In re the Name Change of Catherine Clemmer, Dawson Clemmer (formerly Catherine Clemmer) (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Oct 22 2019, 9:00 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Kathleen Cullum
Indiana Legal Services, Inc.
Indianapolis, Indiana
Megan Stuart
Indiana Legal Services, Inc.
Bloomington, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In re the Name Change of October 22, 2019
Catherine Clemmer, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-MI-1221
Dawson Clemmer (formerly
Catherine Clemmer), Appeal from the Hancock Superior
Court
Appellant-Petitioner.
The Honorable Terry K. Snow,
Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
30D01-1901-MI-21
Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-MI-1221| October 22, 2019 Page 1 of 4
Case Summary
[1] In January of 2019, Dawson Clemmer, a transgender man, petitioned for a
name and gender-marker change. The trial court granted the name change but
denied the gender-marker change. Clemmer contends that the trial court
erroneously denied his petition. We agree and reverse and remand with
instructions consistent with this decision.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Dawson Clemmer (formerly Catherine Clemmer) is a transgender man who
was born a female. On January 4, 2019, Clemmer petitioned for a change of
name and gender marker. In his petition, Clemmer included a proposed order
providing findings and conclusions of law. Clemmer averred that he was
changing his name and gender marker in good faith and not for a fraudulent or
unlawful purpose. Clemmer also averred that he wanted to make these changes
to accurately reflect his gender identity and presentation. On April 5, 2019, the
trial court held a hearing regarding Clemmer’s petition. Following the hearing,
the trial court took the matter under advisement pending resubmission after
concluding that the proposed order was not properly completed because “[it
didn’t] have the name of the court in there, and also [it] didn’t have the names
in there, and [the court would] like to have it uh, typed out so it’s legible.” Tr.
p. 4. Upon resubmission, the trial court granted the name change, but the
change of gender marker remained pending. On April 22, 2019, Clemmer
moved for a final order regarding his petition for a gender-marker change and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-MI-1221| October 22, 2019 Page 2 of 4
submitted a third proposed order. That same day, the trial court denied
Clemmer’s motion stating that “The court did not rule on gender change
because the petitioner did not include that in the proposed order. Motion for
gender marker change is denied.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 3.
Discussion and Decision
[3] Clemmer contends that the trial court erroneously denied his petition for
gender-marker change. “[T]o the extent that our review requires us to review
the trial court’s factual determinations, we will apply a clearly erroneous
standard.” Angelopoulos v. Angelopoulos, 76 N.E.3d 852, 858 (Ind. Ct. App.
2017). This court provided guidance for trial courts to issue orders requiring the
Indiana State Department of Health to change an individual’s gender marker
on his birth certificate in In re Petition for Change of Birth Certificate, 22 N.E.3d
707 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). In doing so, we concluded that Indiana Code section
16-37-2-10 gives authority to grant petitions for gender-marker change.
I.C. § 16-37-2-10 provides general authority for the amendment
of birth certificates, without any express limitation (in the statute
or elsewhere) regarding gender amendments. In light of this
statute, as well as the inherent equity power of a court of general
jurisdiction, we conclude that the trial court had authority to
grant the petition at hand.
Id. at 709. In discussing what evidence was required to support a petition for
gender-marker change, we concluded that the “ultimate focus should be on
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-MI-1221| October 22, 2019 Page 3 of 4
whether the petition is made in good faith and not for a fraudulent or unlawful
purpose.” Id. at 710.
[4] Here, the record contains no evidence to suggest that Clemmer’s petition was
for fraudulent or unlawful purposes. In fact, Clemmer testified that he was not
seeking a name change to defraud creditors or for fraudulent purposes.
Clemmer also averred that he was seeking a gender-marker change in order to
accurately reflect his gender identity and presentation. We conclude that
Clemmer’s petition was made in good faith and should not have been denied
because of formatting errors on a proposed order.
[5] The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded with instructions for
the trial court to enter an order granting Clemmer’s petition for gender-marker
change within thirty days after certification of this decision.
Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-MI-1221| October 22, 2019 Page 4 of 4