In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: L.M., Z.M., A.S. & E.S. (Minor Children) And M.S. (Mother) and J.M. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Nov 27 2019, 10:31 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
R. Patrick Magrath Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Magrath, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Madison, Indiana David E. Corey
Jennifer A. Joas Deputy Attorney General
Madison, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Termination of the Parent- November 27, 2019
Child Relationship of: Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-JT-484
L.M., Z.M., A.S. & E.S. (Minor
Children) Appeal from the Jennings Circuit
Court
And
The Honorable Jon W. Webster,
M.S. (Mother) and J.M. Judge
(Father), Trial Court Cause No.
Appellants-Respondents, 40C01-1807-JT-15, 40C01-1807-
JT-16, 40C01-1807-JT-17, &
v. 40C01-1807-JT-18
The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
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Riley, Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Respondents, M.S. (Mother) and J.M. (Father), appeal the trial
court’s Order terminating their parental rights to their minor daughters, Z.M.,
L.M., and A.S. Mother also challenges the termination of her parental rights to
her son, E.S.
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Although Mother and Father have filed separate appellate briefs, we
consolidate the issues they raised and restate as the following single issue:
Whether the trial court’s Order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental
rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] Mother and Father are the biological parents of Z.M. born on December 20,
2013; L.M. born on May 28, 2014; and A.S., born on May 18, 2016. Prior to
Mother’s relationship with Father, Mother and S.W. 1 had E.S., born on June
1
S.W., the biological father of E.S., does not participate in this appeal. We therefore limit our recitation of
the facts to those pertinent solely to Mother’s and Father’s appeal.
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10, 2010. In 2016, Mother was living with Z.M., L.M., A.S., and E.S.
(collectively, Children) in her sister’s home in Jennings County, Indiana.
[5] On September 1, 2016, the Jennings County Department of Child Services
(DCS) received a report, alleging that the Children were victims of child abuse
or neglect with “Mother as the perpetrator.” (Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II, p.
50). When DCS visited Mother’s sister’s home, DCS observed “some gunky
substance” in the refrigerator, the bathroom was “full of trash and clothes,” the
kitchen sink was “full of dirty dishes,” and the living room was packed with
“debris of clothes and blankets.” (Transcript Vol. II, p. 11). DCS found that
the Children lacked “appropriate bedding,” and “most of them were running
around in dirty diapers.” (Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 50; Tr. Vol. II, p.
8). Following that visit, DCS removed the Children, placing Z.M., L.M., and
A.S. with Father, and E.S. with maternal grandmother (Maternal
Grandmother).
[6] On September 7, 2016, DCS filed separate Petitions, alleging that the Children
were in need of services (CHINS). At the initial hearing, Mother and Father
appeared and denied the allegations pertaining to Z.M., L.M., and A.S.
Mother also denied the allegations relating to E.S. During another
dispositional hearing on December 7, 2016, Mother and Father appeared and
admitted the allegations in the CHINS petitions. At the time of the hearing,
Father was “pretty bad off on heroin and methamphetamines” and was not
capable of caring for daughters Z.M., L.M., and A.S. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 110). As
such, Father requested that his daughters be removed from his care and be
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placed with his aunt (Aunt). On December 20, 2016, based on the admissions
made by Mother and Father, the trial court adjudicated the Children as
CHINS. The trial court ordered Z.M., L.M., and A.S., to be placed with Aunt,
but E.S. to remain with Maternal Grandmother.
[7] On March 17, 2017, the trial court issued a dispositional order. In pertinent
part, Mother was ordered to maintain suitable safe and stable housing for the
Children, keep her residence clean and free from clutter, and “assist in a
protection plan which protects the [C]hildren from neglect.” (Appellant’s App.
Vol. II, p. 38). Father was ordered, among other things, to contact the family
case manager assigned to the case every week, attend all scheduled visitations,
obey the law, notify DCS of any arrests of criminal charges, and maintain safe
and stable housing.
[8] During a review hearing on April 27, 2017, Father failed to appear. The trial
court found that Mother had complied with the case plan, cooperated with
DCS, participated in services, consistently visited the Children, and had
enhanced her parental abilities. Father, however, had only visited Z.M., L.M.,
and A.S. three times since their removal, and had not cooperated with DCS.
[9] In June 2017, Father was charged with nonpayment of child support of his
daughters Z.M., L.M., and A.S. On July 21, 2017, family case manager
Jennifer Carroll (FCM Carroll) visited Mother’s sister’s home and noted some
progress, although “roaches” were present. (Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II, p.
52). On July 21, 2017, six family case managers went to Mother’s sister’s home
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to help Mother “continue to clean out her home and get rid of several items.”
(Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 52).
[10] In August 2017, DCS learned that Father and his girlfriend were living in
Aunt’s home without DCS’s permission even after he had been told he could
not reside there. At the time, Father was not participating in any of the ordered
services. DCS also had additional concerns regarding Father’s “judgment to
allow his girlfriend to live in [Aunt’s] home” since Father’s girlfriend had an
“open DCS case against her and was a known drug user.” (Appellant’s App.
Conf. Vol. II, p. 52). Also, DCS was concerned that there were “fleas and
roaches” in Aunt’s home. (Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 52). Based on all
of DCS’s concerns, DCS removed Z.M., L.M., and A.S. from Aunt’s home and
placed them with Maternal Grandmother.
[11] Between September 2017 and October 2017, Joyce Harden (Harden) of the
Ireland Home Based Services supervised Mother’s visits with the Children.
Mother only attended nine visits out of the thirteen. During the visits, Mother
often showed up with inappropriate and insufficient food and drinks for the
Children. On October 20, 2017, multiple FCMs showed up at Mother’s sister’s
home for another Community Clean Up Day. Mother was not home to help
with the cleanup. In November 2017, while Father still not in compliance with
his case plan, Mother had complied with all DCS’s services, followed all
recommendations, made necessary changes, and visited Children. Based on
Mother’s progress, DCS recommended that Mother have unsupervised visits
with the Children, including overnight visits. The goal at that time was to
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transition to a “Trial Home Visit and Reunification.” (Appellant’s App. Conf.
Vol. II, p. 85).
[12] In February 2018, Mother moved out of her sister’s home and moved into a
small two-bedroom trailer. FCM Carroll visited Mother’s trailer and found it to
be in good condition. In that same month, Mother’s working relationship with
her home-based case worker, Harden, ended when Mother indicated at a child
and family team meeting that Harden was a “bitch” and that she wanted to
“punch [Harden] in the face.” (Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 52). Ireland
Home Based Services terminated its services due to the threat Mother made to
Harden, and “due to the fact Mother had missed every single appointment
between November 2017 and February 2018.” (Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II,
p. 96).
[13] In March 2018, DCS visited Mother’s trailer and discovered that it had no
running water. In the same month, FCM Carroll visited Mother’s trailer and
noted that Mother did not “consistently have electricity” and the porch “roof
was leaking badly with nails exposed.” (Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 65).
At a review hearing, DCS determined that Mother’s trailer was no longer safe
or habitable, and that Mother had not regularly met with service providers to
address parenting and life skills concerns. The trial court found that Mother
struggled with following the visitation rules and that she used offensive
language when speaking in front of the Children. Mother’s unsupervised visits
with the Children reverted to being supervised after Mother admitted to striking
E.S. in the face because he had an “attitude.” (Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II,
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p. 53). As for Father, the trial court also found that Father, who had failed to
appear at the review hearing, had not complied with DCS’s services or his case
plan.
[14] By May 2018, Mother had made progress and was transitioned back to
unsupervised visits with the Children. Sometime in May 2018, the Children
had an overnight visit at Mother’s home, but the Children “slept outside on the
porch.” (Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 53). FCM Carroll was concerned
about the Children sleeping on the porch since she had previously noted the
“deteriorating condition of the porch and the leaking roof overhead” and also
because the Children, who were allergic to mosquito bites, returned to Maternal
Grandmother’s home with large welts. (Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II). On
May 18, 2018, FCM Carroll visited Mother’s trailer, and she observed “a
smelly bag of trash with flies [and] a large piece of glass on the porch,” the
Children’s bedrooms had clothing everywhere, “multiple piles of dog feces on
the floor” and on the Children’s “mattresses.” (Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II,
p. 54). On May 26, 2018, FCM Carroll again visited Mother’s home, and E.S.
“pointed out two (2) piles of dog feces in the [C]hildren’s room.” (Appellant’s
App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 53). FCM Carroll additionally noted that there were
house flies and the conditions inside the trailer was unsafe for the Children.
[15] In June 2018, FCM Carroll received a report that Mother had not engaged in
any of DCS’s services since March of 2018. On June 22, 2018, FCM Carroll
visited Mother, but Mother was not present. However, looking through the
windows, FCM Carroll saw “trash all over the porch” and “piles of dog feces
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inside the home.” (Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 54). On June 29, 2018,
FCM Carroll once again visited Mother’s trailer and noted no improvement
with the condition of Mother’s home. On July 18, 2018, FCM Carroll visited
Mother’s trailer and “observed the same trash all over the porch including dirty
diapers that had been untouched in the last month.” (Appellant’s App. Conf.
Vol. II, p. 54).
[16] On July 31, 2018, DCS filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of Mother
and Father with respect to Z.M., L.M., and A.S. DCS likewise filed a petition
to terminate Mother’s parental rights to E.S. Following the filing of the
termination petitions, in August 2018, after not complying for almost one and
one-half years, Father began participating with his ordered services. This
happened by “pure coincidence” after Father’s mother, who was at the DCS’s
office for a separate matter, provided DCS with Father’s updated contact
information. (Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 54). On September 17, 2018,
FCM Carroll visited Mother’s home and observed that Mother had ripped up
the carpet and there was “black mold everywhere.” (Appellant’s App. Conf.
Vol. II, p. 54). Mother’s home was thereafter condemned, and she moved into
her sister’s home.
[17] On November 12, and December 19, 2018, the trial court conducted a
factfinding hearing on DCS’s termination petitions. During the hearing, FCM
Carroll opined that termination of Mother’s parental rights to E.S., and
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Z.M., L.M., and A.S. were in the
Children’s best interests. Guardian ad litem Laural French (GAL French), who
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testified at the December hearing, stated that there were still no indications that
Mother and Father were anywhere closer to reunification than when the case
opened. She added that Mother did not have an appropriate home for the
Children and had not “shown an ability to parent safely and appropriately for
any length of time.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 193).
[18] On January 31, 2019, the trial court issued finding of facts and conclusion
thereon terminating Mother’s parental rights to E.S. Then on February 11,
2019, the trial court issued finding of facts and conclusion thereon terminating
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Z.M., L.M., and A.S.
[19] Mother and Father now appeal. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
A. Standard of Review
[20] Mother and Father appeal the trial court’s Order, terminating their parental
rights to Z.M., L.M., and A.S. Mother also appeals the trial court’s termination
of her parental rights to E.S. A parent has an “interest in the care, custody, and
control of his or her children [that] is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests.’” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). The Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution thus safeguards “the traditional right of parents to establish
a home and raise their children.” Id. Nevertheless, it is well-established that
“parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child’s
interests when determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate
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parental rights.” S.L. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1122 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re I.A., 934
N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010)). Termination of parental rights is appropriate
where “parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.”
In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1259-60. We appreciate that the termination of a
parent-child relationship is “an extreme measure and should only be utilized as
a last resort when all other reasonable efforts to protect the integrity of the
natural relationship between parent and child have failed.” K.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of
Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[21] Upon review of a trial court’s termination of parental rights, our court does not
reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at
1260. Rather, we “consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that
are most favorable to the judgment.” Id. Additionally, the trial court issued
specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, which requires application of
the two-tiered standard of review set forth in Indiana Trial Rule 52(A): “[f]irst,
we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second we
determine whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. We “shall not set
aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.” Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). A trial court has clearly erred “if the
findings do not support the trial court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not
support the judgment.” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1260 (quoting Bester v. Lake
Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005))
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II. Termination of Parental Rights Statute
[22] In order to terminate a parent’s rights to her child, DCS must prove:
(A) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6)
months under a dispositional decree.
****
(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been
under the supervision of a local office . . . for at least fifteen (15)
months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning
with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of
the child being alleged to be a [CHINS] . . . ;
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a [CHINS];
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
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(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove each of the foregoing elements by
clear and convincing evidence. C.A. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d 85,
92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “[C]lear and convincing evidence requires the
existence of a fact to ‘be highly probable.’” Id.
[23] Father challenges the trial court’s conclusion that there is reasonable probability
that he would not remedy the reasons for the removal of Z.M., L.M., and A.S.
or that he poses a threat to their well-being. Mother, on the other hand,
challenges the trial court’s conclusion that termination of her rights to the
Children was in their best interest.
B. Failure to Remedy Conditions2
[24] In considering whether there is a reasonable probability that conditions will not
be remedied, we must identify what conditions led to the Child’s “placement
and retention” outside of the home and then determine whether there is a
reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. K.T.K. v. Ind.
Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). In making these
decisions, “the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness as of the time of the
2
Because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive and we affirmed the trial
court’s conclusion that the conditions that resulted in Z.M.’s, L.M.’s, and A.S.’s removal have not been
remedied, we will not address whether the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to
Z.M.’s, L.M.’s, and A.S.’s well-being.
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termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed
conditions—balancing a parent’s recent improvements against habitual
pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of
future neglect or deprivation.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 152; K.T.K.,
989 N.E.2d at 1231). “Habitual conduct may include ‘criminal history, drug
and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of
adequate housing and employment.’” K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 647. DCS “is not
required to provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it need
only establish that there is a reasonable probability that the parent’s behavior
will not change.” A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.
[25] Father maintains that he was not responsible for his daughter’s initial removal.
While Father is correct that he had nothing to do with Z.M.’s, L.M.’s, and
A.S.’s removal and it was due to Mother’s inability to provide a safe and stable
home, Father fails to show the conditions justifying his daughter’s continued
placement outside his care have been remedied.
[26] Following Z.M.’s, L.M.’s, and A.S.’s removal from Mother’s home in
September 2016, they were placed with Father. Four months later, Father
requested that his daughters be removed from his home and be placed with
Aunt since he was “pretty bad off on heroin and methamphetamines.” (Tr.
Vol. II, p. 110). After Father’s request, the trial court approved the settlement
change with Aunt.
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[27] In his brief, Father asserts that he was “free from drugs and had been for
approximately one year as evidenced by his hair follicle drug screen performed
on August 16, 2018.” (Father’s Br. p. 15). We note that the negative drug
screen occurred after DCS had filed the termination petitions. During the
CHINS proceedings Father never completed any substance abuse treatment or
performed drug screens. The trial court was not required to consider Father’s
late-breaking efforts, and it was within its discretion to weigh Father’s history
and consider any reasons for his daughters continued placement away from his
care. See In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1234 (Ind. 2013) (holding that a trial
court may “disregard the efforts . . . made only shortly before termination and
to weigh more heavily [a parent’s] history of conduct prior to those efforts.”).
[28] The dispositional order required Father to have safe and stable housing for
Z.M., L.M., and A.S. Father argues that his mother’s home, where he resided
at the time of the termination hearing, was adequate housing for Z.M., L.M.,
and A.S., although it “was a work in progress.” (Father’s Br. p. 16). GAL
French who visited Father’s mother’s home, testified that the home had a “very
active” cockroach problem. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 193). Further, in the bedroom
where Z.M., L.M., and A.S. were expected to sleep, had a “furnace” which did
not have a cover, and it had “open working parts” which was a major safety
concern. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 193). GAL French also was concerned with the fact
that three dogs present in the home were “urinating on the sofa.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.
193). Based on her visit, GAL French was unable to recommend that Z.M.,
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L.M., and A.S., be placed back in Father’s care since he lacked a safe and stable
home.
[29] After absenting himself for more than one and one-half years on the pretext that
he was trying to get himself clean from drugs, Father, involuntarily, began
participating in DCS’s services and visiting his daughters after DCS had
initiated the termination petition. Moreover, Father’s engagement transpired
by coincidence when Father’s mother provided DCS with Father’s updated
contact information. Additionally, there is no evidence that Father progressed
to unsupervised visitations with his daughters or successfully completed
substance abuse treatment.
[30] In the instant case, there was substantive evidence documenting Father’s
pattern of inability to otherwise successfully participate in services, and to
provide adequate safe housing for his daughters. Thus, we conclude that the
trial court’s findings or conclusions that there was a reasonable probability that
the continued placement of Z.M., L.M., and A.S. away from Father’s care
would not be remedied.
C. Best Interests of Children
[31] Mother challenges the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental
rights is in the Children’s best interests. The parent-child relationship is “one of
the most valued relationships in our culture.” Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147
(quoting Neal v. DeKalb Cnty. Div of Family & Children, 796 N.E.2d 280, 285 (Ind.
2003)). Thus, the purpose of terminating a parent-child relationship is to
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protect the child, not to punish the parent. In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 855 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. When considering whether termination would be
in a child’s best interests, the trial court must “look beyond the factors identified
by [DCS] and . . . look to the totality of the evidence.” A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of
Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “The
trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the
child’s physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before
terminating the parent-child relationship.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235.
Permanency is a central consideration in determining a child’s best interests.
Id. Nevertheless, “the right of parents to raise their children should not be
terminated solely because there is a better home available for the children.” In
re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
[32] By the time of the termination hearing, the Children had been removed from
Mother’s care for nearly two years. The Children were living with Maternal
Grandmother, they were well adjusted, they were having all their needs met,
and Maternal Grandmother intended to adopt all of them.
[33] Mother contends that if the Children continue to reside with Maternal
Grandmother, they will “continue to go to school in the same district, and they
will continue to interact with the same friends.” (Mother’s Br. p. 14). Thus,
Mother suggest that the termination of her parental rights was not geared to
provide any “extra stability, consistency, or assurance,” for the Children,
rather, it was aimed at withdrawing DCS services which she desperately needs
“to get her life back in order.” (Mother’s Br. p. 14). Mother then points to the
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belated improvements she made in the wake of termination petitions to support
her argument that termination of her parental rights to the Children was not in
their best interest. Mother, who is diagnosed with bipolar disorder and
depression, claims that she had “been consistently taking her medication for six
weeks and was feeling much better.” (Mother’s Br. p. 13). Mother adds that
shortly before the termination petitions were filed, she had been meeting with
her counselor three times a week and had made progress, “although she needed
more therapeutic services.” (Mother’s Br. p. 13). Thus, Mother posits that she
has “demonstrated a genuine interest in the wellbeing of her [C]hildren and had
taken proper steps to provide for her own mental health so that she could
provide for their care and needs.” (Mother’s Br. p. 13).
[34] In concluding that termination would serve the Children’s best interests, the
trial court relied on Mother’s historical conduct during the CHINS proceedings,
as opposed to her late-breaking progress. Evidence was presented that Mother’s
bipolar disorder is managed better with medication. Throughout the CHINS
proceedings, Mother was inconsistent in taking her medication, except for the
six weeks preceding the termination hearings. As for the services that Mother
claims she desperately needs, Mother expressed to DCS that the “reason why
she was not compliant with services is because she believes she does not need
them, and because she believes her [C]hildren never should have been removed
in the first place.” (Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 69). FCM Carroll
recommended termination of Mother’s parental rights because Mother had not
addressed her parental deficiencies, had not made any meaningful progress, did
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not “have a safe and stable home, and [had] not address[ed] her mental health”
issues. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 56). In terms of permanency, FCM Carroll opined that
the Children were well cared for by Maternal Grandmother and adoption was
in their best interest. GAL French testified that Mother did not have a safe and
stable home for the Children, and she was not any closer to reunification than
when the CHINS case opened. While Mother had made some belated progress
by taking her medication, and seeing counselors, it is well-established that the
trial court will look at a parent’s overall conduct during the case. See In re
K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234. Given the totality of the evidence, we cannot
conclude that the trial court’s conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental
rights was in the Children’s best interest was clearly erroneous.
CONCLUSION
[35] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s conclusions that there
was a reasonable probability that the conditions meriting continued placement
would not be remedied and that termination was in the Children’s best
interests were not clearly erroneous.
[36] Affirmed.
[37] Vaidik, C. J. and Bradford, J. concur
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