In re the Matter of: Z.R. (Child in Need of Services) and D.S. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services and Child Advocates, Inc. (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 30 2019, 9:21 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Valerie K. Boots Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Abigail R. Recker
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In re the Matter of: September 30, 2019
Z.R. (Child in Need of Services) Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-JC-720
and
Appeal from the Marion Superior
D.S. (Mother), Court
Appellant-Respondent, The Honorable Mark Jones, Judge
v. The Honorable Rosanne Ang,
Magistrate
Indiana Department of Child Trial Court Cause No.
Services, 49D15-1809-JC-2318
Appellee-Petitioner,
and
Child Advocates, Inc.,
Guardian Ad Litem.
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Robb, Judge.
Case Summary and Issue
[1] D.S. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s determination that her minor
child, Z.R. (“Child”), is a child in need of services (“CHINS”). Mother raises
two issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as a single issue:
whether the juvenile court’s CHINS determination is clearly erroneous.
Concluding the juvenile court’s CHINS determination is clearly erroneous, we
reverse the CHINS adjudication.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Mother and T.R. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) are the biological parents
of Child, born June 30, 2015.1 Mother has legal custody of Child,2 and Father
has primary physical custody of Child. Father and Child reside with L.R.,
Child’s paternal grandfather, at his home, and Mother lives alone in an
apartment.
[3] On the evening of September 12, 2018, Mother arrived at her apartment to find
Father inside. Mother asked Father to leave her home, but he refused. A verbal
and physical altercation ensued. As Mother tried to escape from the apartment,
1
Father does not participate in this appeal.
2
Mother also has another child who is subject to a separate CHINS proceeding and is not in her care.
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Father threw her to the ground. Once Mother escaped, she ran outside and
called the police.
[4] Officer Lovepreet Singh of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department
arrived at the scene, and at that time Mother and Father were both outside
alone. Mother told Officer Singh that she had been assaulted by Father and the
assault initially occurred inside her apartment where there was a child. He
observed bruises and minor cuts on both Mother and Father but was unable to
gather information on whether the cuts came from this incident. During Officer
Singh’s investigation, he did not observe any children. Officer Singh arrested
Father, but criminal charges filed as a result of the incident were later
dismissed. DCS did not come to the scene, but later got involved because of the
nature of the police report.
[5] On September 14, DCS family case manager (“FCM”) Jairo Sanchez assessed
the family at L.R.’s home, but Mother declined to speak with him. That same
day, because of the alleged domestic violence, Child was removed from Mother
and Father’s care and placed with L.R., where she was already living. The
juvenile court ordered Father to find an alternate place of residence; Father
began living with a friend. See Appellant’s Appendix, Volume II at 60.
[6] On September 17, FCM Sanchez spoke with Mother at the local DCS office
and she denied that incidents of domestic violence between her and Father had
ever occurred around Child. Mother stated the child named in the police report
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was not Child, and she refused to offer any other information regarding the
identity of the other child.
[7] On September 18, DCS filed a verified petition alleging Child to be a CHINS,
as defined in Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, that read in relevant part as
follows:
Inability, Refusal or Neglect, I.C. 31-34-1-1: The child’s physical
or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered
as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child’s parent,
guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision; and the
child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that the child is not
receiving; and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the
coercive intervention of the Court.
Id. at 25. DCS specifically alleged Parents were unable to provide Child with an
environment free from substance abuse and domestic violence; Mother has a
history with DCS due to her substance abuse issues and has not successfully
completed services in an open CHINS case involving her other child; Parents
were recently involved in a physical altercation in Child’s presence; Father was
arrested and incarcerated; and Parents have not taken the necessary actions to
address these issues. See id. at 25-26. Following an initial hearing, the juvenile
court ordered Child’s continued placement with L.R. but granted Mother and
Father supervised parenting time.
[8] A fact-finding hearing was held on January 8, 2019, following which the
juvenile court entered its order finding Child to be a CHINS, concluding:
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12. [Child’s] physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or
seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or
neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the
child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
education, or supervision. [Mother] and [Father] have a violent
relationship and have had altercations while Child was present.3
[Father] has also threatened additional harm to [Mother] and
harm to [Child]. [Child’s] physical and mental condition is
seriously endangered in the current situation.
13. [Child] needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that she is not
receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the
coercive intervention of the Court. The Court does not find
[Mother] and [Father]’s testimony denying domestic violence to
be credible [because] [Mother] previously disclosed domestic
violence to Officer Singh and each parent was observed to have
injuries as a result of the altercation. As neither parent is
acknowledging the issue of violence, the coercive intervention of
the Court is necessary to compel engagement in treatment so that
[Mother] and [Father] are able to identify and address this issue.
Id. at 86. On March 5, 2019, the juvenile court entered its dispositional decree
containing the following findings:
[I]t is in the best interests of [Child] to be continued removed [sic]
from the home environment and remaining in the home would
be contrary to the welfare of [Child;] . . .
3
During the fact-finding hearing, DCS presented evidence of an unrelated altercation between Mother and
Father that occurred on August 27, 2018. See Transcript of Evidence, Volume II at 22-23.
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[R]easonable efforts were made by DCS to prevent or eliminate
the need for continued removal of [Child;] . . .
[R]esponsibility for the placement and care of [Child] is ordered
or continues to be ordered to the DCS.
[Child] should be under the temporary supervision of [DCS] . . .
[t]o protect [Child.]
Appealed Order at 2. Based on these findings, the juvenile court awarded
wardship of Child to DCS, ordered that Child remain in relative care, and
entered the following order with respect to parental participation:
Participation by [Mother] and [Father] in the plan of care for
[Child] is necessary . . . . [F]ailure to participate as required by a
Parental Participation Order . . . can lead to the termination of
the parent-child relationship[.]
Id. at 3. Mother now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[9] A CHINS proceeding is a civil action and thus, requires the State to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the statute.
In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012). Preponderance of the evidence
simply means “the greater weight of the evidence.” Kishpaugh v. Odegard, 17
N.E.3d 363, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). On review
of a juvenile court’s judgment that a child is in need of services, we do not
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reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re S.D., 2
N.E.3d 1283, 1286 (Ind. 2014). Instead, we consider only the evidence
supporting the juvenile court’s decision and any reasonable inferences arising
therefrom. Id. at 1287. Where, as here, the juvenile court has entered findings of
fact and conclusions thereon, our review is two-tiered. B.T. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
Servs., 121 N.E.3d 665, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). First, we decide whether the
evidence supports the findings, and second, whether the findings support the
judgment. Id. We will set aside the juvenile court’s findings and conclusions
only if they are clearly erroneous and our review of the record leaves us firmly
convinced a mistake has been made. In re A.M., 121 N.E.3d 556, 561 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2019), trans. denied.
II. CHINS Determination
[10] Mother contends there is insufficient evidence supporting Child’s CHINS
adjudication. She argues that Child was not seriously endangered by the actions
or inactions of Mother and Father, and Child was not in need of care she was
not receiving or unlikely to receive without the coercive intervention of the
court.
[11] DCS alleged that Child was a CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-
1-1. Thus, DCS must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Child is
under age eighteen and:
(1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired
or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or
neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply
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the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
education, or supervision; and
(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
(A) the child is not receiving; and
(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive
intervention of the court.
Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1 (2005); In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253. Our supreme
court has interpreted the statute to require three basic elements that DCS must
prove for a juvenile court to adjudicate a child a CHINS: (1) that the parent’s
actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, (2) the child’s needs
are unmet, and (3) those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion. In
re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287.
[12] In this case, the alleged domestic violence between Parents served as the basis
of the CHINS petition.4 Following the fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court
concluded (1) Child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or
seriously endangered because Mother and Father have had altercations while
Child was present and have a violent relationship, and (2) Child needs care she
is not receiving and is unlikely to receive without the coercive intervention of
4
Although DCS alleged substance abuse in its CHINS petition, no evidence of substance abuse was
presented at the fact-finding hearing, and the juvenile court did not make any findings that Child was a
CHINS because of it. Therefore, we only review the juvenile court’s findings related to Mother and Father’s
“violent relationship” and the altercation that occurred in Child’s presence.
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the court because Parents do not acknowledge the issue of violence in their
relationship. See Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 86.
[13] We acknowledge that the purpose of a CHINS adjudication is to “protect
children, not punish parents.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2010). A
CHINS adjudication focuses on the child’s condition and status and a separate
analysis as to each parent is not required at the CHINS determination stage. Id.
at 105-06.
[14] Mother first argues the evidence does not support the juvenile court’s findings
that Child was present during Parent’s altercation. We disagree. Conflicting
evidence was presented at trial as to whether Child was present during the
altercation between Mother and Father. Officer Singh testified that there were
not any children present during his investigation outside the home, but Mother
told him that a child was in the apartment during the altercation. See Transcript
of Evidence, Volume II at 24. Mother later stated in the interview with FCM
Sanchez, however, that the child in the apartment was not Child. DCS did not
question Officer Singh, at trial, on whether Child was the actual child that was
present during the altercation. DCS also presented additional witnesses who
could not confirm that Child was present during the altercation. We
acknowledge that conflicting evidence was presented as to whether Child was
present during the altercation. However, our standard of review requires that
we consider only the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s decision and any
reasonable inferences arising therefrom. See In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287.
Therefore, in light of the evidence and our standard of review, we find that
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sufficient evidence was presented to support the juvenile court’s finding that
Child was present during Parent’s altercation.
[15] Mother next argues that the evidence does not support the juvenile court’s
finding that Mother and Father had a violent relationship. Again, we disagree.
The record reveals that when Officer Singh arrived at the apartment where the
altercation occurred, Mother told him that she had been physically assaulted by
Father, and Father threw her to the ground. She had bruise marks and cuts on
her hands. She also told Officer Singh that she had previous injuries from prior
altercations with Father and that Father had threatened to “hurt her
daughter[.]” Id. at 23. Father told Officer Singh that he also had sustained cuts
during the altercation from his attempts to defend himself. This evidence
supports the juvenile court’s finding that Mother and Father had a violent
relationship.
[16] Our analysis, however, does not end here. Although the evidence most
favorable to the juvenile court’s determination supports the finding that Child
was present during the September 12 altercation, and that Parents were
involved in at least one act of domestic violence, we still must determine
whether the juvenile court’s conclusion that this altercation seriously
endangered Child is supported by the evidence.
[17] We recognize that “a single incident of domestic violence in a child’s presence
may support a CHINS finding[.]” K.A.H. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 119 N.E.3d
1115, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (emphasis added). In K.A.H., a mother and her
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boyfriend had an abusive relationship and mother’s two children often
witnessed mother’s boyfriend “screaming, belittling, and battering” her. Id. at
1116. At various times, the boyfriend babysat the children. After one such
time, one of the children, M.G., complained to his mother that his head hurt.
The following day, the boyfriend babysat M.G. again while the other child was
at school. At some point, M.G. was nonresponsive and died later that day.
DCS filed a petition alleging that the other child, K.H., was a CHINS. The
juvenile court concluded that K.H. was seriously impaired or seriously
endangered from the mother’s inability to provide K.H. with appropriate shelter
or supervision and thus, was a CHINS. Mother appealed and a panel of this
court affirmed the CHINS adjudication, concluding that the physical trauma
that the mother and M.G. suffered, and the mother’s inability to recognize the
effects of domestic violence on her parenting and children’s well-being
warranted the coercive intervention of the CHINS court. Id. at 1124.
[18] The instant case, however, can be distinguished from K.A.H. Here, the evidence
DCS presented was not nearly as egregious as the evidence presented in K.A.H.
For example, DCS offered no evidence that Child was afraid to be around
Parents or that Child suffered any trauma or abuse from domestic violence. No
evidence was presented that Child, three years old at the time the September 12
incident occurred, comprehended the violence between Mother and Father. Cf.
K.B. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services, 24 N.E.3d 997 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (noting
that children, twelve and thirteen, were old enough to comprehend the
violence). Unlike in K.A.H., where the children witnessed the domestic
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violence, the facts presented here do not indicate Child’s exact location to
witness Parents’ altercation and therefore, we cannot make an inference that
Child suffered as a result of the domestic violence. Although DCS presented
evidence of a prior unrelated altercation between Parents on August 27, in
addition to evidence of the September 12 incident, DCS failed to establish a
sufficient nexus between the altercations and Child’s condition. It did not offer
evidence that the child was impacted, let alone that she suffered or
comprehended the violence between Parents. DCS asserts Parents have a
violent relationship based solely on these two incidents. While we cannot stress
enough that incidents of domestic violence are not to be taken lightly, we
reiterate that a “CHINS adjudication focuses on the condition of the child[,]”
not the parents. In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 105. The evidence presented here
focused solely on the physical altercation between Mother and Father rather
than the condition of Child. As such, the evidence presented, without more,
does not support the juvenile court’s determination that Child’s physical or
mental condition was seriously endangered for purposes of Indiana Code
section 31-34-1-1(1).
[19] Next, Mother argues there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile
court’s conclusion that Child was in need of care she was not receiving or
unlikely to receive without the coercive intervention of the court. We agree.
[20] DCS largely focuses on the altercation that occurred between Mother and
Father on September 12 rather than any of Parents’ accomplishments or
improvements made since the incident. The coercive intervention element
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“guards against unwarranted State interference in family life, reserving that
intrusion for families ‘where parents lack the ability to provide for their
children,’ not merely where they ‘encounter difficulty in meeting a child’s
needs.’” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287. When determining CHINS status under
this element, courts should consider the family’s condition not just when the
case was filed, but also when it is heard. Matter of A.R., 110 N.E.3d 387, 401
(Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “Doing so avoids punishing parents for past mistakes
when they have already corrected them.” Id.[21] Prior to the incident, Child was living with Father at L.R.’s home. FCM
Sanchez testified that when he visited L.R.’s home, the home was appropriate
for Child. See Tr., Vol. II at 40. Father provided for Child’s medical and
educational needs without assistance from DCS or the State and properly
supervised Child when she was in his care.
[22] At the time of the fact-finding hearing, Parents had taken substantial steps to
remedy the disagreements between them. Father voluntarily attended domestic
violence sessions through Families First because he wanted to “take the classes
and then kind of better himself [after the incident.]” Id. at 44. He began these
sessions on October 25, 2018, and at the time of the fact-finding hearing, he had
completed seven of the recommended twenty-six weeks of sessions. Father’s
drug screens also demonstrate that he maintained sobriety throughout the
pendency of this case. Most notably, on March 5, 2019, Father asked the
juvenile court that Child be placed in his care, demonstrating his willingness
and ability to care for Child. See id. at 86.
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[23] As for Mother, she began supervised visits on November 13, 2018 at Hoosier
Families. These visits took place once a week at Mother’s home and increased
to twice a week in December 2018. Sahsell Hunnighan, a visitation supervisor
at Hoosier Families, testified that Mother provides Child with meals at every
visit as well as toys to engage in activities. See id. at 73. She emphasized that
Child and Mother “have a really good relationship. . . . [Child] shows her
respect[,] so I think it goes pretty well and they have a lot of fun.” Id. at 74. She
further testified that Mother uses “[a]ppropriate parenting skills, no profanity
[or] anything like that.” Id. In describing Mother’s home, Hunnighan testified,
The home is fine, it’s well kept. I believe she moved in [there]
recently [and] it has [a] new look. . . . She has food stacked in the
fridge all the time, cupboards are always filled [be]cause I do
home audits once a month. . . . [A]ctually she always has hot
water, she always has heat, always has you know food stocked
up so it’s good.
Id. at 74-75. She further testified, “I did recommend to move to unsupervised
parenting time [be]cause I didn’t see any safety concerns.” Id. at 75. Moreover,
Mother tested negative for illegal substances from July 2018 until the day of her
last screen in February of 2019. See Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 100-02. Mother
has demonstrated that she, too, is well-equipped to provide Child with the
necessary care and supervision for her development. Again, we emphasize that
the point of a CHINS inquiry is to “protect children, not [to] punish parents.”
In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 106.
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[24] Based on this evidence, we conclude that DCS failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that Child needed care or treatment that was
unlikely to be provided without the juvenile court’s coercive intervention.
Therefore, the juvenile court’s conclusion to the contrary was clearly erroneous
and not supported by the evidence.
[25] Although Parents have a history of making poor decisions and have one
substantiated incident of domestic violence, the record reflects that they have
made significant efforts to remedy their situation and become more suitable
parents. We must note that parents who make positive changes in their lives
should be applauded, rather than being subjected to the coercive intervention
that results from a CHINS finding. See In re R.S., 987 N.E.2d 155, 159 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013).
[26] In sum, the evidence, even viewed most favorably to the judgment, cannot
reasonably support an inference that Parents’ actions or inactions seriously
endangered Child or that they were likely to need the juvenile court’s coercive
intervention. Therefore, the State failed to meet its burden by a preponderance
of evidence.
Conclusion
[27] We conclude that the juvenile court’s determination that Child was a CHINS
was clearly erroneous. We therefore reverse and remand to the juvenile court to
vacate the CHINS finding as to Child.
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[28] Reversed and remanded.
Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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