David C. Hunt v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                              FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                   Oct 22 2019, 9:10 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                       CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                      Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                                 and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Christopher J. Petersen                                  Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Goshen, Indiana                                          Attorney General of Indiana
    Samuel J. Dayton
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    David C. Hunt,                                           October 22, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-CR-3102
    v.                                               Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Stephen R.
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Bowers, Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    20D02-1709-F5-238
    Sharpnack, Senior Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3102 | October 22, 2019                     Page 1 of 7
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Hunt appeals after a jury trial from his conviction for escape as a Level 5
    1
    felony. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction,
    specifically challenging the evidence that he had the requisite mens rea for the
    offense. We affirm.
    Issue
    [2]   Hunt presents one issue for our review, which we restate as the following
    question: Did Hunt have the requisite mens rea to commit escape as a Level 5
    felony?
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   At the beginning of May 2017, Hunt was sentenced in Elkhart Superior Court
    to serve a portion of incarceration at the Elkhart County Work Release Center,
    which is operated by the Elkhart County Community Corrections program. A
    new arrival at the facility meets with their case manager within 48 hours upon
    arrival. Case managers ensure that inmates have the proper identification to
    work and make arrangements to release the inmates to acquire identification
    from the Bureau of Motor Vehicles and the Social Security Administration.
    Inmates are not released from the work release facility during the first seven
    days of their arrival.
    1
    
    Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3
    -4 (2014).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3102 | October 22, 2019   Page 2 of 7
    [4]   Hunt’s case manager was Cammi Waggoner. She gave him passes to leave the
    facility on July 13 and July 14, 2017. Standard policy at the facility involves
    logging the passes into the computer system, a task done directly by the case
    manager. That allows for the passes not to be recorded on paper and for other
    employees at the facility to access the information via the computer. More
    specifically, Hunt was to go to the BMV on July 13, 2017, and to the Social
    Security Administration office on July 14, 2017. Waggoner communicated the
    terms of these releases to Hunt. She did not issue a pass for Hunt to leave the
    facility on July 12, 2017 and never met with Hunt thereafter.
    [5]   On July 12, 2017, Hunt showed up at the front desk where Jeff Yaddow, a
    security officer, was working at the Elkhart County Work Release Center. One
    of Yaddow’s duties was to allow inmates to leave the center to go to work or
    other appointments such as getting identification cards at the BMV.
    [6]   Hunt asked to be released on a pass. Yaddow scanned Hunt’s identification
    card and saw that the computer indicated there was an error. In other words,
    Hunt was not authorized to leave. Yaddow told Hunt that he needed to speak
    with his case manager, Waggoner, because the computer did not show that
    Hunt was authorized to leave on that day. Yaddow never told Hunt that he
    had permission to leave.
    [7]   Yaddow did tell Hunt that, as a courtesy, he would release Hunt’s property that
    had been transferred from the county jail. Normal procedure was that personal
    property could be left in a locker in the locker room and was not allowed in the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3102 | October 22, 2019   Page 3 of 7
    living areas of the facility. Yaddow told Hunt that he would have to perform a
    search of Hunt before he could return from the locker room area to the living
    areas of the facility in order to contact Waggoner. Another officer replaced
    Yaddow at the front desk while Yaddow took a short break.
    [8]    After his break was over, Yaddow returned with Hunt’s property. Yaddow
    then realized he had forgotten to have Hunt sign a form stating that the
    property had been released to Hunt. Yaddow retrieved the form, had Hunt sign
    it, and Hunt then took his belongings to the locker room.
    [9]    Inmates at the Elkhart work release facility use an exit in the locker room to
    leave the facility. Inmates typically approach the front desk, state their name,
    and explain the purpose of leaving the facility. The officer at the desk would
    then open a door, which permitted inmates to come up to the front desk and
    hand over their identification to be scanned. Once the inmate was cleared for
    release, they would go to the locker rooms, obtain the property needed for the
    day, and would leave through the exit door. The exit was locked, and inmates
    would say “door” when they were ready to leave the facility. At that point the
    door, which was not within the view of the officer at the desk, would be
    unlocked and the inmate would leave.
    [10]   Yaddow did not realize that Hunt had left the facility until later that afternoon
    when he conducted a head count of the inmates. Yaddow informed his
    supervisor about the situation and later confirmed with Waggoner that she had
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3102 | October 22, 2019   Page 4 of 7
    not given Hunt authorization to leave the facility on July 12, 2017. Hunt did
    not return to the work release facility. He was apprehended thirty days later.
    [11]   On September 21, 2017, the State charged Hunt with escape, as a Level 5
    felony. After a jury trial was held on October 23, 2018, the jury found Hunt
    guilty as charged. Hunt’s sentencing hearing was held on December 3, 2018.
    Hunt was sentenced to three years in the Indiana Department of Corrections,
    with no portion of the sentenced suspended to probation. Hunt now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    [12]   Hunt challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.
    More specifically, Hunt challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he
    intended to escape lawful detention. He argues that, at best, the evidence
    establishes that he had the requisite mens rea to fail to return from lawful
    detention, a less severe offense than escape.
    [13]   When we review a challenge alleging that the evidence is insufficient to support
    the conviction, we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable
    inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 
    867 N.E.2d 144
    , 146 (Ind.
    2007). The factfinder’s role and not the appellate court’s role is to assess
    witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether the evidence is
    sufficient to warrant a conviction. 
    Id.
     It is the “jury’s exclusive province to
    weigh conflicting evidence.” McHenry v. State, 
    820 N.E.2d 124
     126 (Ind. 2005)
    (quoting Alkhalidi v. State, 
    753 N.E.2d 625
    , 627 (Ind. 2001)).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3102 | October 22, 2019   Page 5 of 7
    [14]   Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-4(a) provides in pertinent part that “[a] person,
    except as provided in subsection (b), who intentionally flees from lawful
    detention commits escape, a Level 5 felony.” On appeal, Hunt’s only challenge
    is to the sufficiency of the evidence that he acted intentionally.
    [15]   Indiana Code section 35-41-2-2(a) (1977) provides that a person “engages in
    conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious
    objective to do so.” “The mens rea element of a crime ‘may be proven by
    circumstantial evidence alone, and may be inferred from the facts and
    circumstances of each case.’” McMiller v. State, 
    90 N.E.3d 672
    , 675 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2017) (quoting Baxter v. State, 
    891 N.E.2d 110
    , 121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)).
    [16]   The evidence most favorable to the verdict shows that Hunt presented his
    identification card to Yaddow on July 12, 2017, and was told that he did not
    have permission to leave the facility on that date. He was allowed to store
    some of his personal items in a locker, as a courtesy. However, at no time was
    he told that he could leave. Further, Yaddow told him that after he placed his
    items in the locker, Yaddow would have to search Hunt before allowing him to
    return to the living area and meet with Waggoner. Hunt never returned to talk
    with Waggoner before leaving the facility. Hunt was apprehended thirty days
    later. Indeed, in his closing statement, Hunt argued that he “left because [he]
    was tired of being there.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 105.
    [17]   On appeal, Hunt argues as he did at trial that he had received a pass from
    Waggoner to leave the facility on July 12, 2017. He further claims that he
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3102 | October 22, 2019   Page 6 of 7
    would not have been issued boots to wear outside the facility if he had not
    received a pass to leave that day. He also argues that there had been a
    misunderstanding between him and Waggoner.
    [18]   Hunt’s arguments on appeal are merely requests to reweigh the evidence, a task
    we shall not undertake. The evidence is sufficient to support his conviction.
    Conclusion
    [19]   In light of the foregoing, we affirm Hunt’s conviction, finding that there is
    sufficient evidence to support it.
    [20]   Affirmed.
    Altice, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3102 | October 22, 2019   Page 7 of 7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18A-CR-3102

Filed Date: 10/22/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2019