State of Indiana v. William F. Stevens ( 2015 )

Jun 12 2015, 5:53 am
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Gregory F. Zoeller Mark Small
Attorney General of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
Brian Reitz
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
State of Indiana, June 12, 2015
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
62A01-1406-CR-00268
v. Appeal from the Perry Circuit Court,
The Honorable Lucy Goffinet, Judge,
William F. Stevens, and the Honorable Karen A. Werner,
Magistrate
Appellee-Defendant
Trial Court Cause No.
62C01-1401-FD-00058
Mathias, Judge.
[1] The State of Indiana (“the State”) appeals the trial court’s order granting
William Stevens’s (“Stevens”) motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant
to his warrantless arrest. The State presents a single issue for review, namely,
whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that law enforcement
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lacked probable cause to arrest Stevens after Stevens attempted to purchase
pseudoephedrine at a drug store.
[2] We reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On January 23, 2014, after checking the pseudoephedrine purchase logs of local
drug stores, Perry County chief deputy sheriff Daymion Marsh (“Deputy
Marsh”) learned that Stevens, along with several other people, had made
suspicious purchases of pseudoephedrine that had “caused a scene” of some
sort the day before at Werner Drug Store in Tell City, Indiana. Tr. p. 10.
Deputy Marsh performed criminal history checks on the purchasers using the
Indiana Data and Communication System (“IDACS”). The results of the check
revealed that Stevens’s criminal history included a Florida conviction labeled in
IDACS as “Poss Meth W Intent to Sell Manufacture Deliver.” Tr. Ex. Vol., Ex.
1, pp. 16-17.
[4] Indiana State Police Trooper Howard Lytton (“Trooper Lytton”) also reviewed
Stevens’s criminal history record. Based on the information in the record,
Deputy Marsh and Trooper Lytton believed it was illegal for Stevens to
purchase pseudoephedrine pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-48-4-
14.5(h)(1)(a), which makes it a Class D felony for a person convicted of dealing
in methamphetamine to knowingly or intentionally possess pseudoephedrine.
[5] Deputy Marsh contacted the Perry County prosecutor’s office to discuss
Stevens’s criminal history, his recent pseudoephedrine purchase, and Deputy
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Marsh’s plan to arrest Stevens.1 While he was speaking with the prosecutor’s
office, Deputy Marsh learned that Stevens had arrived at Werner Drug Store
again and was attempting to purchase more pseudoephedrine. Deputy Marsh
went to the drug store and arrested Stevens for possession or purchase of a
precursor by a methamphetamine user. Deputy Marsh did not Mirandize
Stevens at the scene, even after his arrest. While still at the drug store, Deputy
Marsh asked Stevens whether he had any drugs on his person, and Stevens
admitted that he had approximately one gram of methamphetamine in his
pocket.
[6] Stevens’s fiancée, Holly Newgard (“Newgard”), was at the drugstore with
Stevens and had also attempted to purchase some pseudoephedrine. After
Stevens was arrested, other officers at the scene interviewed Newgard and
obtained written consent from her to search the residence she shared with
Stevens. During the search of Stevens’s and Newgard’s house, in which Deputy
Marsh participated, officers discovered a burnt piece of aluminum foil, two
hollowed-out pen bodies, hypodermic needles, a smoking pipe, and a spoon
containing an unidentified white residue.
[7] Deputy Marsh then drove to the Tell City Police Department, where Stevens
was being held, and read Stevens a Miranda warning. During his interview with
Deputy Marsh, Stevens admitted that the house in which the paraphernalia was
1
The record is unclear as to what action, if any, the prosecutor’s office advised Deputy Marsh to take with
regard to Stevens’s arrest.
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found was his house and that the paraphernalia itself belonged to him, not to
Newgard. During the interview, Deputy Marsh noticed marks on Stevens’s arm
that looked like injection marks from hypodermic needles. Stevens stated that
the marks came from injecting methamphetamine.
[8] On January 28, 2014, the State charged Stevens with Class D felony possession
of a precursor by a methamphetamine offender, Class D felony possession of
methamphetamine, Class D felony unlawful possession of a syringe, Class D
felony maintaining a common nuisance, and Class A misdemeanor possession
of paraphernalia.
[9] Stevens filed a motion to suppress on March 21, 2014, arguing no probable
cause justified his arrest at Werner Drug Store because the Florida conviction
that served as the basis for the arrest was in fact not for dealing
methamphetamine but instead for dealing Alprazolam, a prescription
medication more commonly known as Xanax. He argued that, as a result of his
illegal arrest, any evidence collected after his arrest, including the
methamphetamine he had in his pocket, the evidence found inside his home,
and the statements he made to Deputy Marsh, should be suppressed. The trial
court held a hearing on the motion on May 1, 2014. On June 6, 2014, the trial
court issued an order granting Stevens’s motion and ordering that “all items
seized and all statements made by the Defendant” be suppressed. Id. at 65. The
State filed a motion to dismiss the cause on June 10, 2014, which the trial court
granted the same day.
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[10] The State now appeals.2
Discussion and Decision
[11] The State appeals the trial court’s order granting Stevens’s motion to suppress
the evidence obtained pursuant to Stevens’s warrantless arrest. We review a
trial court’s order granting a motion to suppress evidence to determine
“whether the record discloses substantial evidence of probative value that
supports the trial court’s conclusions.” State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200,
1203 (Ind. 2008) (citations and quotations omitted). We do not reweigh
evidence. Id. The State must, on appeal from a negative judgment, show that
the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress was contrary to law. Id.
[12] As a general rule, the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable warrantless
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme Court of the
United States has explained that “the line is crossed when the police, without
probable cause or a warrant, forcibly remove a person from his home or other
place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police station, where
he is detained, although briefly, for investigative purposes.” Hayes v. Florida, 470
U.S. 811, 816 (1985). However, “the warrantless arrest of an individual in a
public place upon probable cause [does] not violate the Fourth Amendment.”
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976).
2
We held oral argument in this appeal on April 24, 2015, at Taylor University in Upland, Indiana. We
extend our gratitude to the faculty, staff, and students for their hospitality and commend counsel for the
quality of their written and oral advocacy.
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[13] Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution is nearly identical in text to the
Fourth Amendment, but Indiana courts have developed a distinct approach to
determining the reasonableness of searches and seizures. Duran v. State, 930
N.E.2d 10, 17 (Ind. 2010). The legality of a governmental search under Article
1, Section 11 turns on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the police conduct
under the totality of the circumstances. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359
(Ind. 2005). The reasonableness of a search or seizure is determined by
balancing (1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation
has occurred; (2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure
imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities; and (3) the extent of law
enforcement needs. Id. at 361.
[14] The remedy for a Fourth Amendment or Article 1, Section 11 violation is
exclusion of the evidence directly obtained and also any evidence derivatively
obtained as a result of the unlawful search or seizure. See Gyamfi v. State, 15
N.E.3d 1131, 1136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“The fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine . . . bars the admissibility in a criminal proceeding of evidence obtained
in the course of unlawful searches and seizures.”) (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
[15] Here, the State argues that because “law enforcement officers had no reason to
doubt the accuracy of the criminal history record and the information available
to them at the time of Stevens’s arrest,” Appellant’s Br. at 9, the fact that
Stevens’s criminal history record incorrectly indicated that he had a prior
conviction for dealing in methamphetamine does not negate the existence of
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probable cause to arrest Stevens when he attempted to buy pseudoephedrine on
January 23, 2014. The State emphasizes that if Stevens had had a conviction
within seven years for dealing in methamphetamine, his purchase of
pseudoephedrine would have been a Class D felony under Indiana Code
section 35-48-4-14.5(h)(1)(A). The State argues that it was reasonable for
officers to rely on information generated by IDACS and that “retrospect is not
the proper lens in which to view probable cause.” Id. at 9.
[16] Stevens, on the other hand, argues that officers should not have merely relied
on the criminal history record without conducting further research into the
nature of Stevens’s conviction. Citing Florida Statutes Annotated section
893.13, he notes that the actual title3 of the Florida statute under which Stevens
was convicted does not contain any reference to possessing or dealing
methamphetamine.4 He contends that before arresting him, officers should have
(1) contacted the prosecutor’s office to confirm that the criminal history entry
was accurate or (2) accessed the Florida statute online to confirm that Stevens
was convicted of a crime involving methamphetamine before arresting him.
[17] The Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution
require that a warrantless arrest be justified with probable cause. Van Winkle v.
State, 764 N.E.2d 258, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. Probable cause to
3
The body of the statute, however, does contain references to the manufacture and possession of
methamphetamine, as well as other drugs. This information was not included in Stevens’s IDACS records.
See F.S.A. 893.13(1)(g)
4
The actual title of the statute section is “Prohibited acts; penalties.” F.S.A. 893.13. The title of the statute
chapter is “Drug Abuse Prevention and Control.” F.S.A. 893.
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arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of an
officer are sufficient to warrant a belief by a person of reasonable caution that
an offense has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it.
Id. at 264-65. Whether evidence is sufficient to meet the probable cause
requirement is determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 265. “[B]ecause the
situations that officers face ‘in the course of executing their duties are more or
less ambiguous,’ probable cause allows for reasonable mistakes by the officer.”
United States v. Moore, 215 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1975)). The existence of probable cause is a fact-
sensitive determination. Id.
[18] Our supreme court has held that
Where police officers in the street act in good faith reliance[5] on a
dispatch from their own or another police agency that a crime
has been committed, there is no need to show the source of the
dispatcher’s information or the reliability of the dispatcher’s
informant. It is ludicrous to assert the police officer on the street
must be provided with some assurance the dispatcher at the
police station has not merely fabricated tales about a crime that
was, in fact, never committed and a description of suspects that
do not exist.
Moody v. State, 448 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. 1983) (internal citations omitted).6
5
Our review of the case law reveals that the courts have treated “good faith reliance” in probable cause
determinations differently than the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule. The good faith
exclusionary rule exception applies in situations where a warrant contains a defect and the officer reasonably
relies on the information in the warrant.
6
However, see State v. Glass, 769 N.E.2d 639, 643 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002):
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[19] We find Moody to be controlling in this case and conclude that under both the
Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11, it was reasonable for law
enforcement officers to believe that the information they received from IDACS,
namely that Stevens had a prior conviction for dealing in methamphetamine,
was accurate. The system is one on which officers regularly rely, and nothing
indicates that officers are or should be expected to confirm or research data
generated by IDACS, particularly absent any evidence of intentional
misconduct with respect to use or maintenance of the system. This reasonable
belief was sufficient to provide probable cause to believe that Stevens was
committing a crime by attempting to purchase pseudoephedrine. See Row v.
Holt, 864 N.E.2d 1011 (Ind. 2007) (county deputy sheriff reasonably believed he
had probable cause to arrest arrestee without warrant, and even if the trier of
fact concluded that the arrest was not based on probable cause because
information communicated to deputy sheriff by another officer was incorrect);
Wessling v. State, 798 N.E.2d 929, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“Where there is a
police-channel communication to the arresting officer, he acts in good faith
thereon, and such knowledge and information exists within the department,
then the arrest is based on probable cause.”); Jenkins v. Keating, 147 F.3d 577,
585 (7th Cir. 1998) (“When an officer has received information from some
person—normally the putative victim or an eyewitness—who it seems
We are cognizant of our supreme court’s statement: ‘Where police officers in the street act in
good faith reliance on a dispatch from their own or another police agency that a crime has been
committed, there is no need to show the source of the dispatcher’s information or the reliability
of the dispatcher's informant.’ Moody v. State, 448 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. 1983). To the extent
the quoted language suggests that every call to a dispatcher is sufficient in itself to satisfy the
Fourth Amendment, it paints Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with too broad a brush.
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reasonable to believe is telling the truth, he has probable cause to arrest the
accused perpetrator.”) (internal quotation and quotation marks omitted).
[20] Therefore, under the unique facts and circumstances before us, we conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Stevens’s motion to
suppress. We accordingly reverse the trial court’s order suppressing the
evidence recovered as a result of Stevens’s warrantless arrest and remand this
matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[21] Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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