Ronnie Fields v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Dec 09 2019, 10:20 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Nathan D. Meeks Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Public Defender Attorney General
Marion, Indiana
Evan Matthew Comer
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Ronnie Fields, December 9, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-1260
v. Appeal from the Grant Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jeffrey D. Todd,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
27D01-1811-F5-164
Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1260 | December 9, 2019 Page 1 of 9
Case Summary
[1] Ronnie Fields appeals his convictions for level 5 felony operating a vehicle after
forfeiture of license for life and class C misdemeanor refusal to identify self. He
asserts that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and
abused its discretion when it denied his motion for continuance on the morning
of trial so that he could obtain standby counsel. Finding no constitutional
violation or abuse of discretion, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On November 29, 2018, the State charged Fields with level 5 operating a
vehicle after forfeiture of license for life and class C misdemeanor refusal to
identify self. During the initial hearing held on December 8, 2018, the trial
court read the charges and advised Fields of his right to counsel. Fields
informed the trial court that he did not want a lawyer but instead wished to
represent himself. The trial court inquired into Fields’s reasoning for wanting
to proceed pro se, and also questioned him about his education, his ability to
read and write, and his prior legal experience. Fields told the trial court that he
had represented himself twice before in jury trials and obtained not-guilty
verdicts on both occasions. Thereafter, the following colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: Okay. Alright. You do understand that you have
the right to an attorney?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And if you want an attorney and can’t afford
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one, the Court will appoint one for you at no expense to you.
THE DEFENDANT: Again, sir, um I don’t want an attorney.
THE COURT: Okay. These are the questions I’m required to
ask you when you indicate that you want to represent yourself.
Okay?
THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
THE COURT: You understand that an attorney can advise you
about the nature of the crimes you’re charged with and any lesser
included offenses? Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you understand that an attorney can assist
you with possible defenses and mitigating circumstances?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You understand an attorney, not having an
attorney represent you is almost always unwise?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You understand that you’ll be required to follow
the same rules as an attorney, and the Court will offer no special
help to you because it cannot.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You understand that the State is going to be
represented by experienced lawyers to make the case against you?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
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THE COURT: You understand that an attorney can help you
investigate and question witnesses before trial?
THE DENFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Get any favorable evidence to present in your
defense?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Prepare and file useful pretrial motions?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Resist unfavorable pretrial motions by the State?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Explore and negotiate possible favorable plea
agreements or sentencing agreements?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
….
THE COURT: I do find that you are in a position where you’re
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waiving your right to an
attorney. So you’ll represent yourself in this case.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
Tr. Vol. 2 at 6-7.
[3] A few days after the initial hearing, Fields filed a pro se motion to dismiss and
motion for certification of interlocutory appeal. Both motions were ultimately
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denied by the trial court, but at the conclusion of the January 7, 2019, hearing
held on the motion to dismiss, the trial court inquired whether Fields wanted to
continue representing himself. Fields responded, “Yes, sir.” Id. at 15. Fields
then appeared pro se at a final pretrial hearing held on March 7, 2019. During
that hearing, in response to the trial court’s inquiry, Field reconfirmed his desire
to represent himself at the upcoming trial which was scheduled for April 8,
2019. After the pretrial hearing, Fields filed a repetitive pro se motion to
dismiss which the trial court denied.
[4] The case proceeded to jury trial as scheduled on April 8, 2019. Prior to the start
of the trial, the trial judge explained the jury selection process to both the
prosecutor and Fields, and Fields responded, “Yes, sir” when asked if he
understood the process. Id. at 23. However, just before the start of voir dire,
Fields told the trial court that he wanted “stand-by counseling” because he had
not had time to “go over all this paperwork,” apparently referring to the jury
questionnaires. Id. at 24. The trial court responded to Fields by telling him that
“the time has pas[sed] for that” and “if you’re requesting a continuance, that
request is denied.” Id. Fields then said, “Yeah, I would like to have an
attorney.” Id. The court explained, “You’ve had plenty of time to hire an
attorney. I’ve asked you several times in court if you intended to represent
yourself. I did at the initial hearing … I did that at the pretrial conference, and
you said, ‘yes, I intend to represent myself.’” Id. Fields did not disagree with
the trial court but went on to complain about not having enough time since the
last hearing to prepare. The trial court reminded Fields that he had had “plenty
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of time” to file a motion for continuance during the month since the pretrial
hearing, noted that Fields had filed a pro se repetitive motion to dismiss
instead, and further noted that Fields had been in possession of the jury
questionnaires for at least a week and could have asked for a continuance at any
time. Id. Fields then inquired into why he could not just go and “get [standby
counsel] today[.]” Id. at 27. The court denied his request, informing Fields
“You’re entitled to an attorney if you timely request one, and you didn’t. No
one is entitled to stand-by counsel. That’s not a right.” Id. Fields disagreed and
reiterated, “I just asked for stand-by counsel.” Id. The court denied his request,
the jury was subsequently selected, and a trial was conducted. At the
conclusion of trial, the jury found Fields guilty as charged. Following a
sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of three years
for the level 5 felony and sixty days for the class C misdemeanor. This appeal
ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[5] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal
defendant the right to counsel. Jones v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1132, 1138 (Ind. 2003).
Implicit in the right to counsel is the right to self-representation. Drake v. State,
895 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Before a defendant waives his right
to counsel and proceeds pro se, the trial court must determine that the
defendant’s waiver of counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Jones, 783
N.E.2d at 1138. “When a defendant asserts the right to self-representation, the
court should tell the defendant of the ‘dangers and disadvantages of self-
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representation.’” Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1126 (Ind. 2001) (quoting
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975)). “Although a trial court need not
follow specific ‘talking points’ when advising a defendant of the dangers and
disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, a trial court must come to a
‘considered determination’ that the defendant is making a knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.” Wilson v. State, 94 N.E.3d 312,
320-21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citation omitted).
[6] Fields does not dispute that he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived
his right to counsel and instead asserted, on multiple occasions, his right to self-
representation. Indeed, it is clear from the record that the trial court made
certain that Fields was well aware of his right to counsel and the many
disadvantages of self-representation. It is also clear from the record that, on the
morning of trial, Fields was not abandoning his right to self-representation but
was requesting a continuance for the purpose of obtaining standby counsel to
assist him. 1 Accordingly, the sole issue we are presented with on appeal is
1
Although on appeal Fields attempts to characterize his request to the trial court as an assertion of his right
to counsel, it is clear from our review of the record that Fields was not attempting to cede control of his
defense but was requesting only standby counsel. Standby counsel is not the same as, and does not confer
the advantages of, full counsel because, even with standby counsel, a pro se defendant retains control over his
case. See Hill v. State, 773 N.E.2d 336, 343 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that a pro se defendant’s right to
control his case is eroded when standby counsel interferes with his right to present his case in his own way).
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whether the trial court abused its discretion in declining to grant a continuance
in order to appoint standby counsel. 2
[7] It is well established that appointment of standby counsel is an appropriate
prophylactic device when a defendant assumes the burden of conducting his
own defense. Wilson v. State, 94 N.E.3d 312, 324 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing
Jackson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 29, 33 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)). However, a defendant
who proceeds pro se has no right to demand the appointment of standby
counsel for his assistance. Kindred v. State, 521 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ind. 1988).
Rather, the decision of whether to appoint standby counsel is a discretionary
one made by the trial court. Id. Moreover, we review the denial of a motion
for continuance only for an abuse of discretion. Perry v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1236,
1231 (Ind. 1994).
[8] Here, Fields waited until the morning of trial, just before voir dire questioning,
to request the appointment of standby counsel to assist him. The trial court
found his request to be untimely in that Fields had numerous opportunities to
request a continuance or to seek the appointment of standby counsel prior to
the start of trial but failed to do so. The trial court also noted that prospective
jurors had already gathered, such that granting a continuance for the purpose of
2
In Koehler v. State, 499 N.E.2d 196 (Ind. 1986), our supreme court held that where a defendant, with
standby counsel already at his side, seeks to abandon a pro se defense and reassert the right to counsel,
“[r]elevant factors must be considered by the trial court in order for it to exercise a meaningful discretion in
ruling on defendant’s request to change from self-representation to counsel-representation.” Id. at 199.
Because the record demonstrates that Fields was not attempting to abandon his pro se defense and change
from self-representation to counsel-representation, the Koehler factors are inapplicable here.
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obtaining standby counsel would have interrupted the proceedings and caused
excessive delay. As stated above, a pro se defendant has no right, constitutional
or otherwise, to demand standby counsel. Under the circumstances presented,
we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Fields’s
request for a continuance for the purpose of obtaining and appointing standby
counsel. We affirm his convictions.
[9] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
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