Charles Arnold v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Sep 23 2015, 9:28 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ellen M. O’Connor Gregory F. Zoeller
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Charles Arnold, September 23, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1503-CR-110
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Shatrese M.
Appellee-Plaintiff Flowers, Judge
The Honorable Peggy Hart,
Commissioner
Trial Court Cause No.
49G20-1408-F4-38278
Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Appellant-Defendant Charles Arnold engaged in an argument with Cynthia
Bell during the early morning hours of August 4, 2014. Arnold interfered when
Bell approached Eddie Williams and asked for assistance. Despite Arnold’s
threatening demeanor, Williams helped Bell get away from Arnold. A few
hours later, Arnold spotted Williams, who had fallen asleep in his vehicle.
Arnold, in an aggressive and threatening manner, demanded that Williams tell
him where he had taken Bell. As Williams attempted to flee from Arnold,
Williams heard two gunshots. Immediately after Williams heard the gunshots,
he noticed that something had shattered the back window of his vehicle and
punctured his left rear tire.
[2] Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (the “State”) subsequently charged
Arnold with a number of crimes, including unlawful possession of a firearm by
a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony, and attempted battery by means of a
deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony. Following a jury trial, Arnold was found
guilty as charged. On appeal, Arnold challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
sustaining his convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious
violent felon and attempted battery by means of a deadly weapon. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On the morning of August 4, 2014, Arnold and Cynthia Bell engaged in an
argument. During the course of the argument, Bell “slashed” Arnold’s tires and
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Arnold called the police. State’s Ex. 35-A, 5:44-5:50. At some point, Bell left
the scene and approached a white SUV which was being driven by Eddie
Williams. Williams observed that Bell appeared to be “distressed” and
appeared to be “trying to get away from [ ] Arnold.” Tr. p. 49.
[4] After Williams agreed to give Bell a ride, Arnold “jumped” in front of
Williams’s vehicle to try to block the vehicle’s exit route. Tr. p. 50. Williams
then “gunned [his] vehicle[,]” causing Arnold to move from the vehicle’s path.
Tr. p. 51. As Williams drove away, he observed Arnold “thr[o]w his hand
behind his back like [he was] going to draw a weapon.” Tr. p. 51. Williams,
however, did not actually see a weapon at this time. Williams gave Bell a ride
to the intersection of 18th Street and Meridian Street.
[5] After dropping Bell off, Williams drove to Graceland Avenue between 36th and
37th Streets, where he feel asleep in his vehicle. Williams was subsequently
awakened by Arnold yelling at him from the passenger seat of a burgundy
Buick that was being driven by Cory Mills. At Arnold’s request, Mills had
stopped the Buick to the left of Williams’s vehicle. Arnold exhibited a
“threatening” demeanor as he questioned Williams about Bell. Tr. p. 54.
Arnold was acting “real aggressive, wanting to know what [Williams] had did
[sic] with [Bell].” Tr. p. 54. Believing that Arnold might be armed, Williams
attempted to flee the encounter by pulling away from Mills’s Buick. As he
pulled away, Williams heard two gunshots. Immediately after Williams heard
the gunshots, he noticed that something had shattered the back window of his
vehicle and punctured his left rear tire. The bullet that shattered Williams’s
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back window came to rest in “the second seat headrest right behind
[Williams’s] head.” Tr. p. 57. Williams proceeded to a nearby restaurant and
reported the incident to the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department.
[6] Detective Stephen Fippen responded to Williams’s call. After conducting an
initial conversation with Williams, Detective Fippen transported Williams to
Arnold’s home which was located just north of the intersection of 36th Street
and Kenwood Avenue. Once at Arnold’s home, Williams identified Arnold as
the individual whom he had encountered both when initially approached by
Bell and when he was awakened in his vehicle and shot at. Based on the facts
known to Detective Fippen coupled with Williams’s identification of Arnold,
Detective Fippen obtained a search warrant for Arnold’s home.
[7] During a subsequent search of Arnold’s home, Detective Fippen discovered a
holster that would fit a “large model frame Smith and Wesson [.]40 caliber
handgun.” Tr. p. 202. In addition, investigating officers recovered two spent
shell casings from the site of the shooting. These shell casings were in “pristine
condition” when recovered, enabling the investigating officers to identify the
casings from .40 caliber Smith and Wesson cartridges. Tr. p. 119. It was later
determined that the only possible weapon that could have fired the shells was a
Smith and Wesson firearm.
[8] On August 5, 2014, the State charged Arnold with Count I – unlawful
possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony; Count II –
attempted battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony; Count III –
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criminal recklessness, a Level 5 felony; and Count IV – possession of
paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court conducted a two-day
jury trial on December 9-10, 2014. Following the conclusion of trial, the jury
found Arnold guilty as charged. At sentencing, the trial court merged Counts II
and III and sentenced Arnold to an aggregate twelve-year sentence. This
appeal follows.
Discussion and Decision
[9] Arnold contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for
unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and attempted
battery by means of a deadly weapon.1
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is
the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess
witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether
it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure,
when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence,
they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.
Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence
overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The
1
Arnold does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for Class A
misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.
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evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn
from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (citations, emphasis, and
quotations omitted). “In essence, we assess only whether the verdict could be
reached based on reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence
presented.” Baker v. State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012) (emphasis in
original). Upon review, appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence or assess
the credibility of the witnesses, Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind. 2002),
as the jury, acting as the trier-of-fact, is “‘free to believe whomever they wish.’”
Klaff v. State, 884 N.E.2d 272, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting McClendon v.
State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)).
[10] “[A] conviction may be based purely on circumstantial evidence.” Hayes v.
State, 876 N.E.2d 373, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Moore v. State, 652
N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)), trans. denied. “‘On appeal, the circumstantial
evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’” Id.
(quoting Moore, 652 N.E.2d at 55). “It is enough if an inference reasonably
tending to support the conviction can be drawn from the circumstantial
evidence.” Id. (citing Moore, 652 N.E.2d at 55). Thus, where circumstantial
evidence is used to establish guilt, “‘the question for the reviewing court is
whether reasonable minds could reach the inferences drawn by the jury; if so,
there is sufficient evidence.’” Klaff, 884 N.E.2d at 274-75 (quoting Maxwell v.
State, 731 N.E.2d 459, 462 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)).
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[11] Furthermore, “[e]ven though one’s mere presence at the crime scene with the
opportunity to commit a crime is not a sufficient basis on which to support a
conviction, one’s presence at the scene in connection with other circumstances
tending to show one’s participation may raise a reasonable inference of guilt.”
Id. at 275 (citing Brink v. State, 837 N.E.2d 192, 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans.
denied). For instance, a defendant’s course of conduct before, during, and after
the offense, may raise a reasonable inference of guilt. Willis v. State, 27 N.E.3d
1065, 1068 (Ind. 2015) (citing Maul v. State, 731 N.E.2d 438, 439 (Ind. 2000)).
I. Unlawful Possession of a Handgun by a Serious
Violent Felon
[12] Indiana Code section 35-47-4-5(c) provides that “[a] serious violent felon who
knowingly or intentionally possesses a firearm commits unlawful possession of
a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony.” Arnold admitted below
that he qualified as a serious violent felon. As such, he does not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence proving that he was a serious violent felon on
appeal. Arnold merely challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that
he knowingly or intentionally possessed a firearm.
[13] In the instant matter, the evidence most favorable to the jury’s finding of guilty
demonstrates that Arnold exhibited threatening behavior toward Williams
during two separate encounters. During Williams’s first encounter with
Arnold, Williams did not actually see a weapon, but saw Arnold “thr[o]w his
hand behind his back like [he was] going to draw a weapon.” Tr. p. 51. During
the second encounter, Williams, who had fallen asleep in his vehicle, was
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awakened by Arnold yelling at him. Arnold exhibited a “threatening”
demeanor as he questioned Williams about Bell. Tr. p. 54. Arnold was acting
“real aggressive, wanting to know what [Williams] had did [sic] with [Bell].”
Tr. p. 54. Because he believed from their earlier encounter that Arnold might
be armed, Williams attempted to flee the encounter by pulling away from
Arnold. As he pulled away, Williams heard two gunshots. Immediately after
Williams heard the gunshots, he noticed that something had shattered the back
window of his vehicle and punctured his left rear tire. The bullet that shattered
Williams’s back window came to rest in “the second seat headrest right behind
[Williams’s] head.” Tr. p. 57.
[14] Further, while Mills testified at trial that he did not see Arnold with a gun on
the day in question, the State attempted to impeach Mills by casting Mills’s
credibility into doubt. In impeaching Mills, the State questioned him about his
prior statement to Detective Fippen that he watched as Arnold “came out of his
back pocket with a gun and started shooting.” Tr. p. 73. The jury, acting as the
trier of fact, was in the best position to judge Mills’s credibility and to decide
whether to believe Mills’s trial testimony. See Stewart, 768 N.E.2d 435; Klaff,
884 N.E.2d at 274.
[15] We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to reasonably infer
Arnold’s guilt. Arnold’s claim to the contrary is effectively an invitation to
reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Stewart, 768 N.E.2d at 435.
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II. Attempted Battery by Means of a Deadly Weapon
[16] Indiana Code sections 35-42-2-1(b)(1) provides that a person who knowingly or
intentionally touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner
commits battery, a Class B misdemeanor. However, the offense is a Level 5
felony if it is committed with a deadly weapon. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(f)(2).
Furthermore, “[a] person attempts to commit a crime when, acting with the
culpability required for commission of the crime, the person engages in conduct
that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime.” Ind. Code
§ 35-41-5-1(a). “An attempt to commit a crime is a felony or misdemeanor of
the same level or class as the crime attempted.” Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1(a).
[17] As is discussed above, the evidence most favorable to the jury’s finding of guilt
demonstrates that Williams was awakened by Arnold yelling at him. Arnold
exhibited a “threatening” demeanor as he questioned Williams about Bell. Tr.
p. 54. Arnold was acting “real aggressive, wanting to know what [Williams]
had did [sic] with [Bell].” Tr. p. 54. When Williams attempted to flee the
encounter, Williams heard two gunshots. Immediately after Williams heard
the gunshots, he noticed that something had shattered the back window of his
vehicle and punctured his left rear tire. The bullet that shattered Williams’s
back window came to rest in “the second seat headrest right behind
[Williams’s] head.” Tr. p. 57. The evidence demonstrates that the trajectory of
the cartridges recovered form Williams’s vehicle was consistent with the gun
being fired by Arnold and the record is devoid of any indication that there was
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some other individual present at the scene that could have shot the gun in the
direction of Williams’s vehicle.
[18] We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to allow the jury to reasonably infer
Arnold’s guilt. Arnold’s claim to the contrary is effectively an invitation to
reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Stewart, 768 N.E.2d at 435.
[19] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
May, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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