In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of C.W. and J.C. (Minor Children) and J.W. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing FILED
the defense of res judicata, collateral Nov 14 2019, 8:35 am
estoppel, or the law of the case. CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT J.W. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Anthony C. Lawrence Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Monika Prekopa Talbot
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Termination November 14, 2019
of the Parent–Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of C.W. and J.C. (Minor 19A-JT-1140
Children) Appeal from the Madison Circuit
and Court
The Honorable G. George Pancol,
J.W. (Father), Judge
Appellant-Respondent,
Trial Court Cause Nos.
v. 48C02-1810-JT-171
48C02-1810-JT-172
The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
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Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] J.W. (“Father”) and S.C. (“Mother”),1 (collectively “Parents”), are the
biological parents of J.C. (born July 28, 2004) and C.W. (born November 16,
2010), (collectively “the Children”). In January of 2017, the Children were
adjudicated to be children in need of services (“CHINS”) after Parents admitted
to such due to substance abuse issues. In October of 2018, the Department of
Child Services (“DCS”) petitioned for the termination of Parents’ parental
rights. On April 22, 2019, the juvenile court ordered that Parents’ rights to the
Children be terminated. Father contends that the juvenile court’s termination of
his parental rights was clearly erroneous. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On October 21, 2016, DCS removed the Children from Mother’s home due to
concerns over substance abuse. DCS was unable to locate Father at the time of
1
Mother does not appeal the termination of her parental rights.
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removal. On October 25, 2016, DCS petitioned for the Children to be
adjudicated CHINS. On January 10, 2017, Parents appeared before the juvenile
court and admitted that the Children were CHINS due to substance abuse. On
February 15, 2017, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing on the
CHINS petition and ordered Father to, inter alia, maintain weekly contact with
DCS; notify DCS of any changes in address, household composition,
employment, telephone number, or any criminal charges within five days;
enroll in any programs recommended by the family case manager (“FCM”);
refrain from any use or possession of illegal drugs; complete a substance-abuse
assessment and follow all recommendations; submit to random drug screens;
participate in home-based counseling and individual and family therapy; and
attend scheduled visitation with the Children. That same month, Father was
arrested and charged with Level 6 felony methamphetamine possession.
[3] On October 4, 2017, the juvenile court held a review hearing and found that
Father’s visitation services were closed out for inconsistent attendance, and
after being reinstated, were again suspended upon the advice of the Children’s
therapist after J.C. refused to attend. Father’s home-based casework was also
closed out for noncompliance. On May 30, 2018, the juvenile court conducted a
modification hearing and found that Father had “consistently failed to comply
with services with the only active service being individual therapy for [Father],
a service focused on his substance issues, and not on the children.” Appellant’s
App. Vol. II p. 20. As a result, the juvenile court added a concurrent
permanency plan of adoption. On October 17, 2018, DCS petitioned for the
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termination of Parents’ parental rights. The juvenile court held evidentiary
hearings on October 17, November 21, and December 4, 2018, and January 22
and February 19, 2019.
[4] At an evidentiary hearing, J.C. testified that she could not remember the last
time she had seen her Father and asked the juvenile court to “[g]et [her] as close
to adoption as they can.” Tr. p. 34. Court-appointed special advocate
(“CASA”) Traci Barber later testified that as a result of having had to testify in
this matter, J.C. “felt suicidal” and had to have her therapy increased. Tr. p. 86.
CASA Barber also testified that she believed there was no reasonable
probability that the reasons that resulted in the Children’s removal would be
remedied and that the Parents’ parental rights should be terminated.
[5] FCM Rob Belt testified that he did not believe there was a reasonable
probability that the conditions that lead to the Children’s removal would be
remedied and that adoption of the Children was in their best interests. FCM
Belt cited Father’s continued drug use throughout this matter, which consisted
of positive drug screens for methamphetamine, amphetamine, cocaine, and
THC. FCM Belt testified that Father had failed to maintain weekly contact with
DCS or participate in family counseling and only started participating in
individual counseling toward the end of this case. On April 22, 2019, the
juvenile court ordered that Father’s parental rights in the Children be
terminated.
Discussion and Decision
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[6] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. Bester v.
Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). “Though
it’s been oft-stated, it bears repeating: the parent–child relationship is one of the
most valued relationships in our culture.” Matter of M.I., 127 N.E.3d 1168,
1170–71 (Ind. 2019) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Parental rights,
however, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child’s interests
when determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate the parent–
child relationship. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147. Therefore, when parents are
unwilling or unable to fulfill their parental responsibilities their rights may be
terminated. Id.
[7] In reviewing the termination of parental rights on appeal, we neither reweigh
the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Doe v. Daviess Cty. Div. of
Children & Family Servs., 669 N.E.2d 192, 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied.
We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom which are
most favorable to the juvenile court’s judgment. Id. Where, as here, a juvenile
court has entered findings of facts and conclusions of law, our standard of
review is two-tiered. Id. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the
factual findings, second, whether the factual findings support the judgment. Id.The juvenile court’s findings and judgment will only be set aside if found to be
clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous if no facts or inferences
drawn therefrom support it. In re R.J., 829 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005). “A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the
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juvenile court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment.”
Id.[8] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b) dictates what DCS is required to establish to
support a termination of parental rights. Of relevance to this case, DCS was
required to establish by clear and convincing evidence
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services[.]
[and]
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child[.]
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).2 In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain the termination of his parental rights, Father contends that the juvenile
court erred by concluding that (1) there is a reasonable probability that the
2
It is not disputed that the Children had been removed from Father for at least six months under a
dispositional decree and that there was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Children, both
required findings pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2).
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conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal would not be remedied and
(2) termination of his parental rights was in the Children’s best interests.3
I. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)
[9] Father contends that there is insufficient evidence to establish a reasonable
probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal would
not be remedied.
[10] In determining whether the conditions that resulted in the
child[ren]’s removal…will not be remedied, we engage in a two-
step analysis[.] First, we identify the conditions that led to
removal; and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable
probability that those conditions will not be remedied. In the
second step, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness as of the
time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration
evidence of changed conditions—balancing a parent’s recent
improvements against habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine
whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or
deprivation. We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court,
which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more
heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.
Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions
does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior
is the best predictor of their future behavior.
3
Father also seemingly contends that the juvenile court erroneously concluded that the continuation of the
parent–child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child. However, because the juvenile court
never reached this conclusion, we will not address this claim.
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In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642–43 (Ind. 2014) (internal citations, quotations, and
footnote omitted, first and third set of brackets in original, second set added).
[11] The condition that led to the Children’s removal was substance abuse. We
conclude that DCS has produced ample evidence to establish a reasonable
probability that this condition would not be remedied. First, Father was
arrested and charged with Level 6 felony methamphetamine possession. Father
has also screened positive for illegal drugs twelve times. Father has tested
positive for opiates, cocaine, methamphetamine, amphetamines, and THC.
Moreover, Father has failed to maintain sobriety throughout this matter or
complete ordered services. Although Father completed his substance-abuse
assessment, he failed to attend in-patient treatment as recommended. CASA
Barber testified that “Father has been unable to consistently stay clean
throughout the case” and has been unable to finish services. Tr. p. 86. While it
is true that Father completed an out-patient program in November of 2018
shortly before the termination proceedings began, the juvenile court was
entitled to conclude that this was outweighed by Father’s history of drug use
throughout this matter and did so. See K.T.K. v. Ind. Dept. of Child Servs.,
Dearborn Cty. Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1234 (Ind. 2013) (concluding that the trial
court was within its discretion to disregard Mother’s efforts that were made
only shortly before termination and to weigh more heavily Mother’s history of
conduct prior to said efforts). The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by
concluding that the conditions that led to the Children’s removal would not be
remedied.
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II. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(C)
[12] Father contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s
conclusion that termination of his parental rights was in the Children’s best
interests. We are mindful that, in determining what is in the best interests of a
child, the juvenile court must look beyond factors identified by DCS and
consider the totality of the evidence. In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009). The juvenile court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed
before terminating the parent–child relationship because it must subordinate the
interests of the parents to those of the children. McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of
Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). We have
previously held that recommendations from the FCM and CASA to terminate
parental rights, in addition to evidence that conditions resulting in removal will
not be remedied, is sufficient evidence to show that termination is in the child’s
best interests. In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d at 236.
[13] CASA Barber testified that termination of Father’s parental rights and adoption
was in the Children’s best interests. FCM Belt also testified that adoption was in
the Children’s best interests. While coupling that testimony with our previous
conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to show that the conditions of
removal would not be remedied is sufficient to support the juvenile court’s
termination of Father’s parental rights, it is not as though this testimony is
unsupported by other evidence in the record.
[14] In addition to his inability to maintain sobriety, Father admitted that in over
two years since this matter began, he has not completed a single service that
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was ordered by the juvenile court. Moreover, visitation was closed out because
of Father’s failure to attend, and once reopened, it was ceased due the
recommendation of the Children’s therapist after J.C. refused to attend. Last,
Father’s relationship with the Children appears to be harmful to their well-
being. J.C. requested that the juvenile court “[g]et [her] as close to adoption as
they can.” Tr. p. 34. Following that testimony, CASA Barber explained that
J.C.’s therapy had to be intensified because she felt suicidal. The Children’s
foster parent Amy Wolfe also testified that following J.C.’s testimony, she was
“extremely emotionally fragile,” and “[they] had to up a lot of her services.” Tr.
p. 82. Wolfe testified, however, that since being placed in her home the
Children are “flourishing.” Id. J.C. is a member of the high school dance team
and has made several friends. C.W. is in gymnastics, girl scouts, and making
tremendous strides academically. Considering the totality of the evidence,
Father has failed to establish that the juvenile court’s determination that
termination was in the Children’s best interest was clearly erroneous.
[15] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
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