Avante L. Robinson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing Oct 09 2019, 9:00 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Talisha Griffin Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, IN
Samantha M. Sumcad
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Avante L. Robinson, October 9, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-825
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Christina R.
Appellee-Plaintiff Klineman, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G17-1901-CM-3833
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-825 | October 9, 2019 Page 1 of 6
Case Summary
[1] Avante L. Robinson (“Robinson”) appeals his conviction for Invasion of
Privacy, as a Class A misdemeanor.1 He presents the sole issue of whether the
trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence two screenshot
pictures. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On November 14, 2018, Robinson’s former girlfriend, L.E., obtained a no-
contact order prohibiting Robinson from contacting her, her children, or her
parents. On December 14, 2018, L.E. was working a shift at a convenience
store and had stepped outside for a cigarette break when she saw Robinson
approach the store. L.E. immediately put out her cigarette and began to walk
back inside the store. Robinson called out to her, “Hey, did you know you
have a warrant out for your arrest?” (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 11.) L.E. went inside,
locked the door, and called police.
[3] On January 31, 2019, the State charged Robinson with Invasion of Privacy. He
was tried in a bench trial on March 14, 2019. L.E. testified that Robinson came
to her workplace and spoke to her and, shortly after the in-person encounter, he
attempted to contact her by social media. The trial court found Robinson guilty
1
Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(12).
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and sentenced him to 365 days imprisonment, all suspended. Robinson now
appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[4] At Robinson’s trial, the State proffered State’s Exhibits 2 and 3, described as
screenshots made by L.E. to document Robinson’s attempts to contact her by
Facebook and Snapchat. Robinson’s counsel objected that the exhibits lacked a
date and did not “show that it’s sent from my client; it has an anonymous name
on it.” (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 8.) The State responded that L.E. could “testify as to
who that Facebook belongs to” and the trial court admitted the exhibits over
Robinson’s objections. Id. at 9. On appeal, he argues that the exhibits were not
properly authenticated as having been authored by him.
[5] Admission or exclusion of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial
court and we will reverse the decision only if the trial court abused its
discretion. Wilson v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1264, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans.
denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly
against the logic, facts, and circumstances presented or the court has
misinterpreted the law. Pavlovich v. State, 6 N.E.3d 969, 976 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014), trans. denied.
[6] To lay a foundation for the admission of evidence, the proponent must show
that it has been authenticated. Hape v. State, 903 N.E.2d 977, 989 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009), trans. denied. Writings, recordings, photographs, and data
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compilations are included within the authentication requirements of Rule
901(a). Id. Evidence Rule 901(a) provides:
To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an
item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it
is.
“Once this reasonable probability [that the document is what it is claimed to be]
is shown, any inconclusiveness regarding the exhibit’s connection with the
events at issue goes to the exhibit’s weight, not its admissibility. Additionally,
authentication of an exhibit can be established by either direct or circumstantial
evidence.” Pavlovich, 6 N.E.3d at 976, (citing Fry v. State, 885 N.E2d 742, 748
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied).
[7] In Wilson, a panel of this Court found the authentication of Twitter messages to
be sufficient where a witness testified that (1) she often communicated with the
defendant, Wilson, on Twitter and that he had posted pictures of the two
online; (2) she recognized the Twitter account as belonging to Wilson, based
upon her knowledge of the account by its name and the header of the account;
and (3) Wilson often used terms that were part of the content of the challenged
messages. 30 N.E.3d at 1268-69.
[8] Here, there was no such testimony elicited to establish a foundation before
admission of the challenged exhibits. L.E. simply testified: “One [exhibit] is of
him contacting me that same day, and the other one is him trying to contact me
on Snapchat that same day.” (Tr. Vol. II, pg. 8.) We agree with Robinson that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-825 | October 9, 2019 Page 4 of 6
the State failed to “produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item
is what the proponent claims it is,” that is, a screenshot of a communication
emanating from Robinson. Evid. Rule 901(a).
[9] However, errors in the admission of evidence are to be disregarded as harmless
error unless they affect the substantial rights of the party. Ind. Trial Rule 61;
Turben v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1245, 1247 (Ind. 2000). To convict Robinson of
Invasion of Privacy, as charged, the State was required to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that Robinson knowingly violated an order issued under
Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-30 requiring Robinson to refrain from any direct
or indirect contact with L.E. See I.C. § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(12); App. Vol. II, pg. 13.
[10] Apart from testifying about social media communications, L.E. testified that
Robinson came to her place of employment and spoke to her. The trial court,
in finding Robinson guilty, referenced only this conduct:
Whether the initial contact at Village Pantry was intentional or
unintentional, I think he said something to her. I’m going to find
you guilty of Invasion of Privacy, as a Class A Misdemeanor.
(Tr. Vol. II, pg. 23.) Because the trial court relied upon Robinson’s personal
speech to find Robinson guilty, we cannot say that the admission of his alleged
social media communications suggesting additional contacts affected his
substantial rights.
[11] Affirmed.
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Najam, J., and May, J., concur.
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