Vince M. Bryan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                    FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                            Dec 02 2019, 7:18 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                             CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                              Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Antonio G. Sisson                                        Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Muncie, Indiana                                          Attorney General
    Benjamin J. Shoptaw
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Vince M. Bryan,                                          December 2, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-CR-851
    v.                                               Appeal from the
    Delaware Circuit Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Thomas A. Cannon, Jr., Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    18C05-1805-F1-2
    Vaidik, Chief Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-851 | December 2, 2019              Page 1 of 9
    Case Summary
    [1]   Vince M. Bryan appeals his convictions for two counts of Level 1 felony child
    molesting, two counts of Level 4 felony child molesting, and two counts of
    Level 5 felony child solicitation. He argues that the trial court committed
    reversible error in admitting testimony about the victims’ allegations before the
    victims themselves testified and that the evidence is insufficient to support his
    convictions. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   In 2015, N.S. (who was born in October 2005) and J.S. (who was born in
    October 2007) (collectively, “the children”) lived with their mother, Stephanie
    Reel, in Muncie. Stephanie, who struggled with addiction, had “involvement
    with [the] Department of Child[] Services [throughout] the lifetime of” N.S.
    and J.S. and had “lost custody [of them] a couple times.” Tr. Vol. I p. 162.
    During the summer of 2015, Stephanie often “h[u]ng out” with Vince. Id. at
    164. Sometimes, Stephanie would bring the children with her to Vince’s house.
    According to Stephanie, the children called him “Vinny.” Id. at 163. On three
    or four occasions, the children spent the night at Vince’s house without
    Stephanie.
    [3]   In November 2015, the children told Jeffrey Reel (Stephanie’s brother) that
    “Vinny” had inappropriately touched them. Id. at 211. Jeffrey told Stephanie
    about the allegations, but Stephanie did not do anything about it. In January
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-851 | December 2, 2019   Page 2 of 9
    2016, the children were removed from Stephanie’s custody (unrelated to this
    case) and placed in foster care.
    [4]   At some point, the children told their foster parents that Vince had molested
    them, and this information “got reported to DCS.” Id. at 141.
    [5]   In March 2018, Muncie Police Department Officer Kristopher Swanson, who is
    a member of the Sexual Molest and Abuse Response Team (SMART), received
    an email from DCS about the children’s allegations against Vince. Shortly
    thereafter, Officer Swanson interviewed N.S., J.S., Stephanie, Jeffrey, and
    Vince. During his interview, Vince admitted that the children frequently came
    over to his house in the summer of 2015 and that they called him “Vinny.” Id.
    at 118. When Officer Swanson told Vince about the allegations that the
    children had made against him, he denied that they had ever spent the night at
    his house, started “throw[ing] out” different names of people who could have
    molested them, and tried to “change the subject.” Id. at 119.
    [6]   Thereafter, the State charged Vince with Count 1: Level 1 felony child
    molesting (N.S.); Count 2: Level 1 felony child molesting (J.S.); Count 3: Level
    4 felony child molesting (N.S.); Count 4: Level 4 felony child molesting (J.S.);
    Count 5: Level 5 felony child solicitation (N.S.); and Count 6: Level 5 felony
    child solicitation (J.S.). A jury trial was held in February 2019.
    [7]   Officer Swanson was the second witness to testify for the State (the first witness
    was another police officer who testified about background information). On
    direct exam, Officer Swanson testified that he interviewed N.S. and J.S. in
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-851 | December 2, 2019   Page 3 of 9
    April 2018 at the Child Advocacy Center. Officer Swanson did not testify
    about what N.S. or J.S. told him during their interviews. On cross-exam,
    however, defense counsel asked Officer Swanson numerous questions about
    what the children told him during their interviews, including how many times
    the alleged incidents occurred, where they occurred, who was present when the
    incidents occurred, and whether Vince was naked during any of the incidents.
    See id. at 144-51. On redirect, when the State asked Officer Swanson what J.S.
    told him during his interview, defense counsel made a hearsay objection. Id. at
    155. The trial court overruled the objection, finding that defense counsel
    opened the door to this line of questioning. Id. Officer Swanson then testified
    that the children told him that “Vinny” touched their penises using his mouth
    and hand. Id. at 156, 158.
    [8]   Jeffrey was the fourth witness to testify for the State. On direct exam, Jeffrey
    testified that when he was alone with N.S. and J.S. in the car one day in
    November 2015, N.S. asked him if he could “keep a secret.” Id. at 211. When
    the State asked Jeffrey what that secret was, defense counsel made another
    hearsay objection. Id. The trial court overruled the objection, and Jeffrey
    testified that N.S. told him that “Vinny” had “pulled on their privates” and
    “sucked on their privates” and that J.S. corroborated what N.S. said. Id.
    [9]   N.S. and J.S. were the last witnesses to testify for the State. They testified live
    from the Child Advocacy Center using a closed-circuit television system. They
    testified that they knew Vince and that they called him “Vinny.” Ex. 27 (3:20-
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-851 | December 2, 2019   Page 4 of 9
    3:36 & 1:58:30-38). They then testified that “Vinny” touched their penises with
    his hand, put his mouth on their penises, and made them touch his penis.
    [10]   After the State rested, Vince moved for a directed verdict because “neither of
    the alleged victims identified [Vince] as the person that sexually assaulted
    them.” Tr. Vol. I p. 241. The trial court denied his motion. At the conclusion
    of trial, the jury found Vince guilty of all six charges. The trial court sentenced
    him to seventy years, with forty years executed and thirty years suspended to
    probation.
    [11]   Vince now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    I. Admission of Evidence
    [12]   Vince contends that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from Officer
    Swanson and Jeffrey regarding what the children told them because it was
    hearsay. Specifically, Vince argues that Officer Swanson’s and Jeffrey’s
    testimony, “prior to testimony of the victims, should have been excluded
    because their testimony had the potential to unfairly prejudice the jury and
    elevate the credibility of the victims.” Appellant’s Br. p. 10. He therefore asks
    us to reverse his convictions. In support of his argument, Vince relies on
    Modesitt v. State, 
    578 N.E.2d 649
     (Ind. 1991).
    [13]   In Modesitt, the defendant was charged with molesting an eleven-year-old girl.
    The victim’s mother, a caseworker, and a psychologist testified at length about
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-851 | December 2, 2019   Page 5 of 9
    what the victim told each of them about the defendant’s conduct before the
    State called the victim to testify. Our Supreme Court held that the “drumbeat
    repetition” of the victim’s statements by other witnesses before the victim was
    called to testify “precluded direct, immediate cross examination of the
    statements and constitutes error requiring reversal.” 
    Id. at 652
    .
    [14]   We find no Modesitt violation here. Officer Swanson testified on direct exam
    that he interviewed each child, but he did not testify as to what they told him.
    On cross-exam, however, defense counsel asked Officer Swanson numerous
    questions about what the children told him, including how many times the
    alleged incidents occurred, where they occurred, who was present when the
    incidents occurred, and whether Vince was naked during any of the incidents.
    See Tr. Vol. I pp. 144-51. On redirect, the trial court allowed Officer Swanson
    to testify more about what the children told him because defense counsel
    opened the door to such testimony. See id. at 155. Notably, Vince does not
    acknowledge the trial court’s specific ruling in his brief. The State argues in its
    brief that Vince opened the door to the testimony, and Vince did not file a reply
    brief to respond to this claim. We agree with the trial court that Vince opened
    the door to Officer Swanson’s redirect testimony about what the children told
    him during their interviews. See Clark v. State, 
    915 N.E.2d 126
    , 130 (Ind. 2009)
    (holding that otherwise inadmissible evidence may be admitted where the
    defendant opens the door to questioning on that evidence), reh’g denied. Having
    opened the door, Vince cannot now be heard to complain about Officer
    Swanson’s redirect testimony.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-851 | December 2, 2019   Page 6 of 9
    [15]   This then leaves us with Jeffrey. Jeffrey briefly testified on direct exam about
    what the children told him in the car in November 2015. Jeffrey’s testimony on
    this point comprises less than one page of his twenty-page testimony. See Tr.
    Vol. I p. 211 (Jeffrey testified that “[N.S.] said that [“Vinny”] pulled on their
    privates, he sucked on their privates, which [J.S.] . . . co[rr]oborated . . . .”).
    This is not the sort of “drumbeat repetition” that Modesitt prohibits. See, e.g.,
    Norris v. State, 
    53 N.E.3d 512
    , 526 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (finding that “the
    challenged testimony of the two witnesses merely provided an overview of the
    situation and a summary of [the victim’s] accusations, without elaborating on
    [the victim’s] evidence,” was “brief and consistent with [the victim’s] later
    testimony,” and therefore did not constitute fundamental error); McGrew v.
    State, 
    673 N.E.2d 787
    , 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (declining to find reversible
    error where, although the victim was not the first to testify, the challenged
    testimony was “brief and consistent with” the victim’s later testimony),
    summarily aff’d in pertinent part, 
    682 N.E.2d 1289
     (Ind. 1997).
    II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    [16]   Vince next contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions.1
    When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction,
    1
    Vince also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict. Because his
    argument in this regard is the same as his sufficiency argument, and our standard of review is the same in
    both cases, we treat his directed-verdict and sufficiency arguments as one. See Edwards v. State, 
    862 N.E.2d 1254
    , 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“If the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction upon appeal, then a
    motion for a directed verdict is properly denied; thus, our standard of review is essentially the same as that
    upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.”), trans. denied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-851 | December 2, 2019                      Page 7 of 9
    appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable
    inferences supporting the verdict. Sallee v. State, 
    51 N.E.3d 130
    , 133 (Ind.
    2016). It is the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness
    credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to
    support a conviction. 
    Id.
     It is not necessary that the evidence “overcome every
    reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” 
    Id.
     (quotation omitted). The evidence is
    sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the
    verdict. Drane v. State, 
    867 N.E.2d 144
    , 147 (Ind. 2007).
    [17]   Specifically, Vince argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his
    convictions because N.S. and J.S. did not identify him “in court, nor via a
    photograph” and there was no “physical or medical evidence” presented to
    show that they were sexually assaulted. Appellant’s Br. p. 12. Numerous
    witnesses identified the defendant in court as Vince M. Bryan. See Tr. Vol. I pp.
    94, 114, 163, 207. Although neither N.S. nor J.S. pointed to the defendant or a
    photo of the defendant as Vince M. Bryan, they testified that they knew Vince
    M. Bryan and that they called him “Vinny.” They then testified that “Vinny”
    touched their penises with his hand, put his mouth on their penises, and made
    them touch his penis. The evidence is sufficient to prove that Vince is the one
    who molested N.S. and J.S. As for the fact that there was no physical or
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-851 | December 2, 2019   Page 8 of 9
    medical evidence presented to show that N.S. and J.S. were sexually molested,
    it is well established that a conviction can be sustained on the uncorroborated
    testimony of a single witness, even when that witness is the victim. Bailey v.
    State, 
    979 N.E.2d 133
    , 135 (Ind. 2012). Here, both N.S. and J.S. testified that
    Vince touched their penises with his hand, put his mouth on their penises, and
    made them touch his penis. We therefore affirm Vince’s convictions.
    [18]   Affirmed.
    [19]   Najam, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-851 | December 2, 2019   Page 9 of 9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19A-CR-851

Filed Date: 12/2/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/2/2019