Angel Renee Campbell v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                     FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    Aug 26 2019, 6:32 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing                               CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                   Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Anne Medlin Lowe                                         Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    James A. Piatt                                           Attorney General of Indiana
    Riley Williams & Piatt, LLC
    Evan Matthew Comer
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                    Deputy Attorney General
    Michael Vo Sherman
    Certified Legal Intern
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Angel Renee Campbell,                                    August 26, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-CR-217
    v.                                               Appeal from the
    Hamilton Superior Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      S. Matthew Cook, Judge Pro
    Tempore
    Trial Court Cause No.
    29D05-1802-CM-1516
    Kirsch, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-217 | August 26, 2019                 Page 1 of 5
    [1]   Angel Renee Campbell (“Campbell”) appeals her conviction for theft and raises
    one issue, which we restate as: whether there was sufficient evidence to support
    her conviction as an accomplice to theft as a Class A misdemeanor.1 We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On December 11, 2017, Jamie Byers (“Byers”), an employee of the Noblesville
    Ace Hardware (“the store”), was working at the store’s cash register. Tr. Vol. 2
    at 11. Campbell entered the store, approached Byers at the cash register, and
    inquired about paint supplies. Id. at 11-12. Byers answered Campbell’s
    questions and directed Campbell to the paint aisle. Id. Campbell returned to
    the cash register and told Byers that she could not find the items she wanted.
    Id. Byers left the cash register, returned to the paint aisle, and helped Campbell
    find what she wanted. Id. When Byers returned to the cash register, she saw
    that several Yeti drinking products near the front of the store were missing, so
    she notified the store manager, Corey Musolf (“Musolf”). Id. at 13. Musolf
    viewed security camera footage to confirm that items were taken before he
    contacted the Noblesville Police Department. Id. at 20. The camera footage
    showed Campbell walking into the store with a man, who was later identified
    as Edward May (“May”), Campbell’s former husband. Id. at 20, 26. Campbell
    and May were holding hands. Id. at 23. Campbell and May walked to the
    1
    See 
    Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2
    (a).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-217 | August 26, 2019   Page 2 of 5
    paint aisle, and Campbell then walked to the cash register to pull Byers away
    from the register while May took Yeti cups and then left the store. 
    Id. at 20
    .
    [3]   The State charged Campbell with theft as a Class A misdemeanor. Appellant’s
    App. Vol. II at 3, 10. At the end of the bench trial, the trial court found
    Campbell guilty as charged and sentenced her to one year in the Hamilton
    County Jail, suspended to probation. Tr. Vol. 2 at 42-43. Campbell now
    appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    [4]   Campbell argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that she was an
    accomplice in helping May commit theft as a Class A misdemeanor. When we
    review the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge
    the credibility of the witnesses. McHenry v. State, 
    820 N.E.2d 124
    , 126 (Ind.
    2005). Rather, we will affirm a conviction if we find that any reasonable
    factfinder could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt when
    considering all the facts and inferences that favor the conviction. Bailey v. State,
    
    907 N.E.2d 1003
    , 1005 (Ind. 2009). The evidence need not exclude every
    reasonable hypothesis of innocence, but it must support a reasonable inference
    of guilt to support the verdict. Drane v. State, 
    867 N.E.2d 144
    , 147 (Ind. 2007).
    [5]   “A person who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over
    property of another person, with intent to deprive the other person of any part
    of its value or use, commits theft, a Class A misdemeanor.” 
    Ind. Code § 35-43
    -
    4-2(a). An accomplice is any person who knowingly or intentionally aids,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-217 | August 26, 2019   Page 3 of 5
    induces, or causes another to commit an offense. 
    Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4
    .
    Factors to determine whether a person is an accomplice include (1) presence at
    the scene of the crime; (2) companionship with another at the scene of the
    crime; (3) failure to oppose the commission of the crime; and (4) course of
    conduct before, during, and after the crime. Castillo v. State, 
    974 N.E.2d 458
    ,
    466 (Ind. 2012). The evidence need not show that the individual participated in
    every element of the crime. Hart, 
    30 N.E.3d 1283
    , 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
    Rather,
    [t]here must be evidence [of] affirmative conduct, either in the
    form of acts or words, from which an inference of a common
    design or purpose to effect the commission of a crime may be
    reasonably drawn. Each participant must knowingly or
    intentionally associate himself with the criminal venture,
    participate in it, and try to make it succeed. That said, the State
    need not show that [the accomplice] was a party to the
    preconceived scheme; it must merely demonstrate concerted
    action or participation in an illegal act.
    Griffin v. State, 
    16 N.E.3d 997
    , 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (internal citations
    omitted).
    [6]   Here, the circumstantial evidence allowed the trial court to reasonably infer that
    Campbell acted as an accomplice to May in his theft of merchandise from the
    store. First, it is undisputed that Campbell was at the scene of the crime with
    May. Tr. Vol. 2 at 12; Castillo, 974 N.E.2d at 466. Second, Campbell and May
    were companions at the scene, evinced by their entry into the store while
    holding hands. Tr. Vol. 2 at 20; Castillo, 974 N.E.2d at 466. The only time they
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-217 | August 26, 2019   Page 4 of 5
    were not together was when Campbell asked Byers to accompany her to the
    paint aisle of the store while May went to the front of the store and took the
    items. Tr. Vol. 2 at 20, 35. Third, May and Campbell acted in concert.
    Castillo, 974 N.E.2d at 466. After they separated inside the store, Campbell
    distracted Byers by luring her into the paint aisle. Tr. Vol. 2 at 12, 20. Once
    Byers was distracted, May went to the front of the store and concealed
    merchandise in his jacket. Id. at 20. After May concealed the merchandise, he
    exited the store, and Campbell left soon after without purchasing anything. Id.
    at 13, 30. These facts make clear that Campbell had the requisite mens rea to be
    convicted as an accomplice to Class A misdemeanor theft. See I.C. 35-41-2-4
    (“A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another
    person to commit an offense commits that offense[.]”).
    [7]   Affirmed.
    Baker, J., and Crone, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-217 | August 26, 2019   Page 5 of 5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19A-CR-217

Filed Date: 8/26/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/26/2019