Paul Reese, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                        Sep 16 2019, 5:45 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                          CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                              Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Mark Small                                               Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                    Attorney General of Indiana
    Laura R. Anderson
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Paul Reese, Jr.,                                         September 16, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-CR-1985
    v.                                               Appeal from the
    Putnam Circuit Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Matthew L. Headley, Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    67C01-1708-F1-210
    Kirsch, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019         Page 1 of 36
    [1]   Paul Reese, Jr. (“Reese”) was convicted after a jury trial of burglary1 as a Level
    2 felony, conspiracy to commit burglary2 as a Level 2 felony, conspiracy to
    commit armed robbery3 as a Level 3 felony, confinement while armed with a
    deadly weapon4 as a Level 3 felony, theft5 as a Level 6 felony, auto theft6 as a
    Level 6 felony, two counts of armed robbery,7 each as a Level 3 felony, and
    burglary8 as a Level 1 felony. As a result of these nine convictions, he was
    given a seventy-two-year aggregate sentence. Reese appeals his convictions and
    sentence and raises multiple issues for our review, which we consolidate and
    restate as:
    I.       Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
    admitted certain evidence at trial, including cell phone
    records obtained as a result of a search warrant and a
    report regarding the contents of a cell phone;
    II.      Whether the State presented sufficient evidence at trial to
    support Reese’s convictions;
    1
    See Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1(3).
    2
    See Ind. Code §§ 35-41-5-2, 35-43-2-1(3).
    3
    See Ind. Code §§ 35-41-5-2, 35-42-5-1.
    4
    See Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3.
    5
    See Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(A).
    6
    See Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2.5.
    7
    See Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1.
    8
    See Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1(4).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 2 of 36
    III.    Whether Reese’s convictions violated the prohibitions
    against double jeopardy; and
    IV.     Whether Reese’s seventy-two-year aggregate sentence is
    inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
    character of the offender.
    [2]   We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   Around 4:00 a.m. on April 2, 2017, Terry McCarter (“Terry”), who was
    seventy-nine at the time, and his wife, Patsy, were awakened by a loud crash in
    the area at the front of their house in Greencastle, Indiana. Tr. Vol. 2 at 142-43,
    168-69. Terry got out of bed to investigate while Patsy stayed in bed because
    she had a broken ankle and could not walk well. 
    Id. at 143,
    169. When he
    reached the front of the house, Terry was met by a masked gunman who said,
    “we’re the police” and told Terry to “[l]ay down on the floor with your face
    down.” 
    Id. at 143.
    Terry knew that the gunman was not a police officer, but
    complied with his demand. 
    Id. [4] Immediately
    following that, three other gunmen, who were all wearing masks,
    black clothes, gloves, some sort of stocking cap, and bandanas, came into the
    house. 
    Id. at 143-45,
    170-72. One man stayed and guarded Terry while another
    went into the bedroom to guard Patsy. 
    Id. at 143.
    The man who went back to
    the bedroom pointed a gun at Patsy and told her, “You’re going to be robbed.”
    
    Id. at 170.
    He then went over to a dresser, where Patsy had eight drawers of
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 3 of 36
    over 100 pieces of jewelry, and started emptying the drawers of jewelry into
    pillowcases. 
    Id. at 170,
    182. The man then found and took a .38 caliber pistol
    from the nightstand by the bed. 
    Id. The man
    also took a small safe and
    additional jewelry from the bathroom. 
    Id. at 172-73.
    The man turned the
    nightstand over, threw the dresser drawers all over the room, threw a lamp
    across the room, and “completely tore the bedroom up.” 
    Id. at 170.
    The man
    also turned over the Sleep Number mattress and pulled all of the hoses out of it.
    
    Id. at 173.
    [5]   The other two men proceeded to ransack the house and steal everything of any
    value in the home. 
    Id. at 143.
    The men went into the attic, the basement, the
    barn, and the garage to steal valuable items. 
    Id. at 143,
    171. The men took
    Terry’s wallet and pants that contained the keys to the couple’s Buick
    Rendezvous, Patsy’s purse, a pot where Terry threw spare change, and
    approximately $6,000 in cash. 
    Id. at 145-47,
    183-84. In addition to the pistol
    from the nightstand, the men stole a .223 rifle, a .22 rifle, a 12-gauge shotgun, a
    single-shot shotgun, an antique musket gun, and knives. 
    Id. at 145,
    184. They
    also stole various bottles of prescription medicine belonging to Terry and
    several cameras that Patsy used in her job. 
    Id. at 184-85.
    The men took a
    chainsaw, air compressor, drills, and a lot of other smaller tools from the barn
    and garage as well. 
    Id. at 145,
    156, 184. If the men did not steal an item, they
    destroyed it, leaving the house in “total disarray.” 
    Id. at 143,
    151, 171.
    [6]   While the men were going through the home, Terry heard one of the men
    referred to as “Dustin or Justin or something like that.” 
    Id. at 146.
    The men
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 4 of 36
    also joked and laughed while ransacking the house, and one in particular had
    an extremely high-pitched laugh. 
    Id. at 162,
    176. The McCarters also noticed
    that one of the men was quite a bit taller than the rest of the men. 
    Id. at 172.
    [7]   The men had been at the McCarters’ home for more than an hour when the
    man guarding Terry ordered him into the bedroom with Patsy. 
    Id. at 143-44.
    The men then ordered Terry and Patsy into the sunroom adjacent to their
    bedroom. 
    Id. at 144,
    174. All four men came into the area, and one of them
    put a gun to Patsy’s head and said, “Tell us where your stash is or I’m going to
    blow her head off.” 
    Id. at 144,
    174. Terry told the men, “You’ve got
    everything. I can’t help you.” 
    Id. at 144.
    One of the men rushed into the
    sunroom at that time and hit Terry on the side of his head with the butt of a
    rifle. 
    Id. at 144,
    174. As a result, Terry was briefly knocked unconscious. 
    Id. at 144.
    Patsy thought she and Terry were going to die. 
    Id. at 174.
    The men
    locked Patsy and Terry in the sunroom, left the house, went to the garage, and
    drove away in the McCarters’ white Buick Rendezvous. 
    Id. at 144,
    146, 165-66,
    174.
    [8]   After waiting a short time to make sure the men were gone, Terry exited the
    sunroom through another door that the men had not locked, found a cell
    phone, got in their other car, drove up the hill to where he had sufficient cell
    phone service, and called 911. 
    Id. at 144.
    Initially, the blow to his head did not
    bother Terry, but three days later, he went to the hospital because of a severe
    headache and learned that he had some bleeding of the brain. 
    Id. at 153,
    175.
    The doctors stated that Terry would likely suffer from a headache for a while as
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 5 of 36
    his body absorbed the dried blood. 
    Id. at 175.
    However, about two weeks later,
    Terry’s headache worsened, and he had to be rushed to the hospital to have an
    emergency brain operation, where two holes were drilled in the side of his head
    to the let the blood drain and relieve the pressure on his brain. 
    Id. at 152-53,
    175. He was hospitalized following the surgery for a period of five days. 
    Id. at 153.
    [9]    Putnam County Sheriff’s Department Detective Douglas Nally (“Detective
    Nally”) was the first detective to arrive on the scene, and as he walked through
    the house, he observed that every room had been rifled through and ransacked.
    
    Id. at 188.
    He discovered a boot print on a piece of plywood that had been used
    as a ramp for Patsy, since she had been using a knee scooter because of her
    broken ankle. 
    Id. at 153,
    190. Detective Nally also noticed tire tracks in the
    yard that appeared as though they had been made by a vehicle, possibly a
    dually truck,9 with a trailer attached to it because there was a set of tracks that
    were normal sized with a smaller tire track next to it and there were tracks
    where there were two sets of tires together. 
    Id. at 193-95.
    [10]   On April 4, 2017, Christina Blair (“Blair”), who lived on Spann Avenue in
    Indianapolis, Indiana saw a white Buick Rendezvous parked between 3835 and
    3902 Spann Avenue and observed a tall white male, who fit the description of
    Daltyn Randolph (“Randolph”), exit the vehicle and walk into the house
    9
    A dually truck is a truck that has dual rear wheels.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 6 of 36
    located at 3835 Spann Avenue. 
    Id. at 210-11;
    Tr. Vol. 3 at 8. Blair called police
    and reported the vehicle. Tr. Vol. 2 at 211. After the vehicle was determined to
    be the McCarters’ stolen car, police recovered it and took it to the Putnam
    County Sheriff’s Department, where it was searched. 
    Id. at 224.
    Inside the
    vehicle, the police found a timestamped receipt from a McDonald’s restaurant a
    few blocks from Spann Avenue, dated April 2, 2017, at 7:36 a.m. 
    Id. at 224-25.
    Putnam County Sheriff’s Department Detective Patrick McFadden (“Detective
    McFadden”) went to that McDonald’s and obtained surveillance footage of the
    vehicle related to the receipt and observed that the driver was wearing dark
    gloves with white trim. 
    Id. at 226,
    228. Detective McFadden also drove past
    the 3835 Spann Avenue residence to gather information about the individuals
    living there. 
    Id. at 228.
    As he drove behind the house, he noticed that the
    garage door was partially open, and an individual later identified as Justin
    Cherry (“Cherry”) came out from under the garage door and stared at Detective
    McFadden’s vehicle as it drove by. 
    Id. at 229;
    Tr. Vol. 3 at 6.
    [11]   On April 9, 2017, an officer with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
    Department executed a search warrant concerning an unrelated matter at the
    garage at 3835 Spann Avenue. Tr. Vol. 2 at 212. When the police arrived to
    execute the warrant, the garage door was open, Reese was sitting outside right
    in front of the garage, and Randolph showed up after the police had begun to
    search. 
    Id. at 213,
    221-22. As a result of the search, the police discovered a
    plastic grocery bag filled with miscellaneous items stolen from the McCarter
    residence including prescription pill bottles bearing Terry’s name, mail, social
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 7 of 36
    security cards, checks, a purse, and a wallet. 
    Id. at 214,
    216-19. The police
    obtained an additional search warrant for the house at 3835 Spann Avenue and
    executed that warrant on April 17, 2017. 
    Id. at 229.
    When the officers arrived,
    they ordered the occupants of the house to come out, and Randolph, Steven
    Cosand (“Cosand”), Michael Hostetter, Ronnie Sosby and Cherry all
    eventually emerged from inside. 
    Id. at 230;
    Tr. Vol. 3 at 6. Cosand was a tenant
    in the house, and Randolph is Cosand’s cousin. Tr. Vol. 2 at 230; Tr. Vol. 3 at 7,
    57. While the men were outside, they were talking and laughing, and Detective
    McFadden noticed that Randolph, who was very tall, had a “very very shrill”
    laugh similar to Patsy’s description of one of the perpetrators. Tr. Vol. 2 at 231.
    Detective McFadden noted that Cherry’s boots had a “strikingly similar” tread
    pattern to that of the boot print found on the plywood at the McCarters’
    residence, so his boots were collected and later compared to the boot print
    recovered from the robbery, and the tread pattern and size of the boots matched
    the impression. 
    Id. at 232,
    235-36, 247; Tr. Vol. 3 at 71-72.
    [12]   Once inside the house, officers entered Cherry’s bedroom and found the
    McCarters’ safe with several pieces of Patsy’s jewelry inside and Terry’s .38
    caliber handgun in a floor vent. Tr. Vol. 2 at 231, 233. Throughout the house,
    the officers also found several pairs of gloves, several bandanas, and some
    stocking caps. 
    Id. at 231-32,
    236-37. Patsy recognized one pair of gloves as
    being similar to a pair she had seen on one of the men who burglarized her
    house. 
    Id. at 237;
    Tr. Vol. 3 at 85.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 8 of 36
    [13]   As a result of a hit on LeadsOnline, a national database covering thousands of
    pawn stores that law enforcement uses to check for items that have been
    pawned, Detective McFadden recovered two of Patsy’s bracelets at a Cash
    America pawn shop directly across the street from the McDonald’s in the same
    area as 3835 Spann Avenue. Tr. Vol. 2 at 191-92; Tr. Vol. 3 at 3, 96. Detective
    McFadden obtained the pawn slip used to pawn those bracelets, and learned
    that Ashley Hillenburg (“Hillenburg”), who has a child with Reese, had
    pawned the items on April 7, 2017. Tr. Vol. 3 at 3-4, 53. Hillenburg admitted
    that she had received the jewelry she pawned from Reese, who had given her
    the jewelry because she needed money to pay for necessities for their child, and
    Reese had no cash. 
    Id. at 55-56.
    Reese and a man Hillenburg knew as
    “Drake”10 went with her when she pawned the jewelry; Hillenburg pawned the
    items, gave the money to Reese, and he gave part of the money back to
    Hillenburg. 
    Id. at 56,
    58.
    [14]   Hillenburg and Reese also shared a storage unit; it was in Hillenburg’s name,
    but Reese paid the bills, and both knew the four-digit PIN number that opened
    the gate and allowed them access to their specific unit. 
    Id. at 53-55.
    The gate
    history log showed that the PIN number assigned to Hillenburg and Reese had
    been used to enter the facility at 8:29 a.m. and to exit at 8:34 a.m. on April 2,
    2017. 
    Id. at 12-13.
    The surveillance video showed a dark-colored dually pickup
    10
    “Drake” was later determined to be Charles William Maybaum. Tr. Vol. 3 at 44, 56-57.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019           Page 9 of 36
    truck entering and leaving at those times. 
    Id. at 14.
    Surveillance video also
    showed Reese paying the bill for the storage unit on April 3, 2017, wearing a
    dark-colored shirt, dark beanie, and a bandana around his neck, which Patsy
    confirmed was similar to the clothing the perpetrators wore. 
    Id. at 14-15,
    85.
    [15]   On May 10, 2017, officers executed a search warrant on the storage unit rented
    by Hillenburg and Reese. 
    Id. at 23.
    When the officers arrived at the storage
    unit, Reese was standing next to a maroon Chevy pickup truck in front of the
    open storage unit. 
    Id. at 24,
    27. The officers yelled, “Stop, police,” but Reese
    refused all commands, jumped into the truck, and accelerated at a high rate of
    speed toward the officers. 
    Id. at 24.
    Reese was not able to exit the facility
    through the only exit because it was blocked by one of the officer’s vehicles, so
    Reese drove his truck through the fence. 
    Id. Reese’s truck
    became stuck
    because one of the tires was caught in the chain and poles of the fence. 
    Id. at 24,
    28-29. When the officers attempted to get Reese out of the truck, he put a
    .38 caliber revolver in his mouth. 
    Id. at 24-25.
    A four-hour standoff ensued,
    which did not end until SWAT officers were able to disarm Reese and take him
    into custody. 
    Id. at 25.
    [16]   During the standoff, Reese called his girlfriend, Emily Redmon (“Redmon”),
    and told her he was going to kill himself because he had “been caught.” 
    Id. at 76.
    Previously, in mid-April, Reese had talked to Redmon about a home
    invasion in Putnam County and told her that he needed to leave town and “lay
    low because the police were closing in on him.” 
    Id. at 74.
    After that
    conversation, Reese disappeared for about a week and a half. 
    Id. at 74-75.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 10 of 36
    After he returned, Reese spoke to Redmon about the home invasion while at
    Drake’s house, and at that time, Reese admitted he and others had taken a
    white Buick Rendezvous, a long gun, and some women’s jewelry during the
    home invasion. 
    Id. at 75-76.
    Redmon had seen some of the stolen jewelry and
    also observed the white Buick on Spann Avenue, where Reese stayed with
    Cherry, Cosand, and Randolph. 
    Id. at 75-76.
    [17]   During the search of the storage unit, police discovered multiple items
    belonging to the McCarters, including a blue tub containing Terry’s tools, a
    money box, a wooden drawer that had been pulled from a piece of furniture
    inside the McCarters’ home, a clock, a box of several cameras, and mail
    addressed to the McCarters. 
    Id. at 39,
    47-50, 84-88. The police later searched
    Reese’s truck and found Terry’s .223 caliber bolt action rifle in the backseat. 
    Id. at 34,
    83.
    [18]   During the searches of the Spann Avenue house and garage, the police found
    two cell phones, one belonging to Randolph and one to Cosand. Tr. Vol. 2 at
    214, 232-33. After obtaining a search warrant for Randolph’s phone, police
    downloaded the contents of the phone using a program called Oxygen
    Forensics and found contact information for a “Justin,” with number 317-515-
    0876, “Paul,” with number 317-495-5083, and “Drake” with number 317-378-
    0969, as well as a past search for the terms “couple held at gunpoint for an hour
    during home invasion near Greencastle” on a local news organization’s
    website. Tr. Vol. 3 at 42-44, 47; State’s Exs. 107, 107a, 107b. Cosand’s phone
    also contained the same contact information for a “Justin,” a “Drake,” a
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 11 of 36
    “Daltyn,” and a “Paul.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 233, 250; Tr. Vol. 3 at 2; State’s Exs. 88-90.
    The contact information for “Justin” matched a cell phone number that Cherry
    had previously provided to state government officials between September 2016
    and January 2017. Tr. Vol. 3 at 69; State’s Ex. 37. Hillenburg also confirmed
    that Reese’s phone number was 317-495-5083. Tr. Vol. 3 at 58.
    [19]   The police used the information obtained from these cell phones to obtain a
    search warrant for the records connected to Reese’s phone number and for the
    phone numbers associated with Cherry and Drake. 
    Id. at 90-95;
    State’s Exs. 122,
    125, 128. The data gathered from Cherry’s phone showed Cherry in the area
    around the Spann Avenue address for most of the day on April 1, 2017, then
    traveling to Greencastle between 8:25 p.m. and 9:20 p.m. and remaining in
    Greencastle until 10 p.m. Tr. Vol. 3 at 115; State’s Ex. 133. Cherry’s phone
    remained inactive from 9:56 p.m. on April 1 until the next morning at around
    8:49 a.m., at which time, Cherry’s phone showed it as being back in
    Indianapolis around Spann Avenue. Tr. Vol. 3 at 115-16; State’s Ex. 133.
    Drake’s phone was also in the Indianapolis area for most of the day on April l,
    but just before 7:00 p.m., the cell phone data showed Drake was traveling to
    Greencastle, arriving just before 8:00 p.m. Tr. Vol. 3 at 116-17; State’s Ex. 133.
    Drake’s phone remained active in the Greencastle area from 8:00 p.m. until
    2:46 a.m. Tr. Vol. 3 at 117-18; State’s Ex. 133. There was no activity after 2:46
    a.m. until 10:00 a.m., at which time, activity showed his phone back in
    Indianapolis. Tr. Vol. 3 at 118; State’s Ex. 133. The cell phone data showed that
    Reese’s phone was in the Indianapolis area until around 8:12 p.m., and at that
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 12 of 36
    time, it started traveling to Greencastle, arriving at 8:50 p.m. Tr. Vol. 3 at 118-
    19; State’s Ex. 133. Reese’s phone remained active in Greencastle until 3:22
    a.m. and showed Reese traveling from Greencastle back to Indianapolis
    between 5:25 a.m. and 6:08 a.m. and then remaining in the Indianapolis area
    on April 2. Tr. Vol. 3 at 119; State’s Ex. 133. The cell phone records also
    established that Cherry and Drake had been communicating with one another
    and that Drake and Reese had been communicating with each other. Tr. Vol. 3
    at 125.
    [20]   On August 24, 2017, the State charged Reese with Level 2 felony burglary,
    Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit burglary, Level 3 felony armed robbery,
    Level 3 felony conspiracy to commit armed robbery, Level 3 felony criminal
    confinement, Level 6 felony theft, and Level 6 felony auto theft. Appellant’s
    App. Vol. 2 at 2.11 On April 3, 2018, the State amended the two conspiracy
    counts and added two counts of Level 3 felony armed robbery and one count of
    Level 1 felony burglary; the State also dismissed the originally charged Level 3
    felony armed robbery. 
    Id. at 6,
    37. On May 11, 2018, the State filed a second
    amended information regarding the two conspiracy counts, and on June 7,
    2018, the State added a Level 5 felony burglary, Level 6 felony theft, Level 5
    felony conspiracy to commit burglary, and Level 6 felony conspiracy to commit
    theft. 
    Id. at 2,
    7-8, 42.
    11
    We note that Reese’s Appellant’s Appendix is missing pages 17-35, which according to the Table of
    Contents should contain the original charging informations and the probable cause affidavit.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019            Page 13 of 36
    [21]   On June 11, 2018, Reese filed a motion to suppress the cell phone records
    obtained as a result of the search warrant officers obtained for his phone
    number. Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 33-40. The trial court denied the motion to
    suppress. 
    Id. at 56-59.
    A jury trial was held on July 16-18, 2018, at which
    Reese faced nine counts: Level 2 felony burglary; Level 2 felony conspiracy to
    commit burglary; Level 3 felony conspiracy to commit armed robbery; Level 3
    felony confinement while armed with a deadly weapon; Level 6 felony theft;
    Level 6 felony auto theft; two counts of Level 3 felony armed robbery; and
    Level 1 felony burglary. During the trial, Reese objected each time evidence
    obtained as a result of the search warrant for his cell phone records was offered,
    and the trial court admitted the evidence over Reese’s objection. Tr. Vol. 3 at
    95, 109. Reese also objected to the admission of the Oxygen Forensics report
    related to the physical search of Randolph’s phone on foundational grounds
    and as to reliability, and the trial court overruled the objection. 
    Id. at 45-46.
    At
    the conclusion of the jury trial, Reese was found guilty on all nine counts. 
    Id. at 165.
    At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an aggregate seventy-
    two-year sentence. Reese now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    I.      Admission of Evidence
    [22]   Reese argues that the trial court abused its discretion both when it admitted
    evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant for cell phone records and
    when it admitted the report from Oxygen Forensics regarding contents of his
    cell phone. Our standard of review of a trial court’s admission of evidence is an
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 14 of 36
    abuse of discretion. Mack v. State, 
    23 N.E.3d 742
    , 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014),
    trans. denied. A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is clearly against
    the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court
    misapplies the law. 
    Id. Even if
    the trial court’s decision was an abuse of
    discretion, we will not reverse if the admission of evidence constituted harmless
    error. Sugg v. State, 
    991 N.E.2d 601
    , 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.
    Error is harmless if it does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant. 
    Id. [23] Reese
    initially contends that the admission of evidence obtained through the
    search warrant for his cell phone records was an abuse of discretion because the
    probable cause affidavit in support of the warrant was based on uncorroborated
    hearsay. He specifically argues that the affidavit contained statements by an
    incarcerated individual and did not contain any indicia of the reliability of this
    individual. Reese further asserts that the affidavit contained information from
    the execution of a different search warrant and that the affiant was not present
    for that search and had no firsthand knowledge of the information.
    Additionally, Reese claims that the affidavit contained information from
    another officer, and that information was not corroborated because it was not
    shown that that officer had actual knowledge of the information. Reese also
    maintains that the good faith exception does not apply here because the
    information contained in the affidavit was misleading.
    [24]   “In deciding whether to issue a search warrant, ‘[t]he task of the issuing
    magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given
    all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability that
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 15 of 36
    contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” Jackson
    v. State, 
    908 N.E.2d 1140
    , 1142 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 238 (1983)). The duty of the reviewing court is to determine whether the
    magistrate had a “substantial basis” for concluding that probable cause existed.
    
    Id. A substantial
    basis requires the reviewing court, with significant deference
    to the magistrate’s determination, to focus on whether reasonable inferences
    drawn from the totality of the evidence support the determination of probable
    cause. 
    Id. (citing Houser
    v. State, 
    678 N.E.2d 95
    , 99 (Ind. 1997)). “Although we
    review de novo the trial court’s substantial basis determination, we nonetheless
    afford ‘significant deference to the magistrate’s determination’ as we focus on
    whether reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of the evidence support
    that determination.” 
    Id. (quoting Houser,
    678 N.E.2d at 98-99).
    [25]   Probable cause is a fluid concept, which is decided based on the facts of each
    case. Hurst v. State, 
    938 N.E.2d 814
    , 817 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Probable cause
    to search premises is established when a sufficient basis of fact exists to permit a
    reasonably prudent person to believe that a search of those premises will
    uncover evidence of a crime. 
    Id. Indiana Code
    section 35-33-5-2(b) requires
    that when a warrant is based on hearsay, the affidavit must either: “(1) contain
    reliable information establishing the credibility of the source and of each of the
    declarants of the hearsay and establishing that there is a factual basis for the
    information furnished; or (2) contain information that establishes that the
    totality of the circumstances corroborates the hearsay.” The trustworthiness of
    hearsay for the purpose of proving probable cause can be established in a
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 16 of 36
    number of ways, including where: (1) the informant has given correct
    information in the past; (2) independent police investigation corroborates the
    informant’s statements; (3) some basis for the informant’s knowledge is
    demonstrated; or (4) the informant predicts conduct or activity by the suspect
    that is not ordinarily easily predicted. Bradley v. State, 
    4 N.E.3d 831
    , 840-41
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. These examples, however, are not exclusive,
    and, depending on the facts, other considerations may factor in when
    establishing the reliability of the informant or the hearsay. 
    Id. at 841.
    [26]   Reese contends that statements made by Officer Matthew McFadden12 (“Officer
    McFadden”) regarding Reese being a known associate of Randolph and known
    to frequent the Spann Avenue residence where Randolph and Cherry lived were
    uncorroborated hearsay. He also takes issue with evidence that was found
    when the search was conducted at Reese’s storage unit because the affiant was
    not present. However, the affiant was allowed to rely on this information under
    the collective or imputed knowledge doctrine. Under that doctrine, “an arrest
    or search is permissible where the actual arresting or searching officer lacks the
    specific information to form the basis for probable cause or reasonable suspicion
    but sufficient information to justify the arrest or search was known by other law
    enforcement officials initiating or involved with the investigation.” State v.
    Gray, 
    997 N.E.2d 1147
    , 1153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “So long as
    12
    No relation to Putnam County Sheriff’s Department Detective Patrick McFadden.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019    Page 17 of 36
    fellow officers applying for a search warrant collectively have probable cause,
    ‘their individual knowledge can be imputed to the officer signing the affidavit in
    support of the search warrant.’” McGrath v. State, 
    95 N.E.3d 522
    , 530 (Ind.
    2018) (quoting Utley v. State, 
    589 N.E.2d 232
    , 236 (Ind. 1992), cert, denied, 
    506 U.S. 1058
    (1993)). The collective-knowledge doctrine presumes a fellow
    officer’s credibility, and, therefore, no special showing of reliability need be
    made as a part of the probable cause determination. 
    Id. [27] Here,
    prior to the probable cause affidavit being filed, Officer McFadden had
    been engaged in an investigation of Reese as a suspect in the present offense;
    therefore, the statement attributed to him in the probable cause affidavit did not
    need to be independently corroborated to be relied upon as credible information
    supporting probable cause. As to the evidence discovered as a result of the
    search of the storage unit, the search was conducted by law enforcement
    pursuant to a valid search warrant supported by probable cause. This evidence
    and information gained by other officers could be imputed to the affiant in
    signing the affidavit in support of the search warrant for cell phone records. No
    special showing of reliability was needed.
    [28]   Reese also takes issue with information included in the affidavit, which was
    gained from an informant who was incarcerated at the time he provided
    information to the police. Michael Hostetter (“Hostetter”) was inside the
    Spann Avenue house, where Randolph and Cherry lived, when the search
    warrant was executed on that house and items stolen from the McCarter
    residence as well as gloves similar to those one of the perpetrators wore were
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 18 of 36
    found. Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 42. After the search occurred, Randolph, who
    would have known that items stolen in the burglary had been collected by the
    police, told Hostetter about the burglary of the McCarters and that Reese and
    Drake, as well as Randolph, were at the McCarter burglary. 
    Id. Hostetter later
    provided this information to the police. 
    Id. The police
    later searched Reese’s
    storage unit and found mail addressed to the McCarters inside the storage unit.
    
    Id. at 43.
    The timing of Randolph’s disclosure to Hostetter, as well as the fact
    that items stolen from the McCarters during the burglary were found in
    Randolph’s house and in Reese’s storage unit, connecting those two to the
    burglary, sufficiently corroborated the statements Hostetter made to the police
    that implicated Reese and Randolph in the crimes; therefore, the totality of the
    circumstances sufficiently corroborated Hostetter’s hearsay statements.
    [29]   Moreover, even if the search warrant affidavit was defective, the exclusion of
    the evidence is not necessary if the officers acted in good faith when relying
    upon the search warrant. “Exclusion of evidence recovered pursuant to a
    search warrant issued by a judge or magistrate is not required when the officer
    obtaining the warrant has acted in objective good faith and within the scope of
    the warrant.” Gerth v. State, 
    51 N.E.3d 368
    , 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing
    United States v. Leon, 
    468 U.S. 897
    , 920 (1984)). The good faith exception to the
    warrant requirement was created in large part because of the practical reality
    that once a neutral and detached magistrate has issued a search warrant, “‘there
    is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the
    law.’” 
    Jackson, 908 N.E.2d at 1144
    (quoting Figert v. State, 
    686 N.E.2d 827
    , 832-
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 19 of 36
    33 (Ind. 1997) (quoting 
    Leon, 468 U.S. at 921
    )). Officers are required to have a
    reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits, but “imposing on officers the
    obligation to second guess a magistrate’s decision in all but the most obvious
    instances of an affidavit lacking an indicia of probable cause is not a burden the
    law anticipates.” 
    Id. The good
    faith exception will not apply if the warrant was
    based on false information knowingly or recklessly supplied or if the affidavit or
    sworn testimony upon which probable cause rests is so lacking in indicia of
    probable cause as to render an official belief in the existence of the warrant
    unreasonable. Hoop v. State, 
    909 N.E.2d 463
    , 470-71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans.
    denied.
    [30]   Reese contends that the good faith exception does not apply here because the
    information in the affidavit was misleading because it stated that the affiant
    found a phone number for “Paul Reese” on a cell phone determined to belong
    to Cosand. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 42. Reese asserts this information was
    false because the affiant did not find a phone number for Paul Reese on
    Cosand’s cell phone; he found three numbers for “Paul” on the contacts of
    Cosand’s cell phone. The statement by the affiant was not factually inaccurate,
    however, because Hillenburg had confirmed that one of the numbers for “Paul”
    found in Cosand’s cell phone contact list belonged to Reese before the affidavit
    was written.13 Tr. Vol. 3 at 2-4, 23; Appellant’s App. 3 at 42-43. Further, the
    13
    By the time the affidavit was submitted, the police had already learned that Hillenburg had pawned the
    stolen bracelets and that she and Reese shared a storage unit which the police had already searched. Tr. Vol. 3
    at 2-4, 23; Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 43.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019                Page 20 of 36
    affiant’s omission of the fact that there were three numbers listed for “Paul” is
    irrelevant. The lack of this information does not make it any less true that the
    number for which the affiant sought a search warrant belonged to Reese. We,
    therefore, conclude that the good faith exception could apply. The trial court
    did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence obtained through the
    search warrant for Reese’s cell phone records because the warrant was
    supported by probable cause, and even if it was not, the good faith exception
    applied.
    [31]   Reese next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the
    Oxygen Forensics report to be admitted at trial. He contends that the report
    should not have been admitted because Detective Darren Chandler (“Detective
    Chandler”) did not meet the requirements for the admission of expert testimony
    under Indiana Evidence Rule 702. Specifically, Reese claims that the State
    failed to establish the foundation and reliability necessary to admit the report.
    [32]   Reese failed to preserve this issue for appeal. At trial, Detective Chandler
    testified that he recovered a cell phone belonging to Randolph during the search
    of the garage at 3835 Spann Avenue, that he obtained a search warrant to
    conduct a forensic examination of the contents of the phone, and that he
    “hooked” the phone up to the Oxygen Forensics computer program to pull data
    from the phone. Tr. Vol. 3 at 42. Detective Chandler then testified that data
    pulled from the phone showed that Randolph’s phone contained contacts for
    “Justin,” “Paul,” and “Drake,” along with their respective phone numbers. 
    Id. at 43.
    Detective Chandler also stated that the phone had been activated on
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 21 of 36
    April 3, 2017, and several days later, a Google search was performed searching
    for information about a home invasion in Putnam County. 
    Id. at 43-44.
    Reese
    did not object to any of this testimony regarding the data obtained from the
    phone using the Oxygen Forensics program. 
    Id. 42-44. He
    only objected when
    the State moved to admit the printed report containing the information about
    which Detective Chandler had already testified, contending that the State had
    failed to establish that the program was reliable or accurate. 
    Id. 45-46. Therefore,
    at the time Reese objected, the information of evidentiary value from
    the report had already been admitted through Detective Chandler’s testimony.
    A defendant must make a contemporaneous objection at the time the evidence
    is introduced to preserve a claim of evidentiary error for purposes of appeal.
    Laird v. State, 
    103 N.E.3d 1171
    , 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.
    Because he failed to do so, we conclude that Reese has waived this issue on
    appeal.
    [33]   Moreover, even if the admission of the Oxygen Forensics report was error, it
    was harmless. We will not reverse a conviction due to evidentiary error unless
    that error affects the substantial rights of the defendant. Teague v. State, 
    978 N.E.2d 1183
    , 1189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). An error is harmless if there is
    substantial independent evidence of guilt, and we are satisfied that there is no
    substantial likelihood the challenged evidence contributed to the conviction. 
    Id. [34] Substantial
    independent evidence was presented to establish that Reese
    committed the crimes for which he was convicted. Hours after the burglary was
    committed, a dually truck, which was the type of truck suspected of making the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 22 of 36
    tire tracks found in the McCarters’ yard, was observed on surveillance footage
    entering the storage facility, where Reese had a storage unit, by using Reese’s
    PIN code. Tr. Vol. 2 at 193-95; Tr. Vol. 3 at 11-14, 54. Reese was also seen on
    surveillance footage at the storage unit facility wearing clothing that matched
    the description of clothing worn by the men who committed the burglary. Tr.
    Vol. 3 at 14-15, 85. Multiple items stolen from the McCarters’ residence during
    the burglary were found inside of Reese’s storage unit, including a blue tub
    containing Terry’s tools, a money box, a wooden drawer from a piece of
    furniture, a clock, a box of several cameras, and mail addressed to the
    McCarters. 
    Id. at 39,
    47-50, 84-88. Only Reese and Hillenburg had access to
    the storage unit, and she testified that she had only been there about five times.
    
    Id. at 55,
    61. When officers arrived to search the storage unit, Reese attempted
    to run over and flee from the officers, which showed consciousness of guilt. 
    Id. at 24.
    After Reese’s truck was stuck, he called his girlfriend during the ensuing
    standoff and told her he was going to kill himself because he had been caught.
    
    Id. at 73,
    76. Reese’s truck was searched when he was arrested, and one of
    Terry’s stolen rifles was found in the backseat. 
    Id. at 33-34,
    83.
    [35]   Evidence was also presented that Reese stayed at 3835 Spann Avenue with
    Cherry, who was linked to the burglary through prints from his boots, and
    where police found items of clothing matching the description of those worn by
    the perpetrators as well as items stolen from the McCarters’ home. Tr. Vol. 2 at
    214, 231-32, 235-37, 241, 246-47; Tr. Vol. 3 at 71-72, 76. Furthermore, the
    McCarters’ Buick Rendezvous was seen near and recovered from 3835 Spann
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 23 of 36
    Avenue. Tr. Vol. 2 at 210-11, 224. Reese had also given jewelry stolen from the
    McCarters to Hillenburg to pawn. Tr. Vol. 3 at 55-56. Further, Reese confessed
    to his girlfriend that he was involved in the home invasion and discussed
    several items that they had stolen, including the Buick Rendezvous, jewelry,
    and a long gun. 
    Id. at 75-76.
    Additionally, the challenged Oxygen Forensics
    report was mostly cumulative of other properly admitted evidence that Reese
    does not challenge on appeal. A cell phone belonging to Cosand was recovered
    during the search of 3835 Spann Avenue, and that phone was also searched and
    contained the same contact information for “Justin,” “Drake,” and “Paul” that
    was found on Randolph’s phone. Tr. Vol. 2 at 233; Tr. Vol. 3 at 2. See Hunter v.
    State, 
    72 N.E.3d 928
    , 932 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (“The improper admission of
    evidence is harmless error when the erroneously admitted evidence is merely
    cumulative of other evidence before the trier of fact.”), trans. denied. The
    Google search for a news story on the burglary by Randolph had no bearing on
    Reese’s guilt. Based on the substantial independent evidence presented in
    support of Reese’s convictions, we conclude that the admission of the Oxygen
    Forensics report, if error, was harmless.
    II.     Sufficient Evidence
    [36]   Reese argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his
    convictions. When we review the sufficiency of evidence to support a
    conviction, we do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the
    witnesses. Lehman v. State, 
    55 N.E.3d 863
    , 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans.
    denied. We consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 24 of 36
    reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence. Fuentes v. State, 
    10 N.E.3d 68
    , 75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. We also consider conflicting
    evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Oster v. State, 
    992 N.E.2d 871
    , 875 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. We will not disturb the
    verdict if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support it. 
    Fuentes, 10 N.E.3d at 75
    . We will affirm unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the
    elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Delagrange v. State, 
    5 N.E.3d 354
    , 356 (Ind. 2014). A conviction can be sustained on only the
    uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even when that witness is the
    victim. Dalton v. State, 
    56 N.E.3d 644
    , 648 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.
    [37]   Reese first contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions
    because neither of the McCarters could identify him as one of the perpetrators.
    He asserts that the four men who broke into the McCarters’ home wore masks
    and gloves, and neither Terry nor Patsy could identify any of the four.
    [38]   Identity may be established entirely by circumstantial evidence and the logical
    inferences drawn therefrom. Cherry v. State, 
    57 N.E.3d 867
    , 877 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2016), trans. denied. Identification testimony need not necessarily be
    unequivocal to sustain a conviction. 
    Id. “When the
    evidence of identity is not
    entirely conclusive, the weight to be given to the identification evidence is left to
    the determination of the jury, as determining identity is a question of fact.”
    Harbert v. State, 
    51 N.E.3d 267
    , 275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Whitt v. State,
    
    499 N.E.2d 748
    , 750 (Ind. 1986)), trans. denied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 25 of 36
    [39]   As previously stated, evidence was presented that the driver of a similar truck to
    that used in the burglary used Reese’s PIN number to enter Reese’s storage unit
    hours after the burglary, and numerous stolen items were discovered in that
    unit. Surveillance footage showed Reese wearing similar clothing to that of the
    perpetrators in the robbery shortly after the crimes occurred. One of Terry’s
    stolen rifles was found in the backseat of Reese’s truck. Reese stayed at 3835
    Spann Avenue with the others implicated in the burglary, and items of clothing
    similar to those worn by the perpetrators and numerous stolen items from the
    burglary were found at that address. Reese gave jewelry stolen during the
    burglary to Hillenburg to pawn. Additionally, Reese’s cell phone records
    showed that between 8:12 and 8:50 p.m., his cell phone traveled from
    Indianapolis to Greencastle, where the McCarters lived, his phone remained
    active in Greencastle until 3:22 a.m., and Reese traveled from Greencastle back
    to Indianapolis between 5:25 and 6:08 a.m. Tr. Vol. 3 at 118-19; State’s Ex. 133.
    Furthermore, Reese confessed that he was involved in the burglary to his
    girlfriend. Even though the McCarters were not able to identify Reese,
    sufficient evidence was presented to establish that Reese was one of the men
    who committed the burglary.
    [40]   Reese next argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support
    his convictions for conspiracy to commit burglary and conspiracy to commit
    armed robbery. Specifically, he asserts that insufficient evidence was presented
    to establish an agreement between him and Cherry, Randolph, or Drake to
    support a criminal conspiracy. Reese contends that none of the men testified,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 26 of 36
    and the only evidence of an agreement were phone calls between cell phones,
    which he maintains was not sufficient.
    [41]   Reese was convicted of both conspiracy to commit burglary and conspiracy to
    commit armed robbery. “A person conspires to commit a felony when, with
    intent to commit the felony, the person agrees with another person to commit
    the felony.” Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2(a). The State must also prove that “the
    person or the person with whom he or she agreed performed an overt act in
    furtherance of the agreement.” I.C. § 35-41-5-2(b). Therefore, in order to
    convict Reese of the two conspiracy charges, the State was required to prove
    that he agreed with Cherry, Randolph, or Drake to break and enter into the
    McCarters’ home with the intent to commit theft or a felony inside and to take
    property from the McCarters by using or threatening the use of force while
    armed with a deadly weapon. I.C. §§ 35-43-2-1, 35-42-5-1.
    [42]   The State is not required to prove the existence of an express agreement, but
    there must be enough evidence to infer an agreement. Purvis v. State, 
    87 N.E.3d 1119
    , 1126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Kemper v. State, 
    35 N.E.3d 306
    , 310
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied). “‘It is sufficient if the minds of the parties
    meet understandingly to bring about an intelligent and deliberate agreement to
    commit the offense.’” Porter v. State, 
    715 N.E.2d 868
    , 870-71 (Ind. 1999)
    (quoting Williams v. State, 
    274 Ind. 94
    , 96, 
    409 N.E.2d 571
    , 573 (1980)). The
    agreement may be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence. 
    Id. at 871.
    However, mere association with the co-conspirator, standing alone, is
    insufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy. 
    Id. Court of
    Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 27 of 36
    [43]   Here, the men’s actions upon entering the McCarters’ residence showed that
    they had entered into an agreement to burglarize and rob the McCarters.
    Immediately after gaining entrance into the home by breaking the glass door,
    one man, while armed with a weapon, forced Terry to the ground, and the
    other three men then entered and began ransacking the house. One of those
    three men went to the bedroom, pointed a gun at Patsy, and told her, “You’re
    going to be robbed.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 170. While these two men confined the
    McCarters, the other two men methodically went through the McCarters’
    home, garage, and barn, ransacking the area and taking numerous items.
    Afterwards, the men ordered both Terry and Patsy into the sunroom, and after
    threatening Patsy and hitting Terry in the head with a gun, the men locked the
    McCarters in the room and left. The actions of the men while in the
    McCarters’ home showed that they had formulated a plan as to how to divide
    their efforts while in the home which supports the conclusion that there was an
    agreement between the men to commit the crimes of burglary and armed
    robbery.
    [44]   Further, the cell phone records which were admitted at trial also supported this
    conclusion. Based on cell phone tower data taken from April 1, 2017 and the
    morning of April 2, when the burglary occurred, Reese, Cherry, and Drake
    traveled from Indianapolis to Greencastle in different intervals at various times
    in the evening. Tr. Vol. 3 at 115-19; State’s Ex. 133. The cell phone evidence
    also showed that there were communications between Reese and the other two
    men in the hours leading up to the burglary; the records showed that Cherry
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 28 of 36
    and Drake had been communicating with one another and that Drake and
    Reese had been communicating with each other during that time period. Tr.
    Vol. 3 at 125; State’s Exs. 123, 126, 129. Based on the actions of the men while
    committing the burglary and armed robbery and the cell phone records, we
    conclude that the jury could infer that Reese had agreed with either Cherry,
    Randolph, or Drake to commit the crimes of burglary and armed robbery.
    Sufficient evidence was presented to support Reese’s convictions for conspiracy
    to commit burglary and conspiracy to commit armed robbery.
    III. Double Jeopardy
    [45]   Reese argues that several of his nine convictions violate the prohibition against
    double jeopardy. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
    provides, “No person shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
    jeopardy of life or limb.” Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution sets
    forth that “[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.”
    [46]   Under the federal constitution, multiple convictions will not be precluded if
    each statutory offense requires proof of an additional fact which the other does
    not. Robinson v. State, 
    835 N.E.2d 518
    , 522 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing
    Blockburger v. United States, 
    284 U.S. 299
    , 304 (1932)). The Indiana Supreme
    Court has developed a two-part test for Indiana double jeopardy claims, holding
    that two or more offenses are the “same offense” in violation of Article 1,
    Section 14, if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged
    crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 29 of 36
    challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged
    offense. Sharp v. State, 
    951 N.E.2d 282
    , 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing
    Richardson v. State, 
    717 N.E.2d 32
    , 49 (Ind. 1999)). Under the “statutory
    elements test,” multiple convictions will not be precluded if each statutory
    offense requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. 
    Id. (citing Robinson
    , 835 N.E.2d at 522). We look only to the statutory elements of the
    offenses in making this analysis. 
    Id. Under the
    “actual evidence test,” the
    evidence presented at trial is examined to determine whether each challenged
    offense was established by separate and distinct facts. Lee v. State, 
    892 N.E.2d 1231
    , 1234 (Ind. 2008). To show that two challenged offenses constitute the
    “same offense,” a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the
    evidentiary facts used by the factfinder to establish the essential elements of one
    offense may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second
    challenged offense. 
    Sharp, 951 N.E.2d at 287
    . “Application of this test requires
    the court to identify the essential elements of each of the challenged crimes and
    to evaluate the evidence from the factfinder’s perspective.” 
    Id. [47] Reese
    contends that his conviction for both Level 1 felony burglary and Level 2
    felony burglary violate the double jeopardy prohibition. The State concedes
    that these two convictions were improper because Level 2 felony burglary is a
    lesser included offense of Level 1 felony burglary. See Ind. Code § 35-38-1-6
    (“Whenever: (1) a defendant is charged with an offense and an included
    offense in separate counts; and (2) the defendant is found guilty on both counts;
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 30 of 36
    judgment and sentence may not be entered against the defendant for the
    included offense.”).
    [48]   Reese also argues that his convictions for Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit
    burglary and Level 3 felony conspiracy to commit armed robbery violate double
    jeopardy under the actual evidence test because the two convictions rely on the
    same evidence. The State also concedes that Reese’s convictions for both Level
    2 felony conspiracy to commit burglary and Level 3 felony conspiracy to
    commit armed robbery violate the double jeopardy prohibition because at trial
    the State relied on same facts to establish both conspiracies.
    [49]   When a double jeopardy violation has occurred, the “reviewing court may
    remedy the violation by reducing either conviction to a less serious form of the
    same offense if doing so will eliminate the violation.” Thompson v. State, 
    82 N.E.3d 376
    , 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing 
    Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 54
    ),
    trans. denied. However, if doing so will not eliminate the violation, one of the
    convictions must be vacated. 
    Id. Reducing Reese’s
    convictions will not
    eliminate the double jeopardy violations, so we must vacate Reese’s convictions
    for Level 2 felony burglary and Level 3 felony conspiracy to commit armed
    robbery since they are the convictions with lesser penal consequences. Vacating
    these convictions and the corresponding sentences does not affect Reese’s
    aggregate seventy-two-year sentence because the sentences for Level 2 felony
    burglary and Level 3 felony conspiracy to commit armed robbery were ordered
    to run concurrently with, and were lesser sentences than, the sentences for the
    Level 1 felony burglary conviction and the two Level 3 felony armed robbery
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 31 of 36
    convictions, which are the three sentences that comprise the seventy-two-year
    aggregate sentence. Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 64; Tr. Vol. 3 at 172.14
    IV. Inappropriate Sentence
    [50]   Reese asserts that his seventy-two-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate.
    Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), this court “may revise a sentence
    authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the
    [c]ourt finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
    offense and the character of the offender.” Our Supreme Court has explained
    that the principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the
    outliers, “not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v.
    State, 
    895 N.E.2d 1219
    , 1225 (Ind. 2008). We independently examine the
    nature of Reese’s offense and his character under Appellate Rule 7(B) with
    substantial deference to the trial court’s sentence. Satterfield v. State, 
    33 N.E.3d 344
    , 355 (Ind. 2015). “In conducting our review, we do not look to see whether
    the defendant’s sentence is appropriate or if another sentence might be more
    appropriate; rather, the test is whether the sentence is ‘inappropriate.’” Barker v.
    State, 
    994 N.E.2d 306
    , 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Whether a
    sentence is inappropriate ultimately depends upon “the culpability of the
    defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad
    14
    Reese also argues that his convictions for two counts of armed robbery and his conviction for conspiracy to
    commit armed robbery violate double jeopardy. However, this argument is rendered moot because we have
    vacated Reese’s conviction for Level 3 felony conspiracy to commit armed robbery.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019              Page 32 of 36
    of other factors that come to light in a given case.” 
    Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224
    . Reese bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is
    inappropriate. 
    Id. [51] Initially,
    we note that, although he argues that his aggregate sentence of
    seventy-two years executed is inappropriate because it constitutes a sentence for
    the “substantial balance of his life,” Appellant’s Br. at 38, Reese has not
    undertaken an analysis of why his sentence is inappropriate in light of the
    nature of the offense and his character as is required under Appellate Rule 7(B).
    He has therefore, waived this argument for failure to present a cogent
    argument. Sandleben v. State, 
    29 N.E.3d 126
    , 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans.
    denied. Although Reese has waived is inappropriateness argument, we will
    proceed to address this issue on the merits.
    [52]   As this court has recognized, the nature of the offense is found in the details
    and circumstances of the commission of the offense and the defendant’s
    participation. Perry v. State, 
    78 N.E.3d 1
    , 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Here, Reese
    and his co-conspirators broke and entered the home of the McCarters, who
    were both over the age of sixty-five, robbed them at gunpoint, destroyed their
    home, and stole multiple items. After ransacking the house, the perpetrators
    ordered the McCarters into the sunroom, where they threatened Patsy by
    pointing a gun at her head, and then hit Terry in the head with the butt of a
    gun, which caused severe injury that required surgery to relieve pressure on
    Terry’s brain. The actions by Reese and his co-conspirators caused extensive
    damage to the McCarters’ home. They ransacked the inside of the home,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 33 of 36
    destroying many pieces of furniture, paintings, and other items that they did not
    steal. Patsy testified that the furniture in their living room was covered in glass
    shards and had to be thrown away. Tr. Vol. 2 at 178. The men stole Patsy’s
    lifetime collection of jewelry, which included items of little monetary value but
    great sentimental value to her that can never be replaced because they were
    from her deceased mother. 
    Id. at 170.
    The men also stole numerous other
    items and $6,000 in cash that will never be returned to the McCarters. Reese’s
    crimes caused physical harm and significant financial loss to the McCarters as
    well as undermining their sense of security. We do not find that Reese’s
    sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense.
    [53]   The character of the offender is found in what we learn of the offender’s life and
    conduct. 
    Perry, 78 N.E.3d at 13
    . When considering the character of the
    offender, one relevant fact is the defendant’s criminal history. Johnson v. State,
    
    986 N.E.2d 852
    , 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The evidence presented at the
    sentencing hearing showed that Reese has an extensive criminal history. His
    criminal activity began when he was a juvenile with adjudications for
    conversion, criminal mischief, and possession of marijuana. Appellant’s App.
    Vol. 4 at 5-6. As an adult, before committing the present crimes, Reese had
    been convicted of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, Class A
    misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class A misdemeanor invasion of
    privacy. 
    Id. at 7-8.
    He also had convictions for Level 6 felony criminal
    recklessness committed with a deadly weapon and Level 6 felony domestic
    battery. 
    Id. After he
    committed the instant offenses, Reese committed and was
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 34 of 36
    convicted twice for Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, Level 5 felony
    carrying a handgun with a felony conviction, and Class A misdemeanor
    unlawful possession of a firearm by a domestic batterer. 
    Id. at 9.
    At the time of
    sentencing, Reese also had two pending cases, one where he had been arrested
    and charged with Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine, Level 3 felony
    possession of methamphetamine, Level 5 felony carrying a handgun with a
    felony conviction, and Level 5 felony possession of a narcotic drug, and one
    where he had been arrested and charged with Level 2 felony burglary with a
    deadly weapon, Level 3 felony robbery, Level 3 felony criminal confinement,
    Level 5 felony corrupt business influence, and Level 6 felony auto theft. 
    Id. at 8-9.
    This criminal history shows that, rather than being deterred by his past
    interactions with the criminal justice system, Reese has continued to commit
    new crimes, many of which were still pending at the time he was sentenced in
    the present case. We do not find that Reese’s sentence is inappropriate in light
    of his character. We, therefore, conclude that Reese’s aggregate seventy-two-
    year sentence in not inappropriate.
    [54]   In conclusion, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
    admitting the evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant for Reese’s cell
    phone records. We also conclude that, even if it was error for the trial court to
    admit the Oxygen Forensics report, it was harmless error. We also find that
    sufficient evidence was presented to establish that Reese was one of the men
    who committed the burglary and to support Reese’s convictions for conspiracy
    to commit burglary and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Reese’s
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 35 of 36
    convictions for Level 2 felony burglary and Level 3 felony conspiracy to
    commit armed robbery violated the double jeopardy prohibition, and we reverse
    those convictions and remand to the trial court to vacate. However, vacating
    those two convictions does not alter Reese’s aggregate sentence of seventy-two
    years, and we do not find his sentence to be inappropriate in light of the nature
    of the offense and character of the offender.
    [55]   Affirmed in part, reverse in part, and remanded with instructions.
    Vaidik, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1985 |September 16, 2019   Page 36 of 36