P.T. (minor child), by next friend, Terry Tlustek v. Ka. A.-L. (minor child) and Ki. A.-L. (minor child), by next friend Rachel Leaneagh (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  •       MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                      FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                             Nov 27 2019, 9:28 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                           and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Michelle L. Woodward
    Pittman Law Firm
    Bedford, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    P.T. (minor child), by next                             November 27, 2019
    friend, Terry Tlustek,                                  Court of Appeals Case No.
    Appellant-Respondent,                                   19A-PO-1241
    Appeal from the
    v.                                              Lawrence Circuit Court
    The Honorable
    Ka. A.-L. (minor child) and Ki.                         Kelsey B. Hanlon, Special Judge
    A.-L. (minor child), by next                            Trial Court Cause Nos.
    friend Rachel Leaneagh,                                 47C01-1902-PO-189
    Appellees-Petitioners.                                  47C01-1902-PO-190
    Kirsch, Judge.
    [1]   P.T., by next friend Terry Tlustek, (“P.T.”) appeals the trial court’s issuance of
    permanent protective orders against him in two separate cases, one for Ka. A.-
    L. (“Ka”) and one for Ki. A.-L. (“Ki”). He raises two issues, which we
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PO-1241 | November 27, 2019              Page 1 of 11
    consolidate and restate as whether sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s
    issuance of the protective orders for both Ka and Ki.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   Sisters Ka and Ki1 participated in a swimming program at Lawrence County
    Aquatics (“LCA”). Tr. Vol. 2 at 8-9. P.T., age eleven, also participated in the
    program. 
    Id. at 8-9,
    88. Ka and Ki would attend practice at least six times per
    week. 
    Id. at 8.
    Between April of 2018 and February of 2019, P.T. touched and
    harassed Ka and Ki. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 18-20 24-26. P.T. usually
    touched and annoyed them while all three were in the swimming pool, but on
    one occasion he did so when all three were at LCA but not in the pool itself.
    [4]   P.T. touched both Ka’s and Ki’s buttocks. P.T. touched Ka’s buttocks two
    separate times. Tr. Vol. 2 at 26, 30. Ka described the incidents as follows:
    “[H]e would come up behind me, and he would use his hand and brush my
    bottom, and then my thighs, or my thighs; then my bottom.” 
    Id. at 30.
    Ki, in
    turn, described the touching as follows: “[P.T.] was standing right next to me
    when I was doing a flip turn, and he put his hand on my butt.” 
    Id. at 34.
    When
    P.T. touched Ka and Ki, he often smirked at them. 
    Id. at 12,
    26, 34-35.
    1
    While the record shows that Ka was born in 2004 and Ki was born in 2007, it does not divulge their dates of
    birth so we cannot determine their exact ages during each incident. However, it appears that that Ka was
    fourteen or fifteen during the incidents and that Ki was at least ten years old during the first incident and at
    least eleven by the time of the last incident in February of 2019. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 9, 13.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PO-1241 | November 27, 2019                  Page 2 of 11
    [5]   P.T. would also rub his body against Ka’s and Ki’s bodies. Ka described the
    incidents as follows:
    [H]e would come up behind me when I finally wasn’t looking at
    him, and he would bob and brush his entire body against my
    back, or if I was talking to someone else, he would come up and
    bob his body -- he would come up and be bobbing, and his whole
    body would brush against my front.
    
    Id. at 30-31.
    Ki described similar incidents; P.T. would rub his belly against
    Ki’s “front, my sides, and my back.” 
    Id. at 36,
    38. P.T. rubbed against Ki’s
    body approximately forty times. 
    Id. at 36.
    This made Ki uncomfortable and
    scared. 
    Id. at 37.
    Ki was afraid of P.T. partly because he was taller than her.
    
    Id. P.T. would
    also grab Ka’s and Ki’s feet. 
    Id. at 12,
    40. Both Ka and Ki
    frequently told P.T. to not touch them. 
    Id. at 13,
    28, 36. Ka told P.T six days
    per week to stay away from her. 
    Id. at 28.
    [6]   P.T. would also come very close to Ka and Ki outside the pool, particularly in a
    hallway just outside the pool. 
    Id. at 15.
    Ka and Ki would go into the hallway,
    put mats on the floor, and do stretching exercises. 
    Id. P.T. would
    follow them
    into the hall and place his mat between the girls’ mats, such that Ka and Ki
    could not do their stretching exercises without touching P.T. 
    Id. [7] P.T.
    would come close to Ka and Ki in other ways they found distressing,
    including placing his face within inches of Ka’s and Ki’s buttocks. This
    occurred when Ka and Ki would stand on a diving block at the edge of the
    pool. As they stood on the block, P.T. would position himself just behind the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PO-1241 | November 27, 2019   Page 3 of 11
    block, so his face was inches from each girl’s buttocks. 
    Id. at 13-14;
    38-39. This
    bothered Ka so much that each time she went to the pool, she would look for
    P.T.: “The first thing I would do is start scanning the pool area and making
    sure that he wasn’t there, and that if he was, I would know exactly where he
    was; that way, I could be away from that area.” 
    Id. at 15.
    [8]    Some of the incidents were unique to each girl. As to Ka, P.T. would rub his
    hand down the full length of Ka’s back, lift his hand to avoid Ka’s buttocks, and
    then run his hand down Ka’s thighs. 
    Id. at 11.
    P.T. would sometimes corner
    Ka in the pool, and while doing so, brush his hand against Ka’s arm or bump
    her with his legs. 
    Id. at 12-13.
    [9]    In a January 14, 2019 incident, while Ka was swimming laps, P.T. brushed his
    side against Ka’s side, which made her “super uncomfortable.” 
    Id. at 16.
    When Ka was stationary against the pool wall, P.T. approached Ka and pressed
    against her. 
    Id. Ka told
    P.T. to stop, but he said that “he had no choice, he
    couldn’t help it.” 
    Id. Ka used
    her elbows to push P.T. away “because it was
    really making me very uncomfortable.” 
    Id. During this
    incident, P.T. touched
    Ka at least thirty times. 
    Id. at 16-17.
    All these incidents made Ka stressed and
    anxious. 
    Id. at 20-21.
    [10]   As to Ki, P.T. massaged her ear, which made Ki uncomfortable and nervous.
    
    Id. at 37.
    On another occasion, Ki was playing cards with friends while sitting
    on the pool’s bleachers, P.T. and his sisters approached the group, and P.T.
    started “stomping around us, jumping off one part of the bleacher to another,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PO-1241 | November 27, 2019   Page 4 of 11
    being really loud,” which made Ki uncomfortable. 
    Id. at 40.
    As P.T. was
    introducing his sisters to Ki and her friends, P.T. thrust his finger close to Ki’s
    face, which made her uncomfortable. 
    Id. On another
    occasion, P.T. spit a
    mouthful of water into Ki’s face. 
    Id. at 39.
    [11]   While P.T. claimed that some of the incidents were accidental, he admitted that
    some were intentional. 
    Id. at 90.
    He also admitted that Ka and Ki often told
    him not to touch them. 
    Id. In fact,
    he admitted that Ka told him once or twice
    per day not to touch her. 
    Id. He also
    admitted to putting his face near each
    girl’s buttocks. 
    Id. at 91.
    [12]   On February 14, 2019, Rachel Leaneagh, Ka and Ki’s mother, filed two
    petitions for a protective order, one for Ka under cause number 47C01-1902-
    PO-189 and one for Ki under cause number 47C01-1902-PO-190. Appellant’s
    App. Vol. II at 17-22, 23-29. Each petition alleged that P.T. had committed a
    sex offense or stalking. 
    Id. at 17,
    23. Ka’s petition listed incidents occurring
    between April of 2018 and February of 2019, claiming that P.T. touched her
    buttocks and thighs, placed his hand near her groin, rubbed his body against
    her, grabbed her feet, placed his face near her buttocks, ran his hand down her
    back, breathed heavily while standing next to her, pointed his finger close to her
    face, and stomped and yelled next to her as she tried to play cards with her
    friends. 
    Id. at 19-20.
    In her petition, Ki made allegations about similar
    incidents occurring during the same period. 
    Id. at 24-26.
    Ki also alleged that
    P.T. touched her and bothered her in different ways; she claimed P.T. massaged
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PO-1241 | November 27, 2019   Page 5 of 11
    her ear, spit water in her face, and pointed his finger close to her face and
    yelled, “I’m not touching you! I’m not touching you!” 
    Id. at 25.
    [13]   On February 15, 2019, the trial court issued a temporary, ex parte order under
    each cause number, finding that both Ka and Ki proved by a preponderance of
    the evidence that P.T had committed a sex offense against each one of them;
    P.T. represented a credible threat, justifying the entry of temporary protective
    orders; P.T. should be enjoined from committing a sex offense against Ka and
    Ki; P.T. should be prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning,
    contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating with Ka and Ki; and P.T.
    should be ordered to stay away from the girls’ home and school. 
    Id. at 35,
    38.
    [14]   On March 28, 2019, the trial court conducted a hearing regarding whether to
    make the temporary protective orders permanent. Tr. Vol. 2 at 2. As the
    hearing began, the trial court consolidated the cases. 
    Id. at 5.
    At the end of the
    hearing, the trial court stated that the temporary, ex parte orders would “remain
    in effect until the court issues its final order[s].” 
    Id. at 92.
    [15]   On May 8, 2019, the trial court issued orders under each cause number, making
    identical findings and issuing identical orders, finding that both Ka and Ki had
    shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that P.T. had stalked them and that
    this justified making the temporary protective orders permanent orders.
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 10-12, 14-16. The trial court enjoined P.T. from
    stalking Ka and Ki and from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or
    directly or indirectly communicating with Ka and Ki. 
    Id. at 10,
    14. The trial
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PO-1241 | November 27, 2019   Page 6 of 11
    court did allow P.T. to be at the same locations and events as Ka and Ki, but it
    ruled that P.T. must stay away from Ka and Ki by at least twenty-five feet. 
    Id. at 11,
    15. P.T. now appeals. We will supply additional facts as necessary.
    Discussion and Decision
    [16]   P.T. argues that the permanent restraining orders were not supported by
    sufficient evidence because both Ka and Ki failed to prove by a preponderance
    of evidence that P.T. stalked each of them.2
    [17]   We initially observe that Ka and Ki did not file an appellee’s brief, either
    individually or collectively. Where an appellee fails to file a brief, we do not
    develop arguments on that party’s behalf; rather, we may reverse upon a prima-
    facie showing of reversible error. Morton v. Ivacic, 
    898 N.E.2d 1196
    , 1199 (Ind.
    2008). Nevertheless, we are obligated to correctly apply the law to the facts to
    determine whether reversal is required. Geico Ins. Co. v. Graham, 
    14 N.E.3d 854
    ,
    857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
    [18]   To obtain an order of protection under the Civil Protection Order Act, the
    petitioner must prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind.
    2
    P.T. also argues at length that the temporary restraining orders, issued because the trial court found that
    P.T. committed sex offenses against Ka and Ki, were not supported by sufficient evidence. However, the
    propriety of those orders is moot because the permanent protective orders superseded those temporary orders.
    See Nordman v. N. Manchester Foundry, Inc., 
    810 N.E.2d 1071
    , 1073 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (appellant’s
    argument that entry of temporary restraining order was erroneous was moot because the trial court entered a
    permanent injunction, which was final judgment and thus superseded the temporary restraining order.).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PO-1241 | November 27, 2019              Page 7 of 11
    Code § 34-26-5-9(f). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility
    of the witnesses. A.S. v. T.H., 
    920 N.E.2d 803
    , 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A
    parent may file a petition for protective order on behalf of a child if a person has
    committed stalking under Indiana Code section 35-45-10-5. Ind. Code § 34-26-
    5-2(b). A person who stalks another person commits stalking, a Level 6
    felony.” Ind. Code § 35-45-10-5(a). “Stalking” refers to a “knowing or an
    intentional course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of
    another person that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized,
    frightened, intimidated, or threatened and that actually causes the victim to feel
    terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened.” Ind. Code § 35-45-10-1.
    “However, there is no requirement that the contact at issue be threatening on its
    face, and stalking may be found where other evidence is sufficient to prove that
    the contact amounted to harassment.” Maurer v. Cobb-Maurer, 
    994 N.E.2d 753
    ,
    757-58 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “Harassment” is conduct “directed toward a
    victim that includes but is not limited to repeated or continuing impermissible
    contact that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress and
    that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional distress.” Ind. Code § 35-45-
    10-2.
    [19]   We have found sufficient evidence for a stalking conviction where after the
    victim declined the defendant’s lunch invitations, the defendant continued to
    send the victim flowers and notes and to telephone the victim, even after she
    demanded that he stop. See Garza v. State, 
    736 N.E.2d 323
    , 325 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2000). We also found sufficient evidence for a stalking conviction where a
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PO-1241 | November 27, 2019   Page 8 of 11
    person followed a woman as she shopped from store to store and videotaped
    her shopping activities, which made her feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated,
    or threatened. Sandleben v. State, 
    29 N.E.3d 126
    , 131-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
    [20]   Here, P.T. contends that the evidence for stalking was insufficient because Ka
    and Ki failed to prove that P.T.’s actions terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or
    threatened both girls and that P.T.’s actions would not have that impact on a
    reasonable person. In support, P.T. cites evidence that does not support the
    judgment. For instance, he mentions the testimony of Tina Howell (“Howell”),
    the safety coordinator at LCA, who investigated the incidents and concluded
    that P.T. was not bullying Ka and Ki and did not pose a threat to either girl.
    Tr. Vol. 2 at 59-66. Howell characterized P.T.’s touching of Ka and Ki as a
    mere annoyance. 
    Id. at 66.
    [21]   We reject P.T.’s request to reweigh the evidence and find that the evidence
    sufficiently established that P.T. stalked both Ka and Ki; that is, the evidence
    showed that P.T. knowingly or an intentionally engaged in a repeated course of
    conduct that would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened,
    intimidated, or threatened and that actually caused Ka and Ki to feel terrorized,
    frightened, intimidated, or threatened. See Ind. Code § 35-45-10-1. We first
    observe that the intentional nature of P.T.’s conduct may be inferred from the
    conduct itself. Phipps v. State, 
    90 N.E.3d 1190
    , 1195-96 (Ind. 2018) (“[I]ntent
    can be inferred from a defendant’s conduct and the natural and usual sequence
    to which such conduct logically and reasonably points.”). Here, P.T. touched
    the girls innumerable times even though they often told him to stop. Tr. Vol. 2
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PO-1241 | November 27, 2019   Page 9 of 11
    at 12-17, 21, 28, 30, 34, 36-38, 40. P.T. even admitted that his behavior was
    intentional. 
    Id. at 90.
    It was also reasonable to infer that P.T.’s non-touching
    behavior was intentional. See 
    Phipps, 90 N.E.3d at 1095-96
    . Indeed, this is the
    only possible inference to be made from P.T. approaching Ka and Ki from
    behind when they were on the diving board and placing his face within inches
    of their buttocks. Tr. Vol 2 at 13-15, 37-38. Underscoring the intentional nature
    of P.T.’s conduct was that after he touched or bothered Ka or Ki, he often
    smirked at them. 
    Id. at 12,
    26, 34-35.
    [22]   The evidence also sufficiently established that P.T.’s behavior frightened,
    intimidated, or threatened Ka and Ki. See Ind. Code § 35-34-10-1. Ka testified
    that she felt “super uncomfortable” when P.T. swam by her and brushed his
    body against her side. 
    Id. at 16.
    She also testified:
    I would stress out before and after practice, because, before
    practice I would be stressing; thinking, oh, my goodness, I hope
    he’s not there, I hope he’s not gonna’ touch me, and then after
    practice, I -- if he had touched me, or came super close to me or
    something, then I would get stressed out and start feeling
    anxious, and be talking to my mom about it, which I’m glad she
    was there for me the whole time. And, it was just so stressful
    until the protective order was put up, and then I felt like I could
    finally relax, until the past week.
    
    Id. at 21.
    [23]   P.T. rubbed against Ki’s body approximately forty times. 
    Id. at 36.
    This made
    Ki uncomfortable and scared. 
    Id. at 38.
    Ki testified that P.T. frightened her
    partly because he was taller than her. 
    Id. at 37.
    Ki felt uncomfortable and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PO-1241 | November 27, 2019   Page 10 of 11
    nervous when P.T. massaged her ear, and she also felt uncomfortable when
    P.T. stomped and yelled and thrust his finger close to her face. 
    Id. [24] Moreover,
    it was reasonable for Ka and Ki to feel frightened, intimidated, or
    threatened by P.T.’s behavior. See Ind. Code § 35-34-10-1. Even though Ka
    and Ki warned P.T. countless times to stop touching and harassing them, P.T.
    stubbornly persisted in his inappropriate behavior. For young girls like Ka and
    Ki, it was reasonable to experience fear and intimidation from P.T.’s constant
    groping and his boorish yelling and stomping. P.T.’s effort to categorize his
    behavior as merely “annoying” ignores the gravity of his behavior and asks us
    to reject the reasonable inferences to be drawn from his behavior and its likely
    emotional impact on vulnerable young girls. Thus, sufficient evidence
    supported the issuance of permanent protective orders against P.T. and in favor
    of both Ka and Ki on the grounds that P.T. stalked each one of them.
    [25]   Affirmed.
    Baker, J., and Crone, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PO-1241 | November 27, 2019   Page 11 of 11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19A-PO-1241

Filed Date: 11/27/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021