Thomas D. Dillman v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any               Dec 16 2014, 12:55 pm
    court except for the purpose of
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    APPELLANT PRO SE:                               ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    THOMAS DILLMAN                                  GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Indianapolis, Indiana                           Attorney General of Indiana
    Edinburgh, Indiana
    KARL M. SCHARNBERG
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    THOMAS D. DILLMAN,                              )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                     )
    )
    vs.                               )       No. 53A01-1406-CR-261
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                               )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                      )
    APPEAL FROM THE MONROE CIRCUIT COURT
    The Honorable Mary Ellen Diekhoff, Judge
    Cause No. 53C05-1012-FC-1207
    December 16, 2014
    MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    BAKER, Judge
    Thomas Dillman appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for home detention
    credit time. We look to the nature of Dillman’s request and treat it as a motion to correct
    erroneous sentence.     Finding that Dillman has failed to show that his sentence is
    erroneous on its face, we affirm.
    FACTS
    On December 18, 2010, Dillman was charged with failure to stop and remain at
    the scene of an accident resulting in injury or death, a class C felony, cause number 53C-
    1012-FC-1207 (cause 1207). Dillman posted bond and, on January 5, 2010, he was
    ordered to be placed on home detention. Subsequently, in February of 2012, Dillman
    was arrested and charged with class D felony resisting law enforcement and class A
    misdemeanor operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, cause number 53C05-1202-
    FD-00169 (cause 169), and his bond was revoked in cause 1207.
    On January 16, 2013, Dillman pleaded guilty to cause 1207 under a plea
    agreement. The plea agreement covered causes 1207 and 169, as well as an unrelated
    probation violation. Under the agreement, Dillman would be sentenced to time served,
    including all credit time, for cause 169, and his sentence for cause 1207 was left to the
    determination of the trial court.
    The trial court held a sentencing hearing on February 7, 2013. Dillman was
    sentenced to time served, including 182 days of credit time for cause 169 and to eight
    years, with 280 days of credit time for cause 1207. Dillman appealed his sentence, and a
    panel of this Court affirmed the trial court’s sentence, but awarded Dillman an additional
    2
    thirteen days of jail-time credit. Dillman v. State, Cause No. 53A01-1303-CR-112 (Ind.
    Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2013).
    On April 11, 2014, Dillman filed a petition for home detention credit time. The
    trial court awarded him fifty-one days of additional credit time. On approximately May
    15, Dillman filed another petition for home detention credit time, asking that he be given
    sixty-seven days of additional home detention credit time.1 The trial court denied the
    petition on June 9, 2014, in an order stating that the sixty-seven days of credit time had
    already been applied to the aggregate sentence in causes 1207 and 169. Dillman now
    appeals.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    Dillman argues that the trial court erred when it denied his petition for home
    detention credit time. He maintains that the sixty-seven days of credit time should be
    applied to cause 1207 and that it was inappropriate for the credit time to be applied to
    cause 169.
    Although Dillman states that he is appealing the denial of his petition for home
    detention credit time, this Court will treat this motion as a motion to correct erroneous
    sentence. See Murfitt v. State, 
    812 N.E.2d 809
    , 809-10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (treating
    defendant’s motion for “motion for pretrial credit time served” as a motion to correct
    erroneous sentence). When reviewing a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to correct
    1
    Dillman states that he filed his petition for home detention credit time on May 15, 2014. However, the
    chronological case summary does not state when the petition was filed, and the affirmation of service
    states that it was sent on May 20, 2014.
    3
    an erroneous sentence, this Court defers to the trial court’s factual findings and reviews
    the decision only for an abuse of discretion. Brattain v. State, 
    777 N.E.2d 774
    , 776 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2002). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is against
    the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. 
    Id.
     However, the trial
    court’s legal conclusions are reviewed under a de novo standard of review. 
    Id.
    To address Dillman’s argument would require this Court to go beyond the face of
    the sentence, and to consider factors extrinsic to his sentence. In Robinson v. State, our
    Supreme Court held that:
    [w]hen claims of sentencing errors require consideration of matters outside
    the face of the sentencing judgment, they are best addressed promptly on
    direct appeal and thereafter via post-conviction relief proceedings where
    applicable. Use of the statutory motion to correct sentence should thus be
    narrowly confined to claims apparent from the face of the sentencing
    judgment, and the “facially erroneous” prerequisite should henceforth be
    strictly applied.
    
    805 N.E.2d 783
    , 787 (Ind. 2004). Claims that require consideration of the proceedings
    before, during, or after trial may not be presented by way of a motion to correct erroneous
    sentence. 
    Id.
    Here, Dillman has failed to show that his sentence is erroneous on its face. It
    would require this Court to look beyond the face of the sentencing order to determine that
    the sixty-seven days requested by Dillman were awarded toward a consecutive sentence.
    Therefore, a motion to correct erroneous sentence is an improper vehicle for Dillman’s
    sentencing claim.
    4
    Affirmed.
    RILEY, J., concurs, and VAIDIK, C.J., concurs in result.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 53A01-1406-CR-261

Filed Date: 12/16/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021