Michael Reid v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FILED
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Dec 30 2016, 6:52 am
    Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
    precedent or cited before any court except for the               CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,            Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Ruth A. Johnson                                          Gregory F. Zoeller
    Suzy D. St. John                                         Attorney General of Indiana
    Marion County Public Defender
    Larry D. Allen
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Michael Reid,                                            December 30, 2016
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    49A02-1603-CR-429
    v.                                               Appeal from Marion Superior Court.
    The Honorable Stanley Kroh,
    Magistrate.
    State of Indiana,                                        Cause No. 49G15-1503-F6-8251
    Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Garrard, Senior Judge
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-429 | December 30, 2016   Page 1 of 13
    [1]   Following a jury trial, Michael Reid was convicted of one count of
    1                                                                      2
    intimidation as a Class A misdemeanor, and one count of harassment as a
    Class B misdemeanor. Judgment of conviction and sentencing was entered on
    only the conviction for misdemeanor intimidation. Reid appeals, contending
    that there is insufficient evidence to support his intimidation conviction, that
    the trial court abused its discretion by instructing the jury on harassment as a
    lesser-included offense, and that the trial court abused its discretion in the
    manner in which it ordered Reid to pay costs and fees. We affirm in part, and
    reverse and remand in part with instructions.
    [2]   Reid, a veteran, worked as the secretary for Michael Rilenge at the Veterans
    Affairs Medical Center in Indianapolis from 2007 to 2010. Rilenge described
    Reid as a good employee to whom other workers turned in order to accomplish
    goals and whose behavior was very pleasant, initially. However, Rilenge
    observed that Reid’s demeanor changed a couple of months prior to Reid’s
    voluntary resignation from that position in the spring of 2010, after a routine
    audit of employee transactions revealed that Reid had inappropriately used his
    government travel credit card for purchases at Walmart and Walgreens. As
    Reid’s supervisor, Rilenge was required to sign off on Reid’s suspension for this
    conduct, even though Rilenge had not discovered or reported the conduct.
    1
    Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1 (2014).
    2
    Ind. Code § 35-45-2-2 (1996).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-429 | December 30, 2016   Page 2 of 13
    [3]   Rilenge was fully aware that Reid was seeking government employment
    elsewhere. Reid ultimately resigned from his position as Rilenge’s secretary at
    the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in May 2010. At some point that spring,
    Rilenge received a telephone call from someone at the U.S.D.A. asking for a
    reference for Reid’s performance during the application process. Rilenge
    described his recommendation of Reid as a “good reference.” Tr. p. 47.
    [4]   The first communication initiated by Reid to Rilenge after Reid left his job at
    the Veterans Affairs Medical Center was on June 2, 2010, when Reid
    telephoned Rilenge’s work telephone number. Rilenge described Reid’s
    demeanor as very angry and upset, with Reid contending that Rilenge was
    messing with his paycheck and stating that Reid was “coming for” Rilenge. 
    Id. at 48.
    After Rilenge replied that he had nothing to do with Reid’s final
    paycheck, Reid hung up the telephone. Rilenge reported the substance of the
    telephone call in writing to the director, who then reported the incident to
    Veterans Affairs Medical Center Police. The Director of the Veterans Affairs
    Medical Center at that time was Thomas Mattice.
    [5]   Nothing further transpired until Rilenge received an email at his government-
    issued email address from Michael.EReid@IRS.gov on August 16, 2013, over
    three years later. The subject line of that email read, “I hope you know that it’s
    not over.” 
    Id. at 53.
    The text of the email read, “I am still coming for you. . . .
    spineless coward. It will never be over. . . . . Vengeance is mine Punk. Don’t
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-429 | December 30, 2016   Page 3 of 13
    3
    think I’ve Faded away.” 
    Id. The signature
    block read, “Thank You and Have
    A Great Day! ‘A person’s Character is measured by how they react to
    Pressured Situations.’ Mike Reid.” Id.; State’s Ex. 1. Rilenge did not respond
    to the email, but forwarded it to the director, and it was subsequently reviewed
    by Veterans Affairs Medical Center Police.
    4
    [6]   The next contact initiated by Reid was an email to Rilenge’s work-issued email
    address from the same IRS email address on October 23, 2014, over a year after
    the last email. Tr. pp. 56-58; State’s Ex. 2. The email, which was initially sent
    to United States Senator Dan Coats and various others at the Department of
    Veterans Affairs, read in pertinent part as follows about an EEOC claim Reid
    had filed:
    [T]he lack of candor, morals, and principles among leadership
    caused me to look for employment elsewhere.
    The retaliatory adverse actions initiated by Michael Rilenge[ . .
    .], have ruined my life[.]
    I initially had an interagency transfer to USDA, I had a start date
    of May 24, 2010. [ ]My Veterans Administration First Line
    supervisor sabotaged that position by calling the Manager I
    would’ve began working for at USDA. The position was
    rescinded the day I cleared Veterans Administration May 19th
    2010. This made my interagency transfer become Null & Void.
    3
    This document was admitted with a limiting instruction to the jury that its admissibility was for the purpose
    of potentially establishing motive, identity, or opportunity.
    4
    Reid admitted in a different proceeding in which Rilenge sought a protective order that he was the author of
    the emails to Rilenge. The trial court limited any reference to the nature of the prior proceeding unless Reid
    placed authorship of the emails at issue.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-429 | December 30, 2016           Page 4 of 13
    This forced me to change the inter-agency transfer to a
    constructional Discharge. In remarks in the SF-50, I specifically
    stated I feared reprisal from supervisor & the Indianapolis
    Medical Center Director.
    The Indianapolis Veterans Health Administration’s Human
    Resource Officer, Corey Baute removed my remarks and entered
    employee offered no explanation for resignation.
    Tr. pp. 56-58; State’s Ex. 2.
    [7]   The incidents of March 3, 2015, formed the basis for the charges filed against
    5
    Reid. On that date, Reid sent an email from his personal account to Rilenge’s
    work-related email address, bearing the subject line, “YOU are still spineless.”
    State’s Ex. 3. The body of the email read as follows:
    I am still coming for YOU. It doesn’t matter how many times
    you contact my agencies [sic] inspector [sic] General. It doesn’t
    matter, it’ll be well worth losing this job to get to you.
    AND Thomas Mattice
    It’s far from over
    Contact the police again while you’re at it.
    Neither one of you hold ANY credibility
    
    Id. 6 [8]
      Later that same day, Reid left a voicemail message for Rilenge at Rilenge’s
    work number claiming that he was still coming to get Rilenge, but this time
    5
    This email was sent from dakurrupt69@gmail.com, but listed Michael Reid as the sender.
    6
    Attempts to save or forward the message in order to preserve it as evidence were unsuccessful due to system
    upgrades.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-429 | December 30, 2016         Page 5 of 13
    communicating that he knew where Rilenge lived. Rilenge was concerned for
    the safety of his employees, himself, and his family.
    [9]    Also that day, the Chief of the Veterans Administration Police Department,
    Brian Fogg, was advised of the progress in the investigation in the case by a
    criminal investigator for police services at the Indianapolis Veterans Affairs
    Medical Center, Officer Roman Hollwka. After the update, Chief Fogg, a
    veteran with twenty-two years of active duty experience in the United States
    Navy, decided to call Reid to discuss the controversy veteran-to-veteran. When
    Chief Fogg identified himself as a police officer, Reid became angry and hung
    up. Reid sent a follow-up email to Rilenge, which read as follows:
    So THE vamc police calls me a few minutes ago, stating they will
    contact my agencies [sic] inspector [sic] General and your
    agencies [sic] inspector [sic] General if I send rilenge another
    email.
    So what, do what you have to DO. My agency inspector general
    has already interviewed me twice already. Let’s make it three
    times, I’ve heard it’s a charm
    Michael Rilenge, Thomas Mattice You both are a joke. YOU
    are scared to answer your phone, and will most likely ignore the
    voicemail I left for you Rilenge
    When I called the police service back, they say that no one from
    the police service called me. I am too old for these games.
    State’s Exhibits 4, 5.
    [10]   Later that same afternoon, Reid sent another email to Rilenge, which read
    “F**k the chief of police at Indianapolis medical center too[.] Yeah Mr.
    Foggs,[sic] you too[.] Get back on your segway mall cop[.]” State’s Exhibit 6.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-429 | December 30, 2016   Page 6 of 13
    [11]   Rilenge testified at trial that he was unsure why Reid was so angry with him but
    that he considered each post-employment communication to be a personal
    threat.
    [12]   On March 12, 2016, the State charged Reid with two counts of intimidation;
    one for the email communication, and one for the telephone call. The charges
    were amended to misdemeanor counts prior to trial, and Reid declined the
    State’s offer of a diversion agreement. After the State’s case, Reid moved for a
    directed verdict, alleging the State had failed to prove a prior lawful act. The
    trial court denied the motion, noting, “I think it is somewhat of a close call but
    the Court believes there is enough evidence in the record to survive a directed
    verdict motion. That the Jury should be the fact finder here because there is
    some evidence in the record.” Tr. p. 109. The State tendered proposed jury
    instructions including Class B misdemeanor harassment as lesser-included
    charges to each of the counts of intimidation. The trial court gave the
    instructions. The jury returned verdicts of guilty as to one count of Class A
    misdemeanor intimidation for the email and one count of Class B misdemeanor
    harassment for the telephone call. The trial court entered a judgment of
    conviction on only the conviction for intimidation for the email.
    [13]   Reid received a sentence of 343 days on probation. The trial court also imposed
    court costs on Reid, and ordered the probation department to assess Reid for
    mental health or anger management services and to determine program fees in
    accordance with Reid’s ability to pay. The probation department set Reid’s
    court costs at $183 and assessed a $100 public defender fee. Reid was also
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-429 | December 30, 2016   Page 7 of 13
    ordered to pay $320 in probation fees, comprised of a $50 administrative fee, a
    $50 initial user fee, and a $20 per month user fee. Reid now appeals.
    [14]   First, Reid challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction
    for intimidation. Challenges to sufficiency of the evidence involve appellate
    consideration of only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to
    the convictions, neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility.
    Griffith v. State, 
    59 N.E.3d 947
    , 958 (Ind. 2016). We will affirm the judgment
    unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty of the offense.
    
    Id. [15] Reid
    also implicitly argues that there is a fatal variance between the charging
    information and the evidence adduced at trial, contending that the State failed
    to establish a prior lawful act matching the allegations in the charging
    information. As stated by our Supreme Court, “because the charging
    information advises a defendant of the accusations against him, the allegations
    in the pleading and the evidence used at trial must be consistent with one
    another.” Blount v. State, 
    22 N.E.3d 559
    , 569 (Ind. 2014). While a variance is
    an essential difference between the two, not all variances are fatal. 
    Id. For a
    defendant to be awarded relief for a variance, the variance must have (1) misled
    the defendant in preparing a defense, resulting in prejudice, or (2) left the
    defendant vulnerable to future prosecution under the same evidence. 
    Id. [16] Before
    we resolve the issue whether there was a fatal variance between the
    proof at trial and the charging information, we must first determine whether
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-429 | December 30, 2016   Page 8 of 13
    there is sufficient evidence to support Reid’s conviction of intimidation as a
    Class A misdemeanor. See Daniels v. State, 
    957 N.E.2d 1025
    (Ind. Ct. App.
    2011) (first determined sufficient evidence that defendant used weapon and then
    determined no fatal variance that information instead charged defendant drew
    weapon).
    [17]   The statute describes intimidation as follows: “A person who communicates a
    threat to another person, with the intent that the other person be placed in fear
    of retaliation for a prior lawful act.” Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(2) (2014). The
    charging information read as follows:
    On or about March 3, 2015, Michael Reid did communicate a,
    [sic] implied threat to commit a forcible felony, to-wit: a threat
    contained in an email to Michael Rilenge stating that he was
    “coming for” Michael Rilenge and that it would be worth losing
    his job to “get to you”, meaning Michael Rilenge, with the intent
    that Michael Rilenge be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior
    lawful act, to-wit: Michael Rilenge providing a report of Michael
    Reid’s work performance as his supervisor prior to Michael
    Reid’s removal from employment at the Veteran’s
    Administration Medical Center[.].
    Appellant’s App. p. 20.
    [18]   Reid contends that the State failed to introduce evidence that Rilenge “provided
    a report” of Reid’s “work performance,” or that the report was provided before
    Reid’s “removal from employment.” Reid, however, was aware during pre-trial
    preparation, arguments of counsel, and rulings of the trial court, that his prior
    emails would be admissible at trial. Those emails revealed that Reid was upset
    because Mattice discovered his improper use of work-related credit cards, and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-429 | December 30, 2016   Page 9 of 13
    Rilenge signed off on the discipline for that impropriety and responded to a
    request for a reference from a manager at the U.S.D.A., both lawful acts
    occurring prior to Reid’s resignation from his position. Preparation and
    maintenance of Reid’s defense was not misled by the imprecise wording of the
    charging information, nor did it lead to harm or prejudice, or vulnerability to
    future prosecution for the same charges.
    [19]   Here the jury determined that the State had not proven intimidation with
    respect to Count II and entered a guilty verdict on the offense of harassment.
    However, the trial court vacated the conviction on Count II. Therefore, any
    abuse of discretion with respect to giving the instruction as to Count II is
    harmless error.
    [20]   Reid also argues the trial court erred by failing to determine his ability to pay
    prior to imposing costs and fees as part of his sentence. Initially, the trial court
    also imposed a $50 fine, but then vacated it. Although the trial court heard
    evidence with respect to Reid’s qualification for appointed appellate counsel, no
    evidence was heard regarding Reid’s ability to pay costs and fees.
    [21]   The trial court stated that “under the circumstances the Court would direct
    Probation to assess the program fees on a sliding scale.” Tr. p. 156. The trial
    court’s written sentencing order reflected no court costs and fees. Sentencing
    Order pp. 1-2. A case transactions summary prepared for Reid’s sentencing
    showed that he was being assessed $603.00 in fees. Appellant’s Appendix, Vol.
    II., pp. 104-05.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-429 | December 30, 2016   Page 10 of 13
    [22]   “Sentencing decisions, which include the imposition of fees, costs, and fines,
    are generally left to the trial court’s discretion.” Henderson v. State, 
    44 N.E.3d 811
    , 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The Supreme Court has held that “a defendant’s
    financial resources are more appropriately determined not at the time of initial
    sentencing but at the conclusion of incarceration, thus allowing consideration of
    whether the defendant may have accumulated assets through inheritance or
    otherwise.” Whedon v. State, 
    765 N.E.2d 1276
    , 1279 (Ind. 2002).
    [23]   Reid’s conviction was for a misdemeanor offense and he was placed on
    probation. With respect to fees, Indiana Code section 35-38-2-1(e) (2012)
    provides that a court may order each person convicted of a misdemeanor to
    pay: (1) not more than a $50 initial probation user’s fee; (2) a monthly
    probation user’s fee of not less than $10 nor more than $20 for each month that
    the person remains on probation; (3) costs of laboratory tests; and (4) an
    administrative fee of $40 to the probation department or the clerk.
    [24]   Here, the probation department, as directed by the trial court, determined that
    Reid should pay various fees and costs. The only fee that does not appear to
    comport with the fee parameters set forth by statute is the supplemental public
    defender fee. Appellant’s Appendix p. 104. The State agrees that the public
    defender fee for a felony conviction is $100 and the public defender fee for a
    misdemeanor conviction is $50. 
    Id. at 101.
    The probation department’s
    calculation is $100. 
    Id. at 104.
    Although the offenses were originally charged
    as felonies, the charges were amended and the conviction was for a
    misdemeanor. Therefore, we must remand this matter to the trial court to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-429 | December 30, 2016   Page 11 of 13
    correct the calculation and assess the fee at the misdemeanor conviction rate.
    Furthermore, pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-33-7-6 (2004), an indigency
    finding must be done when a person requests assigned counsel, prior to the
    imposition of the fee, and the indigency finding may be reviewed at any time
    during the proceedings. See Berry v. State, 
    950 N.E.2d 798
    , 799-800, 802 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2011).
    [25]   With respect to probation fees, we have held that a trial court acts “within its
    authority when it chooses to wait and see if a defendant can pay probation fees
    before it finds the defendant indigent.” Johnson v. State, 
    27 N.E.3d 793
    , 795
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Ind. Code ch. 35-38-2). However, the trial court
    has a duty to conduct an indigency hearing, at the latest upon the completion of
    the defendant’s sentence. 
    Id. When the
    trial court imposes costs on a
    defendant, Indiana Code section 33-37-2-3 (2007), explicitly sets forth the
    timing of the hearings to determine indigency.
    [26]   In summary, we affirm Reid’s conviction, but reverse and remand to the trial
    court the public defender fee calculation for correction and determination of
    Reid’s ability to pay. As for the probation fees and other costs imposed, the
    trial court must determine Reid’s ability to pay, at the latest, at the completion
    of his sentence.
    [27]   Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part with instructions.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-429 | December 30, 2016   Page 12 of 13
    Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1603-CR-429 | December 30, 2016   Page 13 of 13
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 49A02-1603-CR-429

Filed Date: 12/30/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/30/2016