In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: K.P., Minor Child, and K.P., Father v. The Indiana Department of Child Services ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not Dec 02 2014, 9:53 am
be regarded as precedent or cited
before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of
res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the
law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
CRAIG W. GRAHAM GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Jeffersonville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
ROBERT J. HENKE
DAVID E. COREY
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION OF )
THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF: )
)
K.P., Minor Child, )
)
and )
)
K.P., Father, )
)
Appellant-Respondent, )
)
vs. ) No. 10A01-1402-JT-73
)
THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD )
SERVICES, )
)
Appellee-Petitioner. )
APPEAL FROM THE CLARK CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Daniel F. Donahue, Senior Judge
Cause No. 10C04-1307-JT-16
December 2, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BROWN, Judge
Ke.P. (“Father”) appeals the involuntary termination of his parental rights to his
child K.P. (“Child”). Father raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether the
evidence was sufficient to support the termination of his parental rights. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Father is the biological father of Child, born April 26, 2010. When Child was born
she tested positive for benzodiazepines and was later removed from the care of Father and
M.P. (“Mother”). The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) alleged that Child
was a child in need of services (“CHINS”), and Child was declared a CHINS. Father
complied with services, and the court dismissed the wardship on May 17, 2011.
On May 31, 2011, Child’s Mother was arrested on a warrant for auto theft and was
in the Floyd County Jail. On June 1, 2011, following the May 17, 2011 dismissal of Child’s
first CHINS case, Father brought Child to Clark Memorial Hospital.1 At the hospital,
Father told hospital staff that Child’s Mother had beaten and drugged both Father and
Child. After a doctor at the hospital examined Child and discovered no evidence of abuse,
a call was placed to law enforcement who arrived at the hospital and noted Father’s
paranoid and delusional behavior. Father tested positive for THC and PCP.
That same day, DCS removed Child from Father’s care on the basis of Father’s
paranoid and delusional behavior and initial refusal to submit to a drug screen while at the
1
Although Mother’s rights were also terminated she is not participating in this appeal. We
therefore limit our recitation of the facts to those facts pertinent solely to Father’s appeal of the termination
of his parental rights to Child.
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hospital. On June 2, 2011, DCS filed a CHINS petition alleging that Father’s behavior was
erratic, and observed that Father had a previously dismissed CHINS case, as well as a
history with Illinois child protective services that resulted in the removal and termination
of parental rights for two of Father’s three children. On July 21, 2011, the court adjudicated
Child a CHINS. At the CHINS hearing, Child’s Mother admitted the allegations in the
petition, but Father failed to appear, and the court granted a default judgment against him.
On September 14, 2011, the court ordered that Father have supervised visitation
with Child, and it also ordered that DCS was not required to make reasonable efforts to
reunify Father with Child because of the prior Illinois case and prior CHINS case involving
Child. In November 2011, DCS filed a termination petition. On April 4, 2012, Father was
arrested on charges of altering a vehicle identification number as a class C felony, and
disorderly conduct as a class B misdemeanor. On August 6, 2012, Child’s Guardian ad
Litem (“GAL”) filed a report recommending that services “resume” for the parents.
Transcript at 66. After the report was filed, the court dismissed the termination petition
and resumed services.
The court entered an amended dispositional decree and an amended order of
participation, both signed on September 4, 2012, that required Father, among other things,
to obtain and maintain stable and appropriate housing, refrain from criminal behavior,
complete drug and alcohol assessments, participate in drug and alcohol classes, complete
parenting classes, submit to random drug screens, participate in supervised visitation, and
pay weekly child support. On October 4, 2012, Father was arrested on charges of dealing
cocaine as a class A felony, possession of cocaine as a class B felony, maintaining a
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common nuisance as a class D felony, possession of paraphernalia as a class A
misdemeanor, and was alleged to be an habitual offender. Following his October 4, 2012
arrest, Father was incarcerated.
On July 10, 2013, DCS filed its petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to
Child. The court held hearings on the termination petition on November 14 and 22, 2013,
and on January 16, 2014. At the November 14, 2013 hearing the court heard testimony
from, among others, Dr. David Winsch, a Licensed Clinical Psychologist, and Paul
Blanton, Child’s GAL.
Dr. Winsch indicated that he had received a referral to see Father in September 2010.
Dr. Winsch explained that he conducted testing and assessments on Father. Dr. Winsch
testified, on the basis of the testing, that he recommended Father “complete a drug and
alcohol education class and submit to all random drug tests for the next year” and that he
complete “a domestic violence class, [and] that he complete a parenting class” along with
maintaining “consistent and gainful employment . . . .” Id. at 27. Dr. Winsch also
expressed his concern that Father’s history of arrests made it “difficult for [him] to see how
someone who’s been arrested as many times as he has been and apparently is at this time
too, how he would be capable of providing a stable home for a child.” Id. On cross-
examination, Dr. Winsch explained that the testing he conducted on Father revealed that
Father had a low dependence on both alcohol and drugs, and his mental attitude test scores
suggested that he did not suffer from a clinical disorder, but he nevertheless opined that
Father likely suffered from “antisocial personality disorder.” Id. at 38. Dr. Winsch further
testified that Father was “able to describe appropriate parenting attitudes and beliefs,” but
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indicated that Father would not be a good candidate for parenting and counseling classes
because the disorder “is largely an untreatable condition.” Id. at 38-40. Dr. Winsch
testified that an individual with antisocial personality disorder would have difficulty
parenting a young child because a parent has to be “available for the child, [and] you can’t
be repeatedly incarcerated in order to provide for the care of a child.” Id. at 43. Dr. Winsch
also opined that the lack of empathy, often characteristic of individuals with antisocial
personality disorder, would make it difficult for the parent to “put[] [the] child’s needs
above your own, and mak[e] decisions that are for the best interest of your child.” Id.
Blanton, Child’s GAL, testified that his recommendation was that “parental rights
be terminated” because “the situations that necessitated the original removal of the minor
child are most likely to recur.” Id. at 69. Blanton further testified that Child “had very
significant bonds with her foster parents and the other children who were at the residence,”
and that Father’s “current incarceration makes it impossible for him to parent [Child].” Id.
at 70. On cross-examination, Blanton stated that “even after [Father] . . . [was] granted the
opportunity to take advantage of services after the original petition had been filed [he]
failed to take advantage of those services.” Id. at 73. Blanton further testified that Father
was “not in full compliance with recommendations or services that were put into place,”
although Blanton acknowledged that Father was undergoing services on his own initiative
before the report recommended that DCS provide services to Father. Id. at 74-75
At the November 22, 2013 hearing, the court heard testimony from Sandra
McDonald, who was Child’s foster mother; Father; and Susan Stotts, the family case
manager (“FCM”). McDonald testified that Child had been living at her home since she
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was five days old and that Child left to return to Father’s care for five weeks before she
was returned to foster care, and that Child had been living with her since June 1, 2011.
McDonald acknowledged that Father regularly visited with Child until his incarceration.
She described a contact visit that Child had with Father while Father was incarcerated:
[Child] didn’t really remember him, so she did not want to go around and at
one point he left the office and came back in and she was sitting on my lap
and he picked her up off my lap and she was just screaming, I want my
mommy, I want my mommy.
Id. at 84. McDonald indicated that after that visit, there were no more visits with Father.
McDonald testified that she was “mom” to Child, and that she was willing to adopt Child
if parental rights were terminated. Id.
Father indicated that he had prior felony convictions for burglary including a
conviction in 1994 and another in 2003. Father also indicated that since October 4, 2012,
he had been residing in the Clark County Jail and was not employed. He testified that his
family, which was his “support system” allowed him to support Child while he was in jail,
but then indicated that he was not paying child support. Id. at 100. Father indicated that he
had custody of Child from March 2011 until June 1, 2011, that he had been in jail for about
one third of Child’s life, and that he had been arrested for domestic battery against Child’s
Mother. Father further testified that in the past year, while he was incarcerated, he had
visited Child three times but in the past had visited Child “every week.” Id. at 103. He
acknowledged that he did not complete a court-ordered drug and alcohol assessment, did
not complete court-ordered parenting classes, did not remember whether he had submitted
to a court-ordered random drug screen, and did not pay court-ordered child support as
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ordered in the dispositional decree. He testified that he had participated in supervised
visitation and that at “this exact moment” he did not have stable and appropriate housing.
Id. at 107. He also indicated that at the time of his October 4, 2012 arrest he was residing
at the Wayfair Motel.
On cross-examination, Father stated that prior to living at the Wayfair Motel he was
living in an apartment in Beech Grove and was working at Beef O’Brady’s. He testified
that at a visit Child had with her Mother a week after his October 4, 2012 arrest, Child “was
asking for her Daddy.” Id. at 115. Regarding unpaid child support, Father testified:
My reason for not paying child support is, I don’t know if it is a valid reason
but in my way of thinking it was, I felt that I provided the stuff for my
daughter. I bought her diapers, I bought all her clothes. And my reason for
that was because there were several visits that she appeared that she had on
dirty clothes, socks with holes in them stuff like that and I felt like that instead
of me giving the Foster parents money I would use the money for what it is
actually intended for, for [Child].
Id. at 116. Father stated that he complied with the court’s order on substance abuse by
attending lectures on “alcohol anonymous, narcotics anonymous” at the Jeff Token Club.
Id. at 119. Father further stated that he complied with Dr. Winsch’s recommendations
because he “attended the classes, uh, took assessments, attended the visitation as he
ordered.” Id. He indicated that he attended parenting classes on his own initiative at the
Clark County Youth Shelter but was unable to complete the classes because of his October
4, 2012 arrest. Father also stated that he had a family member who was willing to be a
guardian for Child, and he wanted the court to delay its decision on termination in time for
him to file guardianship papers. Father explained that he expected to be released from jail
in February or March of 2014.
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FCM Stotts testified that services had been offered to Father under the order of
participation and dispositional decree, and that Father “did not complete parenting classes.
He only completed 5 out of the 14 that were offered. I did a drug screen on September 19,
2012. He tested positive for THC, cocaine, opiates, and morphine.” Id. at 155. She then
stated that Father never provided her with proof of completion of Narcotics Anonymous or
Alcoholics Anonymous classes, that “prior to [Father’s] arrest he [resided] at the Wayfair
Motel,” and that after his October 4, 2012 arrest, she was unaware of any services that he
may have completed. Id. at 156. She testified that Father visited Child “on a weekly basis,”
but later stated that Father’s attendance at visits was “infrequent . . . .” Id. at 156-157. She
stated that the last time Father visited Child was June 6, 2013, and that Child was doing
“very well” in her placement and had bonded with her foster family. Id. at 179. She stated
that she had not been contacted by any of Father’s relatives regarding placement or
visitation, that the conditions which led to Child’s removal were not likely to be remedied
because of Father’s “lack of follow through” and incarceration, and that reuniting Child
with Father would be a threat to Child’s well-being. Id. at 180.
At the start of the January 16, 2014 hearing, the court determined:
it would not at that time [after the November 22, 2013 hearing] terminate the
parental rights of [Father] but the Court set forth certain conditions and
among those conditions was a requirement that there be an acceptance
entrance into drug court, that there be domestic violence classes, that there
should be a completion of parenting classes, there should be attempts of
regular employment and there should be no further arrests.
Id. at 181-182. DCS stated the parties had been ordered to mediation but “no agreement
was able to be made and the mediator did file a report to the Court on January 10th after
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mediation was unsuccessful” and that DCS was “requesting that the Court find that it is in
the best interest of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship . . . .” Id. Father’s
counsel requested that “the Court refrain from making the decision for sixty days” and that
Father “be allowed to testify briefly about his criminal proceeding.” Id. at 182-183.
Father’s counsel called Father as a witness, and Father stated his belief that he would
be released from incarceration on or about April 4, 2014 and would then be willing to
engage in domestic violence classes, parenting classes, drug and alcohol classes, and find
suitable employment. On cross-examination, he acknowledged that he had not entered into
a guilty plea or been sentenced on the drug charges. The court then stated Father received
“many opportunities and I don’t feel that it would be proper to extend any further, given
the charges that he faces in that particular drug court. He’s probably going to be in jail for
a period of time. So, at this time we’ll terminate the relationship.” Id. at 185-186.
On March 21, 2014, the court entered its termination order. The court found, in
part, that:
8. Father has been incarcerated since October 4, 2012 in the Clark
County Jail. Father does not have a date of release from the Clark
County Jail and his charges are still pending.
9. Father did not have custody of the Child from May 2010 to March
2011. Father has not had custody of the child since June 2011.
10. Father had a contact visit at the Clark County Jail with the child in
April 2012. Contact visits were suspended by the court based on the
child’s reaction to the contact visit in April 2012.
11. Father failed to complete services provided by DCS.
12. Father failed to complete drug and alcohol classes. Father screened
positive for THC and PCP on June 1, 2011 and screened positive for
THC, cocaine and opiates included 6 MAM (metabolites of heroin)
and Morphine, on September 19, 2012.
13. Father did not complete parenting classes.
14. Father is not employed and has no income.
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15. Father has not paid child support for the child.
*****
27. After removal of Child on June 1, 2011, the Child was never returned
to [Father’s] care and custody. After formal removal of Child per the
Dispositional Decree of September 4, 2012, the Child was never
returned to [Father’s] care and custody.
*****
35. Guardian Ad Litem (GAL), Paul M. Blanton, agrees that it is in the
Child’s best interest for termination of parental rights and adoption.
The GAL’s testimony reflected a belief that based on history, neither
Mother nor Father would take advantage of services and the reason
for removal would reoccur. The child is bonded with and would be
emotionally endangered if separated from the foster family.
36. DCS’s plan for Child is that [Child] be adopted; this plan is
satisfactory for Child’s care and treatment.
37. Child has been in the same foster family since approximately June 1,
2011. The Child was previously placed with the same foster family
during the previous CHINS removal from May 2010 until March
2011. The child is very bonded with the foster family and they are
willing to adopt Child.
38. Adoption would provide permanency for the child in a safe and stable
environment.
Appellant’s Appendix at 21-23. The court concluded that DCS had “met its burden of
proof, proving its petition to terminate . . . Father’s parental rights by clear and convincing
evidence.” Id. at 25.
DISCUSSION
The issue is whether the evidence was sufficient to support the termination of
Father’s parental rights. When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will not
reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office
of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Instead, we consider only the
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evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. In
accordance with Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(c), the trial court’s judgment contains specific
findings of fact and conclusions thereon. We therefore apply a two-tiered standard of
review. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second,
whether the findings support the judgment. Id. In deference to the trial court’s unique
position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court’s judgment terminating a parent-
child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1161, 122 S. Ct. 1197
(2002); see also Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147; In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1997) (noting that this court will reverse a termination of parental rights “only upon
a showing of ‘clear error’—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made” (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 592
N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992))). Thus, if the evidence and inferences support the trial
court’s decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.
The involuntary termination of parental rights is the most extreme measure that a
court can impose and is designated only as a last resort when all other reasonable efforts
have failed. In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). This policy is in
recognition of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution which provides
parents with the right to establish a home and raise children. Id. However, these protected
parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the children’s interests to
maintain the parent-child relationship. Id.; see also Egly, 592 N.E.2d at 1234 (noting that
the “purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish parents, but to protect the
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children.”). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law provides
for the termination of these rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their
parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Moreover,
a trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-
child relationship. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d
185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS is
required to allege and prove, among other things:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the
well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child[.]
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).
Father asserts that because of his incarceration “he was unable to participate in
services” and that classes and counseling would have helped him to be a better parent.
Appellant’s Brief at 2. He maintains that prior to his incarceration, he completed some
services on his own initiative and attempted to maintain visits with Child while he was
incarcerated. Father contends that he “made reasonable efforts to rectify the problems. He
believes that the [DCS] failed to show that his behavior will not change.” Id.
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DCS maintains that the court’s order terminating Father’s rights was supported by
clear and convincing evidence. Moreover, DCS asserts that Father “does not specifically
challenge any of the court’s legal conclusions.” Appellee’s Brief at 15. DCS further
contends that Father also “does not challenge any of the court’s findings of facts.” Id. at
17. Consequently, DCS posits that Father has waived his sufficiency claims on appeal
because he does not specifically contest the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.
We note that Father does not specifically challenge the trial court’s findings or
conclusions. To the extent Father argues that the trial court’s findings or conclusions are
clearly erroneous, Father has waived this issue by failing to make a cogent argument. See
In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373
(Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied; Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).
A. Remedy of Conditions
We note that the involuntary termination statute is written in the disjunctive and
requires proof of only one of the circumstances listed in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B).
Because we find it to be dispositive under the facts of this case, we limit our review to
whether DCS established that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions
resulting in the removal or reasons for placement of Child outside the home will not be
remedied. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i).
In determining whether there exists a reasonable probability that the conditions
resulting in a child’s removal or continued placement outside a parent’s care will not be
remedied, a trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or her child at the time
of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re
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J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. The court must also
“evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future
neglect or deprivation of the child.” Id. Pursuant to this rule, courts have properly
considered evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of
neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment. A.F. v.
Marion Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002),
trans. denied. A trial court may also properly consider the services offered to the parent by
a local DCS office and the parent’s response to those services as evidence of whether
conditions will be remedied. See id. at 1252. Finally, we point out that a local DCS office
is not required to provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it need
establish only that there is a reasonable probability a parent’s behavior will not change.
See In re Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
Waiver notwithstanding, we note that although Father testified that he attempted to
participate in services on his own initiative, the record reveals that Father failed to follow
through with the services offered to him during the CHINS case. The court heard testimony
from GAL Blanton that “even after [Father] . . . [was] granted the opportunity to take
advantage of services after the original petition had been filed [he] failed to take advantage
of those services.” Transcript at 73. It is established that a “trial court can reasonably
consider the services offered . . . and the parent’s response to those services,” that “the law
concerning termination of parental rights does not require” that services be offered “to
correct deficiencies in childcare,” and that “termination of parental rights may occur . . . as
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long as the elements of Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 are proven by clear and convincing
evidence.” In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
Moreover, Father admitted that he did not comply with the requirements of the
dispositional decree, including his failure to complete the drug and alcohol assessment,
participate in parenting classes, or pay child support. The record also reveals that Father
was arrested twice during Child’s CHINS case and was incarcerated on pending charges
related to his October 4, 2012 arrest. Father also has a criminal history including
convictions for aggravated battery in 1991 and convictions for burglary in 1994 and 2003.
Additionally, Father was living in a motel prior to his October 4, 2012 arrest and admitted
that he was unable to care for Child due to his incarceration. As noted above, DCS is not
required “to provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish
only that there is a reasonable probability a parent’s behavior will not change.” In re Kay
L, 867 N.E.2d at 242.
Based upon the record, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supported
the court’s determination that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions leading
to Child’s removal would not be remedied based on Father’s lack of adequate housing,
criminal history, and failure to participate fully in DCS services during Child’s underlying
CHINS proceeding.
B. Best Interests
We next consider Father’s assertions that DCS failed to prove termination of his
parental rights is in Child’s best interests. In determining what is in the best interests of a
child, the trial court is required to look beyond the factors identified by the Indiana
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Department of Child Services and to the totality of the evidence. McBride, 798 N.E.2d at
203. In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child.
Id. The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the
parent-child relationship. Id. Moreover, “[p]ermanency is a central consideration in
determining the best interests of a child.” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009),
reh’g denied. In addition, we have held that the recommendations of a child’s case manager
and guardian ad litem that parental rights should be terminated support a finding that
termination is in the child’s best interests. See In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 170 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008).
Father contends that, notwithstanding Child’s need for stability and permanency,
“there would have been no prejudice to the child for the [DCS] to give [Father] more time
after release from jail.” Appellant’s Brief at 3. DCS maintains that the “best interests of
the child are the ultimate concern in termination proceedings.” Appellee’s Brief at 22.
DCS asserts that it is not error for a court to invoke stability or permanency and notes that
“only one (1) of the court’s extensive factual findings even mentions permanency.” Id. at
23. DCS further contends that Father’s alternative permanency plan of, “leaving [] Child
in foster care until Father can demonstrate his stability to parent Child . . . . is
unpersuasive.” Id. at 23-24.
The record reveals that Child has been in Father’s custody and care for a short period
of time that roughly corresponds to the dismissal of Father’s prior CHINS case and the
initiation of the underlying CHINS proceedings in this termination. Child has been living
with the same foster family since June 1, 2011 and had also lived with that same foster
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family between May 2010 and March 2011 during a previous CHINS case involving
Father. The court heard testimony from Dr. Winsch stating that Father’s criminal history
and current incarceration make it “difficult for [him] to see how . . . he would be capable
of providing a stable home for a child.” Transcript at 27. Both GAL Blanton and FCM
Stotts recommended termination of Father’s parental rights. GAL Blanton stated that Child
“had very significant bonds with her foster parents and the other children who were at the
residence” and that Father’s “current incarceration makes it impossible for him to parent
[Child].” Transcript at 70. FCM Stotts also stated that Child had bonded with her foster
family. Id. at 179.
Based on the totality of the evidence, we conclude that the trial court’s
determination that termination was in Child’s best interests is supported by clear and
convincing evidence. See In re A.H., 832 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“[T]he
historic inability to provide adequate housing, stability, and supervision, coupled with the
current inability to provide the same, will support a finding that continuation of the parent-
child relationship is contrary to the child’s best interests.”); In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d at 170
(explaining that the recommendations of a child’s guardian ad litem and a child’s case
manager that parental rights should be terminated support a finding that termination is in
the child’s best interests).
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the trial court’s judgment terminating Father’s parental rights
related to Child is supported by clear and convincing evidence. We find no error and
affirm.
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Affirmed.
BARNES, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
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