Kayla N. Hudson v. State of Indiana ( 2019 )

FILED
Oct 30 2019, 9:20 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Anthony C. Lawrence Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kayla N. Hudson, October 30, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-1088
v. Appeal from the Madison Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable David A. Happe,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
48C04-1808-F1-1965
Pyle, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Kayla N. Hudson (“Hudson”) appeals her aggregate forty-year sentence
imposed after she pled guilty to Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent causing
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death1 to her daughter and Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in
serious bodily injury2 to her son. Hudson argues that: (1) the trial court abused
its discretion in its determination of aggravating and mitigating circumstances;
and (2) her aggregate sentence is inappropriate. Concluding that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion and that Hudson’s sentence is not inappropriate, we
affirm her sentence.
[2] We affirm.
Issues
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when sentencing
Hudson.
2. Whether Hudson’s sentence is inappropriate.
Facts
[3] Hudson had two children, including son R.H. (“R.H.”) and daughter P.H.
(“P.H.”) (collectively, “the children”). On the evening July 28, 2018, Hudson
went to work and left twenty-three-month-old P.H. and three-year-old R.H. in
the care of her boyfriend, Ryan Ramirez (“Ramirez”). Hudson did so even
though she knew that Ramirez had physically abused the children on multiple
occasions. Ramirez, along with the children, picked up Hudson from work that
evening. R.H. had bruising on his body and legs and swollen eyes. Hudson
1
IND. CODE § 35-46-1-4.
2
Id.
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went into a Walmart store to buy cover-up cream to mask the bruising and
green tea bags to put on R.H.’s eyes to reduce the swelling before a scheduled
doctor’s appointment for the following day. When they all got home, Ramirez
carried P.H. into the house and put her to bed.
[4] The following morning, around 6:15 a.m., Hudson was “worried” about P.H.
because she had “not heard any sounds coming from her” during the night.
(Tr. Vol. 2 at 11). When Hudson checked on P.H., she noticed that the child
was unresponsive, not breathing, and cold to the touch. Hudson did not call for
medical help. Instead, Hudson undressed P.H. and placed her in a warm bath,
attempting to raise her body temperature. Hudson noticed that P.H. had
bruises on her. After the bath failed to yield the desired results, Hudson
attempted to do CPR on the child. Hudson still did not call for medical help.
Eventually, Hudson put P.H. in a diaper, dressed her, and took her to the
emergency room, where they arrived at 6:49 a.m. P.H. had “multiple
contusions and abrasions to her face, head, and body,” and these injuries were
“apparent to everyone” at the hospital. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 13). P.H. was
pronounced dead at 7:06 a.m. An autopsy report was later conducted, and it
revealed “two deep liver lacerations accompanied by a measured 410 ml of
blood in the abdomen as well as fracture of the right occipital skull, subdural
staining overlying the left parietal lobe of the brain and very numerous
contusions involving the head, trunk and upper and lower extremities.” (State’s
Ex. Vol. at 6). The report also revealed that P.H. had a “[f]aint circumferential
contusion encircling [her] anus and involving the perineum[.]” (State’s Ex. Vol.
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at 6). The autopsy report listed P.H.’s cause of death as “[m]ultiple blunt force
injuries with liver lacerations and hemoperitoneum” and the manner of death
as “Homicide[.]” (State’s Ex. Vol. at 4).
[5] R.H. was also at the hospital with Hudson. The hospital staff examined R.H.,
who was “covered with a myriad of contusions and abrasions,” and then sent
him to Riley Hospital. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 12). Further examination revealed that
R.H.’s injuries included “multiple contusions, a fracture to the distal right ulnar
diaphysis, a buckle fracture to the ninth rib, an old fracture of the right distal
radial diaphysis, a healed fracture at the base of the metatarsal.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at
12-13). R.H. also had elevated liver enzymes, indicating that his liver had been
bruised and was healing. Additionally, R.H. had petechiae in his left eye that
was the result of “a lot of force” to his head, a distended stomach, a bald spot
on the top of his head that was caused by either his hair being pulled out or
malnourishment, light bruising on and above his penis, and cigarette burns on
his ankles. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 13).
[6] The State charged Hudson with Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent causing
death and Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in serious bodily
injury.3 Thereafter, during a March 2019 hearing, Hudson pled guilty as
3
The State charged Ramirez with murder and Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in serious
bodily injury, and it also filed a life without parole enhancement. See Trial Cause Number 48C04-1808-MR-
1964. Ramirez’s case is currently pending and is scheduled for trial in 2020.
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charged and agreed to an “open plea.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 5). The trial court
accepted the guilty pleas and enter judgments of conviction on both counts.
[7] During the sentencing hearing, the State introduced the autopsy report and
photographs of R.H.’s injuries. The State also presented testimony from Kailyn
Morgan (“Morgan”), who was the mother of P.H.’s brother, and Dannette Fee
(“Fee”), who was P.H.’s maternal grandmother. Both witnesses had, at various
times, seen P.H. and R.H. with bruises or injuries on their bodies. These
witnesses testified that, when they had asked Hudson about injuries to P.H.,
Hudson would blame R.H. for P.H.’s injuries. For example, P.H. had
previously had a broken leg that required a cast, and Hudson blamed R.H. for
the injury. They also testified that Hudson would always have an excuse or a
change of story about any injuries to the children. Morgan stated that she had
been concerned about Hudson’s care of the children and the people that
Hudson let around the children. Morgan once questioned R.H. about how he
had gotten a mark on his arm, and he responded that “mommy” had done it.
(Tr. Vol. 2 at 26). Morgan noticed around Christmas that the children’s
“behaviors were changing” and that they were “acting very strange[ly.]” (Tr.
Vol. 2 at 27). Specifically, Morgan noticed that P.H. was “irritated in her
diaper area” and that R.H. was “very underweight[,] . . . look[ed] very
malnourished[,] [a]nd was hiding his food[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 27). After Morgan
asked Hudson about her concerns for the children, Hudson ceased
communication with Morgan and refused to let her see the children. When Fee
asked Hudson about R.H. having black eyes, Hudson told Fee that R.H. just
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had low iron levels. When discussing Hudson’s decision to plead guilty, both
Fee and Morgan testified that they did not believe that Hudson had any
remorse or sense of responsibility for her offenses against her children. Morgan
stated that Hudson’s guilty plea was merely “part of the lies that have continued
since the beginning” and that she was doing it “to avoid more trouble.” (Tr.
Vol. 2 at 29). Fee stated that Hudson was “a master of deception” and warned
the trial court “not to be misled . . . by her ability to deceive people.” (Tr. Vol.
2 at 38).
[8] During the hearing, Hudson admitted that she knew that Ramirez had abused
her children, that she had not done anything to stop it, and that she had tried to
cover it up. She also admitted that she had lied to the police when they were
conducting the initial investigation and then again just a month or two before
the sentencing hearing. She also testified that she had been in numerous
abusive relationships and admitted that she had put “having a man in front of
everything else.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 57). Hudson testified and presented testimony
from her therapist at the county jail who testified that Hudson had a difficult
childhood and had been raised by her grandparents. Hudson, however,
acknowledged that her difficult childhood did not change the fact that she knew
it was wrong to beat a child to death. Hudson indicated that she was pleading
guilty to accept responsibility and so that R.H. could be adopted by his foster
family.
[9] When sentencing Hudson, the trial court stated, in part, as follows:
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In cases involving serious misconduct like in this case, I think it’s
a helpful starting point[] to think about why the legislature treats
this conduct so severely. And, of course, that’s because as a
society we recognize that parents have a crucial, fundamental,
human obligation to protect and care for their children. They
have to be the ones that are obligated to reach out and help when
their child cries out for help. It’s fundamental to being a parent,
it’s fundamental to being a human to respond that way. And the
harms from not meeting that obligation can be severe, as they
were in this case. It states the obvious to say that this [is] a tragic
case. . . . It is not at all an overstatement to say that based on the
evidence, the testimony, the autopsy photos, probable cause
affidavit, that both of these children suffered tremendously.
Openly and visibly. And there’s no doubt in the Court’s mind
that [Hudson] had to have been aware that that was going on,
had opportunities to intervene and stop it, and did not do that. . .
. The Court has no power to undue [sic] the wrong that
happened here and the pain that was caused by Mr. Ramirez and
Ms. Hudson. The one thing we can do is hold parents
accountable for the actions that they engaged in. This kind of
conduct can’t be dismissed as a lapse of judgment. It was
conscious conduct that went on over a long period of time. And
it’s reasonable to expect that when young child victims have life-
altering harms or life-ending harms that the people who
participated in that will have some life-changing consequences as
a result.
(Tr. Vol. 2 at 68-69, 73-73).
[10] The trial court found that Hudson’s remorse, her guilty plea, and her lack of
criminal history to be mitigating circumstances. As for aggravating
circumstances, the trial court found the following: P.H.’s “tender age” and
vulnerability; the fact that there were “multiple counts with multiple victims[;]”
the nature and circumstances of the offenses, including that the crimes were an
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“ongoing pattern of conduct over a period of time” where Hudson was aware of
her children’s injuries but had failed to intervene and protect them. (Tr. Vol. 2
at 71, 72). The trial court imposed a thirty-one (31) year sentence, which was
only one year above the advisory sentence, for Hudson’s Level 1 felony
conviction and an advisory sentence of nine (9) years for her Level 3 felony
conviction, and the trial court ordered that the two sentences be served
consecutively in the Indiana Department of Correction. Thus, the trial court
imposed an aggregate forty (40) year sentence. Hudson now appeals.
Decision
[11] Hudson contends that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when sentencing
her; and (2) her sentence is inappropriate. We will review each argument in
turn.
1. Abuse of Discretion
[12] Hudson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its determination of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Sentencing decisions rest within the
sound discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind.
2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). So long as the sentence is
within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion.
Id. An abuse of discretion will be found where the decision is clearly against
the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the
reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. A trial
court may abuse its discretion in a number of ways, including: (1) failing to
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enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that
includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record;
(3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported
by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that
are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91.
[13] Hudson first contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
consider her troubled childhood as a mitigating circumstance. However, a trial
court is not obligated to accept a defendant’s claim as to what constitutes a
mitigating circumstance. Rascoe v. State, 736 N.E.2d 246, 249 (Ind. 2000). In
fact, a claim that the trial court failed to find a mitigating circumstance requires
the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and
clearly supported by the record. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. “Our supreme
court has ‘consistently held that evidence of a difficult childhood warrants little,
if any, mitigating weight.’” Patterson v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1058, 1062 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009) (quoting Ritchie v. State, 875 N.E.2d 706, 725 (Ind. 2007), reh’g
denied).
[14] Here, when sentencing Hudson, the trial court acknowledged Hudson’s difficult
childhood and her attempt to explain “the causes of how [she] got to this
point[,]” and it indicated that “it should not be ignored.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 70).
However, the trial court stated that Hudson’s childhood “d[id]n’t eliminate the
responsibility” and refused it as a mitigating factor. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 70). We find
no abuse of discretion by the trial court. See, e.g., Patterson, 909 N.E.2d at 1062
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(concluding that there was no abuse of discretion because the defendant’s
childhood was not a significant mitigating circumstance).
[15] Next, Hudson challenges the trial court’s determination that P.H.’s tender age
of twenty-three months was an aggravating circumstance. Specifically, she
contends that such an aggravator was improper because the age of the victim
was an element of her offense.
[16] Generally, where the age of the victim is a material element of the crime, the
age of the victim may not be used as an aggravating circumstance. Kien v. State,
782 N.E.2d 398, 414 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Stewart v. State, 531 N.E.2d
1146, 1150 (Ind. 1988)), reh’g denied, trans. denied. “However, the trial court
may properly consider the particularized circumstances of the material elements
of the crime” to be an aggravating factor. Id. (citing Stewart, 531 N.E.2d at
1150). For example, a trial court may properly consider as aggravating the age
of the victim when the trial court considers that the victim was of a “tender
age.” Id. (citing Stewart, 531 N.E.2d at 1150 and Buchanan v. State, 767 N.E.2d
967, 971 (Ind. 2002)). Stated differently, we have held that a trial court may
properly consider the victim’s age as an aggravating factor where “the youth of
the victim is extreme.” Reyes v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1124, 1128 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009). Our supreme court has explained that “[t]he younger the victim, the
more culpable the defendant’s conduct.” Hamilton v. State, 955 N.E.2d 723, 727
(Ind. 2011).
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[17] Hudson seems to recognize that her challenge to this aggravating circumstance
rings hollow. Indeed, she acknowledges that “in many neglect of a dependent
cases, this Court has affirmed the trial court’s use of a victim’s tender age as an
aggravating factor.” (Hudson’s Br. 15) (citing Edwards v. State, 842 N.E.2d 849(Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Kile v. State, 729 N.E.2d 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Mallory
v. State, 563 N.E.2d 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied). She suggests that
we should “revisit[]” these “rulings[.]” (Hudson’s Br. 15). We reject her
suggestion.
[18] Here, when discussing the tender age of P.H. as an aggravating circumstance,
the trial court stated:
The extreme tender age of P.[H.] in particular is an aggravating
factor. The elements of this crime could’ve been proven with a
young teenager, but here we had a two (2) year old child, in fact
two (2) children with a fairly tender age, but particularly P.[H.],
was particularly vulnerable. She wasn’t able in any way to reach
out for help outside the home. She was more dependent and
more vulnerable so the crime is worse when committed against a
child like that.
(Tr. Vol. 2 at 72). The trial court also noted that the abuse against P.H. had
occurred over an extended period of time, that Hudson was aware of it, but she
did nothing about the abuse. Because the trial court found that P.H.’s tender
age to be part of the particularized circumstances of this case, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by identifying this aggravating
circumstance.
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[19] Lastly, we reject Hudson’s suggestion that the trial court improperly considered
the nature and circumstances of the offenses to be an aggravating circumstance.
“Generally, the nature and circumstances of a crime is a proper aggravating
circumstance.” Gomillia v. State, 13 N.E.3d 846, 853 (Ind. 2014) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the trial court discussed the
nature and circumstances of Hudson’s offenses, including the extent and
obvious nature of the injuries to the children, the ongoing duration of the abuse,
and Hudson’s lack of action to protect the children. Accordingly, we conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering this aggravating
circumstance. See, e.g., id.
2. Inappropriate Sentence
[20] Hudson argues that the aggregate sentence for her Level 1 felony neglect of a
dependent causing death and Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in
serious bodily injury is inappropriate. We disagree.
[21] We may revise a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). The
defendant has the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate.
Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). The principal role of a
Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some
guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement of the
sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.”
Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). “Appellate Rule 7(B)
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analysis is not to determine whether another sentence is more appropriate but
rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Conley v. State, 972
N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),
reh’g denied.
[22] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we acknowledge that
the advisory sentence “is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an
appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081.
Here, Hudson entered a guilty plea and was convicted of Level 1 felony neglect
of a dependent causing death and Level 3 felony neglect of a dependent
resulting in serious bodily injury. A person who commits a Level 1 felony
“shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between twenty (20) and forty (40)
years, with the advisory sentence being thirty (30) years.” I.C. § 35-50-2-4. A
person who commits a Level 3 felony “shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of
between three (3) and sixteen (16) years, with the advisory sentence being nine
(9) years.” I.C. § 35-50-2-5. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of
thirty-one (31) years—only one year above the advisory sentence—for
Hudson’s Level 1 felony conviction and an advisory sentence of nine (9) years
for her Level 3 felony conviction. Thus, the trial court imposed an aggregate
forty (40) year sentence, which was below the potential maximum sentence of
fifty-six (56) years.
[23] Turning first to the nature of Hudson’s two felony neglect of a dependent
offenses, we echo the trial court’s observation that twenty-three-month-old P.H.
and three-year-old R.H. had “suffered tremendously[,]” both “[o]penly and
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visibly[,]” for an extended period of time in their short lives. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 69).
More specifically, P.H.’s autopsy report revealed that the toddler had “two deep
liver lacerations accompanied by a measured 410 ml of blood in the abdomen
as well as fracture of the right occipital skull, subdural staining overlying the left
parietal lobe of the brain and very numerous contusions involving the head,
trunk and upper and lower extremities.” (State’s Ex. Vol. at 6). The report also
revealed that P.H. had a “[f]aint circumferential contusion encircling [her] anus
and involving the perineum[.]” (State’s Ex. Vol. at 6). R.H.’s injuries included
“multiple contusions, a fracture to the distal right ulnar diaphysis, a buckle
fracture to the ninth rib, an old fracture of the right distal radial diaphysis, a
healed fracture at the base of the metatarsal.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 12-13). R.H. also
had elevated liver enzymes, indicating that his liver had been bruised and was
healing. Additionally, R.H. had petechiae in his left eye that was the result of
“a lot of force” to his head, a distended stomach, a bald spot on the top of his
head that was caused by either his hair being pulled out or malnourishment,
light bruising on and above his penis, and cigarette burns on his ankles. (Tr.
Vol. 2 at 13). Despite the obvious nature of these injuries and Hudson’s
awareness of them, Hudson did nothing to protect her children. Instead, she
tried to cover up the injuries—both physically with cream and tea bags and
factually when she made excuses about the origin of the injuries when
confronted by other people.
[24] Turning to Hudson’s character, we recognize that she has no prior criminal
history. Indeed, the trial court considered that as a mitigating circumstance
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when imposing the advisory and near-advisory sentences in this case. We note,
however, that Hudson’s admitted choice to put “having a man in front of” the
care of her young and vulnerable children reflects poorly on her character. (Tr.
Vol. 2 at 57). Hudson admitted that she knew that her children were being
abused, that she did not do anything to stop it, and that she tried to cover it up.
She also admitted that she had lied to police, both when they were conducting
the initial investigation and then again just a month or two before the
sentencing hearing.
[25] Hudson has not persuaded us that her aggregate forty-year sentence for her
Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent causing death and Level 3 felony neglect
of a dependent resulting in serious bodily injury is inappropriate. Therefore, we
affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.
[26] Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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