Terry L. Hill v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 12 2016, 5:53 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
James Harper Gregory F. Zoeller
Harper & Harper, LLC Attorney General
Valparaiso, Indiana
Chandra K. Hein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Terry L. Hill, December 12, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
64A03-1602-CR-313
v. Appeal from the Porter Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable William E. Alexa,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
64D02-1109-FA-8534
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Terry L. Hill repeatedly molested his stepson. The State charged him with class
A felony and class C felony child molesting. Hill moved to dismiss the class C
felony charge as untimely. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the
statutory limitation period was tolled because Hill had concealed evidence of
the offense by warning his stepson that he would “get in trouble” if he said
anything. After a trial, a jury found Hill guilty of the class C felony charge.
[2] On appeal, Hill contends that the State committed reversible error in failing to
plead concealment in the charging information and that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss. We hold that Hill has waived
his first argument and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
his motion to dismiss. Therefore, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] The facts most favorable to the conviction follow. D.T. was born in 1983. His
mother married Hill in 1989. In 1994, D.T. asked his mother about sex. His
mother referred him to Hill, who talked with him about sex and masturbation.
Hill told D.T. that he “could come back if [he] had any more questions.” Tr. at
67. The two had more conversations, and Hill asked D.T. if he wanted to
masturbate together. D.T. “thought it was weird,” but Hill said that he had
“done this before. It wasn’t that big of a deal. [D.T.] was like, okay, fine.” Id.
at 68. The two then masturbated together “often.” Id. at 81. At first they
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masturbated only themselves, but later, at Hill’s instigation, they began
masturbating each other.
[4] “The majority of the time [Hill and D.T.] didn’t really talk” during their
encounters. Id. at 77. But “[t]here was a time that, specifically, [Hill] had told
[D.T.], and it was the one and only time [Hill] ever told [D.T.], don’t say
anything because you’ll get in trouble.” Id. According to D.T., “[T]hat was, I
guess, at the time, all I needed. All right, I won’t say anything.” Id. D.T., who
was ten or eleven years old at the time, “believed” that he would get in trouble
if he told anyone. Id. He did not know what would happen if he told anyone,
but he did not tell anyone because he was “scared.” Id. at 78.
[5] The molestations continued until Hill and D.T.’s mother divorced in 1998.
When D.T. was approximately seventeen, he told a friend about the
molestations but asked her not to tell anyone. D.T. developed a “drinking
problem .… because of what happened to [him] as a kid” and was hospitalized
after a drunk-driving accident in 2006. Id. at 88. D.T.’s mother was upset
about his drinking, and D.T.’s friend told her that the drinking was “probably”
due to Hill’s molestations. Id. at 87. D.T.’s mother “asked [D.T.] about it, and
[he] told her it was true.” Id. at 89. D.T.’s mother then told relatives and
acquaintances that D.T. had been molested and encouraged him to go to the
police, but D.T. “wanted it all to just go away. [He] didn't want to deal with it
because [he] wasn’t ready to face it.” Id. at 90. Finally, in April 2009, D.T.
decided that he did not “want to feel like this anymore” and did not “want
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anyone else to feel like this” and reported Hill’s molestations to the police. Id.
at 100.
[6] In September 2011, the State charged Hill with one count of class A felony
child molesting (based on allegations of oral and anal sexual activity) and one
count of class C felony child molesting (based on allegations of fondling or
touching with intent to arouse or satisfy D.T.’s or Hill’s sexual desires). Hill’s
first trial ended in a hung jury, and he was tried again in October 2015. During
trial, Hill made an oral motion to dismiss the class C felony charge on the basis
that it was filed after the five-year statutory limitation period expired. The trial
court denied the motion, finding that the limitation period was tolled because
Hill had concealed evidence of the offense by telling D.T. that he would “get in
trouble” if he said anything. Id. at 153. The jury found Hill not guilty of the
class A felony charge and guilty of the class C felony charge. Hill now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Section 1 – Hill has waived his argument regarding the State’s
alleged failure to plead concealment.
[7] Hill contends that the State committed reversible error in failing to plead
concealment in the charging information. He did not raise this issue before the
trial court, and therefore it is waived. Harbart v. State, 51 N.E.3d 267, 279 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. In his reply brief, Hill reframes the issue as
fundamental error, which he may not do. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(C) (“No
new issues shall be raised in the reply brief.”).
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Section 2 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Hill’s motion to dismiss.
[8] Indiana Code Section 35-41-4-2(a) provides that a prosecution for a class C
felony is barred unless it is commenced within five years after the commission
of the offense. Subsection (h) of the statute provides that the limitation period
“does not include any period in which … (2) the accused person conceals
evidence of the offense, and evidence sufficient to charge the person with that
offense is unknown to the prosecuting authority and could not have been
discovered by that authority by exercise of due diligence[.]” Hill’s last act of
molestation occurred in 1998. D.T. reported the molestations to the police in
2009, and the State filed the class C felony charge against Hill in 2011. Hill
challenges the denial of his motion to dismiss that charge, claiming that the trial
court erred in finding that he concealed evidence of the offense by warning D.T.
once that he would “get in trouble” if he said anything. Tr. at 153. 1 We review
a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss only for an abuse of discretion.
Study v. State, 24 N.E.3d 953, 950 (Ind. 2015), cert. denied. “An abuse of
discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances before it or it misinterprets the law.” Norris
v. State, 53 N.E.3d 512, 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Hill’s argument regarding
1
The trial court found that Hill’s warning was “sufficient effort to conceal” and that the five-year limitation
period was tolled such that the prosecution was timely. Tr. at 153-54. Hill challenges only the trial court’s
finding of concealment.
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concealment is a matter of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo
because it presents a question of law. Study, 24 N.E.3d at 950.
[9] “A statute of limitation is designed to insure against prejudice and injustice to a
defendant which is occasioned by a delay in prosecution.” State v. Lindsay, 862
N.E.2d 314, 317 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. “The limitation period
seeks to strike a balance between a defendant’s interest in being placed on
notice so as to be able to formulate a defense for a crime charged and the State’s
interest in having sufficient time to investigate and develop a case.” Id. The
State has the burden to prove that the crime charged was committed within the
statutory limitation period. Id. “Any exception to the limitation period must be
construed narrowly and in a light most favorable to the accused.” Id.
[10] Our supreme court has stated that “tolling the statute of limitations for
‘concealing evidence of the offense’ requires a positive act by the offender that is
calculated to conceal that a crime has been committed.” Study, 24 N.E.3d at
957. The court has also stated that concealment “is a fact-intensive issue.”
Willner v. State, 602 N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ind. 1992). We conclude that Hill’s
warning to his ten- or eleven-year-old stepson that he would “get in trouble” if
he said anything about the molestations was a positive act by Hill that was
calculated to conceal that those crimes had been committed. Hill cites no
authority holding that a single warning is insufficient to constitute concealment,
and we decline to so hold in this case. The obvious purpose of Hill’s warning
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was to coerce D.T. to keep quiet, and a single warning accomplished that
purpose for many years. 2 Hill also cites no persuasive authority for his assertion
that the warning did not constitute concealment because D.T. did not know
precisely what “trouble” meant. 3 “Trouble” can take on many forms in the
mind of a ten- or eleven-year-old child, and we agree with the State that Hill’s
“lack of specificity” made his warning “more coercive.” Appellee’s Br. at 13.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Hill’s motion to dismiss. Therefore, we affirm his
conviction.
[11] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and May, J., concur.
2
To the extent Hill suggests that D.T. initially might have been scared to report the abuse but later was
merely “embarrassed and uncertain about how he would report” it, Appellant’s Br. at 11, our supreme court
has stated that Indiana Code Section 35-41-4-2(h)(2)
mandates that courts judge the period of concealment by the defendant’s actions and not how
the victim processes the effects of those actions over time. When a defendant’s actions amount
to concealment, he or she hopes that the period of concealment will continue indefinitely.
Accordingly, as the statute states, the tolling period begins when the defendant’s actions first
amount to concealment and ends when authorities discover or should have discovered the
evidence.
Sloan v. State, 947 N.E.2d 917, 923 n.10 (Ind. 2011). Hill does not argue that the tolling period ended when
D.T. and his mother disclosed the abuse to friends, relatives, and acquaintances.
3
At trial, the prosecutor asked D.T. if Hill had ever “threaten[ed]” him “at any point[.]” Tr. at 78. D.T.
replied, “No, he didn’t threaten me.” Id. The prosecutor then asked, “But you felt the ‘you’ll get in troub1e’
was real?” Id. D.T. replied, “Yeah.” Id. Hill makes much ado about D.T.’s statement that Hill did not
“threaten” him. A “threat” is not required for concealment under Indiana law, and, in any event, D.T.’s
characterization of Hill’s words and actions is not dispositive. For these reasons, and because concealment is
a fact-intensive issue, we are unpersuaded by Hill’s reliance on State v. Henry, 834 S.W.2d 273 (Tenn. 1992),
in which the court found no concealment where the incest victim “denied that the [d]efendant threatened
her” and the defendant “‘would always remind [her] that [the abuse] was [their] secret and for [her] not to tell
anyone[.]’” Id. at 275 (second alteration in Henry).
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