In the Matter of Tiffany R. Laux: John R. Laux v. Deborah S. Mock (Wilson) (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing Mar 14 2017, 8:11 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Dale W. Arnett
Winchester, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of Tiffany R. Laux: March 14, 2017
Court of Appeals Case No.
38A04-1605-JP-1045
John R. Laux,
Appeal from the Jay Circuit Court
Appellant, The Honorable Peter Haviza,
Special Judge
v.
Trial Court Cause No.
38C01-9503-JP-13
Deborah S. Mock (Wilson),
Appellee.
May, Judge.
[1] John R. Laux (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition to
modify the amount he was ordered to pay toward his daughter’s post-secondary
educational expenses. Because the evidence and findings support the trial
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court’s conclusion that “[Father] failed to show a substantial change of
circumstances such that the order for educational assistance should be
modified[,]” (App. Vol. 2 at 33), we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Father and Deborah S. Mock (Wilson) (“Mother”) are the parents of Tiffany R.
Laux, who was born July 21, 1995. Tiffany was emancipated on July 21, 2014,
ending Father’s child support obligation. Mother filed a Petition for College
Expenses. On December 10, 2014, the trial court ordered Father to pay $45.00
per week for post-secondary educational expenses, effective September 3, 2014. 1
[3] On June 17, 2015, Father filed a petition to modify the order for post-secondary
educational expenses. On that same day, Mother filed a motion for contempt
alleging Father “hasn’t attemped [sic] to pay one dime” towards his obligation.
(App. Vol. 3 at 9.) On January 25, and February 22, 2016, the court held
hearings on Father’s petition and Mother’s motion. After receiving proposed
orders from both parties, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions
of law on April 18, 2016.
[4] The trial court made several findings. Father was in arrears toward his
obligation to pay post-secondary expenses in the sum of $3,025.00. Tiffany was
1
Father unsuccessfully attempted to directly challenge this order. Father’s attorney belatedly filed a motion
to correct error, which was denied. Father filed an appeal but then, when Father obtained a different
attorney, Father dismissed the appeal.
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enrolled at Ball State University and maintaining a GPA of 3.499. Tiffany was
residing with Mother. Father retired and receives $1,646.00 per month in social
security benefits. Mother received “Social Security/Disability income of
$770.00 per month.” (App. Vol. 2 at 32.) Tiffany received the 21st Century
Scholarship, some grants, and has access to student loans. Tiffany was
unsuccessful in obtaining Hoosier Healthwise medical coverage.
[5] The trial court concluded health insurance expenses were included in the term
“educational expenses,” (id. at 33), and the “evidence shows a continued and
substantial need for educational support for Tiffany Laux [and t]hat [Father]
failed to show a substantial change of circumstances such that the order for
educational assistance should be modified.” (Id.) The trial court thus denied
Father’s petition for modification. The court also found Father in contempt
“for willfully failing to pay educational expenses as ordered.” (Id. at 34.) It
ordered Father to pay an additional $20.00 per week toward the arrearage,
which was $3,025.00 as of February 22, 2016. Tiffany was ordered to continue
to provide to Father, via his attorney, her grades and proof of enrollment as a
full time student.
Discussion and Decision
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[6] Father asserts “the trial court erred by declaring [Father] had not shown a
substantial change in circumstances.” 2 (Appellant’s Br. at 13.) In support,
Father claims the evidence demonstrates “all of Tiffany’s post-secondary
educational needs are met,” (id.), so it is “unreasonable” for him to pay her
health insurance costs. 3 (Id.)
[7] When, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions
thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of
Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). We determine first
whether the evidence supports the findings and second whether the findings
support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the
record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen
v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences
support the court’s decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208
(Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied 534 U.S. 1161 (2002).
2
At the outset, we note Mother did not submit an appellee’s brief. In such a situation, we do not undertake
the burden of developing arguments for the appellee. Applying a less stringent standard of review with
respect to showings of reversible error, we may reverse the lower court if the appellant can establish prima
facie error. Fisher v. Bd. of Sch. Trs., 514 N.E.2d 626, 628 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). Prima facie, in this context, is
defined as “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Johnson Cty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v.
Burnell, 484 N.E.2d 989, 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). Where an appellant is unable to meet that burden, we will
affirm. Blair v. Emmert, 495 N.E.2d 769, 771 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
3
At the hearing on the petition to modify, Father testified he retired, which had reduced his income from
“approximately five hundred and forty per week,” (Tr. January Hearing at 12), to $1,646.00 per month.
Although a decrease in income was part of the basis for Father’s petition to modify, Father does not, on
appeal, assert the trial court erred when finding his decreased income did not “show a substantial change of
circumstances.” (App. Vol 2 at 33.)
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[8] On December 10, 2014, the court ordered Father to pay $45 per week in post-
secondary education expenses because Tiffany needed $41 per week to obtain
health insurance coverage. Approximately six months later, Father asked the
trial court to modify his obligation to pay post-secondary education expenses.
“Orders requiring the payment of college expenses are modifiable because
college expenses are in the nature of child support.” Borum v. Owens, 852
N.E.2d 966, 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Such a “modification may be made only
. . . upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as
to make the terms unreasonable.” Ind. Code § 31-16-8-1. However, appellate
courts give “considerable deference to the findings of the trial court in family
law matters, including findings of ‘changed circumstances’ within the meaning
of Indiana Code section 31-16-8-1.” MacLafferty v. MacLafferty, 829 N.E.2d 938,
940 (Ind. 2005).
[9] The trial court denied Father’s petition, and thus he appeals from a negative
judgment. See Smith v. Dermatology Assocs. of Fort Wayne, P.C., 977 N.E.2d 1, 4
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“A judgment entered against a party who bore the burden
of proof at trial is a negative judgment.”). To obtain reversal of the trial court’s
decision, Father must establish “the judgment is contrary to law.” Khaja v.
Khan, 902 N.E.2d 857, 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), reh’g denied. Based on our
review of the record, Father cannot meet that burden.
[10] Father argues “Tiffany’s post-secondary educational needs were met by 21st
Century Scholarship and other grants so there was no longer a need to [sic] for
an order for post-secondary educational expenses.” (Appellant’s Br. at 9)
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(formatting removed). While Tiffany may have had scholarships and grants
that cover her expenses at a post-secondary educational institution, our
legislature has declared that orders for post-secondary educational expenses
may include:
(1) amounts for the child’s education in elementary and
secondary schools and at postsecondary educational institutions,
taking into account:
(A) the child’s aptitude and ability;
(B) the child’s reasonable ability to contribute to
educational expenses through:
(i) work;
(ii) obtaining loans; and
(iii) obtaining other sources of financial aid
reasonably available to the child and each parent;
and
(C) the ability of each parent to meet these expenses;
(2) special medical, hospital, or dental expenses necessary to
serve the best interests of the child; . . .
Ind. Code § 31-16-6-2. See also Cubel v. Cubel, 876 N.E.2d 1117, 1120 (Ind.
2007) (“a post-secondary educational order may include medical, dental, and
optical insurance costs, as well as other health care costs, where the court finds
such costs appropriate”). Thus, the trial court had authority to order Father to
pay for health insurance in a post-secondary education order.
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[11] Father also takes issue with the fact that he was ordered to continue paying for
Tiffany’s health insurance when Tiffany qualifies for Hoosier Healthwise. The
trial court found:
22. Tiffany Laux previously tried to obtain Hoosier
Healthwise medical coverage, but was denied; she is again
attempting to obtain coverage through Hoosier Healthwise.
23. Tiffany Laux has been without health insurance coverage
for approximately one and one-half years.
(App. Vol. 2 at 32.) Tiffany had tried to obtain Hoosier Healthwise but,
contrary to Father’s assertion that she qualifies for it, the program
administrators “kept telling [her] that [she] didn’t fit into it[.]” (Tr. February
Hearing at 45.) As the record supports the court’s finding Tiffany’s need for
health insurance has not changed, Father has not demonstrated the trial court
erred in concluding Father “failed to show a substantial change of
circumstances such that the order for educational assistance should be
modified.” (App. Vol. 2 at 33.)
Conclusion
[12] As Father has not demonstrated error in the trial court’s concluding no
substantial change in circumstances existed to justify modifying Father’s
obligation, we affirm.
[13] Affirmed.
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Najam, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
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