Christopher Buckhalter v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
Nov 14 2016, 8:42 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
regarded as precedent or cited before any Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Deborah Markisohn Gregory F. Zoeller
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Christopher Buckhalter, November 14, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1511-CR-1852
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Ronnie Huerta,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Commissioner
Trial Court Cause No.
49F19-1405-CM-27225
Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Christopher Buckhalter (“Buckhalter”) appeals, following a bench trial, his
conviction for battery as a Class A misdemeanor. He argues that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting into evidence the victim’s show-up and in-
court identifications of him. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting this evidence, we affirm.
[2] We affirm.
Issue
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into
evidence the victim’s show-up and in-court identifications of
Buckhalter.
Facts
[3] On May 24, 2014, the night before the Indianapolis 500, Nicholas Castorena
(“Castorena”) and his friends were camping in the Coke Lot (“the Lot”) near
the Indianapolis Motor Speedway. While Castorena and his friends were
walking around the Lot, they came upon a group involved in an altercation
with another man. One of Castorena’s friends asked the group, “where’s the
party at?” (Tr. 24). Someone from the group responded to the comment by
hitting Castorena’s friend and knocking him to the ground. As Castorena
attempted to intervene, he was hit in the back of the head. When he turned
around, Castorena looked right at Buckhalter and clearly saw Buckhalter’s face
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before Buckhalter hit Castorena in the face. Castorena and his friends quickly
turned and ran.
[4] Later that evening, Castorena and his friends came upon the same group.
Castorena was hit again but did not see who it was. Gunshots were fired, and
one of Castorena’s friends was fatally wounded. Speedway Police Department
Officers arrived at the scene, and Officer Matthew Pridemore (“Officer
Pridemore”) noticed Castorena, who was covered in blood. Officer Pridemore
asked Castorena if he had been involved in the altercation, and Castorena
responded that he had.
[5] While walking through the Lot with Officer Pridemore, Castorena pointed out
the group of individuals that had been involved in the two altercations. These
individuals were standing together and talking. They had not been detained by
the police at that time. Officer Pridemore radioed a detective and asked the
detective to detain these individuals. After the individuals were detained,
Castorena identified Buckhalter as the man who had hit him in the face during
the first altercation.
[6] The State charged Buckhalter with Class A misdemeanor battery. At trial, over
Buckhalter’s objection, Castorena identified Buckhalter as the person who had
hit him in the face. However, according to Buckhalter, he was walking through
the Lot when he was “snatched up from behind” without any warning and
taken to the ground by a police officer who handcuffed him and took him to the
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show up. (Tr. 145). The trial court convicted Buckhalter as charged.
Buckhalter appeals.
Decision
[7] Buckhalter argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence
of the show-up and in-court identifications. The admission of evidence is
within the discretion of the trial court. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259-60
(Ind. 2013). We will reverse a ruling on the admission of evidence only for an
abuse of discretion, which occurs only when the ruling is clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects the party’s
substantial rights. Id. at 260.
I. Show-up Identification
[8] Buckhalter first contends that the admission of the show-up identification into
evidence violated his rights against unreasonable search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the police lacked
reasonable suspicion to detain him for the show-up identification.1 The Fourth
Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the government,
and its safeguards extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that
1
Buckhalter also argues that the admission of this evidence violated Article 1, Section 11 of
the Indiana Constitution. However, we do not address state constitutional claims that are
raised for the first time on appeal. See Mahl v. Aaron, 809 N.E.2d 953, 958 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004) (declining to address equal protection argument under Indiana Constitution when
argument at trial was based only on federal constitution). Here, our review of the record
reveals that Buckhalter did not raise the state constitutional claim at trial. Accordingly, he has
waived this allegation of error. See id.
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fall short of traditional arrest. C.H. v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1086, 1092 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014), trans. denied. However, a police officer may briefly detain a person
for investigatory purposes without a warrant or probable cause if, based upon
specific and articulable facts together with the rational inferences from those
facts, the official intrusion is reasonably warranted and the officer has a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity “may be afoot.” Moultry v. State, 808
N.E.2d 168, 170-71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 266
(1968)). Reasonable suspicion must be more substantial than an officer’s
unparticularized suspicion or hunch. C. H., 15 N.E.3d at 1092. In determining
whether reasonable suspicion exists, we must examine the totality of the
circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer had a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting wrong-doing. Id.
[9] Here, Buckhalter specifically argues that the “State presented absolutely no
evidence at trial as to why Buckhalter had been detained for the show-up.”
(Buckhalter’s Br. 21). According to Buckhalter, “[s]imply being a black male at
the Coke Lot on the night of May 24, 2014, was not the individualized
articulable reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that Terry requires to justify
a seizure.” (Buckhalter’s Br. 21).
[10] However, our review of the evidence reveals that Castorena was involved in
two altercations with the same group, which included Buckhalter, on the same
night. Following the second altercation, while Castorena was walking through
the Coke Lot with Officer Pridemore, Castorena noticed and pointed out
members of that group standing together and talking. Officer Pridemore
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radioed a detective and asked him to detain these individuals. In a show-up,
Castorena identified Buckhalter as the individual who had hit him in the face.
Castorena, who was a witness to two altercations, provided the detaining officer
with a particularized and objective basis for suspecting wrong-doing on the part
of the individuals that he detained for the show-up. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.
II. In-Court Identification
[11] Buckhalter also argues that pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine,
the unconstitutional show-up identification “tainted the subsequent in-court
identification.” (Buckhalter’s Br. 27). However, to invoke this doctrine, a
defendant must show that the seizure was illegal in the first place. Gyamfi v.
State, 15 N.E.3d 1131, 1136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), reh’g denied. Because there
was no illegal seizure in this case, there can be no fruit of the poisonous tree,
and Buckhalter’s argument fails.
[12] Lastly, Buckhalter argues that the trial court erred in admitting the in-court
identification because there was no independent basis for it. The factors a court
considers in determining whether an independent basis exists include: (1) the
amount of time that the witness was in the presence of the defendant; (2) the
distance between the two; (3) the lighting conditions; (4) the witness’ degree of
attention to the defendant; (5) the witness’ capacity for observation; (6) the
witness’ opportunity to perceive particular characteristics of the defendant; (7)
the accuracy of any prior description of the defendant by the witness; (8) the
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witness’ level of certainty at the pretrial identification; and (9) the length of time
between the crime and the identification. Hyppolite v. State, 774 N.E.2d 584,
594 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.
[13] Here, our review of the evidence leads us to agree with the State that
“application of the above-recited factors to this case shows that Castorena had a
sufficient independent basis to support his ability to fairly identify [Buckhalter]
in-court.” (State’s Br. 18). Specifically, Castorena had sufficient opportunity to
view his attacker. After being hit in the back of the head, Castorena turned and
looked right at Buckhalter. According to Castorena, he could “clearly see who
[had] hit [him] in the face.” (Tr. 130). Because Castorena was in extremely
close physical proximity to Buckhalter, Castorena had a high degree of
attention fixed on him. In addition, Castorena’s identification of Buckhalter
was certain. We find no error here, and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting the in-court identification of Buckhalter.
[14] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Riley, J, concur.
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