Tyrone D. Payton v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION                                                       FILED
    Dec 19 2016, 9:10 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    CLERK
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                 Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                  and Tax Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Matthew J. McGovern                                     Gregory F. Zoeller
    Anderson, Indiana                                       Attorney General of Indiana
    Kelly A. Loy
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Tyrone D. Payton,                                       December 19, 2016
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    22A01-1605-CR-980
    v.                                              Appeal from the Floyd Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Susan L. Orth,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                     Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    22D01-0410-FB-754
    Barnes, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1605-CR-980 | December 19, 2016       Page 1 of 7
    Case Summary
    [1]   Tyrone Payton appeals the revocation of his probation. We affirm.
    Issues
    [2]   Payton raises one issue, which we revise and restate as:
    I.      whether the trial court properly revoked his probation; and
    II.     whether the trial court properly ordered him to serve four
    years of his previously-suspended sentence.
    Facts
    [3]   In 2006, Payton pled guilty to Class B felony conspiracy to commit burglary,
    and he was sentenced to ten years with five years suspended to probation.
    Between 2008 and 2010, the probation department filed three notices of
    probation violation. In 2011, the probation department filed a fourth notice of
    probation violation, and Payton stipulated to violating his probation. The trial
    court extended Payton’s probation by six months. In 2012, the probation
    department filed fifth and sixth notices of probation violation. In 2014, the
    probation department filed a seventh notice of probation violation, and Payton
    again stipulated to violating his probation. The trial court ordered Payton to
    undergo intensive probation with the Floyd County Intensive Probation
    Program (“FLIP”). The probation department filed an eighth notice of
    probation violation in 2015.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1605-CR-980 | December 19, 2016   Page 2 of 7
    [4]   In July 2015, the probation department filed a ninth notice of probation
    violation, which it later amended and alleged the following violations: (1)
    failing to maintain good behavior; (2) violating a law by committing new
    offenses; (3) failing to report for probation; (4) using alcohol or controlled
    substances not prescribed by a physician; and (5) failing to pay probation fees.
    At the probation revocation hearing, the State presented evidence that Payton:
    (1) failed to report for at least two probation appointments; (2) on December 16,
    2014, he admitted to using marijuana and Lortabs that were not prescribed by a
    doctor; (3) on January 15, 2015, he admitted to using marijuana and
    oxycodone; (4) he failed to attend appointments at LifeSprings; and (5) he was
    charged with additional criminal offenses in July 2015. The additional charges
    were Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon,
    Level 5 felony carrying a handgun with a prior felony conviction, Level 5
    felony battery, Level 5 felony obliterating identifying marks on a handgun, and
    Level 6 felony criminal recklessness. During his testimony, Payton admitted
    that he had used illegal drugs, that he had been arrested on new charges, and
    that he had missed probation appointments.
    [5]   At the probation revocation hearing, the State sought to admit a file stamped
    copy of the charging information and probable cause affidavit for the new
    offenses. Payton objected based on “hearsay,” but the trial court admitted the
    exhibit “for the purpose of showing that there was an arrest.” Tr. pp. 30-31.
    We note that the exhibit submitted to this court contains only the charging
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1605-CR-980 | December 19, 2016   Page 3 of 7
    information and the first page of the probable cause affidavit. It is unclear
    whether the exhibit admitted at trial included the full probable cause affidavit.
    [6]   The trial court found that Payton violated his probation by failing to attend
    probation appointments, using illegal drugs, being charged with new crimes,
    and failing to attend LifeSpring. The trial court revoked Payton’s probation
    and ordered him to serve four years of his previously-suspended sentence.
    Payton now appeals.
    Analysis
    I. Probation Revocation
    [7]   Payton argues that the trial court erred by revoking his probation. The State
    must prove a violation of probation by a preponderance of the evidence. Dokes
    v. State, 
    971 N.E.2d 178
    , 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The decision to revoke
    probation lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and it may revoke
    probation if the conditions thereof are violated. Lamply v. State, 
    31 N.E.3d 1034
    , 1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). We review challenges to the revocation of
    probation for an abuse of discretion. Rudisel v. State, 
    31 N.E.3d 984
    , 987 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2015). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly
    against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Figures v.
    State, 
    920 N.E.2d 267
    , 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). If there is substantial evidence
    of probative value to support the trial court’s conclusion that a defendant has
    violated any term of probation, we will affirm its decision to revoke probation.
    
    Id. at 272
    .
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1605-CR-980 | December 19, 2016   Page 4 of 7
    [8]   Payton’s challenge centers on the trial court’s reliance on the State’s exhibit that
    contained the charging information and probable cause affidavit. Payton
    argued at the revocation hearing that the document contained hearsay and, on
    appeal, notes that the document was not certified. The Indiana Rules of
    Evidence in general and the rules against hearsay in particular do not apply in
    probation revocation proceedings. Ind. Evidence Rule 101(d)(2); Cox v. State,
    
    706 N.E.2d 547
    , 550 (Ind. 1999). Our supreme court has held that hearsay
    evidence may be admitted without violating a probationer’s due process rights if
    the hearsay is substantially trustworthy. Smith v. State, 
    971 N.E.2d 86
    , 90 (Ind.
    2012); Reyes v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 438
    , 442 (Ind. 2007). Given the lack of a full
    copy of the probable cause affidavit, it is impossible to determine whether the
    exhibit was substantially trustworthy. We conclude, however, that any error in
    the admission of the exhibit was harmless.
    [9]   The violation of a single condition of probation is enough to support a
    probation revocation. Pierce v. State, 
    44 N.E.3d 752
    , 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
    Payton does not challenge the trial court’s finding that he violated his probation
    by failing to attend probation appointments, using illegal drugs, or failing to
    attend LifeSpring. Those violations were sufficient to support the revocation of
    his probation. See, e.g., Jenkins v. State, 
    956 N.E.2d 146
    , 149 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2011) (holding that the probationer’s failure to timely report to the probation
    department, by itself, was sufficient to support the revocation of his probation),
    trans. denied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1605-CR-980 | December 19, 2016   Page 5 of 7
    II. Sentence
    [10]   Payton also challenges the trial court’s imposition of four years of his
    previously-suspended sentence. Upon the revocation of probation, the trial
    court may: (1) continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or
    enlarging the conditions; (2) extend the person’s probationary period for not
    more than one year beyond the original probationary period; and (3) order
    execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial
    sentencing. 
    Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3
    (h). We review a trial court’s sentencing
    decisions for probation violations for an abuse of discretion. Prewitt v. State, 
    878 N.E.2d 184
    , 188 (Ind. 2007).
    [11]   Payton argues that, without consideration of his new arrest, the trial court
    would not have imposed four years of his previously-suspended sentence. We
    disagree. Payton has repeatedly violated his probation and was shown
    significant leniency in the past. Despite that leniency, Payton again violated his
    probation by failing to attend probation appointments, using illegal drugs, and
    failing to attend LifeSpring. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
    imposing four years of the previously-suspended sentence as a result of these
    violations. See, e.g., Jenkins, 
    956 N.E.2d at 150
     (“In light of the current
    violations and Jenkins’ history of probation violations, we cannot say that the
    trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve twelve years of his
    previously suspended sentence.”).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1605-CR-980 | December 19, 2016   Page 6 of 7
    Conclusion
    [12]   The trial court properly revoked Payton’s probation and ordered him to serve
    four years of the previously-suspended sentence. We affirm.
    [13]   Affirmed.
    Bailey, J., and Riley, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 22A01-1605-CR-980 | December 19, 2016   Page 7 of 7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 22A01-1605-CR-980

Filed Date: 12/19/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/19/2016