Ivan Green v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Jun 30 2015, 10:17 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Barbara J. Simmons Gregory F. Zoeller
Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Ivan Green, June 30, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No.
49A02-1412-CR-870
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court.
State of Indiana, The Honorable Grant Hawkins,
Judge.
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Cause No. 49G05-1408-F5-41456
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 49A02-1412-CR-870 | June 30, 2015 Page 1 of 5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Ivan Green (Green), appeals his conviction for battery
resulting in bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(b)(1).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Green raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows: Whether the
State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support his
conviction for battery resulting in bodily injury.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] On August 11, 2014, Gabriela Cozad (Cozad) was drinking coffee on the porch
of her home on Grey Street in Indianapolis, Indiana. From her unobstructed
vantage point, she noticed a vehicle, with two males and one female, parked in
the middle of the street, right in front of her house. She heard people arguing
and walked into her front yard. When she entered her front yard, one of the
males exited the backseat of the car and told her “to go back in the house.”
(Transcript p. 59). The male and female remaining in the car continued to
argue. Cozad observed that the female, later identified as Natisha Jones
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 49A02-1412-CR-870 | June 30, 2015 Page 2 of 5
(Jones),1 was “trying to get the keys” while the male, later identified as Green,
“hit her a couple of times with his fists” in her face with “moderate to hard”
force. (Tr. p. 62, 63). Jones started screaming “help me.” (Tr. p. 64). Cozad
described that Green then exited the car, ran around to the passenger side
where Jones was sitting, and began choking her “over the console of the car.”
(Tr. p. 62). As Green walked around the car, Cozad was able to “get a good
look at his face” and Cozad recognized Green, as well as Jones, from driving
around in the community. (Tr. p. 67). Cozad called law enforcement.
[5] Officer Aaron Helton of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department
(Officer Helton) responded to the report of the disturbance. When he arrived in
Grey Street, he observed Jones standing next to the vehicle in the middle of the
street. Jones appeared “upset” and “angry,” and told the officer that she had
been “assaulted.” (Tr. p. 15). Officer Helton noticed that Jones had “a slightly
swollen lip with red marks [] on the bottom of it.” (Tr. p. 17).
[6] On September 5, 2014, the State filed an Information, charging Green with
Count I, battery resulting in bodily injury to a pregnant woman, a Level 5
felony, I.C. 35-42-2-1(b)(1); Count II, domestic battery, a Level 6 felony, I.C. §
35-42-2-1.3(a); Count III, battery in the presence of a child, a Level 6 felony,
I.C. § 35-42-2-1(b)(1); Count IV, domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C.
§ 35-42-2-1.3(a); Count V, battery resulting in bodily injury, a Class A
1
At trial, the State presented evidence that Natisha Jones also used the alias Natisha Harris, which was used
to identify her in the charging information.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 49A02-1412-CR-870 | June 30, 2015 Page 3 of 5
misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-42-2-1(b)(1). On November 24, 2014, the State
dismissed all charges with the exception of Count V, misdemeanor battery
resulting in bodily injury. That same day, the trial court conducted a bench
trial. At the close of the evidence, the trial court found Green guilty as charged
and sentenced him to three hundred sixty-five days with two hundred and seven
days suspended.
[7] Green now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[8] Green contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to convict
him of battery resulting in bodily injury. Specifically, in a one paragraph
argument, Green attempts to create doubt about Cozad’s testimony, speculating
that she merely saw “both parties fighting in front of her home” and what she
actually witnessed could well “have been a mutual struggle.” (Appellant’s Br.
p. 7).
[9] Our standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is well settled. In
reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, we will not reweigh the evidence
or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Moore v. State, 869 N.E.2d 489, 492
(Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We will consider only the evidence most favorable to the
judgment, together with all reasonable and logical inferences to be drawn
therefrom. Id. A single eyewitness’ testimony is sufficient to sustain a
conviction. Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 49A02-1412-CR-870 | June 30, 2015 Page 4 of 5
conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value to
support the conviction of the trier of fact. Moore, 869 N.E.2d at 492.
[10] To convict Green of battery resulting in bodily injury as a Class A
misdemeanor, the State is required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
Green “knowingly or intentionally touch[ed] [Jones] in a rude, insolent, or
angry manner [that] result[ed] in bodily injury.” See I.C. § 35-42-2-1(b). Here,
the State presented Cozad’s and Officer Helton’s testimony at trial to support its
charge. Particularly, Cozad testified that she saw Jones and Green argue inside
the car. While fighting over the car keys, Green hit Jones a couple of times in
her face and then started choking her. After arriving on the scene, Officer
Helton observed that Jones was angry and had an injured lip. Both Cozad and
Officer Helton identified Green and Jones during the proceedings. Green’s
claim that Cozad might not have appropriately interpreted what she actually
saw on August 11, 2014, amounts to an invitation for this court to reweigh the
evidence, which we decline to do. See Moore, 869 N.E.2d at 492.
CONCLUSION
[11] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain Green’s conviction of battery resulting in
bodily injury.
[12] Affirmed.
[13] Bailey, J. and Barnes, J. concur
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 49A02-1412-CR-870 | June 30, 2015 Page 5 of 5