Juan Hernandez v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                  FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                              Nov 28 2016, 8:59 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                               CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing                           Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Brandon E. Murphy                                       Gregory F. Zoeller
    Public Defender’s Office                                Attorney General of Indiana
    Muncie, Indiana
    George P. Sherman
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Juan Hernandez,                                         November 28, 2016
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A02-1604-CR-816
    v.                                              Appeal from the Delaware Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Thomas A.
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                     Cannon, Jr., Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    18C05-1501-MR-1
    Najam, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1604-CR-816| November 28, 2016      Page 1 of 6
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Juan Hernandez appeals his convictions for voluntary manslaughter, a Level 2
    felony, and battery, as a Level 5 felony, following a jury trial. Hernandez raises
    two issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial
    court abused its discretion when it denied Hernandez the opportunity to present
    certain evidence in support of his claim of self-defense. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   In 2013-14, Hernandez and Teresa Hittson were involved in a sexual
    relationship. At the time, Teresa was married to Mark Hittson, although she
    had filed for dissolution of their marriage. In early 2014, however, Teresa
    withdrew her dissolution petition and, instead, later called off her relationship
    with Juan. But Juan continued to interact with Teresa and Mark. Mark and
    Juan did not get along.
    [3]   On January 13, 2015, the three were in a vehicle together when Juan and Mark
    got into an altercation. Juan and Mark exited the vehicle, and the two began to
    fight. After Mark had punched him, Juan punched Mark and Mark appeared
    to momentarily lose consciousness before sliding down the side of the vehicle
    and onto the ground. At some point during the altercation, while Juan and
    Mark were in close proximity to each other, Juan removed a large serrated knife
    that was on his person and stabbed Mark in the back eleven times. The wounds
    almost immediately killed Mark. Juan then went back to the car for a moment,
    but he returned to Mark’s body, which was motionless on the ground, straddled
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1604-CR-816| November 28, 2016   Page 2 of 6
    him, and stabbed him another twelve times in the chest. Teresa watched those
    events occur, as did an unrelated witness, Robert Brancecum.
    [4]   The State charged Juan with murder, a felony; voluntary manslaughter, a Level
    2 felony; and battery, as a Level 5 felony. At his ensuing jury trial, on the third
    day, Hernandez sought to call a previously undisclosed witness, Matthew
    Waller. The trial court excluded Waller from testifying. Had he been called,
    Waller would have testified that he knew that Mark owned a gun and that
    Mark had said he would use that gun on Juan if he had to. Hernandez also
    sought to introduce evidence that, in 2004, Mark had shot a gun in the presence
    of law enforcement officers who had responded to a report of domestic violence
    between him and Teresa. The trial court also excluded that evidence.
    [5]   However, the trial court permitted the following evidence to be admitted:
    evidence that Mark and Teresa had a violent relationship, with Mark as the
    initial aggressor; evidence that Teresa had told Juan of some of those incidents
    prior to the January 13, 2015, altercation; evidence that Mark often carried a
    firearm on his person; evidence that Mark was generally known to be a violent
    person; and evidence that, in the car on January 13, 2015, immediately before
    the altercation between Juan and Mark, Teresa had told Juan that Mark had a
    gun on him. Thereafter, the jury acquitted Hernandez of murder but found him
    guilty of voluntary manslaughter and battery. The trial court entered its
    judgment of conviction and sentence accordingly. This appeal ensued.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1604-CR-816| November 28, 2016   Page 3 of 6
    Discussion and Decision
    [6]   Hernandez contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it prohibited
    him from calling Waller and from presenting evidence that Mark shot a firearm
    in the presence of police officers in 2004. A trial court has broad discretion in
    ruling on the admission of evidence, and we review those rulings only for an
    abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Vasquez v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 473
    , 476 (Ind. 2007).
    But even if a trial court errs in the exclusion of evidence, “an improper
    evidentiary ruling does not constitute reversible error if the probable impact on
    the jury does not impact the substantial rights of defendant.”1 Cook v. State, 
    675 N.E.2d 687
    , 691 (Ind. 1996).
    [7]   Hernandez asserts that the trial court’s exclusion of Waller’s testimony and the
    2004 incident adversely impacted his defense to the jury that he had acted in
    self-defense when he stabbed Mark.2 A valid claim of self-defense is a legal
    justification for an otherwise criminal act. Hollowell v. State, 
    707 N.E.2d 1014
    ,
    1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). However, the amount of force used to protect
    oneself must be proportionate to the urgency of the situation. 
    Id. “‘Where a
    person has used more force than necessary to repel an attack the right to self-
    1
    We reject Hernandez’s assertion that any error by the trial court must be reviewed as harmless beyond a
    reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California, 
    386 U.S. 18
    (1967). To be sure, however, applying that
    standard would not change our conclusion.
    2
    Hernandez also appears to suggest that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that Mark and Teresa
    had a violent relationship and that Mark had threatened acts of violence against Juan. See Appellant’s Br. at
    15-16. But Hernandez acknowledges that the trial court permitted evidence that supported both of those
    concerns. Insofar as Hernandez complains that the trial court erred when it did not admit cumulative
    evidence, we will not consider that argument. See, e.g., Hoglund v. State, 
    962 N.E.2d 1230
    , 1238 (Ind. 2012).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1604-CR-816| November 28, 2016             Page 4 of 6
    defense is extinguished, and the ultimate result is that the victim then becomes
    the perpetrator.’” 
    Id. (quoting Geralds
    v. State, 
    647 N.E.2d 369
    , 373 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 1995), trans. denied). Indeed, “‘[w]hen danger of death or great bodily
    harm ceases, the right of self-defense ceases with it.’” Fuentes v. State, 
    952 N.E.2d 275
    , 279 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Schlegel v. State, 
    238 Ind. 374
    ,
    383, 
    150 N.E.2d 563
    , 567 (1958)), trans. denied. Thus, evidence that
    demonstrates the use of violent force beyond that necessary to repel an initial
    aggressor will “undercut a claim of self-defense.” 
    Id. at 279-80
    (discussing
    Mayes v. State, 
    744 N.E.2d 390
    , 395-96 (Ind. 2002)).
    [8]   For example, in Fuentes we held any error in the trial court’s jury instructions on
    self-defense was harmless because the evidence demonstrated that the defendant
    shot the victim after the victim had appeared to surrender during an altercation
    with the defendant. 
    Id. at 280.
    As we stated, “any threat [the victim] had posed
    to [the defendant] had been neutralized, and [the defendant’s] right to self-
    defense therefore ceased.” 
    Id. Accordingly, we
    concluded that “the jury could
    not have properly found that [the defendant had] acted in self-defense . . . .” 
    Id. [9] Similarly
    here, in light of the substantial evidence before it, the jury could not
    have properly found that Hernandez acted in self-defense even if the trial court
    had admitted Hernandez’s proffered evidence. In particular, the evidence
    before the jury demonstrated that Hernandez had stabbed Mark twenty-three
    times in the course of a fist-fight. Hernandez first stabbed Mark eleven times in
    the back. Hernandez then stepped away from Mark momentarily before
    straddling Mark’s motionless body while it laid on the ground and stabbing him
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1604-CR-816| November 28, 2016   Page 5 of 6
    another twelve times in the chest. As the State notes, Hernandez’s actions went
    beyond the proportional repelling of an aggressor and “ensur[ed] that Mark
    would have no chance of survival.” Appellee’s Br. at 23. Accordingly, no
    reasonable jury could have concluded that Hernandez acted in self-defense,
    even if the trial court had admitted the proffered evidence. Thus, any error in
    the trial court’s decision to exclude that evidence is harmless. We affirm
    Hernandez’s convictions.
    [10]   Affirmed.
    Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A02-1604-CR-816| November 28, 2016   Page 6 of 6