State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Sean Woodgett , 59 N.E.3d 1090 ( 2016 )

FILED
Sep 20 2016, 8:40 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark D. Gerth David W. Stone IV
Kightlinger & Gray LLP Stone Law Office & Legal
Indianapolis, Indiana Research
Anderson, Indiana
Michael W. Phelps
Rom Byron
Nunn Law Office
Bloomington, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
State Farm Mutual Automobile September 20, 2016
Insurance Company, Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellant-Defendant, 18A02-1505-CT-292
Appeal from the Delaware Circuit
v. Court
The Honorable Marianne L.
Sean Woodgett, Vorhees, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No.
18C01-1302-CT-11
Brown, Judge.
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[1] State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) appeals
the trial court’s order on verdict and judgment in favor of Sean Woodgett. State
Farm raises three issues, one of which we find dispositive and which we revise
and restate as whether the court abused its discretion in excluding certain
evidence. We reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On September 20, 2011, at approximately 1:10 p.m., Woodgett was driving a
van northbound on Batavia Avenue in Muncie, Indiana. While stopped
waiting for the traffic signal to change at 7th Avenue, Woodgett’s van was struck
from behind by a van being operated by Timmie Storms. The force of the
collision caused Woodgett’s van to roll into the back of another automobile.
Woodgett’s father Nicklaus arrived on the scene a few minutes after the
accident, and about fifteen minutes later he followed Woodgett as they began to
drive to the hospital. On the way, the bumper fell off the van, and they decided
to first drive home and leave the van. After doing so, they proceeded to the
emergency room where Woodgett was treated for neck pain and a headache.
He was diagnosed with a cervical sprain and advised to take ibuprofen. At the
time, Woodgett had uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage pursuant to a
policy issued by State Farm.
[3] On October 19, 2011, Woodgett saw his family physician, Dr. Mark Litz, for
“intermittent stress headaches” and neck pain. Transcript at 135. Woodgett
next visited Dr. Litz on January 17, 2012, again for intermittent stress
headaches and neck pain, and Dr. Litz prescribed physical therapy. In
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February 2012, Woodgett underwent five physical therapy sessions, and
afterwards he reported that he had slight headaches that came infrequently and
was able to engage in all of his recreational activities with no neck pain at all.
[4] In January 2013, Woodgett saw neurologist, John D. Wulff, M.D., Woodgett
described two types of headaches he was experiencing, including a daily mild
headache and a “very severe headache” about three or four times per week
involving a “throbbing sensation over the left posterior head” that can be
“unbearable.” Exhibits at 158. Woodgett noted that since the accident of
September 20, 2011, his mild headaches “gradually got worse.” Id. Dr. Wulff
diagnosed Woodgett with migraines.
[5] On February 25, 2013, Woodgett filed a complaint for damages against Storms
individually and State Farm pursuant to Woodgett’s uninsured motorist
coverage.1 The court commenced a jury trial on April 7, 2015. At the outset of
trial, Woodgett orally moved in limine to preclude State Farm from introducing
any evidence concerning a second motor vehicle accident involving Woodgett
occurring in the fall of 2012. In his oral motion, Woodgett’s counsel stated:
I would move in limine to prohibit the defense from discussing
an intervening cause. What we’re talking about is in the
deposition of Sean Woodgett, defense counsel raised were you in
any crashes after this crash concerning this case. Yes, in the fall
of 2012. Okay, what was it. It was a minor sideswipe crash.
Were you injured? No. Did you go to the hospital? No. Did
1
The complaint also named another insurer which was subsequently dismissed from the action.
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your headaches get worse after the fall of 2012? Yes. How did
your headaches get worse? Well, they were progressively getting
worse. The crash didn’t – in 2012 didn’t cause them to get
worse. They had been getting worse for a period of time and
they just kept on getting worse. In the depositions of Dr. Litz,
family doctor, and Dr. Wulff, neurologist, there’s no discussion
as to this crash or any potential impact on [Woodgett’s]
headaches.[2]
Transcript at 13. Counsel for State Farm responded that Woodgett admitted
that his pain increased after the second accident, that he did not tell his doctors
about the second accident, and that the doctors testified during depositions that
minor injuries can cause the sort of headaches that Woodgett experienced.
Woodgett’s counsel argued that State Farm had the opportunity “to do a Trial
Rule 35 exam and have a doctor opine on whether it was more likely than not
that the second wreck caused the exacerbation of the injuries,” and State Farm
responded that it was not its duty to prove causation. Id. at 15. The court
indicated that it would examine a case directed to its attention by State Farm,
Walker v. Cuppett, 808 N.E.2d 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), and then revisit the issue.
[6] State Farm’s counsel directed the court’s attention to testimony given by Dr.
Wulff at his first deposition of March 12, 2014, as follows:
2
Woodgett’s deposition is not contained in the record on appeal.
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Q. And given the trauma that’s associated when you say,
perhaps, post-traumatic migraine or whatnot, does that trauma
have to be major? Can it be minor?
A. It can be pretty minor trauma. . . .
Appellant’s Appendix at 90. State Farm argued that this testimony was
“enough for the Walker v. Cuppett standard, possibility versus probability being
the standard.” Transcript at 27. Woodgett’s counsel responded that Dr. Wulff
was opining regarding the first accident, that the statement was being taken out
of context, and that “without referencing the second accident, he can give no
causal basis for that.” Id. When asked by the court whether the jury would be
asked to speculate regarding injury from the second accident, State Farm’s
counsel argued:
Not at all, Your Honor. There’s even evidence, in addition to
the ten (10) month gap between the visits, there’s evidence that
there were different types of headaches. The first round of
headaches, we’re just talking, the medical records note them as
muscular stress headaches. The second round of treatment, it
goes from migraine headaches. So there’s evidence there as to
the difference between the two (2). They don’t have to speculate
because they can look at the medical records and they can see
that they’re different types of headaches. And they tie in nicely
between the two (2) accidents.
Id. at 32.
[7] Following a recess, the court ruled that “there’s no medical evidence that
directly speaks to the issues of the injury that [Woodgett] suffered as a result of
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the second collision,” that the jury would have to speculate as to the injury that
the second collision caused,” that the case of Daub v. Daub, 629 N.E.2d 873(Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied, states that head injuries are not within a lay
person’s understanding and expert testimony is required, and it ruled that
“without expert testimony from a doctor by way of using [Woodgett’s] doctor
or by having a Trial Rule 35 examination and a medical doctor’s opinion, then
I would have to exclude the evidence as to the second collision,” and it granted
Woodgett’s motion. Id. at 37.
[8] On the second day of trial, April 8, 2015, State Farm moved the court to
reconsider its ruling, which the court denied. Subsequently, State Farm made
an offer to prove noting that Dr. Wulff’s deposition testimony was “enough to
relate the accidents after that point to the headaches, particularly the migraine
headaches complained of here, which were not documented into the records
until January of 2013” and that Woodgett misled the doctors when he told
them that he had experienced “no other trauma.” Id. at 172-173.
[9] The jury returned a verdict in favor of Woodgett in the amount of $85,000, and
the court entered judgment in Woodgett’s favor for that amount against Storms
and State Farm.
Discussion
[10] The dispositive issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding
evidence of the second automobile accident. We review a trial court’s decision
to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. Lanni v. Nat’l Collegiate
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Athletic Ass’n, 989 N.E.2d 791, 797-798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We will reverse a
trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence only if that decision is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or
the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. at
798. A trial court may also abuse its discretion if its decision is without reason
or is based upon impermissible considerations. Walker v. Cuppett, 808 N.E.2d
85, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Even if a trial court errs in a ruling on the
admissibility of evidence, this court will reverse only if the error is inconsistent
with substantial justice. Id.[11] State Farm argues that evidence of the second accident was admissible to
inform the jury as to a possible cause of Woodgett’s migraine headaches and
that the court abused its discretion in excluding this evidence, ruling that it
“was not admissible because it was not supported by any expert medical
testimony to demonstrate a connection . . . .” Appellant’s Brief at 7. It argues
that this court has previously rejected a rule that a defendant’s evidence on
causation must be supported by expert testimony that such causation was likely,
citing to Walker and Armstrong v. Gordon, 871 N.E.2d 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),
reh’g denied, trans. denied, for the proposition. State Farm asserts that “the heart
of the matter which the jury was asked to decide was whether [Woodgett’s]
ongoing migraine headaches were caused by the negligence of the defendant”
and that the “court’s exclusion of evidence of the second motor vehicle collision
directly implicated that issue,” which “was error and inconsistent with
substantial justice.” Id. at 13.
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[12] State Farm also points to Dr. Wulff’s testimony that posttraumatic or
postconcussive headaches are “usually” caused when “[s]omething has jostled
the head and brain to result in headache issues, you know, memory issues, and
again, with him, perhaps some of the sleep issues as well,” and argues it should
have been given the opportunity to question Woodgett about the second
accident regarding whether it jostled Woodgett’s head and brain to result in
headache issues. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5. State Farm also argues that it
was not required to address the second accident during cross-examination of
Dr. Wulff nor offer its own expert testimony and instead was required only to
present evidence that it was possible the second accident caused Woodgett’s
migraines. It maintains that the timeline of events, in which Woodgett
completed his first course of physical therapy in February of 2012, was involved
in a second accident in the fall of 2012, and then sought further medical care in
late January 2013, and that his migraines were not documented until three or
four months after the second accident, met the applicable evidentiary burden.
[13] Woodgett contends that State Farm seeks to assert a possible cause of the
injuries without any evidence, medical or otherwise, establishing a causal
connection which simply invites confusion and speculation by the jury. He
argues Walker is distinguishable and that “State Farm’s offer of proof said
nothing about the circumstances of the later accident either as to the force
involved, vehicle damage or any areas of injury to Woodgett.” Appellee’s Brief
at 9. He states that “State Farm failed to show the nexus or relationship
between the later minor accident and the injuries sued for.” Id. at 10. He
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maintains that State Farm could not connect the second accident to the injuries
at issue because it did not ask Dr. Wulff about a possible connection between
the development of migraines in connection to that accident and did not
provide other expert testimony to show a connection. Woodgett argues that
State Farm did not present evidence that the second accident broke the chain of
causation and did not proffer evidence legitimately suggesting that the injuries
were not caused by the first collision.
[14] In Walker, this Court addressed whether the trial court abused its discretion in
precluding the admission of certain evidence relating to defendant Joan
Cuppett’s medical history. 808 N.E.2d at 89. In that case, on February 3,
1998, Michael Walker rear-ended Cuppett’s car, and although she did not
initially complain of injuries, while driving home she began experiencing neck,
shoulder, and elbow pain, as well as severe headaches that evening that
continued off and on. Id. Her neck and shoulder pain also continued
intermittently. Id. Eight days later, Cuppett visited Dr. Patrick Foley, her
family physician, who ordered x-rays and a CT scan, which revealed
degenerative arthritic conditions in her cervical spine, and refilled a prescription
for Fiorinal, a headache medicine she had been taking prior to the accident. Id.Cuppett also continued to see a chiropractor from whom she received treatment
for her neck pain and headaches as well as for pain in other areas of her body.
Id. at 89-90. She stopped seeing Dr. Foley at the end of 1998, and at her first
visit to her new doctor in January 1999 she did not complain of neck pain. Id.
at 90. She did mention neck pain at later visits, and she was also treated for
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“allergies, hypertension, high cholesterol, asthma, gastroesophageal reflux
disease, menopause, degenerative conditions in her knees, and obesity.” Id.She also had been diagnosed with fibromyalgia before the accident. Id.[15] In June 2000, Cuppett was referred to a pain management center for her
continuing neck pain. Id. The first treating physician “opined that her chronic
neck pain was consistent ‘with possible mild facet arthritis since that mediated
the pain and/or some myofascial pain in the soft tissues in the right cervical
paraspinal region,’” but a second physician, Dr. James Crawford, “believed her
neck pain was caused solely by myofascial problems stemming from the 1998
automobile accident and treated her accordingly.” Id. Cuppett visited physical
therapists, an acupuncturist, and a pain psychologist for treatment of her neck
pain. Id.[16] Cuppett filed a complaint against Walker, who died prior to trial. Id. Also
prior to trial the court granted Cuppett’s motion in limine to prevent the Estate
from presenting “Any Evidence of a Pre-Existing Affliction or Condition Not
Supported by Admissible Expert Medical Opinion,” “Any Evidence of
Unrelated and Post-Collision or Subsequent Injuries/Occurrence Not
Supported by Admissible Medical Opinion,” or “Any Evidence of Low Impact
Collision and Relationship to Joan Cuppett’s Physical Injuries.” Id. This ruling
“allowed [Cuppett] to redact from her medical records any reference to the
arthritis or other non-accident related conditions in her neck, her diagnosis of
fibromyalgia, and her pre-accident treatment for headaches,” and it prevented
the jury “from hearing any reference to these matters in pre-trial evidentiary
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depositions conducted of Dr. Crawford and one of her physical therapists, Dr.
David Cross, or in the trial testimony of Dr. Foley,” as well as the videotaped
testimony of Walker concerning the accident itself and his interaction with
Cuppett afterward. Id. Cuppett also redacted any mention of other ailments in
her medical bills submitted into evidence. Id. at 91. The court held a damages
hearing and granted judgment on the evidence with respect to all of Cuppett’s
claimed past medical bills, totaling $17,025.99, and a jury awarded another
$10,000 for claimed future medical expenses. Id. She was ultimately awarded
$81,808.79 after the court granted her motion for sanctions as well as additur.
Id.[17] On appeal, this court discussed at length the evidence excluded by the court and
observed:
The sum effect of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings was that the
Estate could make no mention of Cuppett’s arthritis and other
conditions in her neck, her fibromyalgia, and her treatment for
headaches predating the accident. The complete exclusion of
Walker’s videotaped testimony also prevented the Estate from
presenting evidence regarding the mildness of the accident and
Cuppett’s condition immediately thereafter.
Id. at 94. Cuppett argued that, since the Estate did not present its own expert
testimony to contradict Dr. Crawford’s and show that “the right-side neck pain
she complains of is being caused by the arthritic and other conditions [in] her
neck, rather than injuries inflicted by the accident,” the court’s rulings were
correct because such evidence was irrelevant. Id. Cuppett cited to Daub v.
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Daub, 629 N.E.2d 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied, in which this Court
noted that a negligence action requires “a reasonable connection between a
defendant’s conduct and the damages that a plaintiff claims to have suffered”
and that “the question of the causal connection between a permanent condition,
an injury, and a pre-existing affliction or condition is often a complicated
medical question,” and held accordingly that “when the issue of causation is
not within the understanding of a layperson, testimony of an expert witness on
the issue is necessary.” Id. (citing Daub, 629 N.E.2d at 877-878; Muncie State
Transit Auth. v. Smith, 743 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (stating,
“when the cause of the injury is not one which is apparent to a lay person and
multiple factors may have contributed to causation, expert evidence on the
subject is required”)).
[18] This Court observed that Cuppett’s argument “confuses the issue of the burden
of proof with the issue of the relevancy or admissibility of evidence and the
proper scope of cross-examination,” noting that Daub addressed a plaintiff’s
burden of proving causation. Id. It stated that Daub did not address “the
relevancy of causation evidence that contradicts the only expert testimony or
suggested in any way that such evidence is necessarily irrelevant or
inadmissible,” and, “[i]nstead, it is evident that defendants in personal injury
actions are entitled to thoroughly challenge a plaintiff’s expert with respect to
that expert’s causation opinions.” Id. at 94-95. The court opined that
“[d]octors and other expert witnesses are not oracles whose opinions, once
stated, cannot be questioned or refuted by other evidence, even if that evidence
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does not come in the form of another expert’s testimony,” that juries are free to
accept or reject the opinion of an expert witness, and that
[t]his rule would seem to have little meaning if, as in this case, a
defendant cannot challenge or cast doubt upon the opinion of a
plaintiff’s expert that the plaintiff was injured by the defendant
with evidence that the plaintiff suffers from a pain-producing
disease or mechanism, unrelated to the defendant’s negligence, in
the precise area of the body where the plaintiff claims to suffer
ongoing pain.
Id. at 95. We then noted the “standard of admissibility for a personal injury
defendant to introduce evidence of a plaintiff’s medical problems that are
unrelated to the defendant’s negligence,” first stated in Rondinelli v. Bowden, 155
Ind. App. 582, 586, 293 N.E.2d 812, 814-815 (1973), as follows:
The general rule is that cross-examination and other evidence is
admissible to lay a basis for impeachment or show that the injury
complained of is due to some other cause where the present
injury and the prior injury or condition are similar, or where a
causal relationship between them can be shown. If the cross-
examiner fails to come forward with evidence showing a logical
nexus or causal relationship between the injury sued on and the
unrelated injury or condition, the evidence may be excluded.
The test of admissibility is not probability, but the possibility that
a plaintiff’s claimed damages resulted from a condition or event
unrelated to the defendant’s negligence.
Id. at 95-96 (internal quotations and citations omitted). It ruled that the Estate’s
proffered evidence of Cuppett’s medical issues unrelated to the accident
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provided “a possible logical nexus to her complaints and meets the Rondinelli
standard of admissibility.” Id. at 96.
[19] Here, Woodgett moved in limine to exclude evidence of a second automobile
accident which occurred in the fall of 2012. The trial court ruled that such
evidence was inadmissible based upon Daub. However, as explained in Walker,
the rule in Daub concerns a plaintiff’s burden of proof and not the relevancy
standard applicable to the admission of evidence a defendant wishes to present
in a personal injury action. As stated in Rondinelli, the applicable test is whether
it is possible that a plaintiff’s claimed damages resulted from a condition or
event unrelated to the defendant’s negligence, where a logical nexus or causal
relationship between the conditions or events exists.
[20] Evidence at trial was presented by way of Dr. Wulff’s deposition in which he
testified that post-traumatic migraine headaches can be the result of “pretty
minor trauma.” Appellant’s Appendix at 90. The medical records admitted at
trial indicated that Woodgett had been treated for intermittent stress headaches
and neck pain following the September 20, 2011 accident, that he underwent
physical therapy in February 2012, after which reporting that he had slight
headaches that came infrequently and was able to engage in all of his
recreational activities with no neck pain at all, and that he began seeing Dr.
Wulff, the neurologist, in January 2013 for two types of headaches, including a
daily mild headache and a “very severe headache” about three or four times per
week. Exhibits at 158. At his deposition, Woodgett testified that he had been
involved in a second automobile accident in the fall of 2012 which was
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described as a minor sideswipe crash. State Farm sought to question Woodgett
at trial regarding this second accident. Recognizing that Woodgett’s
complained injuries were allegedly the result of an automobile accident in the
fall of 2011, that he stopped medical treatment in February of 2012, that he was
involved in another accident in the fall of 2012, and that he again sought
medical treatment for headaches in January 2013, we find that a logical nexus
exists between the second accident and the migraine headaches sufficient such
that the second accident was a possible cause of such headaches and that the
court abused its discretion in excluding any evidence of the second accident.
[21] Having concluded that the court abused its discretion in refusing to permit State
Farm to question Woodgett regarding the second accident, we must now
address whether this error was inconsistent with substantial justice. We
conclude that it was. This exclusion went to the heart of the matter that the
jury was asked to decide—the extent to which Woodgett’s accident with Storms
caused the headaches experienced by Woodgett and, in particular, the severe
migraine headaches.
Conclusion
[22] The court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence of a second
automobile accident involving Woodgett, which was inconsistent with
substantial justice. We reverse the court’s judgment and remand for
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proceedings consistent with this opinion.3 See Armstrong, 871 N.E.2d at 296(holding that a logical nexus between the injury sued upon and an unrelated
prior condition satisfied the Rondinelli test requiring only the possibility that the
plaintiff’s claimed damages in whole or in part resulted from a condition or
event unrelated to the defendant’s negligence).
[23] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the court’s judgment and remand.
[24] Reversed and remanded.
Baker, J., and May, J., concur.
3
Because we reverse and remand, we need not address State Farm’s arguments related to the jury
instructions given by the court.
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