Terrell A. Dodd v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Mar 15 2017, 6:39 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
John T. Wilson Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General
Katherine Cooper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Terrell A. Dodd, March 15, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
33A01-1607-CR-1543
v. Appeal from the Henry Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Kit C. Dean Crane,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
33C02-1506-F6-146
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Terrell Dodd appeals his convictions for domestic battery and invasion of
privacy, challenging the sufficiency of the State’s evidence. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Dodd and A.S. have two young children, born in approximately 2009 and
2011. On August 20, 2013, A.S. filed a petition seeking a protective order
against Dodd (A.S.’s petition is not in the record). The same day, Henry
Circuit Court 2 issued an ex parte order that, among other things, required
Dodd to “stay away from” A.S.’s residence. Ex. 1. The order was set to last
two years. On August 26, Dodd filed a written request for a hearing on A.S.’s
petition, in which he acknowledged that he received a copy of the ex parte
order on August 23. The court granted the request and scheduled a hearing.
However, the address Dodd had provided was no good, so he did not receive
notice and did not appear for the hearing. The court vacated the hearing, and
the ex parte order remained in effect.
[3] On May 15, 2015, Dodd went to A.S.’s house to address concerns about one of
their children. According to A.S., Dodd got out of his car and started yelling at
her before pushing her off her porch so he could get to the kids inside the house.
A.S.’s knee hit a step, which “hurt.” Tr. p. 124. Dodd, on the other hand,
maintains that he did not go onto A.S.’s property, let alone push her, and that
the children ran to him. A.S. and Dodd agree that the confrontation ended
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when Dodd left with the couple’s youngest child and A.S. called police. Officer
Jason Boring arrived at A.S.’s house and noticed that she was red and sniffing,
as if she had been crying. A.S. told Officer Boring that her knee hurt, and he
saw and then photographed a small abrasion on her knee.
[4] The State charged Dodd with domestic battery as well as invasion of privacy
(for going to A.S.’s residence in violation of the protective order). The jury
found Dodd guilty on both charges, and the trial court sentenced him to a year
in jail, all suspended to probation except for the few days that he had already
served.
[5] Dodd now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Dodd contends that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support
either of his convictions. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting a conviction, we consider only the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Wilson v. State, 39 N.E.3d 705,
716 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. We do not reweigh the evidence or
assess witness credibility. Id. We consider conflicting evidence most favorably
to the verdict. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. It is not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis
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of innocence. Id. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be
drawn from it to support the verdict. Id.[7] To convict Dodd of domestic battery as a Class A misdemeanor, the State was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he touched A.S. in a rude,
insolent, or angry manner that resulted in bodily injury. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-
42-2-1.3 (West 2012).1 Dodd acknowledges that A.S. gave testimony that
would satisfy all of these elements, but he argues that we should find her
testimony to be “incredibly dubious” and disregard it. Dodd correctly notes
that the incredible dubiosity rule allows us to impinge upon the fact finder’s
responsibility to judge the credibility of witnesses “‘where a sole witness
presents inherently contradictory testimony that is equivocal or coerced and
there is a lack of circumstantial evidence of guilt.’” Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d
1039, 1059 (Ind. 2011) (quoting Whedon v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1276, 1278 (Ind.
2002)). However, he then fails entirely to explain how A.S.’s testimony was
inherently contradictory, equivocal, or coerced. In addition, there is
circumstantial evidence of guilt, namely, Officer Boring’s testimony that A.S.
appeared to have been crying and that he saw an abrasion on her knee. The
jury also saw Officer Boring’s photos of the abrasion. Under these
circumstances, Dodd cannot benefit from the incredible dubiosity rule.
1
In 2016, the legislature amended the statute to eliminate the bodily-injury requirement. See P.L. 65-2016, §
34. Dodd was charged and convicted under the previous version.
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[8] On the invasion-of-privacy charge, the State had to prove that Dodd knowingly
or intentionally violated an ex parte protective order issued under Indiana Code
chapter 34-26-5. See Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(2). Dodd does not deny that the
protective order was still in effect when he went to A.S.’s house, nor does he
deny that the order required him to “stay away from” A.S.’s house. Rather, he
contends that he “did not receive sufficient notice of the protective order.”
Appellant’s Br. p. 9. But in his request for a hearing on A.S.’s petition, Dodd
explicitly acknowledged that he received a copy of the order on August 23,
2013—an order that listed an expiration date of August 20, 2015. This evidence
supports the jury’s determination that Dodd knew he was violating a protective
order when he went to A.S.’s house in May 2015. Dodd’s reliance on his own
testimony that he “never had a hearing” and therefore was not “ever aware of
what the final outcome was for that protective order,” Tr. p. 192, is nothing
more than a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See
Wilson, 39 N.E.3d at 716.
[9] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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