issued its order granting T.K.’s petition to adopt, including
findings and conclusions, in late December 2015. Relevant to this appeal, the
trial court concluded that G.S.’s consent was not required because he “did not
provide any financial support for [Child]” for more than one year despite there
being times when G.S. was employed and could have provided some financial
support, and that “[G.S.] has failed without justifiable cause to communicate
significantly with [Child] for a period of at least one (1) year.” Appellant’s
App. p. 17-18. The trial court also concluded that “[Child’s] best interests are
served by granting [T.K.’s] petition to adopt him.” Id. at 19.
[7] G.S. now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision
[8] G.S. contends that the trial court erred in granting T.K.’s petition to adopt
Child because (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s
conclusions that his consent was not required and the adoption was in Child’s
best interests and (2) T.K. failed to comply with certain statutory requirements.
When reviewing the trial court’s ruling in an adoption proceeding, we presume
the trial court’s decision is correct, and we will not disturb the ruling unless the
evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the decision, leads to but one
conclusion and the trial judge reached an opposite conclusion. In re Adoption of
T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014).
[9] When, as in this case, the trial court has made findings of fact and conclusions
of law, we first determine whether the evidence supports the contested findings
and, second, whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We will not set
aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Ind. Trial Rule 52.
Factual findings are clearly erroneous if the record lacks any evidence or
reasonable inferences to support them, and a judgment is clearly erroneous
when it is unsupported by the findings of fact and the conclusions relying on
those findings. T.L., 4 N.E.3d at 662.
I. Insufficient Evidence
[10] G.S. argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s
conclusions that his consent to the adoption is not necessary and that the
adoption is in Child’s best interests.
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A. Consent
[11] Generally, a trial court cannot grant an adoption without the consent of the
child’s parents. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1. However, Indiana Code section 31-
19-9-8(a)(2) provides that a non-custodial parent’s consent is not required “if for
a period of at least one (1) year the parent: (A) fails without justifiable cause to
communicate significantly with the child when able to do so; or (B) knowingly
fails to provide for the care and support of the child when able to do so as
required by law or judicial decree.”
[12] Here, the trial court found that both of these statutory provisions applied to
G.S., but in this appeal, G.S. challenges only the trial court’s findings with
respect to communication. The statute is written in the disjunctive such that the
existence of either one of the circumstances provides sufficient ground to
dispense with consent. In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 973 (Ind. 2014).
Because G.S. makes no argument that the trial court’s findings and conclusions
are clearly erroneous with regard to his failure to provide financial support for
Child, even if the trial court’s findings and conclusions with regard to G.S.’s
failure to significantly communicate were clearly erroneous, we would not
reverse the judgment of the trial court. In re Adoption of S.W., 979 N.E.2d 633,
642 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
[13] Nevertheless, we will address G.S.’s argument with respect to communication.
G.S. argues that he had some communication with Child—he attended a t-ball
game in 2013 and he sent a handful of cards after he was incarcerated in 2014.
We have long held that the purpose of Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8(a)(2)(A)
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is to “foster and maintain communication between non-custodial parents and
their children, not to provide a means for parents to maintain just enough
contact to thwart potential adoptive parents’ efforts to provide a settled
environment to the child.” In re Adoption of S.W., 979 N.E.2d at 640.
Therefore, T.K. “[was] not required to prove that [G.S.] had no communication
with [Child,]” but rather that the communication G.S. had with Child was not
significant. Id. Attending a sporting event and sending a few cards over the
course of three years, in the context of a parent-child relationship, is minimal
communication. The trial court reasonably concluded from these facts that
G.S. failed to significantly communicate for at least one year.
[14] However, the statute also requires that the failure to significantly communicate
be unjustifiable, and G.S. asserts that he “can be said to have justifiably failed”
to communicate with his son because he was incarcerated and he is a drug
addict.2 Appellant’s Br. p. 17. G.S. is correct that his communication with
Child after being incarcerated in March 2014 must be viewed in the context of
that incarceration and the attendant limitations on his ability to communicate
with Child. See Lewis v. Roberts, 495 N.E.2d 810, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
2
G.S. also argues that Mother did not give adequate notice of a change in address and phone number, and
that “[Mother] said she was not inclined to drive [Child] to see G.S.” Appellant’s Br. p. 17. However, the
trial court found that Mother did not know how to reach G.S. when she moved and that Mother notified
G.S.’s mother, with whom G.S. sometimes lived, of the changes. Additionally, G.S. in fact contacted
Mother after her contact information changed. Because G.S. makes no argument that there was an attempt
to contact Child that was thwarted because he did not have valid contact information, or that Mother was
obligated to be the person who supplied transportation for his visitation, we do not need to address this
argument further.
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However, even before his incarceration, G.S. failed to communicate with Child
for sixteen months from November 2012 through March 2014, with the
exception of attending one t-ball game. While we understand that G.S. is an
addict and that may have hindered his ability to communicate, difficult times
do not constitute justifiable cause for failing to maintain significant
communication with one’s child. In re Adoption of T.H., 677 N.E.2d 605, 607
(Ind. Ct. App. 1997). There is sufficient evidence to establish that G.S.
unjustifiably failed to significantly communicate with Child for at least one
year. G.S. has failed to persuade us that the evidence regarding communication
“leads to but one conclusion and the trial judge reached an opposite
conclusion.” In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d at 662.
B. Best Interests of the Child
[15] G.S. also asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
conclusion that adoption is in Child’s best interests. In determining the best
interests of a child in an adoption proceeding, we have noted that there are
strong similarities between the adoption statute and the termination-of-parental-
rights statute. In re Adoption of M.S., 10 N.E.3d 1272, 1281 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014). In termination-of-parental-rights cases, the trial court looks to the
totality of the evidence to determine the best interests of a child. Id. Relevant
factors include a parent’s historical and current inability to provide a suitable
environment for the child, In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013),
and the child’s need for permanence and stability, see A.J. v. Marion Cnty. Office
of Family and Children, 881 N.E.2d 706, 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.
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[16] G.S. argues that there is “no testimony in the record regarding the impact of the
adoption on [Child]” except for his own testimony that Child would feel
abandoned if he “lost” his biological father. Appellant’s Br. p. 18. Therefore,
G.S. concludes, the trial court erred in deciding that adoption was in Child’s
best interests. We cannot agree. G.S. also testified that he has been
incarcerated for the past two years, that he has no prospective employment for
when he is released, that he has no stable housing of his own and intends to
return to his mother’s house, and that G.S. was periodically homeless when he
was using drugs during the year before his incarceration. G.S. has a history of
drug abuse and criminality that has kept him from providing a stable
environment for his child, and the trial court could reasonably infer that this
pattern will continue.
[17] In contrast, T.K. provided financial support and participated in Child’s daily
life as a step-parent for the three years preceding the adoption hearing. In light
of the above factors, and based on the record as it stands now, the trial court’s
conclusion that adoption was in Child’s best interests was not clearly
erroneous.3
3
This is, of course, subject to change depending on the findings, if any, of the complete background check
discussed below.
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II. Strict Procedural Compliance
[18] G.S. also argues that T.K. failed to comply with certain provisions of the
adoption statute and, therefore, the trial court should have dismissed the
petition. In some circumstances, it is possible that procedural irregularities in
family-law proceedings may be of such significance that they deprive a parent of
procedural due process when terminating his or her parental rights. A.P. v.
Porter Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 734 N.E.2d 1107, 1112-13 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000), trans. denied. In general, the adoption statute is to be strictly construed
and followed. See In re Adoption of A.M., 930 N.E.2d 613, 620 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010). But it is not to be so strictly construed as to defeat the statute’s purposes.
Id. The Court “must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Ind. Trial Rule 61. Therefore,
we will not reverse for harmless errors. See id.
[19] First, G.S. complains that he did not receive adequate notice of the proposed
adoption. He notes that the original petition did not list Child’s sex, race, or
how long Child had lived with T.K.; the Notice to Named Father did not
contain the reasons why T.K. would argue G.S.’s consent was not required; and
G.S. maintains that he did not initially receive the Notice to Named Father.4
4
The adoption statute provides more than one form for notice to the parent whose rights will be terminated if
the adoption petition is granted. Here, T.K. tendered a Notice to Named Father that complies with Indiana
Code section 31-19-4-5. But because T.K. was arguing that G.S.’s consent was not required, the proper form
is a Notice of Adoption described in Indiana Code section 31-19-4.5-3. However, this does not affect our
conclusion that sufficient notice was given in this case.
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[20] It is well settled that substantial compliance with the notice provision “will be
sufficient if the party receives notice which achieves that purpose for which the
statute was intended.” In re Adoption of J.T.A., 988 N.E.2d 1250, 1257 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013) (quoting Matter of Paternity of Baby Girl, 661 N.E.2d 873, 877 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1996)), trans. denied. Here, G.S. knew from the adoption petition that
T.K. was seeking to adopt Child, and the petition made clear that T.K.
intended to argue G.S.’s consent was not required because of a lack of
significant communication and failure to pay child support. G.S. was able to
contest the adoption in court, with counsel. While the petition to adopt and
Notice to Named Father did not strictly comply with the statute, and G.S.
contends he did not initially receive the Notice to Named Father, these defects
did not cause G.S. to be deprived of due process; notice was, therefore,
sufficient.
[21] G.S. next complains that T.K. failed to satisfy Indiana Code section 31-19-2-7,
which requires a medical report to be submitted within sixty days of filing the
petition to adopt. In this case, the report was not submitted until seven months
after the adoption petition was filed, and G.S. notes that it does not contain
information regarding his own medical history, or Child’s size and APGAR
score at birth. However, G.S. does not argue that timely submission or the
missing information would have changed the outcome in this case. Any error
was therefore harmless.
[22] Next, Section 31-19-2-8 requires that an adoption-history fee and putative-
father-registry fee be attached to the petition for adoption. T.K. did not submit
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proof of payment for these two fees until December 2015, after the adoption
hearing. Appellant’s App. p. 99-101. We agree that these fees should have
been paid according to the deadlines in the statute; however, G.S. offers no
explanation of how the error affected his rights, and we see no reason to
remand simply to have the trial court say that the requirements are now met.
[23] Finally, G.S. complains that the trial court did not order the complete criminal-
history report required by Indiana Code section 31-19-8-5(d).5 Instead, the trial
court accepted the Limited Criminal History prepared by the Indiana State
Police and submitted after the hearing. Among other issues, the State Police
report does not satisfy the requirements for national database searches in
Indiana Code section 31-9-2-22.5. According to Indiana Code section 31-19-2-
7.3, “[a] court may not waive any criminal history check requirements . . . .”
For the protection of the child, we recently decided that the absence of a
statutorily compliant background check “renders an adoption petition fatally
deficient.” See In re Adoption of S.O., No. 41A01-1510-AD-1781, 2016 WL
3421219 (Ind. Ct. App. June 22, 2016).
5
Section 31-19-8-5(d) requires the trial court to order either the county office of family and children or a child
placement agency to prepare a criminal-history report. There are five components to the report that are listed
in Indiana Code section 31-9-2-22.5, which we summarize: (1) a state police department fingerprint-based or
name-based criminal history check of both national and state databases; (2) a check for substantiated reports
of child abuse or neglect in jurisdictions where a person lived within the previous five years; (3) a search of
the United States Department of Health and Human Services’ national registry of substantiated cases of child
abuse or neglect; (4) a search of the national sex offender registry maintained by the United States
Department of Justice; and (5) a check of local law enforcement agency records in every jurisdiction where a
person has lived within the previous five years.
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[24] Here, the trial court relied on the limited background check that T.K. submitted
after the adoption hearing. That is not sufficient. Therefore, we must remand
to the trial court to order a background check that fully complies with Indiana
Code section 31-19-8-5(d) and to reconsider the best interests of the child should
the background check reveal that T.K. has a criminal history.
[25] Vacated and remanded.
Baker, J., and Najam, J., concur.
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