In the Term. of the Parent-Child Relationship of: P.J.H. & J.H. (Minor Children) and P.H. (Father) v. The Ind. Dept. of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                  FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                               Dec 22 2016, 9:18 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                               CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing                           Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Mark Small                                               Gregory F. Zoeller
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                    Attorney General of Indiana
    Robert J. Henke
    David E. Corey
    Deputy Attorneys General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Termination of the Parent-                        December 22, 2016
    Child Relationship of:                                   Court of Appeals Case No.
    11A04-1606-JT-1224
    P.J.H. & J.H. (Minor Children)
    Appeal from the Clay Circuit
    and                                                      Court
    P.H. (Father),                                           The Honorable Joseph Trout,
    Appellant-Respondent,                                    Judge
    Trial Court Cause Nos.
    v.                                                       11C01-1510-JT-208
    11C01-1510-JT-209
    The Indiana Department of
    Child Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Robb, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 11A04-1606-JT-1224 | December 22, 2016    Page 1 of 10
    Case Summary and Issue
    [1]   P.H. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s termination of his parental rights to
    eight-year-old P.J.H. and seven-year-old J.H. (“Children”), raising a sole
    restated issue: whether the juvenile court’s termination order is supported by
    clear and convincing evidence. Concluding the termination order is not clearly
    erroneous, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   In 2013, Father, a veteran, and A.A. (“Mother”) were dating and living
    together with the Children in a residence in Brazil, Indiana. 1 Also living in the
    home were Mother’s three other children (“Half-Siblings”) and their father,
    T.A.2 In February 2013, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”)
    received a report alleging two of the Half-Siblings were underweight, the family
    sometimes had no food in the home, a law enforcement K-9 unit recently
    searched the home, and Mother abused drugs. A week later, DCS confirmed
    law enforcement discovered a methamphetamine lab in the garage and
    marijuana in an upstairs bedroom; DCS then removed the Children from
    Mother’s and Father’s care. On March 4, DCS filed petitions alleging the
    1
    Mother is not part of this appeal.
    2
    Although not clear from the record, it appears Mother and T.A. were married, but Father and Mother were
    dating.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 11A04-1606-JT-1224 | December 22, 2016     Page 2 of 10
    Children were children in need of services (“CHINS”),3 and on June 25, 2013,
    the juvenile court entered an order adjudicating the Children as CHINS and
    ordering Father to participate in reunification services.
    [3]   On January 28, 2014, the juvenile court held a permanency hearing and DCS
    presented evidence that Father did not engage with the Children during
    visitation, failed two drug screens and skipped other screenings, missed
    parenting sessions, and failed to follow through with initial efforts to seek
    treatment through the Veterans Administration. The juvenile court then
    approved concurrent plans of reunification and termination of parental rights
    against Father.
    [4]   In the summer and early fall of 2014, DCS allowed the Children to return to
    Mother’s and Father’s care on a home trial visit. On November 3, 2014, the
    juvenile court granted DCS’ motion to discharge the CHINS adjudication as to
    P.J.H., but not J.H.4 However, on January 23, 2015, DCS filed another
    petition alleging P.J.H. as a CHINS, citing Mother’s methamphetamine use.
    Both Mother and Father admitted to the material allegations set forth in the
    petition and the juvenile court adjudicated P.J.H. as a CHINS. Several months
    later, DCS requested leave to cease all reunification services, citing Mother’s
    3
    DCS also filed a petition alleging the Half-Siblings were CHINS, but Father is not the father of the Half-
    Siblings and neither Mother nor the Half-Siblings are subject to this appeal.
    4
    The record indicates the reasons for the discharge as to P.J.H. were Mother’s and Father’s reasonable
    compliance with the dispositional decree. As to J.H., DCS noted his condition “declin[ed] drastically”
    during the home trial visit. Transcript at 117.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 11A04-1606-JT-1224 | December 22, 2016          Page 3 of 10
    and Father’s inability to comply with the case plans. As to Father, DCS noted
    Father did not comply with his substance abuse treatment, failed to attend drug
    screenings, and participated in visitation sporadically. DCS also did not believe
    Father could care for the Children. The juvenile court granted DCS’ request
    and ordered the Children’s permanency plan be amended to adoption.
    [5]   Around the same time, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father’s and Mother’s
    parental rights to the Children. At an evidentiary hearing, both the family case
    manager and the court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) opined Father’s
    parental rights should be terminated. Following the evidentiary hearing, the
    juvenile court issued an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental
    rights, finding in relevant part,
    19. According to the testimony and the exhibits proffered by
    [DCS], a . . . CHINS case was filed in October 2008. The
    Children, [P.J.H.] and [J.H.] were out of the home for 6 months
    as a result of that CHINS Action. At that time, [Father] and
    [Mother] resided together. In that case, [J.H.] was born with
    methamphetamine in his system and [Mother] tested positive for
    methamphetamine at the time of the birth. The safety of the
    children living in a home with a parent who uses
    methamphetamine and has a history of drug addiction was the
    basis for removal. Also of record in that file is [Father] refused to
    be drug screened.
    20. [The present CHINS] action was brought against both
    parents in March 2013 . . . . In a fact finding hearing as to
    [Mother], it was found and concluded that “there is clear
    evidence that a methamphetamine lab was in operation in the
    garage on the parents’ property which garage is within 15 ft.-30
    ft. of the [C]hildren’s residence, the presence of the lab with its
    chemical component is dangerous to the [C]hildren, [Mother]
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 11A04-1606-JT-1224 | December 22, 2016   Page 4 of 10
    has a history of prior cases with the department with the
    presenting issue in both cases being [M]other’s use of
    methamphetamine, [M]other admitted to using
    methamphetamine during the investigation of this case and has
    tested positive for methamphetamine since the investigation of
    this case.[”] It should be noted that a similar findings of fact and
    conclusion of law was found as to fathers, T.A. and [Father].
    ***
    22. As to [J.H.] and the 2013 case . . . [Father] has not been fully
    compliant with the child’s case plan in that he has only
    sporadically participated in visits, drugs screens, and services.
    Further, neither [F]ather nor [M]other have enhanced their
    ability to fulfill their parental obligations . . . .
    23. In light of the fact that the 2013 [P.J.H.] CHINS case had
    been dismissed as to that child, it was refiled in January 2015.
    The report indicated that in 2014, DCS made an unannounced
    visit to the home. [Mother] and [Father] had completed drug
    screens and signed a safety plan that stated . . . [Father] would
    not allow the [C]hildren to be alone with [Mother] if he thought
    or knew she was under the influence of drugs. Thereafter, in
    January 2015, [Mother] began testing positive for
    methamphetamine. All parties admitted and disposition was on
    April 22, 2015. Once again, [Mother] and [Father], by
    disposition decree, was [sic] not to allow the use of or consume,
    manufacture, trade, or distribute any illegal controlled substances
    and not permit the possession or consumption of any illegal
    controlled substances in the home or in the presence of the
    [C]hildren.
    ***
    25. According to the testimony, [P.J.H.] does not trust his
    parents to parent and does not feel safe. He has not had visits
    from his mom for a year. Father was incarcerated twice in 2015
    and visited one time after he was most recently released from jail.
    It was the opinion of the supervisors of parenting time that
    [Father] has an inability to watch both [C]hildren. Visits were
    voluntarily stopped by Father due to the emotional impact it was
    having on the [C]hildren, in fact [J.H.] wet the bed every night
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 11A04-1606-JT-1224 | December 22, 2016   Page 5 of 10
    after visiting with his father.
    26. It has been the testimony from multiple witnesses that,
    through no fault of his own, [Father] has cognitive disabilities
    that prevent him from effectively parenting young children
    including one that is autistic. Father himself is under a legal
    guardianship and, according to the witnesses, lacks parenting
    skills and would not be able to take care of these [C]hildren.
    ***
    36. The [C]hildren would be severely traumatized if required to
    visit with their biological parents.
    37. Parents have had multiple prior contacts with DCS and the
    [C]hildren have been removed from their parents by DCS on at
    least three (3) prior occasions.
    38. Father is cognitively unable to parent these [C]hildren, due
    to his own mental health needs.
    39. Father has not complied with the terms of the dispositional
    decree, and was incarcerated a substantial part of the time of the
    pendency of the CHINS matters.
    40. Father has been convicted and put on probation twice for
    possessing controlled substances. [Father] violated the terms of
    that probation by possessing/abusing controlled substances.
    41. The [C]hildren are traumatized and act out behaviorally
    whenever they visit their father.
    42. Father does not engage with [C]hildren during visits and will
    sometimes leave during the visits. Father loves the [C]hildren
    but due to his disability and theirs (especially [J.H.]), he cannot
    provide the necessary education or supervision.
    ***
    45. The [C]hildren are well settled in their current foster family.
    The [C]hildren have a bond with their foster family and their
    foster family with them.
    46. It would severely traumatize the [C]hildren to remove them
    from that home. The [C]hildren have a right to permanency and
    it is in their best interest to be adopted by the foster family. The
    foster family is willing to adopt the [C]hildren.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 11A04-1606-JT-1224 | December 22, 2016   Page 6 of 10
    Appellant’s Appendix at 18-21. Father now appeals. Additional facts will be
    added as necessary.
    Discussion and Decision
    I. Standard of Review
    [6]   “[T]he involuntary termination of parental rights is an extreme measure that is
    designed to be used as a last resort when all other reasonable efforts have failed
    . . . .” In re K.W., 
    12 N.E.3d 241
    , 249 (Ind. 2014) (alteration in original)
    (citation omitted). Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) sets out what must be
    proven in order to terminate parental rights, which we quote in relevant part:
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the
    conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the
    reasons for placement outside the home of the
    parents will not be remedied.
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the
    continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
    threat to the well-being of the child.
    ***
    (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child . . . .
    The State must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence. 
    Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2
    ; In re G.Y., 
    904 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1261 (Ind. 2009). If a juvenile
    court determines that the allegations of the petition are true, then the court shall
    terminate the parent-child relationship. 
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8
    (a).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 11A04-1606-JT-1224 | December 22, 2016   Page 7 of 10
    II. Children’s Best Interests
    [7]   Father contends the juvenile court’s termination order is clearly erroneous,
    arguing DCS failed to present clear and convincing evidence to establish
    termination of his parental rights is in the best interests of the Children.                         5
    In determining what is in the best interests of the Children, the
    trial court is required to look beyond the factors identified by the
    Indiana Department of Child Services and to look to the totality
    of the evidence. In so doing, the court must subordinate the
    interests of the parent to those of the children. The court need
    not wait until the children are irreversibly harmed before
    terminating the parent-child relationship. Moreover, we have
    previously held that the recommendation by both the case
    manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in
    addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will
    not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing
    evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests.
    5
    Specifically, it appears Father argues the trial court erred in considering his mental health issues when
    it found Father is cognitively unable to parent the Children due to his mental health needs. We
    acknowledge Father suffers cognitively and note “[m]ental [disability] of the parents, standing alone, is
    not a proper ground for terminating parental rights.” In re V.A., 
    51 N.E.3d 1140
    , 1147 (Ind. 2016)
    (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, in cases where
    parents are “incapable of or unwilling to fulfill their legal obligations in caring for their children,”
    mental disability may be considered. Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 
    592 N.E.2d 1232
    ,
    1234 (Ind. 1992). We further note, the focus in determining what is in the best interests of the Children
    is the Children, not the parents, and although we commend and thank Father for his service to this
    country and hope he can receive the treatment he seeks, the evidence in this case—including his
    arrests, lack of participation in services, dependency on others for care and support, and substance
    abuse issues—overwhelmingly establishes Father has not provided the Children with the necessary
    care and support and is incapable of doing so. Thus, the trial court did not err in considering Father’s
    mental health issues in terminating his parental rights.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 11A04-1606-JT-1224 | December 22, 2016            Page 8 of 10
    A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    987 N.E.2d 1150
    , 1158-59 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2013) (citations omitted), trans. denied.
    [8]    Here, Father does not challenge the juvenile court’s conclusion that there is a
    reasonable probability the conditions resulting in the Children’s removal will
    not be remedied, and both the CASA and the family case manager opined it
    would be in the Children’s best interests for Father’s parental rights to be
    terminated. Accordingly, these findings are sufficient to show by clear and
    convincing evidence that termination is in the Children’s best interests. See 
    id.
    [9]    Further, we note “[p]ermanency is a central consideration in determining the
    best interests of a child.” Id. at 1159 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
    The findings establish the Children, both of whom have special needs, have
    been removed from Father’s care on multiple occasions. Moreover, DCS
    expressed concern because after one of the trial home visits, the Children “each
    lost at least one or two clothing sizes . . . they had lost so much weight they
    were emaciated and quite undernourished.” Tr. at 116. Since the Children
    have been in their foster home, “They have done well. They attend school
    regularly . . . . And they’re progressing. They’re maturing. They look healthy.
    They’ve gained weight. They look well.” Id. at 44.
    [10]   We therefore conclude DCS established by clear and convincing evidence that
    termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interests of the Children.
    Conclusion
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 11A04-1606-JT-1224 | December 22, 2016   Page 9 of 10
    [11]   DCS established by clear and convincing evidence the elements necessary to
    support the termination of Father’s parental rights. The judgment of the
    juvenile court terminating Father’s parental rights is affirmed.
    [12]   Affirmed.
    Kirsch, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 11A04-1606-JT-1224 | December 22, 2016   Page 10 of 10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11A04-1606-JT-1224

Filed Date: 12/22/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021