Matthew A. Mahoney v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
Nov 10 2014, 9:30 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
CARA SCHAEFER WIENEKE GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Plainfield, Indiana
CHRISTINA D. PACE
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MATTHEW A. MAHONEY, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 84A01-1405-CR-191
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE VIGO SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable David R. Bolk, Judge
Cause No. 84D03-1304-FB-1015
November 10, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NAJAM, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Matthew Mahoney appeals his sentence following his convictions for three counts
of sexual misconduct with a minor, as Class B felonies; sexual misconduct with a minor,
as a Class C felony; vicarious sexual gratification, as a Class D felony; child solicitation,
as a Class D felony; and dissemination of matter harmful to minors, a Class D felony;
after he pleaded guilty as charged. Mahoney presents a single issue for our review,
namely, whether his sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
From July 15, 2012, through March 23, 2013, Mahoney, a youth pastor at Good
Shepherd Baptist Church (“the Church”) in Vigo County, and his wife hosted fourteen-
year-old A.B., a member of the Church, overnight at their home on most Friday nights.
Mahoney, both with and without his wife’s participation, engaged in frequent sexual
activities with A.B., including sexual intercourse. On April 3, 2013, the State charged
Mahoney with three counts of sexual misconduct with a minor, as Class B felonies;
sexual misconduct with a minor, as a Class C felony; vicarious sexual gratification, as a
Class D felony; child solicitation, as a Class D felony; and dissemination of matter
harmful to minors, a Class D felony. And on March 4, 2014, Mahoney pleaded guilty as
charged without a plea agreement.
At sentencing, the trial court identified the following mitigators: Mahoney’s
guilty plea without the benefit of an agreement; his cooperation with police; and his
insignificant criminal history. And the trial court identified the following aggravators:
the harm suffered by the victim was significant and greater than the elements necessary to
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prove the commission of the offenses; and Mahoney was in a position of trust with the
victim. The trial court found that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and imposed
an aggregate twelve-year sentence with ten years executed and two years suspended to
probation. This appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Mahoney purports to appeal his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), but
he makes no cogent argument regarding the nature of the offenses or his character. See
Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Instead, we read Mahoney’s contentions on appeal to
amount to a request that we review the weight the trial court assigned to the mitigators
and aggravators in imposing his sentence. But in Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482,
491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on other grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007), our
supreme court held that, “[b]ecause the trial court no longer has any obligation to ‘weigh’
aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence, unlike
the pre-Blakely statutory regime, a trial court cannot now be said to have abused its
discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ such factors.” Thus, we will not review the trial
court’s weighing of aggravators and mitigators here.
To the extent Mahoney challenges his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule
7(B), we set out the applicable standard of review. Although a trial court may have acted
within its lawful discretion in determining a sentence, Article VII, Sections 4 and 6 of the
Indiana Constitution “authorize[] independent appellate review and revision of a sentence
imposed by the trial court.” Roush v. State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(alteration original). This appellate authority is implemented through Indiana Appellate
Rule 7(B). Id. Revision of a sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B) requires the appellant
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to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and
his character. See App. R. 7(B); Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007). We assess the trial court’s recognition or non-recognition of aggravators and
mitigators as an initial guide to determining whether the sentence imposed was
inappropriate. Gibson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). However, “a
defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met th[e]
inappropriateness standard of review.” Roush, 875 N.E.2d at 812 (alteration original).
The Indiana Supreme Court has also stated that “sentencing is principally a
discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment should receive considerable
deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). Indiana’s flexible
sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate sentence to the
circumstances presented. See id. at 1224. The principal role of appellate review is to
attempt to “leaven the outliers.” Id. at 1225. Whether we regard a sentence as
inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant,
the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that come to
light in a given case.” Id. at 1224.
Mahoney, a youth pastor, took advantage of his position of trust with a young
member of his church and sexually abused her over the course of several months. His
sentence is not an outlier. Mahoney’s aggregate twelve-year sentence is not
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.
Affirmed.
BAILEY, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
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