Kenneth Wayne Wentworth, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jul 11 2019, 9:02 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jane Ann Noblitt Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Columbus, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Lauren A. Jacobsen
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kenneth Wayne Wentworth, Jr., July 11, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-270
v. Appeal from the Bartholomew
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable James D. Worton,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
03D01-1801-F2-94
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-270 | July 11, 2019 Page 1 of 8
[1] Kenneth Wentworth, Jr. pled guilty to Level 3 felony attempted robbery
resulting in bodily injury and Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily
injury and was sentenced to an aggregate term of twelve years. On appeal,
Wentworth challenges the sentence imposed.
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] On January 1, 2018, twenty-eight-year-old Wentworth went to the emergency
room at Columbus Regional Hospital (the Hospital) because he believed he was
having a heart attack and he was hearing voices. Wentworth had used
methamphetamine two days earlier. The voices in Wentworth’s head were
telling him “they were going [to] bulldoze [his] house down and kill [his]
family.” Transcript Vol. II at 26. Hospital staff wanted Wentworth to go to the
stress center, but Wentworth “wigged out” and walked out of the Hospital to
find a way home. Id. at 27.
[4] Lorrie Crouch and her grandson, Clayton Harris, were outside the Hospital
moving Crouch’s eighty-nine-year-old mother from Crouch’s van to a
wheelchair. Wentworth ran up and jumped in the front seat of Crouch’s van
and told her he was going to take it. All of the doors of the van remained open
and Crouch jumped in the van through the front passenger door to try to stop
Wentworth from stealing her vehicle. Wentworth slapped Crouch in the face
and then drove in reverse, hitting Crouch’s mother with the passenger door.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-270 | July 11, 2019 Page 2 of 8
Wentworth then shifted the car into drive and hit three parked cars. Crouch
was thrown from the van.
[5] After hitting the parked cars, Wentworth jumped out of the van and took off
running. Harris gave chase and caught up with Wentworth after he crossed the
street. Wentworth kicked Harris in the stomach, but Harris still managed to
tackle him. Wentworth continued to fight as Harris held him to the ground
until an officer arrived and took Wentworth into custody. When questioned by
police, Wentworth initially stated that after walking out of the Hospital, he had
“blacked out” and could not remember anything about the incident. Appellant’s
Appendix Vol. 2 at 22. However, upon further questioning, Wentworth was
capable of recalling the details of what had transpired.
[6] As a result of being thrown from the van, Crouch suffered a serious head injury,
along with other injuries. Hospital staff tended to Crouch’s injuries, but they
were so severe that she had to be airlifted to IU Methodist Hospital in
Indianapolis. Crouch survived but incurred over $200,000 in medical bills.
[7] On January 8, 2018, the State charged Wentworth with Count I, attempted
robbery resulting in serious bodily injury as a Level 2 felony; Count II,
attempted auto theft as a Level 6 felony; Count III, failure to remain at the
scene of an accident with serious bodily injury as a Level 6 felony; Count IV,
failure to remain at the scene of an accident with bodily injury as a Class A
misdemeanor; and Count V, battery resulting in bodily injury as a Class A
misdemeanor. After Wentworth filed a notice of insanity defense, the trial
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-270 | July 11, 2019 Page 3 of 8
court appointed two doctors to examine him for the purpose of determining his
competence to stand trial. One doctor submitted his report to the court, stating
that he believed Wentworth appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct. He
also stated that any mental deficiencies Wentworth may have had at the time of
the offense were a “manifestation of methamphetamine intoxication.” Id. at
70. The second doctor disagreed and found that Wentworth did not appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offense. Both doctors,
however, found Wentworth competent to stand trial.
[8] Thereafter, on November 28, 2018, Wentworth pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to a lesser included offense under Count I (attempted robbery
resulting in serious bodily injury as a Level 3 felony) and Count V, and the
State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. The trial court held a sentencing
hearing on January 8, 2019. After considering the evidence presented and
arguments of counsel, the trial court sentenced Wentworth to twelve years for
the Level 3 felony conviction and one year for his Class A misdemeanor
conviction. The court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently for an
aggregate sentence of twelve years. Wentworth now appeals. Additional facts
will be provided as necessary.
Discussion & Decision
[9] Wentworth couches his sentencing challenge as “[w]hether [his] sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender.” Appellant’s Brief at 4. Aside from providing the standard of review
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-270 | July 11, 2019 Page 4 of 8
for such a challenge, he provides no authority or analysis on how the nature of
the offense and his character render his sentence inappropriate. Wentworth has
therefore waived review of his sentence pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B).
See Sanders v. State, 71 N.E.3d 839, 843-44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (finding
appellate review waived where defendant failed to present any authority or
analysis on the issue of nature of the offense), trans. denied.
[10] The substance of Wentworth’s argument on appeal is that the trial court abused
its discretion in sentencing him. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound
discretion of the trial court. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007),
clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218. “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision
is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn
therefrom.’” Id. (quoting K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006)). A
trial court may abuse its sentencing discretion in a number of ways, including:
(1) failing to enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing
statement that includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported
by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are
clearly supported by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that
includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91.
[11] Initially, Wentworth asserts that the trial court did not afford sufficient
mitigating weight to his mental health. However, because trial courts are no
longer obligated to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors when imposing a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-270 | July 11, 2019 Page 5 of 8
sentence, a trial court cannot be said to have abused its discretion in failing to
properly weigh such factors. Id. at 491.
[12] In any event, we note that with regard to Wentworth’s mental health, the trial
court stated:
I do find as a mitigator, the defendant’s mental health, but I want
to make a couple of notes there. And number one, and this is
why I am finding this as a slight mitigator, instead of a significant
mitigator. It’s . . . because the defendant . . . chose to use illegal
substances, in choosing methamphetamine and heroin . . . which
can exacerbate those mental health symptoms and was not
complying with the treatment recommendations of, what they
had already given him, at the time. But I will, nonetheless he did
try and obtain some help, for mental health, I will find that as a
slight mitigator.
Transcript Vol. II at 40. We will not second guess the trial court in its assessment
of Wentworth’s mental health.
[13] Wentworth also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
recognize that he accepted responsibility for his actions by pleading guilty. 1
Even though he did not raise his guilty plea as a mitigating factor before the
sentencing court, this does not prevent him from raising the issue for the first
time on appeal. Anglemyer v. State, 875 N.E.2d 218, 220 (Ind. 2007), opinion on
1
In a similar vein, Wentworth argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to find his expression
of remorse to be a significant mitigating factor. Wentworth, however, did not advance his remorse as a
mitigating factor to the trial court, and a defendant who fails to propose mitigating circumstances at the trial
level is precluded from advancing them on appeal. See Pennington v. State, 821 N.E.2d 899, 905 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-270 | July 11, 2019 Page 6 of 8
reh’g. A guilty plea is deserving of some mitigating weight; however, the
significance of a guilty plea varies from case to case. Id. A guilty plea is not
significantly mitigating where, for example, it fails to evince acceptance of
responsibility or where the defendant receives a substantial benefit, including
dismissal of other charges, in return for the plea. Id. at 221. A plea fails to
demonstrate acceptance of responsibility where the decision to plead was “more
likely the result of pragmatism than acceptance of responsibility and remorse.”
Id.
[14] Here, Wentworth’s plea was nothing more than a pragmatic decision based on
the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. His plea was for a Level 3 felony as a
lesser included offense of the Level 2 felony initially charged and the State
agreed to dismiss three charges, two of which were felonies. Wentworth has
not established that the trial court abused its discretion in not identifying his
guilty plea as a significant mitigating factor.
[15] Finally, Wentworth notes in his brief, without any argument, that this was his
first felony conviction and that, although he was ultimately convicted of two
Class B misdemeanors in other causes, those convictions were entered after the
date of the current offense. In this regard, the trial court stated:
The defendant does have a history of criminal delinquent
behavior, even though the, the convictions might not have been
logged in at the time, he did have pending charges and I don’t
find that as a significant aggravator, but I do find that as
somewhat of an aggravator, that he does have a history of
criminal delinquent behavior.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-270 | July 11, 2019 Page 7 of 8
Transcript Vol. II at 40. We will not second guess the trial court’s assessment of
Wentworth’s criminal history.
Judgment affirmed.
Kirsch, J. and Vaidik, C.J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-270 | July 11, 2019 Page 8 of 8