Jeffrey L. McMahel v. Mary A. Deaton , 61 N.E.3d 336 ( 2016 )

FILED
Sep 14 2016, 9:01 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Zachary J. Stock David A. Smith
Zachary J. Stock, Attorney at Law, Patrick J. Smith
P.C. McIntyre & Smith
Carmel, Indiana Bedford, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jeffrey L. McMahel, September 14, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
59A04-1601-PL-91
v. Appeal from the Orange Circuit
Court
Mary A. Deaton, The Honorable Larry R. Blanton,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
59C01-1403-PL-73
Brown, Judge.
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[1] Jeffrey L. McMahel appeals the trial court’s order awarding certain property to
Mary A. Deaton following their cohabitation. McMahel raises one issue which
we revise and restate as whether the court’s order is clearly erroneous. We
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In 1996, McMahel and Deaton met and Deaton moved into McMahel’s house
on Hudleson Street in Paoli, Indiana. McMahel and Deaton had one child
together born in April 1998. McMahel and Deaton’s relationship ended in
February 2014.
[3] On March 20, 2014, Deaton filed a Complaint for Partition and/or Unjust
Enrichment alleging she and McMahel resided together for a number of years,
they have one child together, they had a joint bank account until September
2013, they acquired property together including real property and vehicles, and
requesting an equitable distribution of the property. McMahel filed a
counterclaim for trespass and conversion.
[4] On August 20, 2015, the court held a hearing at which the parties presented
testimony and documentary evidence. Deaton called McMahel as a witness
and asked when he and Deaton began residing together, and McMahel replied
that “[t]o be honest from April 9th she would not leave,” that “I never asked
her to come to my home, ever,” and that “[s]he never left.” Transcript at 49.
McMahel testified that Deaton moved around, and when asked how often she
left, he replied “[a]t least half the time but would not stay gone. She would
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come back.” Id. at 51. When asked when Deaton’s name was added to his
account at Hoosier Hills Credit Union, McMahel replied he did not know the
exact date but probably 2008 or 2009. When asked how long he was in a
relationship with Deaton, McMahel replied “[p]robably never,” and when
asked what he called it, he answered “[a] mistake.” Id. at 53. McMahel
testified that he worked for Essex, the plant closed in 2003, he received a
severance, he was unemployed for one year and received unemployment
benefits, and that he worked for Production Heating and Cooling from 2004
until 2009, when he became disabled. He testified that he purchased a home on
Sandyhook Road at an auction in 2002 and the closing occurred in 2003, that
Deaton was present during the auction, and that they probably discussed the
purchase but did not discuss the finances.
[5] Deaton testified that she was in a relationship with McMahel from April 1996
until February 2014 and that they resided together during that time. She
testified they did everything as a family, made purchases together, and took
vacations. She stated that, when she first moved in with McMahel, he was
living on Hudleson Street and that he had purchased the residence the previous
month, that their son was born in 1998, and that she, McMahel, and their son
moved to the Sandyhook Road residence. She also testified that, around
Christmas time of 1997 or 1998, she and McMahel purchased a living room
suite and that her sister co-signed a loan to help McMahel establish his credit
after he filed for bankruptcy. She also testified that she and McMahel
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purchased a truck that he drove and a car as her main transportation and that
they made these decisions together.
[6] With respect to her earnings, Deaton testified that she began working at
Hoosier Uplands in August of 1998, her salary in 2000 was about $14,000 and
gradually increased, and that she earned just under $19,000 in 2013. She stated
that she worked from August through May, was off in the summers, received
unemployment benefits, and that her income was deposited into the joint
account with McMahel. When asked when the joint account was created,
Deaton responded that McMahel already had the account in his name and then
they added her name and that she was “pretty sure” that occurred before her
son was born. Id. at 69. The court admitted into evidence certain tax and
employment documents showing that Deaton earned wages of approximately
$2,919 in 1998; $13,719 in 2000; $14,261 in 2001; $15,637 in 2002; $18,131 in
2003; $15,990 in 2004, $16,403 in 2005; $18,263 in 2006; $17,053 in 2007;
$18,870 in 2011; $15,727 in 2012; and $18,755 in 2013.
[7] Deaton presented bank statements of McMahel and Deaton from Hoosier Hills
Credit Union for July of 2005 through July of 2013, into which the parties
made deposits and later direct deposits from Hoosier Uplands and social
security. Deaton testified that she and McMahel paid all of the bills and made
all of their purchases from the checking account, including utilities, household
items, groceries, insurance, and medical expenses. She also testified that the
money for purchasing vehicles and four-wheelers came from the joint account
and that the only debt was the home mortgage.
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[8] Deaton also presented an itemized list of assets showing a value for each based
upon an appraisal, statement, guide, or personal belief, including a house,
Deaton’s 401(k), McMahel’s IRA and savings, a 1996 Chevy, a Subaru
Tribeca,1 a 2009 Harley Davidson, an ATV, a Genesis Boat, a 1998 Suzuki dirt
bike, a 2001 Honda EX, two 4-wheelers, two trailers, a golf cart, and two riding
mowers. She presented print-outs of guides from the National Automobile
Dealers Association regarding the value of the 1996 Chevy, the Subaru, the
2009 Harley Davidson, the ATV, the 1998 Suzuki, one of the 4-wheelers, and
the 2001 Honda. Deaton also presented Hoosier Hills bank statements for
2014, and the statement for the period of February 1, 2014, through February
28, 2014, the month in which the parties’ relationship ended, showed an IRA
with a previous balance of $13,671.58, and a mortgage loan with a previous
balance of $8,300.21. Deaton testified that McMahel had her name taken off of
the account near the end of 2013.
[9] Deaton further testified that McMahel opened the IRA in 2003 and had rolled
over funds from a 401(k) into the IRA. When asked if the IRA had about seven
thousand dollars at the time, she answered that she was unsure. 2 She also
stated that she worked for Hoosier Uplands for several years before she signed
up for her retirement account and that she started working there after she began
1
Deaton’s list of assets includes a 1998 Subaru Tribeca, and the value guide she submitted relates to a 2008
Subaru Tribeca.
2
The earliest statement from Hoosier Hills in the record is for the period of July 1, 2005, through August 1,
2005, and indicates that the IRA’s previous balance was $7,081.91.
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her relationship with McMahel. She presented a statement from her 401(k)
showing it had a value of $28,521.37 on January 1, 2014. She presented an
appraisal report dated March 23, 2015, for the residence on Sandyhook Road
which stated that the value by a sales comparison approach was $105,000.
[10] Deaton testified that she owned some property together with her sister that they
had received from their parents, that likewise McMahel owned some property
with his father, there were no joint efforts to acquire them, and those properties
should be set aside. She testified that $4,100 was spent from her joint account
with McMahel toward the construction of a garage on the property owned by
McMahel and his father but that she was not including that in her list of assets
to be divided. She testified that McMahel’s earnings were probably higher than
her earnings, that she kept the home, she was the person who cleaned the
gutters, painted the house, cleaned the toilets, and cooked, and that she was
their son’s primary caretaker.
[11] McMahel presented evidence that he received proceeds of $7,333.34 from the
sale of real estate in October 2002 and testified that he had “sold ten (10) acres
of [his] grandpa’s property that actually paid for the down payment” on the
Sandyhook Road property. Id. at 130. He testified that he took a mortgage
with Hoosier Hills to finance the remaining portion of the purchase price and
presented a mortgage dated February 7, 2013, identifying him as the borrower
and securing a promissory note in favor of Hoosier Hills in the original amount
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of $59,400.3 He also testified that he gave a cashier’s check of $20,900 to a car
dealership when the Subaru was purchased and that he received the money
from back pay for disability.4 He testified that he received disability benefits of
$1,630 per month, and that he earned around $40,000 per year when he worked
for Essex, that he earned about $65,000 per year at Production Heating and
Cooling, and that in his final year of working he earned $67,500 “counting
everything.” Id. at 146. With respect to the IRA, McMahel testified that he
had “an account with Essex before [Deaton],” id. at 147, that he transferred the
funds to an IRA after his employment with Essex ended, and that he has not
contributed to the IRA since then.5 On cross-examination, McMahel indicated
that the mortgage payments were made from the Hoosier Hills account, and
that his salary of $67,500 included his vehicle, that he was hired at a rate of
around $16.75 per hour, and that he received a commission check as well.
[12] Following the hearing, the parties submitted proposed findings of fact and
conclusions, and on December 11, 2015, the court entered its findings and
conclusions, awarded certain property to Deaton, and ordered McMahel to pay
3
Deaton testified that McMahel purchased the Hudleson Street residence the month before she moved there.
McMahel does not point to evidence regarding any equity he may have had in that residence when he and
Deaton began their cohabitation.
4
McMahel presented a copy of the cashier’s check issued by Hoosier Hills dated June 29, 2011. The Hoosier
Hills statement for the period of June 1, 2011, through June 30, 2011, shows a deposit of $22,516 on June 9,
2011, and a withdrawal by check of $20,900 on June 29, 2011.
5
McMahel testified he worked for Essex until 2003. He does not point to testimony regarding when he
started working for Essex or when and the extent to which he or his employer made contributions to his
retirement account while he was employed there.
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Deaton the sum of $13,102.30. The court’s findings of fact and conclusions
state in part:
Findings of Fact
1. There is agreement, by the Parties, that they met in April
of 1996, and entered into a relationship. They began living
together (co-habitation) almost immediately. They resided
together, in the house owned by Mr. McMahel.
*****
4. Plaintiff Deaton, during the term of co-habitation earned
from $13,000 to $18,000 per year. Her work was irregular
and sometimes seasonal, depending on the needs of
services provided by Hoosier Uplands . . . .
Defendant McMahel, during the tenure of the relationship
earned from his employment $40,000 to $67,000 per year.
His employment options and opportunities are severely
limited due to complications arising from multiple
sclerosis. He now receives disability benefits of
(approximately) $1,600 per month.
*****
6. However the Parties choose to define their physical and
psychological relationship they lived in at least two
residences together, they purchased vehicles, furniture and
residential accouterments and they became parents to a
son.
7. Factually, the Parties presented a family unit. They shared
a home, they parented a child, they purchased vehicles and
they traveled together.
8. At some point in time (the exact time is in dispute) the
parties began to comingle their assets. They established
and maintained a joint checking account. Ms. Deaton
claims that arrangement began in 1997. Mr. McMahel
estimates that arrangement began some time around 2005.
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During this period of their co-habitation there were assets
purchased - some jointly - some in their individual names
and some for mutual use in the house where the three lived
as a unit.
9. There are titles to automobiles purchased in joint names.
There are titles to vehicles in one name only.
10. It is a fact that bank accounts were held in joint and that
both [Deaton] and [McMahel] deposited money into that
account. Funds were comingled in an account that existed
for a significant period of time. (Ten years being the lesser
estimate - seventeen years being the higher) There is a
dispute as to when the co-mingling started and when it
ended - but the fact remains that the joint account existed
and it could have only occurred by active and willing
participation of both parties.
The money in the joint account was used to fund the co-
habitation, to support their lifestyle and to provide for their
child.
Those funds were accessible to both parties equally,
without limit.
The use of those funds enured to the benefit of both
parties.
11. That the parties resided in [McMahel’s] home that he had
acquired prior to the parties’ relationship. In 2002
[McMahel] purchased his current home at auction. Said
real estate was deeded solely into [McMahel’s] name, and
[McMahel’s] name was the only one listed on the
mortgage and note for said real estate, as evidenced by
Defendant’s Exhibit B and Exhibit D.
That [McMahel] contributed $7,333.00 towards the
purchase of the real estate in 2002 through funds received
through an estate for his grandfather, as evidenced by
Defendant’s Exhibit A and Exhibit C.
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That payments towards the note and mortgage for the real
estate were withdrawn from the parties’ joint account
through Hoosier Hills Credit Union, in which both parties’
income was deposited from at least August, 2005 to June,
2013.
12. The real estate appraised for $105,000 (March 2015) with a
mortgage balance of $8,300 remaining unpaid.
13. The courts . . . have determined that a party who co-
habitates with another person, without subsequent
marriage, is entitled to relief upon a showing of an express
contract or a viable equitable theory such as implied
contract or unjust enrichment.
There are no claims that any express contract exists.
The Court here finds that sufficient evidence was
presented at the hearing to support an equitable claim for
recovery. See Bright v Kuehl, 650 [N.E.2d] 311, 315 ([Ind.
Ct.] App. 1995 (reh’g denied))[.]
14. Clearly, the evidence presented at the hearing showed that
Deaton made economic contribution to the co-habitation.
Decidedly, those contributions [] made by Deaton were
not equal, and although Deaton benefitted significantly
from the resources provided by McMahel[,] McMahel
would be unjustly enriched if the court took the position
that Deaton had no claim whatsoever to any of the assets
held in McMahel’s name alone, or to the growth in
McMahel’s asset base, that occurred during the years of
their co-habitation.
Principles of equity prohibit unjust enrichment of a party
who accepts unrequested benefits that another person
provides, despite having the opportunity to decline those
benefits.
Deaton has presented evidence of a long term co-
habitation and that to some extent McMahel was unjustly
enriched thereby. They were together for almost nineteen
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years. During which time they parented a child, went
places and bought things that were paid from their joint
efforts. Funds were expended from their joint bank
account.
*****
16. There are individual retirement accounts held in the
separate names of the parties. It is determined that there
were no agreements, no intention of the parties to co-
mingle or jointly claim those individual accounts. . . .
*****
20. During their intimate tenure they acquired property and
possessions. Some they held in joint, some were Deaton’s
exclusively. Some of the acquired possessions and
property were/are exclusively McMahel’s.
*****
22. McMahel became disabled due to complications from
Multiple Sclerosis. Since his disability (in 2009) his
earning capacity decreased from approximately $67,000 a
year to $1,600 per month through disability services
(approximately $19,200.00 per year). His earning ability is
severely and permanently impaired.
*****
Conclusions of Law
1. The Parties lived together, created a life as a family unit
and parented a child during their 19 years of co-habitation;
2. There has been sufficient evidence of the co-habitation and
the co-mingling of assets to cause the Court to recognize
equitable remedy under the unjust enrichment criteria;
3. The earning capacity of McMahel has drastically
diminished. Deaton’s earning capacity is reasonably
unaffected and remains stable depending on her initiative
and work ethic;
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4. [Deaton] presents a statement of assets with her calculated
valuations. The home was appraised and that value is
accepted without demur.
The other itemized assets and [Deaton’s] valuations are as
follows: (motor vehicles valuation by NADA estimate)
ASSET VALUE
House $105,000
Deaton 401(k) 28,521
McMahel IRA 13,672
‘96 Chevy 1500 3,250 joint title
‘98 Subaru Tribeca 9,500 joint title
2009 Harley Davidson 12,000
2001 E-Ton ATV 500
Genesis Boat 9,000
1998 Suzuki dirt bike 900
2001 Kawas[a]ki 4 wheeler 13,000[6]
2001 Honda Ex 400
2009 125 - 4 wheeler 2,000
1999 ASM car Trailer 500 joint title
1995 enclosed Trailer 500
Golf cart 1,000
John Deere Law[n] Mower 1,000
MTD Lawn Mower 400
6
The value submitted on Deaton’s list for this asset is $1,300.
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182,511 gross estate[7]
*****
7. It is evident that during this period of cohabitation Mr.
McMahel was the beneficiary of Ms. Deaton’s affections,
labors and economic contributions. It is also evident that
based on Ms. Deaton’s earnings and economic situation
that she benefitted from this relationship as well, beyond
her means. She was provided a home, transportation,
stability and a standard of living beyond her financial
means. She received a significant benefit from this
association.
8. Mr. McMahel shall retain the residence and have sole
ownership of the realty located on Sandyhook Road.
9. Deaton shall be awarded property as follows:
Asset Value
1998 Subaru Tribeca 9,500
2009 125 4 wheeler 2,000
1999 ASM Trailer 500
MTD Lawn Mower 500
1998 Suzuki dirt bike 900
Deaton 401K 28,251[8]
$41,651.02
McMahel Equalization payment to Deaton $13,102.30
Total Award to Deaton $54,723.30[9]
7
The sum of these amounts, including a positive value of $1,300 for the 2001 Kawasaki and a negative value
of $8,300 attributable to the home mortgage, is $181,143.
8
In paragraph 4 of its conclusions, the court stated the value of Deaton’s 401(k) as $28,521.
9
The addition of $41,651.02 and $13,102.30 is $54,753.32.
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Appellant’s Appendix at 7-19.
Discussion
[13] The issue is whether the trial court’s December 11, 2015 order is clearly
erroneous. When a trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions thereon,
findings control only as to the issues they cover and a general judgment will
control as to the issues upon which there are no findings. Yanoff v. Muncy, 688
N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997). A general judgment entered with findings will
be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.
Id. When a court has made special findings of fact, an appellate court reviews
sufficiency of the evidence using a two-step process. Id. First, it must
determine whether the evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact, and
second it must determine whether those findings of fact support the trial court’s
conclusions. Id. Findings will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous.
Id. Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to
support them either directly or by inference. Id. In order to determine that a
finding or conclusion is clearly erroneous, an appellate court’s review of the
evidence must leave it with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Id.
[14] McMahel requests this court to reconsider the holding in Bright v. Kuehl, 650
N.E.2d 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), reh’g denied, regarding the equitable remedies
that may be invoked in disputes between formerly cohabiting couples who
never married and that an express agreement should be required before dividing
the property acquired by unmarried, formerly cohabiting couples. He asserts
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that certain agreements and relationships are so difficult to delineate that they
should be written down. McMahel next contends that there is no evidence that
he was unjustly enriched by his cohabitation with Deaton or that there was an
implied contract between the parties and therefore the court’s judgment is
clearly erroneous. He argues the court never found that he received any greater
benefit from Deaton than Deaton received from him, that he and Deaton
commingled funds but there is no evidence that either of them expected that
their money would be returned, that there is no evidence he and Deaton left the
relationship in wildly unequal financial positions, and that Deaton left with a
larger retirement savings than him. He argues that “[t]he problem here is that
the case was treated like a divorce,” that “[a]ll parties involved seemed to
assume that there should be a division of assets in keeping with the income of
the parties,” and that “this approach completely ignored the assets brought to
the relationship and the reciprocal financial and emotional benefits enjoyed
during the relationship.” Id. at 14-15.
[15] Deaton contends that McMahel has waived his arguments because he failed to
raise them before the trial court and that he had accepted, at the hearing below
and in his proposed findings and conclusions, that Bright was applicable and
that the trial court intended to apply that case. Deaton further argues that the
doctrine of stare decisis prohibits overturning Bright, that McMahel is asking for
twenty-year-old precedent to be overturned, that “many Hoosiers—including
both McMahel (by his own admission) and Deaton—have relied on the holding
in Bright to settle disputes arising from the breakups of their non-marital
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relationships,” that “[t]o yank the rug out from under that understanding, as
McMahel urges, would seriously unsettle the state of the law in this area,” and
that “[t]herefore, this Court should be very reluctant to reconsider Bright.”
Appellee’s Brief at 20-21.
[16] In addition, Deaton maintains that there is ample evidence to support the relief
ordered by the court and that the court’s equitable relief in her favor is actually
very modest in comparison to the parties’ total assets.
[17] In Bright v. Kuehl, this court addressed whether a party is entitled to relief based
upon contributions during cohabitation without subsequent marriage absent an
express agreement. 650 N.E.2d at 314. The court first discussed the case of
Glasgo v. Glasgo, where a former wife sued her former husband for one-half of
the assets accumulated during their period of cohabitation after their divorce
and the trial court awarded the former wife a share of the property. Id. (citing
Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), reh’g denied). The former
husband argued on appeal that claims by nonmarried cohabitants were against
public policy in Indiana because common law marriages were prohibited, and
this court affirmed the trial court’s decision and expressly stated that granting
the petitioner relief was not against the public policy of this state and that
recovery for parties seeking relief “would be based only upon legally viable
contractual and/or equitable grounds which the parties could establish
according to their own particular circumstances.” Id. (citing Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d
at 1331). The court in Bright then discussed the case of Chestnut v. Chestnut, in
which this court approved the rationale in Glasgo and affirmed the trial court’s
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decision to include the wife’s contributions during premarital cohabitation in
the distribution of marital property upon dissolution. Id. at 314-315 (citing
Chestnut, 499 N.E.2d 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)). Finally, the court in Bright
noted that other jurisdictions have adopted this right to relief and have held that
unmarried couples may raise equitable claims such as implied contract and
unjust enrichment following the termination of their relationships where one of
the parties attempts to retain an unreasonable amount of the property acquired
through the efforts of both. Id. at 315 (citing cases from California,
Connecticut, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin).
[18] Following this discussion, we held in Bright that “a party who cohabitates with
another without subsequent marriage is entitled to relief upon a showing of an
express contract or a viable equitable theory such as an implied contract or
unjust enrichment.” Id. We specifically held that, “[t]o recover under the
theory of implied contract, the plaintiff is usually required to establish that the
defendant impliedly or expressly requested the benefits conferred” and that
“[a]ny benefit, commonly the subject of pecuniary compensation, which one,
not intending it as a gift, confers upon another who accepts it, is an adequate
foundation for a legally implied or created promise to render back its value.”
Id. (citations omitted). We further held that, “[t]o prevail on a claim for unjust
enrichment, a plaintiff must establish that a measurable benefit has been
conferred on the defendant under such circumstances that the defendant’s
retention of the benefit without payment would be unjust” and that
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“[p]rinciples of equity prohibit unjust enrichment of a party who accepts the
unrequested benefits another provides despite having the opportunity to decline
those benefits.” Id. at 316 (footnote and citations omitted). See also Sclamberg v.
Sclamberg, 220 Ind. 209, 212-215, 41 N.E.2d 801, 802-803 (1942) (holding that
although the purported marriage was void, the court could settle the property
rights acquired during the “marriage relation”).
[19] In Turner v. Freed, the trial court ordered Danny Turner to pay Angela Freed
$18,000 under a theory of unjust enrichment. 792 N.E.2d 947, 949 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003). Specifically, the trial court found that, “[a]lthough the relationship
provided a home, resources, and some financial security to [Freed] for a
number of years, it is also important to acknowledge that [Turner] received
some modest benefit from food, clothing, and other financial contributions
made by [Freed] and that he received substantial benefit from her homemaking and
housekeeping responsibilities.” Id. at 950. The trial court further found that,
“[a]lthough [Turner’s] economic contribution to the joint household exceeded
[Freed’s], and although [Freed] benefit[ed] significantly from the resources
provided by [Turner], he would be unjustly enriched if the Court took the
position that [Freed] had no claim whatsoever to significant assets which are
held in [Turner’s] name alone, or the growth in his asset base that occurred
during the years of their cohabitation.” Id. On appeal, Turner argued the court
erred in finding that he had been unjustly enriched by Freed’s domestic services.
Id. at 649.
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[20] In addressing Turner’s argument, we first observed that we had already
determined that a party who cohabites with another person without subsequent
marriage is entitled to relief upon a showing of an express contract or a viable
equitable theory such as an implied contract or unjust enrichment. Id. at 950
(citing Bright, 650 N.E.2d at 315). We held that Freed presented evidence to
demonstrate that Turner was unjustly enriched. Id. In support of our
conclusion, we noted that Turner and Freed lived together for about ten years;
that during that time Freed took care of their child and at times Turner’s child
from a previous relationship; that Freed regularly maintained the home and
contributed financially by performing one of Turner’s daily newspaper delivery
routes; that while Freed took care of the children and the home, Turner had the
time to develop his business; and that Turner purchased a home and furnishings
from the income generated through his employment. Id.
[21] We held that, “[a]lthough it is true that Freed benefited from the resources and
home provided her by Turner, we also agree with the trial court that Turner
substantially benefited from the services Freed provided and that Turner would
be unjustly enriched if Freed were awarded no part of the value of the assets
Turner acquired in his name alone during their cohabitation” and that,
“[a]ccordingly, we conclude there is evidence to support the trial court’s finding
that Turner had been unjustly enriched.” Id. at 950-951. We also noted that,
because we found support for the trial court’s decision under the theory of
unjust enrichment, we did not need to not address Turner’s implied contract
arguments. Id. at 950 n.2. See also Neibert v. Perdomo, 54 N.E.3d 1046, 1051-
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1052 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (stating that the cases of Glasgo and Chestnut allowed
recovery for cohabiting couples who cohabited either before marriage or after
divorce, that later Bright expressly eliminated the exclusion from relief for
couples who cohabit without ever marrying, that thereafter Turner granted
equitable relief where parties cohabited without marriage, and that the
cohabitation relationship is important to the extent that it provides evidence of
the couple’s relative expectations); Putz v. Allie, 785 N.E.2d 577, 580 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003) (observing the holding in Bright), trans. denied.
[22] Based on our previous decisions and the reasons for those decisions, we decline
McMahel’s invitation to reconsider the holding in Bright or other cases
regarding the equitable remedies available to Indiana courts in addressing
claims by formerly cohabiting persons based upon the theories of implied
contract and unjust enrichment.
[23] Turning to the evidence presented in this case, the record reveals that Deaton
moved in with McMahel in 1996, that the parties had a child together in 1998,
and that their relationship ended in 2014. The parties presented evidence of
their incomes, other resources, and the value of the assets accumulated during
the period of their cohabitation. The evidence establishes that the parties made
deposits from their respective earnings from employment or other resources into
an account at Hoosier Hills and that the funds were used to pay the mortgage
and utility expenses, medical expenses, and other regular and one-time living
expenses and asset purchases over the period of their cohabitation. The court
was able to review ten years’ worth of monthly Hoosier Hills statements
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showing the parties’ various deposits into and expenses paid from the checking
account, the monthly mortgage balance, and the monthly balance in
McMahel’s IRA. Further, the evidence establishes that the Sandyhook Road
house purchased in 2003 was financed by a mortgage paid from the Hoosier
Hills checking account and a down payment using money McMahel received
the previous year. The court heard testimony that Deaton and McMahel did
everything as a family and took vacations, that Deaton’s sister co-signed a loan
to help McMahel establish his credit, and that Deaton cleaned the gutters,
painted the house, cleaned the toilets, cooked, and was the primary caretaker of
the parties’ son. The evidence does not indicate that McMahel rejected the
benefits provided by Deaton or declined to accept her financial or other
contributions. Evidence in the record supports the trial court’s findings.
[24] In addition, the trial court found that the value of Deaton’s earnings was thirty
percent of McMahel’s earnings, and we note that the court awarded Deaton
assets valued at approximately thirty percent of the parties’ combined assets.
Thus, the court awarded Deaton a share of the assets accumulated by the
parties during their cohabitation which was proportionate to her share of the
parties’ combined income during the same period.
[25] While Deaton benefited from the resources provided to her by McMahel,
McMahel also substantially benefited from the monetary and other
contributions provided by Deaton during their cohabitation of over seventeen
years. We conclude the evidence supports the trial court’s award of certain
property to Deaton and its order that McMahel pay Deaton the amount of
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$13,102.30. See Turner, 792 N.E.2d at 950-951 (concluding that there was
evidence to support the trial court’s finding that defendant had been unjustly
enriched).10
Conclusion
[26] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the December 11, 2015 order of the trial
court.
[27] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and May, J., concur.
10
Because we find support for the trial court’s decision under the theory of unjust enrichment, we need not
address the theory of implied contract. See Turner, 792 N.E.2d at 950 n.2.
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