Mingo Thames v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Aug 07 2019, 9:00 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Rory Gallagher Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana Sierra A. Murray
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Mingo Thames, August 7, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-340
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Hon. Sheila A. Carlisle,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G03-1705-MR-16589
Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-340 | August 7, 2019 Page 1 of 9
Case Summary
[1] In April of 2017, Maurice Turentine agreed to purchase drugs from Darrell
Miller and James Clark at Clark’s Indianapolis home. When Turentine arrived
with another man, Darrell’s wife Sarah was also in the house. A gunfight broke
out, leaving Turentine wounded and Darrell and Clark dead. Eight days later,
Sarah, who had known Turentine prior to the gunfight, was searching the
internet in an attempt to identify Turentine’s then-unknown accomplice and
eventually identified him as Mingo Thames. A jury found Thames guilty of
two counts of murder, and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of
110 years of incarceration. Thames contends that the State failed to produce
enough credible evidence to support his convictions and that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence. Because we disagree with
both contentions, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] At approximately 2:00 p.m. on April 20, 2017, Sarah met her husband Darrell
at the Indianapolis home of Clark. At approximately 2:30 p.m., Sarah and
Darrell consumed less than half a gram of methamphetamine, an amount that
did not get Sarah high due to the tolerance she had to it. Some four hours later,
Clark told Sarah that he was interested in selling some drugs and asked her if
she knew anyone who would be interested in buying. Sarah made some
inquiries, and Maurice Turentine responded that he would “take a couple
grams” of methamphetamine. Tr. Vol. II p. 44.
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[3] At approximately 10:15 p.m., Turentine and Thames arrived at the house, and
they, Clark, and Darrell went into the kitchen to complete the drug sale while
Sarah stayed in the adjacent dining room. Sarah soon walked over so that she
could overhear the conversation in the kitchen. When Turentine asked Clark if
he could obtain a large quantity of drugs for him, Clark replied that he could if
he were given advance notice. Clark also indicated that Turentine would have
to go through Clark and Darrell in order the purchase the large amount.
[4] At this point, Turentine gave Thames a “weird” look, as if to say, “it’s time
now” or “‘Okay. Let’s go.’” Tr. Vol. II p. 51. Thames reached into the front
of his pants, Sarah heard Darrell say Clark’s nickname three times, and gunfire
commenced. Darrell told Sarah to run, and she did, hiding behind a door in
another room. Sarah heard what she estimated to be between five and fifteen
shots. After the firing ended, Sarah heard the front door open, heard Turentine
say that he had been shot, and saw a gold or tan extended-cab pickup truck
drive away. Clark was on the living room floor, soon to expire from shots to
the chest and arm. Darrell was in the basement at the bottom of the stairs, with
fatal gunshots wounds to his lower extremities and genitalia.
[5] Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Detective Brian Schemenaur interviewed
Sarah soon after the shooting, and she described Turentine’s accomplice, with
whom she had not been previously acquainted, as “a black male, between five
foot five and five foot seven, skinny, 40’s years of age, light skinned, fade hair,
longer on the top, shorter on the sides [and] [m]aybe with a gold tooth.” Tr.
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Vol. II pp. 203–04. Police responding to the scene indicated that Sarah did not
seem intoxicated or on drugs.
[6] On April 28, 2017, Sarah was searching through the Facebook friends of
Turentine’s nephew when she came upon a photograph of a man on a horse
that she recognized from his other profile photographs as Turentine’s
accomplice, who turned out to be Thames. Sarah contacted Detective
Schemenaur with her discovery, and Sarah later selected Thames from a photo
array. Police discovered an address at which they believed Thames was
residing with his wife and investigated. At the address, police discovered a
2002 Dodge Ram pickup truck that was registered to Turentine in the garage.
Turentine’s blood was found on the truck’s tailgate, and Thames’s fingerprints
were found on the hood.
[7] On May 5, 2017, the State charged Thames with two counts of murder and
Leve 5 felony carrying a handgun without a license. On August 7, 2018, the
State added an allegation that Thames was a habitual offender. On September
27, 2017, Thames was with a group called Imperial Valley Ministries in El
Paso, Texas, when he was apprehended in possession of false identification. At
the time, Thames was “five foot seven, 150 pounds[,] light skinned[, had a]
faded haircut, and was 48 years of age.” Tr. Vol. II p. 204.
[8] Thames’s jury trial began on December 10, 2018. Sarah testified that when she
first saw Thames’s photograph on Facebook, she did not believe him to be
Turentine’s accomplice, but that she heard Clark’s voice in her head, telling her
to look at more of the man’s photographs. Sarah, however, acknowledged that
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Clark could not have actually been speaking to her. On redirect, Sarah also
indicated that she had had a feeling upon seeing the photograph of Thames on a
horse that caused her to look further, a feeling that “may have included a
feeling that [she was] hearing [Clark.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 105. Detective
Schemenaur testified, inter alia, that he had done internet research on Imperial
Valley Ministries and had determined that it was a homeless-outreach ministry.
The jury found Thames guilty of two counts of murder; the State dropped the
habitual-offender allegation; and, on January 14, 2019, the trial court sentenced
Thames to 110 years of incarceration.
Discussion and Decision
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[9] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the
evidence nor resolve questions of credibility. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816,
817 (Ind. 1995). We look only to the evidence of probative value and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom which support the verdict. Id. If
there is evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could
conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we will
affirm the conviction. Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720, 724 (Ind. 1993).
[10] Thames contends only that his conviction must be reversed by operation of the
incredible dubiosity rule, i.e., that the State’s evidence of his identity simply
cannot be believed by a reasonable person. Specifically, Thames contends that
Sarah’s identification of him as Turentine’s accomplice was the result of an
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auditory hallucination caused by chronic drug use and simply cannot be
believed.
Within the narrow limits of the “incredible dubiosity” rule, a court
may impinge upon a jury’s function to judge the credibility of a
witness. If a sole witness presents inherently improbable
testimony and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence,
a defendant’s conviction may be reversed. This is appropriate only
where the court has confronted inherently improbable testimony
or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of
incredible dubiosity. Application of this rule is rare and the
standard to be applied is whether the testimony is so incredibly
dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could
believe it.
Love v. State, 761 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2002) (citations omitted).
[11] The incredible dubiosity rule does not apply in this case, as the record contains
ample evidence to corroborate Sarah’s identification of Thames as Turentine’s
accomplice. First, Sarah’s description of Thames’s appearance closely matches
his actual appearance when he was arrested. As mentioned, soon after the
shootings, Sarah described Turentine’s accomplice as “a black male, between
five foot five and five foot seven, skinny, 40’s years of age, light skinned, fade
hair, longer on the top, shorter on the sides [and] [m]aybe with a gold tooth.”
Tr. Vol. II pp. 203–04. When apprehended a few months later, Thames was
“five foot seven, 150 pounds[,] light skinned[, had a] faded haircut, and was 48
years of age.” Tr. Vol. II p. 204. Second, there is substantial evidence tying
Thames and Turentine to what one may reasonably infer was the getaway
vehicle. The truck found in Thames’s garage was consistent with Sarah’s
description of the getaway vehicle, was registered to Turentine, and yielded
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Turentine’s blood and Thames’s fingerprints when examined. In short, the
truck ties Thames and Turentine to each other and ties both to the shootout.
Finally, the fact that Thames was found in Texas with false identification is
further circumstantial evidence of his guilt. It is well-settled that “[f]light and
related conduct may be considered by a jury in determining a defendant’s
guilt.” Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001).
[12] In any event, the record does not establish that Sarah’s testimony is inherently
incredible. Thames claims that Sarah’s testimony about hearing Clark’s voice
clearly indicates that she was experiencing a drug-induced auditory
hallucination at the time. This claim, however, is nothing more than
speculation, supported by no evidence in the record. Moreover, Sarah
acknowledged that Clark could not have actually been speaking to her and that
the feeling that caused her to investigate Thames’s Facebook page further “may
have included a feeling that [she was] hearing [Clark.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 105. A
reasonable interpretation of Sarah’s testimony—one which the jury was free to
make—is that she did not actually believe she was hearing Clark’s voice.
Because Sarah’s identification of Thames as Turentine’s accomplice was
corroborated by ample evidence in the record and was not inherently incredible,
the incredible dubiosity doctrine does not help Thames.
II. Whether the Trial Court Abused its
Discretion in Admitting Certain Evidence
[13] Thames contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
Detective Schemenaur’s testimony that his internet research had revealed that
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Imperial Valley Ministries was a homeless-outreach ministry was inadmissible
hearsay. A trial court’s ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion that results in prejudicial error. Williams v.
State, 43 N.E.3d 578 (Ind. 2015). A trial court’s evidentiary decision will be
reversed for an abuse of discretion only where the court’s decision is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or when the court
misinterprets the law. Id.
[14] Thames did not object to the evidence in question on the ground of hearsay and
so has waived it for appellate review. As such, he would have to establish that
the trial court committed fundamental error in admitting the evidence to obtain
relief. “The fundamental error exception is ‘extremely narrow, and applies only
when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or
potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant
fundamental due process.’” Delarosa v. State, 938 N.E.2d 690, 694 (Ind. 2010)
(quoting Matthews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006)). To be
fundamental, the error “must either ‘make a fair trial impossible’ or constitute
‘clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process.’”
Id. (quoting Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. 2009)). The exception
applies “only in ‘egregious circumstances.’” Id. at 694–95 (quoting Brown v.
State, 799 N.E.2d 1064, 1068 (Ind. 2003)).
[15] Even if we assume, arguendo, that the trial court abused its discretion in some
way by admitting evidence that Imperial Valley Ministries is a homeless-
outreach ministry, any such error could only be considered harmless. When a
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trial court erroneously excludes or admits evidence, if its “probable impact on
the [factfinder], in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as
not to affect the substantial rights of the parties,” the error is harmless. Daniels
v. State, 683 N.E.2d 557, 559 (Ind. 1997) (citing Schwestak v. State, 674 N.E.2d
962 (Ind. 1996)). Thames does not claim, much less establish, that the
testimony in question prejudiced him, much less rise to level of making a fair
trial possible. Indeed, even if Thames had argued that he was prejudiced, we
fail to see how the jury knowing that Imperial Valley Ministries worked with
the homeless could have harmed him in any way. Thames has failed to
establish harmful error, much less fundamental error.
[16] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
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